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In the last two decades, airline alliances were not only successful in extending the size of their networks, but also received approvals by public authorities to intensify their ooperation through to merger-like revenue-sharing joint ventures (JVs). We empirically investigate the impact of the implementation of such joint ventures on both the respective airlines’ competitive strategies as well as productive efficiency. Using U.S. DOT T100 International Segment data and applying airline-market fixed effects models, we find that joint ventures – compared to services with a lower degree of cooperation – lead to a 3-5 percent increase in capacity between the respective partner airlines’ hub airports; however, this is done at the expense of services elsewhere in the network. Productive efficiency, as measured by load factors, is found to be 0.5-5 percent lower for joint venture routes compared to routes operated under antitrust immunity only. We use our empirical results to discuss implications for the balancing of competition and cooperation in transatlantic airline markets.

Although the aviation industry is increasingly becoming important for Africa's economic development and integration, the ability of airlines to access foreign markets remains hindered by restrictive regulatory policies. Attempts have been made to fully liberalize the intra-African air transport market. Except for general assertions about the merits/demerits of liberalization, our empirical understanding of the welfare effects of such polices in Africa remains rudimentary. This study empirically measures the economic effects of air transport liberalization, mainly on two supply side variables: fare and service quality, measured as departure frequency. The results show up to 40 % increase in departure frequency in routes that experienced some type of liberalization compared to those governed by restrictive bilateral air service agreements. While the effect of liberalization is substantial in improving service quality, there is no evidence of its fare reducing effect.

The effect of corruption on airport productive efficiency is analyzed using an unbalanced panel data of major European airports from 2003 to 2009. We first compute the residual (or net) variable factor productivity using the multilateral index number method and then apply robust cluster random effects model in order to evaluate the importance of corruption. We find strong evidence that corruption has negative impacts on airport operating efficiency; and the effects depend on the ownership form of the airport. The results suggest that airports under mixed public–private ownership with private majority achieve lower levels of efficiency when located in more corrupt countries. They even operate less efficiently than fully and/or majority government owned airports in high corruption environment. We control for economic regulation, competition level and other airports’ characteristics. Our empirical results survive several robustness checks including different control variables, three alternative corruption measures: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index, Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and Control of Corruption Index (CCI). The empirical findings have important policy implications for management and ownership structuring of airports operating in countries that suffer from higher levels of corruption.