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One measure of governance quality is the level of reported conflict and cooperation that is present between and among elected officials and administrators. High levels of conflict or low levels of cooperation can hinder the decision-making process. However, there are few attempts to assess the causes of conflict and cooperation in the existing literature. This study uses an expanded typology of local government form and additional independent variables to determine what factors are likely to lead to conditions conducive to cooperation and lower perceived conflict in the local governance process. Data on government performance and indicators of perceived conflict and cooperation were collected from a national survey of municipal mayors, council members, and chief administrators in cities with populations of 50,000 to 250,000. Our results suggest that form of government and proportion of council members elected by district are two factors that significantly influence governance at the local level. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A great deal of variability exists in American local government structures. It would be useful to analyze the differences in outcomes associated with different structures, but two factors stand in the way. First, there is no agreement about how to classify city governments. Second, many of the components used in existing classifications are inaccurately reported or missing in survey data. In this research note, a new classification system based on three easily determined components is developed and used to measure the current distribution of forms and variations in an expanded data set that includes almost all cities over 10,000 in population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new institutionalism concentrates on the nature and effects of rules, and intergovernmental relations on the levels of government. This article integrates these foci to present a model of nested institutions and levels of government, focusing on constitutional and substantive rules of governance in states and municipalities. The authors contend that cities' constitutional rules (specifically their governance arrangements) shape local actors' incentives and influence their implementation of state mandates. They argue further that the mere presence--not the actual evocation--of these rules casts a shadow that defines the actors' decision space and that broad distinctions among laws have profound implications for the actors' choices. They support this explanation by empirically testing propositions derived from the framework regarding property tax dependence in large cities between 1975 and 1995. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]