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The United Nations is hardly a popular pursuit in today’s academic and policy literatures, and so it is unsurprising that an examination of that multilateral structure before 1945 shows an even more egregious absence of analytical attention. Such ignorance conveniently ignores the forgotten genius of 1942–45, namely in the wide substantive and geographic relevance of multilateralism during World War II and in the foundations for the contemporary world order. This collection of papers critically reviews the worlds of 1945 and 2015, of then and now, to determine the role of continuity and change, of the ongoing bases for compromise, and for the clashes between the Global South and Global North.

This article analyses Mexico’s presidency of the G20 in 2012 as seen through the lens of new multilateralism, with a particular focus on civil society’s growing demand for participation in the shaping of the global agenda. On one hand, we examine the mechanisms for inclusion and participation provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for that specific purpose. On the other, we reflect on the real results of these mechanisms in practice during the Los Cabos Summit. Drawing on our empirical observations, we argue that G20 summits are still very much ‘protocol as usual’, with echoes of traditional multilateralism, thus leaving very little room for civil society to have a noticeable effect on the summit’s conclusions. On a more positive note, the very existence of such mechanisms suggests that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has at least given symbolic recognition to the importance of having spaces and dialogues available to civil society as part of the presidency’s agenda.

The distinctive contributions of the several Commonwealths— inter- and non-state—to global development and governance have been overlooked for too long. The four treated here continue to advance multilateralism and public diplomacy, having earlier contributed to the decolonisation of countries and communities. The anglophone Commonwealth was especially active in support of the liberation movements in Southern Africa, leading to South Africa's transition to a non-racial democracy and return to the Commonwealth in the early 1990s. Commonwealths' norms and values remain relevant in the second decade of the 21st century, symbolised by Rwanda's late 2009 admission to the anglophone family.

In the aftermath of 9/11 surely of great significance is the reassertion of the South – North divide as a defining axis of the international system. In this context the emergence of a coterie of Southern countries actively challenging the position and assumptions of the leading states of the North is an especially significant event. The activism on the part of three middle-income developing countries in particular—South Africa, Brazil and India—has resulted in the creation of a ‘trilateralist’ diplomatic partnership, itself a reflection of broader transformations across the developing world in the wake of globalisation. This article will examine the rise of the co-operative strategy known as ‘trilateralism’ by regional leaders within the South. Specifically it will look at the relationship between emerging regional powers in the context of multilateralism, as well as at the formulation and implementation of trilateralism. As with previous co-operative efforts in the developing world, the prospect...

The criticisms of globalisation and international institutions often confuse the current state of multilateralism and its asymmetrical organisation; the economic theories it uses (the ‘Washington consensus’); and the reforms it promotes, such as liberalisation. Economic stagnation, however, has many causes other than the multilateral organisations’ reforms, which may have little impact on growth. These reforms may be efficient, irrelevant or powerless vis-a-vis the other determinants of growth. The paper discusses the several determinants of growth other than policy reforms, such as countries' structural and institutional characteristics, and analyses the consequences of reforms, in particular trade liberalisation. These consequences constitute a challenge to the credibility of reforms, but may also lead to deeper thinking about the determinants of economic growth and further developmental reforms.

The official and unofficial Commonwealths have rarely been treated as inter- or non-state organisations, partnerships or epistemic communities contributing to global development and governance. This article seeks to rectify this oversight, especially in an emerging world 'order' characterised by unilateralism rather than multilateralism. After more than a half-century, both types of (interrelated) Commonwealth communities have emerged as invaluable, albeit second-order, adjuncts to global institutions, civil societies and private corporations. Their undramatic yet helpful characteristics as established, empathetic networks may be more needed to advance global development and governance in the new century than in recent decades, with implications for both analysis and practice, approaches and policies.

The Lome Convention is a trade and development co-operation agreement between the 15 member states of the European Union (EU) and 71 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. On 30 September 1998 the EU and ACP started negotiating a successor agreement to the fourth Lome Convention. This paper introduces a 'regulation approach' to a political economy examination of the EU's new trade priorities for the developing world. The paper aims to evaluate the extent to which the Union's post-Lome strategy, with its commitment to multilateralism, differentiation and regionalism, reflects a fundamental change in the nature of contemporary international economy and society. The EU argues that multilateralism, driven by globalisation and policed by multilateral agencies like the World Trade Organization (WTO), has served to undermine Lome. This paper argues that multilateral principles, and in particular WTO compliance, are at the very centre of the present post-Lome negotiations because the EU, indirectly supporte...

A democratic euphoria gripped the Americas during the decade of the 1980s. During this period, many Latin American countries underwent a 'transition to democracy', generating high expectations, especially in Washington, that the goals of political stability, electoral democracy and economic development through neoliberal economic policies can be simultaneously achieved. Key US foreign policy objectives in Latin America and the Caribbean, as elsewhere under the 'new' world order, have been made abundantly clear: the twin goals of free markets and electoral democracy are to be achieved by unburdening the economy of governmental intrusion. Under IMF direction, states are to allow the free market to determine currency values, curtail many government-sponsored programmes, and enforce the payment of lower wages. Additionally, with support from the USA and supervision by regional/international organisations, where present, the military is to retreat from politics by transferring government to civilian control via competitive elections.' This renewed emphasis on multilateralism suggests that there is a critical role for the OAS in supervising and facilitating the transition to democracy in the Americas. The outbreak of several coup attempts by February 1992, however, has dampened this euphoria. Haiti, the poorest country in the region, underwent a coup in September 1991, a mere 8 months after inaugurating its first truly democratically elected government. The governments of Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela, two of the region's richest and longest-standing democracies, also experienced undemocratic challenges to their rule. Venezuela, in particular, experienced two attempted coups in 1992. Additionally Peru's democratically elected President Fujimori instituted an auto-golpe (palace coup) in April 1992, thereby suspending the democratic process in that country. Thus, within two years of being assigned its new role, the OAS was being called to action, thereby raising an all-important question: can and will the OAS rise to this new challenge and use its multilateral mandate to nurture the democratic process in the region? Focusing on the current crisis in Haiti, this paper argues that despite the best of intentions, the OAS will remain largely ineffective in neutralising challenges to the democratic process in Latin America and the Caribbean. This ineffectiveness is due largely to two factors: (i) misperceptions about the purpose of the organisation; and (ii) power asymmetries and a concomitant fear and suspicion of the OAS among members of US motives.