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This article aims, on the one hand, to comment on the dialectic of "the absolute" in Hegel's Science of Logic, in a way that not only makes very dry matters comprehensible, but also helps to cover the richness and depth of the approaches present in this dense and inexhaustible section. On the other hand, it maintains that the genuine performance of the dialectic of the absolute consists in highlighting the connection between thought and remembrance. At the level of the absolute we recognize that the function of thinking has been properly that of remembering, that is, to see in all the conceptual constellations considered in this work a process of internalization or remembrance of the absolute. The last part of the article dwells on a task that remains to be done: to elaborate the emergent philosophy in accordance with these conceptual developments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we examine the young Schelling's first letter of 1795, Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie oder über das Unbedingte im menschlichen Wissen, to the light of the programmatic intention of developing an "ethics à la Spinoza". This aim not only involves going beyond the methodological intent of a critical philosophy of Kantian inspiration, but also seeks to fully address the human need to reach an unconditioned knowledge, beyond both thematic and methodological assumptions of criticism and pre-critical dogmatism. In order to respond to this call of idealism, the young philosopher sought to harmonize the clamor of freedom with the nature of the absolute, following Spinoza. But this harmony was not found in the unfolding of a simple theoretical exigency, but rather in the full practical realization of what we think and experience as the unconditioned. This harmony is fulfilled through articulating the self, the absolute and freedom. Such a fulfillment determined the direction and possibilities of philosophy in the nineteenth century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can we find propositions that cannot rationally be denied in any possible world without assuming the existence of that same proposition, and so involving ourselves in a contradiction? In other words, can we find transworld propositions needing no further foundation or justification? Basically, three differing positions can be imagined: firstly, a relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are impossible; secondly, a meta-relativist position, according to which ultimately founded propositions are possible but unnecessary; and thirdly, an absolute position, according to which such propositions are necessary. In this short essay I show that under the premise of modal logic S5 with constant domain there are ultimately founded propositions and that their existence is even necessary, and I will give some reasons for the superiority of S5 over other logics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]