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Una crítica del concepto vulgar de tiempo busca explicitar los caracteres básicos de dicho concepto y fundamentalmente las aporías en el planteo. En relación a lo primero, en este artículo se pone énfasis en el carácter “originario” del concepto vulgar, es decir, su conexión con el “tiempo del mundo” y en el nexo de fundamentación que conecta ambos – tiempo vulgar y tiempo del mundo – con la temporalidad originaria del Dasein. En relación a lo segundo (las aporías), el artículo cuestiona los límites de una atribución del concepto vulgar de tiempo a Aristóteles; se discute asimismo la homologación de espacio y tiempo, por un lado, y la relación entre tiempo y presencia por otro, dos presupuestos de la representación tradicional (física y filosófica) del tiempo como medida/parámetro de los cambios en general.

To show how metaphysics may come to know objects without matter, space or time, the author contrasts the Aristotelian notion of space, as the real distance between two material objects, against Kantian space, conceived as geometrical and uniform. In a way similar to Avicebron who proposes a uniform ontological 'subject' or 'matter' to every possible object, even in God, Kant extends the conditions of mathematical knowledge (spatial and temporal) to every possible kind of knowledge. Aquinas —following Aristotle— distinguishes mathematical and physical knowledge; so that the notion of space also differ in both sciences. This allows for a proper understanding of immaterial objects, which do not depend on these homogeneous matter, space and time.

This essay focuses on the brief but significant passage of Physics IV 13, 222a28-b7, where Aristotle provides two arguments in favor of the extensive infinitude of time. The first one, Vigo argues, presents its extensive infinitude as depending on infinitude of movement. By contrast, the second argument proceeds immanently out of the consideration of the properties the ‘now’ possesses as being a limit that accounts for both the possibility of limitation (divisibility) and the continuity of time. The paper also explores some systematic consequences of this last argument and attempts to figure out some puzzles it involves from the methodological point of view. Such difficulties underline some structural limits of Aristotle’s attempt to perform a re(con)ductive treatment of the properties of time regarded as a way of continuum dependent of other two more basic domains: movement and spatially extensive magnitude.

This paper stresses the incidence of a temporal component in the Aristotelian doctrine of substance and categories, insofar as the distinction substance-accidents refers not only to the logical opposition between subject and predicate, but also refers to the real opposition between the subject of change and their determinations. The argument is based on interpretation of important passages from Cat. 5, Phys. I 7 and IV 10-14.

A fundamental problem of philosophy of nature is attended in this paper: is it possible for time to flow even if the changes that in fact go along with it did not exist? The two antique positions that are the most recognized, the one of Aristotle and the one of the stoics, are analized in this essay. On the one hand, Aristotle defines time based on change, so his answer to the question here addressed would be negative; but, on the other hand, the stoics argue that there exist moments in which time truly flows without there being changes, as the orthodox version of the Eternal Return states, and therefore time does not presupposes the notion of change. I here present the following hypothesis: the heterodox stoics accepted the aristotelian idea of time that presupposes change, an idea which they got to know from Eudemus, and that leads them to propose transcyclic changes in order to solve the problems generated by the discussion on individualization, identity and change through time.

This paper intends to examine Aristotle’s conception of the ‘now’, such as it is presented in Physics IV 10-14. The author argues that in the two main issues Aristotle tackles there (that is, whether time exists and what time is) the now is understood as being an inner limit of time, an understanding where the main emphasis is upon the condition of indivisibility of such a limit or, in other words, upon the fact that the now is not part of time. Baño concentrates on the analogy between ‘now’ and moving body, presented by Aristotle in order to account for the difficult thesis that the ‘now’ is always the same and, at once, always different. The issue the author is particularly concerned with is the fact that the moving body does not appear to be the same to movement as the ‘now’ is to time, since the moving body is not an inner limit of movement. Consequently, the analogy cannot be based on the punctual condition of the ‘now’, and rather it seems to be based on the fact that the ‘now’ is a principle of time cognition, such as the moving body is a principle of cognition of movement.

En el presente trabajo se demuestra, siguiendo a Levinas, que la ética, entendida como la relación intersubjetiva entre sujetos absolutamente separados, se instaura a partir de acontecimientos concretos que determinan la existencia histórica del hombre, pero revistiendo éstos la particularidad de ser acontecimientos que escapan al orden ontológico. Antes bien, remiten a un más allá, a un fuera-de la ontología significando ante todo de manera ética, es decir de otro modo que ser.In the present paper it is shown, following Levinas, that Ethics, understood as an intersubjective relation among completely separate subjects, sets itself up starting from concrete events that determine man's historical existence, but these are invested with the peculiarity of being events which escape the ontological order. Rather, they send to somewhere beyond, outside ontology, signifying above all in an ethical fashion, i.e., in a way other than being.

Este artículo analiza las Lecciones de fenomenología de la conciencia interna del tiempo. En primer lugar se propone mostrar la excedencia del tiempo cósmico respecto de la temporalidad de la conciencia. En segundo determinar si la descripción husserliana de la forma del flujo de la conciencia absoluta del tiempo es circular, es decir, si no presupone el tiempo objetivo que pretende constituir. En tercero someter a análisis crítico la automostración del flujo absoluto de la conciencia. Finalmente se menciona la aporética que se cierne sobre toda investigación que quiera reducir uno forma del tiempo a la otra o asirlas independientemente.The article examines Husserl´s work On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Firsttly, it seeks to show the surplus of cosmic time with regard to the temporality of consciousness. Secondly, an attempt is made to establish whether the Husserlian description of the form of the flow of consciousness is circular, i.e., whether it does not presupposes the objective time that it purports to constitute. Thirdly, a critical analysis of the self-manifestation of the absolute flow of consciousness is advanced. Finally, a reference is made to the aporetics that befalls any investigation that tries to reduce one form of time to the other or to apprehend them independently.

Este artículo enfoca la problemática del sentido desde dos puntos de vista. 1) Su "Wirkungsgeschichte": gesta efectual, historia o contra-tiempo que produce, efectúa, deja ser memorado. 2. Su tiempo principal, pro-veedor, localizable tras la necesidad de lo sido, libertad precedente a cuanto se forma, punto en el cual el significante "ser" se rompe. "Principio", evocado por "principal", no alude aquí, ante todo, a una causa en sentido estricto, sino al tiempo vigente de una efectividad actuante, respecto del cual la inherencia del efecto no puede prejuzgarse a priori.This article focuses on the problem of sense from two standpoints: 1) Its "Wirkungsgeschichte", effectual epic, story or setback which produces, makes effectual, allows to be recalled. 2) Its "principial" (opening time), traced behind the necessity of what has been, freedom that precedes all which forms itself, point at which the signifier "being" breaks itself apart. "Principle" evoked as "principial", does not refer here, first of all, to a cause in its strict sense, but to the current time of an executive effectiveness, time in respect of which the inherence of the effect cannot a priori be judged in advance

Se analiza la estética trascendental y las analogías de la experiencia en la Crítica de la razón pura. Contra la afirmación kantiana del tiempo como mera forma de la intuición pura, el análisis procura mostrar: 1) en qué medida el tiempo real, cósmico o tiempo propiamente dicho, aun cuando no pueda ser asido en sí mismo, debe suponerse como determinante de las características generales de la temporalidad propia de las relaciones objetivas entre los fenómenos; y, 2) en qué medida esta temporalidad implica a su vez una fenomenología encubierta de la temporalidad conciencial inmanente.The article analyses the trascendental aesthetics and the analogies of experience in the Critique of Pure Reason. Against the kantian assertion about time as a mere form of pure intuition, the analysis endeavours to show: first, up to which extent real, cosmic time o time proper, even when it cannot be apprehended in itself, must be presupposed as determining the general characteristics of the temporality inhering in the objective relations among phenomena; and second: up to which extent does that temporality imply a covert phenomenology of the immanent conciential temporality.

El trabajo compara las nociones de "historicidad" e "irreversibilidad" en la concepción del tiempo de Prigogine y de San Agustín, estableciendo semejanzas y diferencias. Analiza primero la idea agustiniana de la temporalidad siguiendo el Libro Undécimo de las Confesiones, y las interpretaciones de dicha idea efectuadas por Paul Ricoeur y por Jean Guitton. A continuación, analiza la redefinición del tiempo llevada a cabo por Ilya Prigogine, diferenciándola fundamentalmente de la concepción estática o geométrica de la dinámica newtoniana. Muestra que esta reconceptualización lo diferencia de la física clásica y lo acerca a la idea agustiniana del tiempo, en tanto y en cuanto, en ambos autores, las nociones de "irreversibilidad", "historicidad", "novedad", "acontecimiento" y "creatividad", son cruciales para entender la temporalidad. Finalmente, pone de manifiesto las diferencias entre los dos autores: mientras que San Agustín se refiere fundamentalmente a un tiempo humano o existencial, en el que está presente un claro sentido de la trascendencia, Prigogine alude al tiempo de la dinámica y la termodinámica de los procesos irreversibles alejados del equilibrio, en un sentido ciertamente inmanente y físico.The essay compares the notions of "historicity" and "irreversibility" in the Prigoginean and Agustinian conceptions, establishing likenesses and differences. It analyzes the Agustinian idea of the temporality following the Book Eleventh of the Confessions, and the interpretations of Paul Ricoeur and Jean Guitton. It analyzes, next, the redefinition of the "time" formulated by Ilya Prigogine, differentiating it, fundamentally, from the static or geometric conception of the Newton's dynamic. It shows that this re-conceptualization differentiates it from the classic Physics and brings it nearer to the Agustinian idea of the time, as that, in both authors, the "irreversibility", "historicity", "novelty", "event" and "creativity" notions are crucial to understand the temporality. Finally, it is shown here the differences between both authors: while St. Agustin fundamentally refers to a human or existential time, in which a clearing sense of the transcendency is present, Prigogine refers to the time of the dynamics and the thermodynamics, of the irreversible processes receded from the equilibrium, and certainly in a physical immanent sense.

El presente trabajo se propone dar cuenta del sentido genérico de la noción levinasiana de diacronía y del influjo de la fenomenología del tiempo husserliana en la construcción de esa categoría. Inicialmente nos centramos en el texto de 1949, Le temps et l'Autre, en el que Lévinas presenta la figura de diacronía, centrándonos especialmente en su descripción como tiempo en el que se cumple la relación con la trascendencia. En segundo lugar, abordamos de manera más extensa el recorrido de la lectura levinasiana de las Lecciones de fenomenología de la conciencia del tiempo interno de Husserl, para sugerir ciertos nexos existentes entre la interpretación crítica de la noción de Urimpression y la de presente viviente husserlianas y su comprensión del tiempo diacrónico como un acontecimiento concreto anclado en la existencia sensible del sujeto, anárquica respecto del presente de la representación.This work intends to give reason of the generic sense of Levinas' notion of diachrony and of the influence of Husserl's phenomenology of time in the construction of that category. First, we concentrate ourselves in the 1949 text, Le temps et l'Autre, in which Lévinas introduces the figure of diachrony, and especially in his description of it as a time in which the relation with transcendence is fulfilled. The second thing we deal with more extensively, is the itinerary of the levinasian interpretation of Husserl's On the phenomenology of the consciousness of internal time, in order to suggest certain existing connections between the critical interpretation of the husserlian notions of Urimpression and of living present and the comprehension of diachronic time as a concrete event anchored in the subject's sensitive existence, which is anarchic as regards the present of representation.