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When coalition leaders have powers to call a vote of confidence, they can invoke the threat of government resignation or early elections, and raise other actors' costs of voting down the government. In this paper, this insight is applied to coalition replacements. The procedure, argued here, allows leaders to reduce their risk of losing office between elections by (i) managing the coalition's cohesion and (ii) denying parliament the option of replacing the government without intervening elections. Premiers, moreover, can be expected to use these powers for partisan benefit, protecting primarily their own rather than their coalition partners' incumbency status. To test this expectation, a novel measure of vote of confidence powers is applied to the analysis of coalition replacement risks in 20 European democracies. The results show that premiers with extensive confidence powers significantly reduce their risk of replacement between elections while their coalition partners do not benefit equally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the effect of national partisanship and Euroscepticism on individuals’ causal responsibility attribution in European multilevel democracies. It is particularly focused on the average differences in responsibility attribution in federal and non-federal states, as well as in countries belonging to different European Union enlargement waves. Using a pooled dataset of the 2004, 2009, and 2014 European Election Studies, results show that when poor economic outcomes are at stake, partisans of the national incumbent in federal states are more likely to assign responsibility to regional governments following a blame-attribution logic, while this logic is absent in non-federal states. Likewise, Eurosceptic individuals are more likely to assign responsibility to European authorities when they hold negative views of the economy and they belong to countries that have been European Union members for a longer period. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Parties may rely on different issue agendas when tailoring their electoral campaigns in an attempt to win elections. This paper compares two key party issue strategies to examine which one the victorious Austrian Peoples' Party (ÖVP) relied on the most during the 2017 Austrian election campaign vis-à-vis its main competitors. These two key party strategies are the 'riding-the-wave' model, which posits that parties focus on issues that currently concern voters the most and the recent 'issue-yield model', which instead suggests that parties adopt strategic behaviour targeting all those issues with genuine opportunities for electoral expansion. It is found that, compared to the other main parties in the 2017 Austrian election campaign, the ÖVP was the one most clearly relying on the issue-yield approach. These results have important implications for our understanding of electoral campaigns, party's exploitation of issue strategies, and voter representation beyond the Austrian case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2017 French presidential elections featured an eventful campaign, produced astonishing results, and presented important signs of party system change. This paper analyses the main lines of divide of the demand and the supply side of electoral competition. It analyses the structure of citizens' preferences, as well as the candidates' strategic issue opportunities, relying on issue yield theory. To that end, it combines data from an original individual-level survey with information about the candidates' Twitter messages. It is found that the traditional model of two-dimensional political space, characterised by an economic (left–right) and socio-cultural (integration–demarcation) dimension is largely challenged. On the supply-side, the analysis offers additional evidence for the central role played by the integration–demarcation divide, while showing that the traditional left–right conflict has not fully disappeared. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2023 Spanish general election was a snap election called unexpectedly by the PM Pedro Sánchez the day after the local and regional elections in May 2023. Turnout was higher than expected (66.6%) and the result confirmed the high degree of multi-dimensional polarisation in Spanish society. Right-wing parties improved their position: the mainstream conservative PP increased its support mainly at the expense of Ciudadanos and the far-right VOX. Yet, parties on the left, especially the incumbent PSOE, performed better than predicted by polls and, together with the seats won by regional parties, were able to keep a dominant position in Congress. A left-wing minority coalition cabinet was ultimately formed with two parties in government (PSOE and Sumar) and the parliamentary support of several regional parties. Parliamentary support was reached after an agreement that includes decentralisation measures and an amnesty to repair the judiciary consequences of the 2017 independence referendum in Catalonia, which showcases the multilevel and multidimensional complexity of Spanish politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The willingness of voters on the losing side to accept electoral outcomes – losers' consent – is essential to democratic legitimacy. This article examines the role of emotions in shaping people's perceptions of electoral fairness, arguing that voters on the losing side who feel angry are less willing to accept democratic outcomes. This is examined in the context of the 2016 Brexit referendum, as well as the 2019 UK general election, using original survey data and an experiment in which specific emotional responses (anger and happiness) are induced to test the causal effect of emotions. The results show that losers who felt angry about an electoral outcome are less likely to accept the legitimacy of the democratic process and that anger has a causal effect in reducing losers' consent. These findings suggest that politicians may be able to influence voters' faith in democracy by mobilising emotional responses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reflects on the Italian election of 2018 and the first populist government of Western Europe. It mentions consequence of the 2016 constitutional referendum as the electoral laws for the two houses of the Italian Parliament lacked uniformity and mentions voters are allowed to cast their two votes on a single ballot paper. It also mentions competition between Partito Democratico (PD) and People of Freedom party and strengths of political leader Matteo Renzi in elections.

This research note presents a general approach for measuring the electoral safety of individual MPs across electoral systems that is based on predicted re-election probabilities estimated from multilevel logistic regression models. In contrast to existing measures, this method yields estimates on an intuitive and readily comparable probability scale, captures the higher sensitivity of re-election prospects to electoral change in the range of close races, and can accommodate regional differences in context conditions such as volatility. The paper implements the approach for two archetypical electoral systems - first-past-the-post (FPTP) systems and closed-list proportional representation (PR) - and estimates re-election prospects for the FPTP and PR tiers of the German mixed electoral system in all Bundestag elections since 1957. While the empirical data presented here is mainly illustrative, the concluding section highlights various questions that future research can address with the new measure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies valence economic voting in municipal elections in Poland, a country characterised by a high degree of decentralisation of the provision of crucial public goods and services. The analysis yields four conclusions. First, municipalities’ expenditures per capita have a positive effect on incumbent executive officials’ electoral fortunes. Second, electoral budget cycles are relevant, incumbent candidates benefiting from a potential election-year boost in a municipality’s spending. Third, the aforementioned effects of a short-term increase in expenditures are much stronger in the case of the largest national party, thereby pointing to the presence of multi-level influences on citizens’ propensity to vote economically. Finally, incumbents enjoy a substantial electoral advantage even in the municipalities that spend relatively little, an observation suggesting that the advantage is founded largely on factors other than economic voting effects. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Voting Aid Applications (VAA) helping voters make their decision at the ballots have become more popular throughout Western Europe. They typically consist of a number of statements that are used to match voters with parties. Drawing on a large-scale simulation of 500,000 different configurations of 36 statements and on a random sample of Belgian voters, the paper shows that many of these combinations produce diverging information for the participants. The study establishes that the specific selection of statements has a considerable impact on the 'voting advice' that is produced: some configurations favour certain parties, other configurations benefit other parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rarely, if ever, has a Finnish general election attracted such foreign media interest. Reporters came from across the globe, not to witness Finland become NATO's thirty-first member-state on 4 April, two days after the general election, but to see if the party-loving Social Democrat prime minister Sanna Marin could secure a second term at the helm.1 In the event, Marin became only the third prime minister in recent times to increase the party vote, albeit by not quite enough, and she promptly indicated she would stand down as party leader. The election was won by the two main opposition parties, the National Coalition and Finns Party. The National Coalition became the largest parliamentary party for only the second time in its history, whilst the Finns Party gained over one-fifth of the national poll for the first time and became the largest party on the basis of the popular vote in no less than half the 12 mainland constituencies. Despite their deep differences on major policy issues – including immigration, taxation, development aid and climate policy – the National Coalition and Finns Party ultimately formed the core of a centre-right government, although it took almost to midsummer to do so, and it was then characterised by a minor coalition party leader as an 'unhappy marriage' made out of necessity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While the electoral decline of Social democracy has received considerable attention in the literature, much less is known about how the structural changes experienced by advanced capitalist societies in the past decades have affected support for the mainstream right. In order to fill this gap, this article examines the relationship between secularisation, educational expansion and support for Conservative and Christian democratic parties in 18 West European democracies since the 1960s. The analysis reveals that secularisation is negatively associated with support for the mainstream right, but the effect is only significant for Christian democratic parties. Moreover, the findings support the expectation that social conservatism tends to damage the electoral prospects of mainstream right parties in highly educated societies. This suggests that, although engaging in cultural wars might sometimes seem like a winning strategy in the short term, it is unlikely to produce long-term positive electoral returns for the centre-right in post-industrial contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which party controls which cabinet posts is an important determinant of how multi-party governments work. Existing research shows that parties' attention to policy domains in election manifestos is a key predictor of portfolio allocation. However, election manifestos are broad documents and typically published months before an election. This research note argues that policy emphasis in the last few weeks before the election matters for portfolio allocation, because parties can focus their message, react to exogenous events and use campaign communication as a commitment device. A test of this argument makes use of a novel dataset on party representatives' campaign statements. The findings show that the policy focus of campaign statements, especially those stating positions rather than referring to valence, predicts who will control a ministerial portfolio associated with the respective policy domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the importance of socio-economic and religious factors in explaining the long-term electoral decay of the dominant party in Italy’s so-called First Republic – the Catholic DC – and the emergence of the regional autonomous Lega Nord (Northern League) from the DC’s remains. On the basis of a unique data set, this paper examines the effects of modernisation and secularisation of the DC electoral decline with particular reference to the change over time of the religious and rural constituencies, i.e. the two main DC reservoirs of votes; and the attraction of former DC voters to the Lega Nord, particularly in the old DC territorial bastion of support, characterised by high religiosity and concentration of farmers. The research demonstrates the relevance and persistence of structures profondes such as religion and rural property in electoral behaviour over a long span of time ranging from 1953 to 2008. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Studies on coalition formation assume that political parties have two major goals: they aim to maximise office and policy payoffs. This paper shows that decision-making in the government formation game is also determined by the voters’ coalition preferences. Since the coalition formation process is not a one-shot game, parties have to take the coalition preferences of the electorate into account when they evaluate the utility of potential coalitions. If parties fail to comply with the coalition preferences of voters, they are likely to be penalised in future elections. The argument is tested by an analysis of government formation in the 16 German states between 1990 and 2009. The results support the argument: the formation of coalitions – at least in the German states – is not only determined by office- and policy-seeking behaviour of political parties, but also by the preferences of voters regarding their preferred outcome of the coalition game. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

How well do electoral competition, ideological divides and territory-based cleavages explain the strategies of administrative-territorial reform chosen by political parties in Poland? The role of these logics is explored in the creation of regions and regional self-governments (1999), local electoral reform (2002), rules of adopting regional development projects (2006) and the creation of metropolitan regions (2008). The paper provides evidence supporting the significance of vote- and office-seeking strategies, the rise of a national conservative opposition to decentralisation associated with the weakening of the post-communist divide, and parties representing distinct eastern and western constituencies. Since its creation, subnational government has become more dominated by state-wide parties and has stabilised the emerging bloc party system on the central level. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The link between public opinion and policy is of special importance in representative democracies. Policymakers’ responsiveness to public opinion is critical. Public responsiveness to policy itself is as well. Only a small number of studies compare either policy or public responsiveness across political systems, however. Previous research has focused on a handful of countries – mostly the US, UK and Canada – that share similar cultures and electoral systems. It remains, then, for scholars to assess the opinion–policy connection across a broad range of contexts. This paper takes a first step in this direction, drawing on data from two sources: (1) public preferences for spending from the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and (2) measures of government spending from OECD spending datasets. These data permit a panel analysis of 17 countries. The article tests theories about the effects of federalism, executive–legislative imbalance, and the proportionality of electoral systems. The results provide evidence of the robustness of the ‘thermostatic’ model of opinion and policy but also the importance of political institutions as moderators of the connections between them. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Theories of electoral institutions and representation suggest that majoritarian and proportional systems will produce distinct patterns of party–voter congruence, with the centripetal incentives of the former pulling parties to the ideological centre and reducing, by comparison with the latter, congruence with voters to the right and left. Recent scholarship, however, has found little contemporary empirical evidence for this pattern but no satisfactory explanation has been advanced to account for these non-findings. This paper develops a new theoretical account of the impact of electoral institutions on congruence that takes into account the increasingly dealigned character of voters. The central argument is that the impact of institutions is conditional on the balance between partisans and independents in the electorate. It is this conditional nature of the influence that seems to account for the absence of the anticipated relationship of institutions to congruence nowadays. This theory is tested using a unique data set of party positions in 24 European states and its consequences are drawn out for the relative representational effectiveness of electoral systems in contemporary conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Constituency campaigns are important phenomena for students of political parties, voting behaviour as well as political communication. These research communities perceive constituency campaigns as parts of centralised high-tech campaigns aiming in strategic ways at the efficient mobilisation of voters. We propose in this paper an alternative understanding of constituency campaigns using the case of the German parliamentary elections in 2005 to empirically test this understanding. We perceive constituency campaigns as phenomena signalling a relative independence of individual candidates from the national party campaign. We label this phenomenon individualised campaigning. We argue that individualised campaigning is driven among others by electoral incentives. We test this hypothesis with regard to the German mixed-member electoral system and on the basis of a survey of all candidates standing for election in 2005. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do incumbent parties that retrench the welfare state lose votes during the next election? That is the guiding question for our paper. We analyse elections and social policy reforms in 18 established OECD democracies from 1980 to 2003. We show that there is no strong and systematic punishment for governments which cut back welfare state entitlements. The likelihood of losing votes is the same for governments that retrench the welfare state as for those that do not. Rather, electoral punishment is conditional on whether governments have the chance to stretch retrenchment over a longer period of time, and whether social policy cuts are made an issue in the electoral campaign. If other political parties and the mass media do not put the theme on the agenda of the campaign, and if the retrenchment can be carried out in small steps during a longer governmental term, governments may considerably reduce welfare state effort without fear of major electoral consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do women fail to rise in parties, especially youth parties? This analysis shows that female party members' preferences regarding the purpose of a committee, networking and the election rule in party organisations differ from male party members' which is likely a reason why women face challenges to rise in parties. This article investigates for the first time these gender based differences in preferences simultaneously by conducting a survey experiment with youth party members. Respondents (n > 1200) were asked if they would run for a seat in a decision-making committee of their youth party. In order to analyse which youth party members opt for which opportunities, the purpose of these committees, the networking opportunities they provide, and the election rule for these committees vary at random. The results show that female members hesitate to join committees that would grant them power, and that they are less likely to opt for upward networking opportunities than their male party colleagues. This effect is particularly strong in hierarchically organised youth parties of centre-right parties. Findings on preferred election rules mostly hold for women from left-wing parties. In contrast to men, this group prefers party quotas. Analysing differences by gender and political orientation, this article shows a clear gender preference gap exists both within and across youth parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature has found that politicians who lag behind in public approval ratings during campaigns resort to more negativity. However, the actual impact of approval on the use of negativity during the electoral cycle has yet to be addressed. Furthermore, due to the short-lived nature of campaigns, current studies have been unable to establish a directional causal link between approval ratings and negativity. This article addresses these gaps by: (i) building a theory for understanding the impact of public approval on the use of negativity throughout the electoral cycle; and (ii) methodologically testing this impact on a time series basis. Using data on negativity in parliaments, the results confirm that low approval ratings lead to more negativity closer to elections in Belgium (2014–2020) and Croatia (2010–2021). In the UK (2010–2020), however, approval does not appear to be a significant predictor of negativity use. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the use of negativity by political actors outside campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By reaching a vote share of 12.6 percent in the 2017 federal election, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) ended Germany's rare status as a Western European polity lacking a significant Populist Radical Right Party (PRRP). Some of this support comes from a group not usually expected to vote for PRRPs: immigrant-origin voters. Recent survey data shows high levels of support for the AfD especially within the group of Russian-Germans – immigrants from the former Soviet Union and its successor states. What motivates these immigrant-origin voters to support an anti-immigrant party? This article argues that support for the AfD – besides immigration-related preferences – can be best explained by their levels of assimilation or incorporation for different domains regarding the mainstream German society. Especially low levels of economic and social integration, and in particular a strong ethnic identity, relate positively to favouring the German radical right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the continued electoral progress of the radical right, there are reasons to believe that its full electoral potential has yet to be revealed. Previous research suggests that it suffers from a stigmatisation effect and that many voters will find its proposals less compelling compared to if they were presented by a mainstream party even for policy issues they agree upon. This study employs a unique survey design, with two experiments conducted seven years apart, on a panel of Swedish voters. The aim is to evaluate whether proposals are assessed differently dependent on who the sender is and whether the effect diminishes as the cordon sanitaire of the party weakens. The results show that proposals are less liked if the sender is the radical right. This effect persists even after a weakening of the ostracisation of the radical right as well as for different types of political issues. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.2019977. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A landmark finding in recent research on electoral behaviour is that voters anticipate the postelection bargaining process among potential members of the governing coalition, and that these anticipated policy agreements inform their vote choice. In this article, this finding is qualified by arguing, and then showing empirically, that when the expected policy change after the elections is marginal or non-existent, ceteris paribus, 'simple' proximity voting should prevail. The argument is tested by using two different but complementary research strategies applied to an individual-level data set constructed from electoral surveys in 28 countries over a 20-year period, and two recent national surveys in which respondents were directly asked to predict the potential coalition government after the elections. Both strategies provide support for the hypothesis and have important implications for the understanding of the consequences of government alternation on voting behaviour and political representation more broadly. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1994843. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Dutch general election of March 2021 can be referred to as the 'Corona' election, as the world-wide pandemic influenced all aspects of this election. The government made special provisions to make participation safer for voters. Restrictions on crowd size and social distancing restricted the possibilities for traditional means of election campaigning. Thus the campaign was carried out primarily in the mass and social media. The Corona virus and health care were prominent issues during the campaign. However, Corona had little influence on turnout as the percentage was only slightly lower than for the previous election. Corona seems to have produced 'rally around the leader' or 'don't change horses' effects among Dutch voters. The Liberal Party (VVD) gained one seat, D66 five, and the CU held onto its seats. Although the CDA lost four seats, this was the first election since 1981 that a coalition had not lost seats at a subsequent election. The total number of parties represented rose to a record 17 (for 150 seats in the Second Chamber or Dutch lower house). Corona also impacted the coalition formation process when an infected 'explorer' was photographed with notes from the negotiations when she hurriedly left the building. The ensuing debate created distrust among potential partners that took several months to resolve. In the end, after the longest formation process in Dutch history, the coalition consisted of the same parties as in the previous Cabinet and was led by the same Prime Minister, Mark Rutte. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the announced end of Angela Merkel's tenure as Chancellor, the 2021 German federal election was particularly charged. In stark contrast to the Social Democratic Party, which became more united as the election approached, the Christian Democrats were not able to consolidate the fissures unveiled by Merkel's departure. The Greens, emboldened by the polls, for the first time joined the traditional major parties in nominating a chancellor candidate. The result was a campaign period that centred heavily on the three-way race between Olaf Scholz (SPD), Armin Laschet (CDU/CSU) and Annalena Baerbock (Greens). The electoral outcome reduced the large number of coalitions discussed against the backdrop of a fragmenting party system and eventually led to a novel partnership on the federal level, a so-called traffic light coalition between the Social Democrats, Greens, and the Liberals. The formation of this coalition was facilitated by the refusal of Social and Christian Democrats to even consider renewing their 'grand' coalition, a newfound self-confidence on behalf of Greens and Liberals as well as the symbolic benefit that this novel alliance brought together the election winners. In many ways, the electoral result and the coalition it engendered represent new beginnings in German politics but significant hurdles to the consolidation of these patterns remain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the political effects of rising radical right-wing parties (RRPs) in Western Europe? Does the rise of the parties drive mainstream parties (MPs) to become more restrictive on issues mobilised by RRPs, such as multiculturalism? Analysing manifesto data from 1981 to 2008, it is found that the rise of RRPs makes right-wing MPs adopt more restrictive positions regarding multiculturalism. However, left-wing MPs do so only when the opinion of party supporters on foreigners becomes more negative or when the parties lost more votes in the previous election than their opponent right-wing MPs did. The result implies that niche parties with extremist positions can benefit from their own electoral success by dragging MPs toward their own positions. However, the impact of rising niche parties on MPs should be understood against a broader background of party competition, and the impact can be dissimilar between MPs with different ideological commitment and strategic opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article addresses the question of how parliamentary actors, namely parliamentary party groups, parliamentary administrators and committees, interact with each other in the new post-Lisbon institutional environment. On the basis of assessing scrutiny of EU proposals in the spheres of pensions and labour migration in the parliaments of Sweden, the Czech Republic and Romania, the article comes to the conclusion that despite existing opportunities for parliamentary administrators and committees to obtain greater leverage, parliamentary party groups continue to play a crucial role in defining the outcomes of the scrutiny process. Parliamentary party groups tend to focus on the division of competences between the EU and member states even when they have electoral incentives to address the content of EU proposals. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Recent electoral results reveal a pronounced decline in the fortunes of Social Democratic parties. Much of the decline debate has revolved around their rightward policy shifts, which have turned Social Democrats away from their founding principle of equality in an age of increasing inequality. Thus, this article examines the interconnections of these major changes in the Western political economy. In doing so, it contributes to the identification of income inequality as a key mechanism moderating Social Democratic policy offerings and their support. It does so through aggregate-level election results and individual-level survey responses on a sample of 22 advanced democracies, over 336 elections, from 1965–2019. Results reveal that rightward economic movements of Social Democrats significantly reduce their vote share under higher levels of income inequality or when they are combined with rightward socio-cultural movements. The findings provide an important explanation for the pronounced electoral decline of Social Democratic parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1990s, many left-wing parties abandoned their traditional economic policies and adopted more pro-market economic stances. Central and Eastern Europe offers a useful context to explore the impact of these policies on the electoral fortunes of the left-wing parties that adopted them. Although rewarded at first with electoral victories, the adaptation of pro-market positions had a less straightforward impact on the left-wing parties' electoral fortunes in the long run. CHES data on party positions and ESS survey data on party support show that pro-market left parties obtain reduced support; this effect is particularly pronounced among the economically vulnerable occupational groups. In countries with more pro-market left parties, these groups have a higher propensity to vote for right-wing parties. These findings highlight important parallels between the dynamics of Western and Central and Eastern European party systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governments in countries with the constructive vote of no-confidence (CVNC) tend to be more durable than governments in countries with a regular vote of no-confidence (RVNC). Although this is the common claim in the limited literature that exists about the CVNC, no comprehensive study and no empirical tests have been conducted to date. We begin to fill this lacuna. Using a two-stage analysis including a Multivariate Cox proportional Hazard Model, we find that the type of no-confidence vote affects the government's term of office, so that in countries with a CVNC, governments in general, and post-election governments in particular, last longer in office than governments in RVNC countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Partisan dealignment is recurrently presented in the literature as one of the main drivers of the 'personalisation of politics'. Yet, on the one hand, the claim that leader effects on voting behaviour are increasing across time is short on comparative evidence. On the other hand, there is limited empirical evidence that such an increase is due to dealignment. This article explores the longitudinal relationship between partisan dealignment, leader effects and party choice, through a novel dataset pooling 109 national election surveys collected in 14 Western European parliamentary democracies across the last six decades. The results show that leader effects increased over time as a function of the decline of party identification. Additional panel evidence from selected countries shows that partisan dealignment is responsible for increasing leader effects on party choice at the individual level. The longitudinal dimension of this study contributes to the most contested aspect of the personalisation of politics debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the transition to democracy in the early 1990s, more than 60 per cent of governments in Central and Eastern Europe have terminated prematurely. This article argues that the character of party system development in the region has facilitated the emergence of a polarised pattern of party competition and that competition for government now takes place in distinct ideological blocs. Parties seek to form governments within these blocs but not across them and therefore there is little incentive to defect from a governing coalition due to the lack of viable alternatives. As a result, more polarised party systems produce more durable governments. The empirical evidence shows that polarisation and ideological diversity of the government are significant indicators of government duration in Central and Eastern Europe. Ideologically compact governments formed within narrow blocs in the party system survive longer than ideologically diverse coalitions that emerge from less polarised party systems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Green parties have been quintessential issue owners since their founding. In recent national and European elections, however, these parties have begun to emphasize additional issues. This article seeks to understand when the greens expand their issue focus to talk about economic issues. It develops a theory of issue expansion which posits that the greens' issue expansion is related to both party competition and economic context. In particular, it posits that the size of the radical-left party and the rate of unemployment influence the degree to which green parties focus on the economy in their election manifestos. It then tests the theory on a dataset of European green parties which have run in national elections between 1981 and 2017 in 14 West and East European countries. The findings have important implications for understanding party competition in general and the issue evolution of new politics parties more specifically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A central question in Western European electoral research is whether electoral changes over the past decades should be interpreted in terms of dealignment or realignment. Although many scholars study this question, they have not paid much attention to the role of generational replacement. This 'age-period-cohort' (APC) study fills this void by examining the last 10 national elections in the Netherlands (1986–2017). The hypothesis is tested that the determinants of party choice differ systematically across generations. With regard to period effects, it is found that the association between party preference and its predictors has mainly weakened. Over generations, contrarily no decreasing associations are found. The effects of religion, social class, partisanship, left–right and redistribution have not structurally decreased with each successive generation, whereas the effects of education, immigration and European unification are stronger for younger generations. Taken together, these findings reveal how dealignment over time can co-exist with realignment over generations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Elections produce shifts in power and policy that give lobbyists incentives to influence the policy plans of new governments, but very little is known about such lobbying. This study directly observes lobbying during government coalition negotiations and its consequences for coalition agreements by studying the letters that policy advocates send to the (in)formateur steering coalition formation negotiations. While political parties are crucial for the preference attainment of lobbyists, the analysis shows that advocates that are traditional allies of a negotiating party tend to benefit more from making a request in line with the preferences of that political party than other advocates. This seems to be especially the case when advocates represent a constituency that is important to a party's electoral strategy, suggesting that the policy implications of ties between parties and organized interests are determined by more than the presence of historical ties between parties and groups alone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Party competition over European integration is structured by two main dimensions of political conflict: a socio-economic dimension (market liberalisation vs. a more regulated economy) and a socio-cultural dimension (libertarian, cosmopolitan values vs. authoritarian, nationalist values). This article investigates the relationship between these conflict dimensions and parties' positions towards EU issues across time and space, in particular focussing on two 'critical junctures' in the European unification process. For this purpose, analysis is made of the election manifestos of parties competing in European Parliament elections (Euromanifestos) from 1979 to 2014. First, it is found that the key moment of the Maastricht treaty significantly reshaped party competition over Europe. After Maastricht, positions towards European integration have become less connected to the economic dimension and much more related to the cultural dimension in Western Europe. Second, it is contended that the Euro crisis has not dramatically restructured political conflict over European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While coalitions are conventionally seen as opportunities for parties to realise their policy preferences or to secure their control over political offices, recent studies show that citizens have preferences for coalitions which influence their vote choice. However, these studies do not consider how party and coalition preferences influence each other. This study uses panel data from the German Longitudinal Election Study from the 2009, 2013 and 2017 German elections to determine whether voters punish the party for which they voted for being in a coalition they dislike or, alternatively, whether they become more supportive of that coalition. We find weak evidence for the former but strong evidence for the latter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Concerns are raised repeatedly about the quality of televised debates. Both a country's electoral system and the presence of populist candidates have been argued to influence the deliberative qualities of these debates. By using an extended version of the Discourse Quality Index, this study conducts a content analysis of 12 televised election debates in Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom between 2009 and 2015. Against expectations, results show that politicians in multiparty systems do not justify their policy positions more and are not more respectful in the televised debates. Rather, this study uncovers a clear populist challenge to key deliberative debate qualities across party systems. Left- and right-wing populist politicians adopt more positions without proper justification, and the presence of right-wing populists in the televised debates increases the number of disrespectful interactions, lowering the deliberative qualities of the televised debates in different electoral contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research has primarily focused on the role of utility and identity in shaping individuals' European Union (EU) preferences. This article argues that macroeconomic context is a crucial predictor of attitudes towards transnational financial assistance, which has been omitted from previous analyses. Using data from the 2014 European Election Studies (EES) Voter Study for 28 EU member states, this article demonstrates that citizens living in poorer EU countries are less willing to support fiscal solidarity than their counterparts in more affluent countries. Country affluence serves as a heuristic, moderating the relationship between individual-level utility and identity considerations and willingness to show solidarity to member states with economic difficulties. When a country does not fare well economically, citizens' views on providing help to others remain negative, irrespective of individual-level utilitarian and identity considerations. Our findings have implications for understanding the decision-making calculus underlying preference formation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the effect of the financial crisis and economic intervention by the European Union on political parties' politicisation of the EU within national elections. Data from the Manifesto Project for elections between 2002 and 2017 in 12 Eurozone countries is used to assess how the crisis and intervention altered the saliency, position and clarity of parties' EU policies. The analysis shows that the crisis only led to an increase in EU saliency in those states not subjected to intervention whilst intervention is actually associated with a decrease in the saliency of the EU. In terms of increasing Euroscepticism, intervention appears to exhibit a greater effect than the crisis although the results display marked asymmetry between different parties on the left and right. The same is observed to be the case for the level of blurring that parties are engaged in to mask their EU positions. The implications of the findings suggest that economic intervention within the EU has negatively impacted democracy in intervened-in member states by reducing the manoeuvrability of parties to provide voters with clear choices on the direction of European integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on voting behaviour stresses that whether citizens become habitual voters depends on the very first elections in their adult life. This article focuses on the increasing participation gap of first-time voters with low and high levels of resources. Looking first at 14 European countries and second at long-term dynamics in Germany, the turnout rate of first-time and older voters over time is compared. It is shown that the turnout gap has increased substantially since the 1980s. In contrast, educational differences in electoral turnout among older citizens are still comparatively small. It is argued and shown that the turnout gap among the young is due to rising 'start-up' costs of voting, which affect mainly those who are resource poor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing research on party behaviour has largely focused on the drivers of issue salience in direct party communication. However, less is known about party‒issue linkages in election campaigns covered by the mass media, from which most voters get their information about party positions. Against this background, this article explores how two important drivers of issue salience in direct party communication – issue ownership and systemic salience – play out in the media. Based on considerations about the news value of specific party‒issue associations, one would expect both relationships to be particularly important in the media. Despite substantial similarities in party‒issue linkages across platforms, a comparison of manifestos and newspaper content reveals evidence for this claim. In particular, smaller parties are hardly covered in the news on issues they do not own, while large parties are especially covered on salient topics. These findings contribute to our understanding of issue competition in mediated environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2018 Italian election produced striking results, with both a historic success for the two challenger parties (League and M5S) and massive defeats for the two mainstream parties (PD and FI). This article analyses party campaign strategies and their consistency with the opportunity structures provided by the configuration of Italian public opinion. Relying on issue-yield theory, original survey data were collected for both issue support and priority among Italian voters, and party emphases on issues in the electoral campaign – through Twitter data. The findings indicate a generalised ideological inconsistency of the constituencies of the main parties, while campaign strategies appear much more ideologically consistent. Moreover, it is found that parties focused mostly on conflict-mobilisation strategies, rather than on problem solving. Finally, the article shows that, in general, parties acted strategically, by aligning their campaign to the available opportunities, although with relevant variations across parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses party strategies during the campaign for the Dutch general election of March 2017, making use of issue-yield theory. It investigates whether parties strategically emphasise high-yield issues, by juxtaposing the issue opportunities provided by voters with parties' issue emphasis during the campaign. More specifically, it asks whether parties strategically emphasised issues that were expected to reward them electorally. Analysing voter preferences and party campaign data, it is found that parties and most of their constituencies show high ideological consistency, that parties emphasise mostly positional issues and thus choose a conflict-mobilising strategy, and that most parties emphasise high-yield issues rather than following the general political agenda. Four small parties that won significantly behaved strategically while the social democrats – who severely lost – hardly did. The findings imply that the issue-yield framework can help to explain the election result in the fragmented Dutch multi-party context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The analysis of issue politics has long suffered from a fragmentation between valence and positional conceptualisations, preventing the effective development of a general model of issue-based party competition. Building on an overview of the evolution of party competition in the Western world in recent decades, this article offers a theoretical development that builds on 'issue yield' theory to provide a conceptualisation of political goals that generalises across positional and valence issues. This in turn allows a common measurement strategy, offering the possibility to comparatively assess various characteristics (including the electoral potential) of both positional and valence issues. Finally, it describes the specific research design derived from this framework and its implementation in comparative perspective in six West European countries during 2017–2018. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Housing has important economic, political, and social ramifications for Western Europe and beyond. Despite its importance in shaping economic and political outcomes, however, housing remains in the peripheral vision of major comparative political economy debates. This introduction to the special issue accomplishes four objectives. First it demonstrates how housing defies current political economy typologies by failing to conform to their theoretical and empirical predictions. Second it summarises the current state of housing research within political science, which still remains in its infancy. Third it highlights how the contributions in this special issue expand our understanding of how housing causes and is shaped by political and economic outcomes in Europe. Finally, this introduction concludes by outlining how the special issue contributions demonstrate housing's importance for the welfare state, political preferences and electoral shifts, regulatory and redistributive policies, and financialisation and household indebtedness in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A well-functioning democracy requires citizens' support for its political institutions and procedures. While scholars have previously studied the role of contextual factors for explaining satisfaction with democracy, a rigorous focus on how the party choice set affects how satisfied citizens are with democracy is largely absent from the literature. This neglect of the impact of parties is surprising, given their central position within modern, representative democracies. In this article, a comprehensive and comparative analysis of the impact of party systems on citizens' satisfaction with democracy is presented. Use is made of the combined data of the first four modules of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems project and various measures of the party system are used to capture different aspects of the party choice set: the number of parties, their polarisation, and the congruence between public opinion and the party offer. In contrast to expectations, only scant evidence is found that having a wider choice increases citizens' satisfaction with democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The governing Centre and Conservative parties played the 'economy' card – we've got Finland 'back into shape'; the green parties, the Greens and Left Alliance, played the 'climate change' card, demanding action to go with the talk; the Social Democrats played the 'caring' card and the need for a Finland that cares for the elderly, the low-paid and young persons; the Finns Party in contrast played the 'no one likes us, we don't care' card, seeking to exploit its pariah status for electoral gain. The adoption of a siege mentality strategy, designed to capitalise on its ostracised position, served to mobilise protest support and the Finns Party came within a whisker of beating the Social Democrats into second place. The Social Democrats then turned the clock back and put together the type of left‒centre ('red mud') coalition that had characterised Finnish governments for half a century from the mid-1930s onwards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]