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This paper considers how webs of connection bridge people from different social worlds and engender affinity ties that can be mobilised to nurture caring relationships, despite the physical and cognitive borders that exist within and between societies. Territorial contestation between the Myanmar military and the Kachin Independence Army has precipitated internal displacement in Kachin state (Myanmar). The situation of Kachin internally displaced people in camps at the China-Myanmar border directs attention to how geographical and geopolitical constraints deter international humanitarian assistance yet provide opportunities to engage a different set of humanitarian actors. The paper first argues that Kachin internally displaced people are treated as surplus populations by the sovereign states in both Myanmar and China. Surplus populations come into existence when nation-states impose punitive measures that compromise the survivability of populations that are considered threatening to national sovereignty. Second, the paper examines how mobilising affinity ties enables Kachin humanitarian workers to leverage the citizenship resources of empathetic Chinese nationals to negotiate humanitarianism constraints at the China-Myanmar border. Affinity ties refer to connections emanating from a dynamic constellation of cultural attributes to do with history, ethnicity, religion and place among other malleable identity constructs. Interlocking constellations form webs of connections that transverse essentialising categories of social difference and contribute to shared biographies that allow for cultivating emotional attachments to a place and its people. Affinity ties may congeal into durable ties of solidarity and activism, but no less significant are vernacular expressions of affinity that prompt empathy for proximate or distant strangers and a predilection to act on behalf of those experiencing oppression. The paper proposes that conceptualising affinity ties draws out transversal webs of connections that bridge people of differential social positionings. This approach provides a potential ethical stance and productive analytical lens for advancing wider migration and citizenship debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unipolar international order led by the USA has given way to a multipolar order with the emergence of China as a great power competitor. According to many commentators, the deterioration of Sino–US relations in recent years heralds a "new Cold War." The new Cold War differs from its namesake in many respects, and in this paper we focus on its novel territorial logic. Containing the USSR was the overriding objective of American foreign policy for nearly four decades, but in contrast, the USA and China are engaged in geopolitical‐economic competition to integrate territory into value chains anchored by their domestic lead firms through the financing and construction of transnational infrastructure (e.g., transportation networks and regional energy grids). We show this competition poses risks as well as opportunities for small states to articulate and realise spatial objectives. We present cases from Nepal and Laos that demonstrate that by hedging between China and the USA and its partners, their governments are able to pursue spatial objectives. In order to achieve them, however, they must implement significant reforms or state restructuring. The result is the emergence of what we term the 21st‐century infrastructure state, which seeks to mobilise foreign capital for infrastructure projects designed to enhance transnational connectivity. The "rise" of China has precipitated a multipolar international order and, according to some commentators, heightened US–China tension heralds a "new" Cold War. In this context, small states hedge between the USA and its partners and China, as they pursue longstanding state spatial objectives. This necessitates state restructuring, which in some cases leads to the emergence of the 21st‐century infrastructure state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically highlights the role of nationalism in the development of the semiconductor industry in Taiwan. First, it demonstrates how the pre-1980s Taiwanese developmental state mobilised Chinese economic nationalism against Japanese colonialism and Chinese communism and adopted the strategies of graduated sovereignty, selectively subsidising certain areas and sectors, and promoting national (homogeneously imagined) territorialisation to integrate with the international market. Second, the paper exhibits how in the late 1980s, when the outflow of capital to Mainland China became a compelling phenomenon and Taiwan democratised, popular sovereignty became the norm and Taiwanese nationalism emerged. In response, the democratised state started employing Taiwanese economic nationalism and implementing populist territorial policies to consolidate the support of 'us' (the Taiwanese/Taiwan) versus 'them' (the Chinese/China). This made China and everything related a security concern that had to be excluded as 'the other'. This paper responds to the appeals of political geographers to give nationalism a central place in contemporary theories of the nation-state and contributes to the theory of the developmental state by bringing 'the nation' back. While most of the existing developmental state literature focuses on how the roles and effects of 'the state' influence economic development, taking 'the nation' seriously can provide more accurate explanations for how and why the state focuses on development or not. Accordingly, through valuing the nation this paper promotes a theory of the developmental nation-state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on the resilience of distinctive local consumption cultures, this paper challenges some of the more sweeping claims that have been advanced in the name of ‘globalization’. Thinking about a ‘globalizing’ rather than a fully ‘globalized’ world encourages us to examine the deeply contested nature of the concept and to explore the geographically uneven nature of recent economic, political and cultural transformations. This paper approaches globalization as a site of struggle rather than as an established fact, emphasizing the need for empirically grounded studies of the impact of ‘globalization’ on consumer cultures in different geographical contexts. The paper examines the way that producers have ‘customized’ their products for different markets (drawing on evidence from China and South Africa). It then reviews case study evidence from three contrasting consumption cultures: consumption and ‘public culture’ in India, ‘consumer nationalism’ in China, and ‘artful consumption’ in Russia. The paper concludes by identifying some current debates and outlining some directions for future research, including a re-emphasis on consumption and material culture; an exploration of consumption as social practice; the delineation of commodity-specific consumption cultures; and some reflections on the political, ethical and methodological issues that are being raised in contemporary consumption research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]