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This paper investigates religiosity in relation to party choice in European Parliament elections. Conventional wisdom tells us that as Europe has secularised, the effect of religion on party choice should also have diminished. Yet, this cross-national and cross-temporal study of religious voting in European elections from 1989 to 2004 paints a more nuanced picture. It shows that a) the effect of religion has been declining, but has increased in recent years, b) religion matters in particular for voting for Christian Democratic parties and Conservative parties, c) while generational replacement reduces the overall effect of religion on electoral decisions, the effect of religion has recently increased within each generation, and d) the impact of religion depends on the religious context in which citizens live so that religion plays a bigger role in fractionalised societies. These findings are discussed in the light of a revived importance of religion for European politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article asks why the European Commission lost control over the policy process in one of the most contested areas of policy-making in the European Union in recent years. The article finds that after years of vigorous political controversy over the framing of the issues at stake, the EU finally shifted into a Schattschneiderian mode of politics. The policy conflict expanded dramatically and a previously unrelated set of actors and interests united along new lines of policy debate. The analysis underscores how the political mode of EU decision-making can shift during the process of policy-making. In particular, it stresses how policy conflicts affect the mobilisation and demobilisation of political contestants and the realignment of political actors in the European Union. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2005 the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) was founded. Contrary to the widely used principal-agent approaches, it is more promising to analyse Frontex through the lens of experimentalist governance. This paper has two lines of argument. First, it argues that Frontex may only succeed if Frontex has a sufficient degree of organisational independence and enjoys appropriate and steady support by all member states. This is especially virulent when many member states fail to provide significant contributions in terms of material and human resources as well as time, leading to a suboptimal reduction of duration, scope and operational impact of Frontex's missions. The second argument is concerned with the accountability of Frontex. Contrary to the experimental approach, this article takes a sceptical stance, arguing that important (supra-)national actors are sidelined and relevant legal rules are ignored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses how the EU regulatory state expands into fiscal surveillance and what conflicts arise in the process. That the EU should have gone down the route of regulating budgets is puzzling. In Majone's original concept, the regulatory state is meant not to interfere with member states' budgetary redistributive policies. Yet the revision of the Pact strengthened the regulatory content of fiscal surveillance by reformulating the policy problem, strengthening delegated monitoring by the Commission, with Eurostat rather than DG Ecfin at its helm, and by extending control through specialised information. The analysis implies that the revision of the Pact in March 2005 cannot simply be dismissed as a watering down of its fiscal rules. However, there are limitations to regulatory expansion. One limitation is the inherent tension between the requirements of control and the economic justification of fiscal rules, another that economic justifications remain ambiguous and contentious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

European state aid control, a part of competition policy, typically follows the logic of negative integration. It constrains the potential for member states to distort competition by reducing their ability to subsidise industry. In addition, this paper argues, ambiguous Treaty rules and heterogeneous member state preferences have enabled the European Commission to act as a supranational entrepreneur, not only enforcing the prohibition of distortive state aid, but also developing its own vision of 'good' state aid policy. In order to prevent or to settle political conflict about individual decisions, the Commission has sought to establish more general criteria for the state aid that it still deems admissible. These criteria have been codified into a complex system of soft law and, more recently, hard state aid law. The Commission has thus created positive integration 'from above' and increasingly influences the objectives of national state aid policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies of the policy process in Spain use distinct periods as an organising framework for analysis, and this approach implies that the process itself changes according to the different periods in question. However, we argue that this 'periodisation' approach fails to draw an appropriate distinction between policy choices and outcomes, on the one hand, and the policy process on the other. Whereas different policy choices may of course have very different consequences, these choices may not result from different processes: the outcomes should be distinguished from the causes. In seeking to explain the policy process, as opposed to policy choices and outcomes, this paper emphasises the need to look at institutional factors - in particular, the institutional design of contemporary Spanish democracy and Spain's economic model as the core explanatory variables. Only in this way can an account be provided which accommodates both core stable characteristics of the policy process as well as short-term variations in policy choices and outcome both across time and across different sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constituency campaigns are important phenomena for students of political parties, voting behaviour as well as political communication. These research communities perceive constituency campaigns as parts of centralised high-tech campaigns aiming in strategic ways at the efficient mobilisation of voters. We propose in this paper an alternative understanding of constituency campaigns using the case of the German parliamentary elections in 2005 to empirically test this understanding. We perceive constituency campaigns as phenomena signalling a relative independence of individual candidates from the national party campaign. We label this phenomenon individualised campaigning. We argue that individualised campaigning is driven among others by electoral incentives. We test this hypothesis with regard to the German mixed-member electoral system and on the basis of a survey of all candidates standing for election in 2005. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of the radical or extreme right parties in Europe - parties usually noted for strong, sometimes racist anti-immigrant ideologies - has attracted a great deal of attention in political science. Ireland, despite having some conditions favourable to the growth of such a party has no radical right party. This paper argues that that this is because the 'space' usually occupied by such parties - for young, poor people disaffected by economic change - is taken up by Sinn Fein, which though it has similarities to radical right parties, differs markedly in its attitudes to immigrants. It goes on to explain the special circumstances that prevent nationalist parties in Ireland from presenting overtly anti-immigrant platforms. The focus on anti-immigration and liberal economic policies for such parties may mean that other parties with strong resemblances are excluded from studies they might usefully be included. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do incumbent parties that retrench the welfare state lose votes during the next election? That is the guiding question for our paper. We analyse elections and social policy reforms in 18 established OECD democracies from 1980 to 2003. We show that there is no strong and systematic punishment for governments which cut back welfare state entitlements. The likelihood of losing votes is the same for governments that retrench the welfare state as for those that do not. Rather, electoral punishment is conditional on whether governments have the chance to stretch retrenchment over a longer period of time, and whether social policy cuts are made an issue in the electoral campaign. If other political parties and the mass media do not put the theme on the agenda of the campaign, and if the retrenchment can be carried out in small steps during a longer governmental term, governments may considerably reduce welfare state effort without fear of major electoral consequences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At a time when the literature on political parties is brimming with health and vitality, the parties themselves seem to be experiencing potentially severe legitimacy problems and to be suffering from a quite massive withdrawal of popular support and affection. This article addresses one key aspect of the problems facing contemporary parties in Europe, which is the challenge to party government. I begin by reviewing the changing pattern of party competition, in which I discuss the decline of partisanship in policy-making and the convergence of parties into a mainstream consensus. I then look again at the familiar 'parties-do-matter' thesis and at the evidence for declining partisanship within the electorate. In the third section of the paper I explore the various attempts to specify the conditions for party government, before going on in the final section to argue that these conditions have been undermined in such a way that it is now almost impossible to imagine party government in contemporary Europe either functioning effectively or sustaining complete legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For the past 15 years or so, the claim of a rise of the regulatory state in Europe has been a dominant theme in public policy research. This paper critically reflects on this claim and the associated scholarship by considering four key questions. First, what is the significance of the supposed rise of the regulatory state for the state in Europe and how can this trend be explained? Second, what insights have been gained from the study of phenomena associated with the regulatory state, both in terms of EU and national levels of government as well as in terms of process and organisational understandings of policy analysis? Third, does the regulatory state represent a stable arrangement or does it suffer from its own peculiar dilemmas that fundamentally affect the nature of European states? Fourth, and finally, this article develops three scenarios - those of withering away, plodding along, and rejuvenation - for the future of the (study of the) regulatory state in Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the evolution of coordination structures for EU policy-making in the new member states from Central and Eastern Europe. The study maps the main features of the established EU coordination machineries, and traces the most important reforms of their organisational structures. It proposes an actor-centred, 'politics of institutional choice' approach to explain the rapid and far-reaching changes in EU coordination structures in all the new member states. By contrast, two alternative frameworks focusing on efficiency and historical-institutional arguments emphasising the impact of early institutional lock-in fail to explain the specific institutional forms adopted and the considerable degree of institutional dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines variation in the timing of compliance with European directives. It formulates and tests the hypothesis that member states' policy-based incentives to deviate from the content of directives influence delay in compliance. This hypothesis is tested along with other factors that are posited to influence compliance, including the amount of discretion directives give member states, the level of misfit between national and European-level laws, and characteristics of member states. The hypotheses are examined in a quantitative research design using arguably the best available information on compliance: national responses to six labour market directives investigated by Falkner et al. (2005) for Complying with Europe. The present study develops Falkner et al.'s analysis in two respects. First, it identifies new theoretically important variables and offers measures of these, notably member states' policy-based incentives to deviate and the amount of discretion granted by directives. Second, it tests these hypotheses using multivariate analysis, while Falkner et al. applied bivariate tests only. In contrast to Falkner et al.'s conclusions, the findings indicate that misfit between national and European laws significantly reduces the likelihood of timely compliance. While political opposition at the time of a directive's adoption is not linked directly to compliance, member states tend to oppose directives that do not fit existing national laws. Compliance is more timely for directives that grant more discretion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of recent welfare reforms associated with new forms of managerial and financial accountability, this paper analyses the significance for the construction of new legitimate forms of governance of the relationship between public managers of welfare provider units and local elected politicians. The shift from local government as democratic representative institutions to depoliticised efficient agent of welfare provision has created in Italy the opportunity for the emergence of a new cadre of managers, less subject to interference by the parties. The increasingly problematic relationship between managers and politicians reflects the dynamics of a shifting game, originally intended for sector-specific interests, that was later transformed into a struggle between political elites across territory and about territorial politics. Any set of alternatives juxtaposing efficient management and politics is best viewed by taking account of the significance of local welfare institutions for political legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Defining industrial policies has traditionally been a preserve of EU member states, upon which the Commission has only impacted indirectly, through numerous measures affecting industry, leaving little room for an industrial policy in its own right. However, growing concern about the EU's future position in the international division of labour has led several member states to request from Brussels a more pro-active approach and closer attention to European industrial interests. This paper investigates the recent trend towards 're-inventing' industrial policy in the EU, France and Germany. It examines the model of intergovernmental industrial cooperation established between these two member states, its usefulness and limitations. It argues that, despite recent regression in France towards old-style interventionist policies, and although German governments sometimes favour a protectionist stance, both countries can also generate new, more constructive, euro-compatible intergovernmental initiatives, but that promoting national champions damages the credibility of such initiatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies the framework developed by Farrell and Héritier to disputes over 'legal bases' (empowering treaty provisions) and legislative procedures in everyday EU decision-making. Using a variety of data, it largely confirms the power of the Farrell-Héritier framework. Legal bases and procedural political disputes respond to incomplete contracting problems, manifested as the jurisdictional ambiguity of specific policy issues. Parties consistently act as competence maximisers, bargaining interstitially in the pursuit of procedural power. Everyday fights over procedures appear to feed back into subsequent formal institutional (treaty) change. The results support claims of endogenous EU institutional change, while highlighting extensive legal-discursive structuring of this process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The traditional literature on interest group behaviour presumes that private interests develop lobbying strategies based on the principle of effective allocation of resources. However, nearly 400 private interest groups actively lobby the Council of Europe, a classical intergovernmental organisation with weak decision-making powers, where no significant policy pay-off is expected to occur. This analysis aims to explain the seeming puzzle of private interest groups seeking to influence an institution which is generally perceived as having no strong decision-making powers in European political space. It does so by exploring three explanations from the existing literature, namely ‘policy overlap’, ‘venue shopping’ and ‘epistemic community’, and considers another explanation not hitherto fully developed, suggesting that the ‘ideological motivation’ of interest groups helps to explain their behaviour. Taking the ideological motivation of interest groups into account when analysing lobbying strategies can in fact shed light on certain lobbying preferences that would otherwise appear to defy the logic of interest representation. This paper therefore suggests that an ‘ideological motivation’ explanation potentially plays a crucial role in the analysis of the behaviour of any interest group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper three main questions concerning women's parliamentarian representation will be addressed. First, to what extent are Nordic parliaments gender balanced today? Second, what factors characterise and explain the different Nordic gender profiles? Third, is it possible to identify any political impact of Nordic women? The discussion of these descriptive and substantive aspects of women's representation is related to the threshold approach and critical mass theory. Obtaining a critical number does not by necessity lead to uninterrupted progress in women's political integration through the different institutional thresholds in the parliamentary system. Critical numbers count, but so do critical acts. Furthermore, the threshold model, developed from studies of men, cannot be applied without amending the process of women's parliamentarian mobilisation. Strictly speaking, only Sweden has gender-balanced representation today. Due to different structural, cultural and political factors, the political integration of women has proceeded at different rates in the Nordic region. There is nevertheless reason to conclude that women's representation has affected both the recruitment of women into politics and women's situation in society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the establishment of the National Health System in Greece in the early 1980s, the institutional framework remained largely unchanged due to opposition from interest groups and large set-up costs, thus allowing the powerful stakeholders to preserve their privileges. Not until almost two decades later was reform attempted in order to rationalise and modernise purchasing and delivery. The objective of this paper is to analyse the ambitious reform attempt of 2000 through the lens of rational choice institutionalism, identifying the initial goals of the reform, the reactions of the key stakeholders and the legislative outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper looks at the process of labour market reform in Greece since 1997, focusing in particular on the 2000 reform initiative launched by the then Socialist (PASOK) government. Despite powerful external and domestic pressures for change, the proposed labour market reform was eventually severely compromised following much acrimony between the government and the social partners. The aim of this article is to look at how this failure of initiative and response came about. In doing so, the article places its empirical analysis into a game theoretic framework that seeks to reveal both the structural characteristics of the '2000 labour market reform' game and the strategies followed by its main protagonists. Reference will also be made to actors' low trust and the failure of a 'winning' package deal to emerge. These, it will be argued, produced powerful blocks to reform and eventually transformed the 2000 reform initiative from a prisoner's dilemma to a deadlock game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the role of expertise in the reform process in Greece by utilising the advocacy coalition framework. Knowledge, power and policy reform are discussed by comparing three frameworks that place knowledge in the centre of the analysis: advocacy coalitions, epistemic communities and policy transfer networks. The theoretical claims made in this paper are illustrated through a discussion of the 2001 constitutional reform and in particular the reform of article 24 on the environment and article 102 on decentralisation of public administration and the strengthening of regional governance. It is argued that the advocacy coalition is a useful framework for studying the role of experts in policy reform, although the framework could be strengthened if more emphasis was placed on political, economic and social interests and the way they form belief systems. In particular, regarding Greece it is claimed that the role of experts in policy reform has increased as part of a general move towards the modernisation of public administration in Greece. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years there has been growing interest in the role of discourses of globalisation and European integration in shaping political outcomes. As a variety of authors have suggested, these discourses may play a powerful causal role in determining the trajectory of policy change and, as such, should be treated as objects of enquiry in their own right. Yet, while much recent scholarship has pointed to the need for systematic empirical analysis of policy-making discourses, little such analysis has yet been undertaken. Our aim in this paper is to contribute to this task, by mapping contemporary appeals to globalisation and European integration in two EU states: Britain and the Irish Republic. We present findings from the discourse analysis (using QSR NVivo) of over 100 speeches backed by supplementary interviews in both cases. Building upon, extending and updating an earlier discussion, we develop a theoretical schema for the classification and mapping of a range of different discourses of globalisation and European integration. These we categorise in terms of the contingent or inevitable character attributed to the process in question and the positive, open-ended or negative connotations it is seen to entail. What becomes apparent is the highly strategic ways in which such discourses are used, the articulation of which depends greatly upon the context in which they are deployed and the audience for which they are intended. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the classification and functions of political parties. It argues that the central concept involved in classifying parties is that of the organisational network, which goes beyond the party itself to include the space that the party occupies. Historical types and sequences of party organisation and organisational development are then explored, as is the central concept of the 'mass party'. Finally, while many different functions can be ascribed to parties, the functions which are central to the notion of party, and which are essentially irreplaceable, are those of participation, electioneering and expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the classification and functions of political parties. It argues that the central concept involved in classifying parties is that of the organisational network, which goes beyond the party itself to include the space that the party occupies. Historical types and sequences of party organisation and organisational development are then explored, as is the central concept of the `mass party'. Finally, while many different functions can be ascribed to parties, the functions which are central to the notion of party, and which are essentially irreplaceable, are those of participation, electioneering and expression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study is about party-system change in modern Greece and has two chief aims. First, it seeks to make sense of and explain the evolution of that country's party system from its early post-war years until today. Far from being 'frozen', the Greek party system has displayed continuous transformations from a system featuring significant party fragmentation into another characterized by the high concentration of its political forces. Second, the paper proposes a classification of the changes that took place during the development of the Greek party system. This classification will yield three distinct types of party system which developed in consecutive order, namely, a predominant-party system (from 1952 to 1963), a system of polarized pluralism (between 1963 and 1981), and a two-party system (since 1981). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Otto Kirchheimer's conception of the catch-all party was part of his more comprehensive theory of party transformation, encompassing four interrelated political processes. By tracing the development of the catch-all thesis and placing it within the wider context of Kirchheimer's complete work, it is possible to reconstruct a more precise understanding of what Kirchheimer meant by the catch-all concept, which itself remains highly contested. Kirchheimer's anxiety about modern democracy originated with what he saw as the vanishing of principled opposition within parliament and society, and the reduction of politics to the mere management of the state. This leads to collusion of political parties and the state, severing of the societal links of party organizations, and erosion of the classic separation of powers. Vanishing opposition, cartelization and professionalization of politics pits citizens against a powerful state, which increases political cynicism and apathy. Kirehheimer's comprehensive approach remains relevant to much of the contemporary debate about the transformation of Western political systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During the Covid-19 pandemic, Sweden soon found itself alone and heavily criticised for its internationally deviant strategy. Why did this approach nevertheless receive widespread public support in Sweden? This article develops and tests a novel rally around the flag (RRTF) theory, which places national identity centre stage. In contrast to previous work, the article differentiates between national pride, national chauvinism, uncritical patriotism, national attachment, and ethnic nationhood conception – expecting only the first three of these to be related to supporting the Swedish Covid approach. Survey data from a politically representative sample of Swedes support the expectations. It is concluded that the popular support for the 'Swedish experiment' is to be understood as an RRTF – although in this case the flag was 'unwaved'. This suggests that even national identities that draw their pride from institutional rather than cultural superiority lend themselves to RRTF processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the 'democratic backslider' parties in Hungary (Fidesz) and Poland (Law and Justice) took differing stances on Russia, bringing their positions on the Rule of Law (RoL) conflict and within the broader alliance of Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties into question. Building on and advancing the theoretical framework of democratic backsliding and PRR party cooperation, this article assesses the impact of exogenous shocks triggered by external authoritarian actors on these types of collaborations. A detailed examination of the voting patterns of Fidesz, Law and Justice and other PRR parties in the European Parliament (EP) is undertaken, and their stances towards Russia and the RoL conflict before and after the invasion are weighed. The findings show that the invasion did not influence the dynamics of democratic backsliding. Despite the rhetoric, it actually brought Fidesz and Law and Justice closer together. While the attack led to a convergence of assertiveness towards Russia among the PRR parties, the Putin regime remains a divisive issue within the PRR family. The different positions towards Russia did not affect the support of PRRs for the backsliders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic boosted political trust in many countries. This article tests the relevance of fear of infection as the micro-level mechanism behind this rally round the flag. This study employs three-wave panel data in the Netherlands, collected days before the first lockdown (early March 2020), during that lockdown (April/May 2020), and after that lockdown (October 2020). Growth curve models isolate the rally effect and its determinants. The article reaches three main conclusions. First, fear of infection is a constituting element of the rally effect: the rise in political trust is more pronounced among people who fear infection. Second, the rise occurs in response to the direct, external threat (health concerns), not in response to the secondary threats (social isolation, economic stagnation). Third, adherents of the radical right are particularly sensitive to the external threat, but only in the short run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Which patterns of democracy perform best? Although a decades-long research tradition has fairly robustly suggested that consensual democracies outperform their Westminster-style majoritarian counterparts, the scope of previous studies has been limited to 'normal times'. In this article, the endogenous context of the COVID-19 pandemic is leveraged to study whether the alleged superiority of consensualism also holds during crises. It is hypothesised that, in addition to consensus democracy, inclusive institutions – i.e. cabinet size and interest-group corporatism – enhance crisis-related performance. Drawing on new and original data, cross-sectional and hierarchical time-series regression analyses show that horizontal power-sharing and the number of ministers substantively reduced excess mortality, while the structure of the interest-group system had no effect. Although established consensus democracies can draw on their built-in institutional assets even during crises, our findings indicate that majoritarian systems may, as a compensatory performance-enhancing tool, flexibly gear up for crisis-induced necessities by adding more ministers to the cabinet. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public opinion regarding EU integration has become increasingly important in light of both increasing public scepticism to integration and the EU's gradual shift towards integration of core state powers (CSPs). This article contributes to an emerging literature studying support for integration of core state powers by investigating whether such integration, given its greater potential for polarisation and activation of nationalist identities, is more likely to be opposed than regulatory integration. The results show that some CSP integration may meet greater support than regulatory integration. They also show that a larger number of exclusively national citizens support externally, rather than internally, oriented CSP integration. This suggests that what policy area a policy belongs to may be more important for predicting contestation of its integration than whether it is a core state or regulatory power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The turbulent ratification of the Treaty of European Union has given a new sharpness to old debates about democratic representativeness in the European arena. The crisis of representation after Maastricht was, however limited in terms of who and what was criticised: Maastricht was a crisis of intergovernmentalism. There are several alternative ways for establishing links between the citizen and Europe. This paper focuses on the role of subnational intermediaries in day-to-day policy making. The first part of the paper places subnational mobilisation in a broader understanding of the Euro-polity. Three competing conceptualisations: a state-centric model, a supranational model, and multi-level governance make distinct predictions about the features, opportunities and constraints for subnational mobilisation. Next, the contemporary variety of subnational mobilisation is compared with each model. The final section points at some implications for representative democracy in the Euro-polity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Group of Seven (G7) countries and the European Union (EU) adopted a variety of financial sanctions, including the freezing of foreign reserve assets of the Central Bank of Russia held by other central banks. Drawing on a Principal-Agent framework and on speeches, newspaper articles and interviews with policy-makers, this study examines what it means for the ECB and the central banks of the Eurosystem to be involved in these sanctions. As a consequence of these actions, these central banks have been enlisted in monetary and financial warfare. Moreover, the three-fold objective of the ECB has de facto effectively been reweighted somewhat, as the focus on 'price stability' (primary objective) has become seemingly temporarily less prominent. Instead, the secondary and tertiary objectives have moved centre-stage, favouring geopolitical considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do women fail to rise in parties, especially youth parties? This analysis shows that female party members' preferences regarding the purpose of a committee, networking and the election rule in party organisations differ from male party members' which is likely a reason why women face challenges to rise in parties. This article investigates for the first time these gender based differences in preferences simultaneously by conducting a survey experiment with youth party members. Respondents (n > 1200) were asked if they would run for a seat in a decision-making committee of their youth party. In order to analyse which youth party members opt for which opportunities, the purpose of these committees, the networking opportunities they provide, and the election rule for these committees vary at random. The results show that female members hesitate to join committees that would grant them power, and that they are less likely to opt for upward networking opportunities than their male party colleagues. This effect is particularly strong in hierarchically organised youth parties of centre-right parties. Findings on preferred election rules mostly hold for women from left-wing parties. In contrast to men, this group prefers party quotas. Analysing differences by gender and political orientation, this article shows a clear gender preference gap exists both within and across youth parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature has found that politicians who lag behind in public approval ratings during campaigns resort to more negativity. However, the actual impact of approval on the use of negativity during the electoral cycle has yet to be addressed. Furthermore, due to the short-lived nature of campaigns, current studies have been unable to establish a directional causal link between approval ratings and negativity. This article addresses these gaps by: (i) building a theory for understanding the impact of public approval on the use of negativity throughout the electoral cycle; and (ii) methodologically testing this impact on a time series basis. Using data on negativity in parliaments, the results confirm that low approval ratings lead to more negativity closer to elections in Belgium (2014–2020) and Croatia (2010–2021). In the UK (2010–2020), however, approval does not appear to be a significant predictor of negativity use. These findings have important implications for our understanding of the use of negativity by political actors outside campaigns. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Polarisation is often seen as mainly negative for the functioning of democracies, but one of its saving graces could be that it raises the stakes of politics and encourages participation. This study explores the relationship between affective polarisation and turnout using three longitudinal designs. It makes use of three decades of repeated cross-sectional surveys in Germany, a two-wave panel study in Spain, and an eleven-wave panel study in the Netherlands. It tests whether affective polarisation increases turnout using varying operationalizations and specifications, and studies whether any boost in participation extends beyond the most politically sophisticated citizens. The findings suggest a sizeable independent effect of affective polarisation on turnout even when accounting for reverse causality and for the confounding impact of positive partisanship and ideological polarisation. Importantly, this effect might even be somewhat more pronounced among those who are least sophisticated. The concluding section discusses the normative and theoretical implications of these findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political participation opportunities have been expanding for years, most recently through digital tools. Social media platforms have become well integrated into civic and political participation. Using a cross-national sample from the United States, United Kingdom and France, this article examines whether acts of participation associated with social media should be classified using a traditional, five-factor solution to the structure of participatory acts. The distinction between online and offline participation is set aside, focusing instead on acts supported and enabled by social media, and in particular on differences between the use of Twitter and Facebook. The analysis shows that acts enabled by social media do not load with traditional factors in the structure of participation. Political acts employing Twitter and Facebook are distinct in the factor structure of participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Covid-19 pandemic triggered polarisation across Europe. While most citizens supported governments' containment measures, others took to the streets and voiced their dissatisfaction. The article focuses on the mobilisation potential related to this heterogenous protest wave. It examines individuals that show sympathy and are willing to engage in anti-containment demonstrations based on 16 waves of a rolling cross-section survey fielded in Germany in 2020/2021. The results show a considerable and stable mobilisation potential: every fifth respondent sympathises with the protesters, and around 60% of those are ready to participate themselves. Political distrust, far-right orientations and an emerging 'freedom divide' structure the potential, as do Covid-19-related economic and health threats. Moreover, the findings indicate a radicalisation process and show how ideology and threat perceptions drive the step from sympathy to willingness to participate, suggesting that ideological polarisation may quickly spill over to the streets given an appropriate supply of protest opportunities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public opinion polarisation can impair society's ability to reach a democratic consensus in different political issue areas. This appears particularly true when the polarisation of opinions coincides with clearly identifiable social groups. The literature on public opinion polarisation has mostly focussed on the US two-party context. We lack concepts and measures that can be adapted to European countries with multi-party systems and multi-layered group identities. This article proposes a conceptualisation of polarisation between groups in society. It presents a measure that captures the overlap of ideology distributions between groups. The two-step empirical framework includes hierarchical IRT models and a measure for dissimilarity of distributions. The second part presents an empirical application of the measure based on survey data from Switzerland (1994–2016), which reveals insightful dynamics of public opinion polarisation between party supporters and education groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populist appeals to 'pure people' have been theorised to mobilise previously disengaged citizens. However, this 'corrective consequence' has found weak support in empirical research. This finding is consistent with studies that suggest that novel campaign appeals and new political offerings have a negligible effect on turnout. As a consequence, this research proposes a distinction between the behavioural and attitudinal effects of populism and introduces a softened revision to the corrective argument: Despite a negligible behavioural impact on individuals' turnout propensity, the electoral success of populism is nevertheless associated with an attitudinal change: increased political interest. This proposition is supported by two empirical tests. The first detects this dynamic among 232,208 respondents in 136 national election studies from 16 Western countries (1970–2017). The second analysis, which uses an improved causal identification strategy, uncovers an analogous effect in the GESIS Panel (2014–17, Germany). Hence, the emergence of populist parties can stimulate political interest among citizens, even though it does not necessarily lead to increased turnout. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments even in consolidated democracies have adopted drastic measures, temporarily constraining individual freedoms and expanding executive political decision making. In light of this trade-off between public health measures and democratic norms, it becomes crucial to assess the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on public support for democratic versus authoritarian regimes. Following insights of the affective intelligence theory, emotions, and not only rational considerations, are key to understanding behavioural and attitudinal responses to crises. In the article it is argued that the pandemic threat of COVID-19 affects regime preferences by evoking distinct negative emotions, in particular anger and fear. Using original survey data in six European countries, it is shown that COVID-19-induced anger and fear have divergent effects on regime preferences. While democratic regime preference has declined for angry respondents, there is also a message of hope: fearful respondents display increased support for a democratic regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars of descriptive representation have paid growing attention to the issue of class. This article contributes to this line of research by examining the educational (mis)match of elected officials and the citizens they serve. Using data from an original paired elite-mass survey experiment, it investigates whether judgements of democratic quality are affected by education-based descriptive representation. The study reveals limited evidence in support of the idea that citizens and politicians value education-based descriptive representation in sociotropic terms. Instead, it provides strong evidence of affinity effects where democratic judgments are influenced by whether descriptive representation, or the lack thereof, favours citizens and politicians based on their own educational background. An important exception though are citizens without higher education, whose assessments of democratic quality are unaffected by education-based descriptive representation. The article ends with a discussion of the implications of these findings for existing and future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents an ideational perspective of new institutional leadership and applies it to the European Commission's role in the policy process concerning the European Union (EU)-Turkey cooperation on migration from 2014 to 2016. On a conceptual and methodological level, through searching for evidence of the causal mechanism of 'strategic framing', the article traces how the Commission deployed its ideas in the different phases of the policy-making process. This contribution feeds into the claim for new institutional leadership by revealing how such ideas shaped some of the main policy outcomes in the EU–Turkey cooperation during the refugee crisis. The ideational perspective of new institutional leadership also suggests that the Juncker Commission's 'strategic framing' was part of the EU's broader principled realism philosophy that led the Commission to take some contestable political choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have extensively studied how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) interacts with Member State courts. The ECJ's behaviour vis-à-vis international tribunals remains, however, underexplored despite its salience for EU global actorness. The ECJ does at times condone and at other times reject cooperation with international tribunals in that it either authorises or prohibits EU and Member State participation in relevant regimes. What drives ECJ behaviour? While intuitive, European law fails to fully account for it. This study draws on models of bounded discretion to explain ECJ behaviour in external judicial politics. It argues that two factors – namely jurisdictional overlap between the European legal order and international tribunals as well as the centrality of these tribunals in global governance – decisively influence the preferences of the ECJ, Member States, the European Commission and Parliament and thus delimit the range of politically viable rulings and shape ECJ behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do governments ensure public compliance with protective policies that restrict individual liberties during a crisis? In this article, the British public's reaction to mask mandates during the Covid-19 pandemic is examined. We argue that providing information about health risks makes people more willing to comply and that the effectiveness of the information depends on the source. This argument is tested with the help of aggregate public opinion and individual-level experimental data collected in the UK in 2020 and we find that the British public adapted its willingness to wear a mask rapidly and in line with government regulation. Moreover, results from a survey experiment show that simply providing information about risk is sufficient to elevate people's willingness to wear masks. Interestingly, there is no clear partisan divide in the willingness to comply, suggesting that government messages about risk and responsibility encourage individuals to make sacrifices in times of crisis regardless of which party they support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By reaching a vote share of 12.6 percent in the 2017 federal election, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) ended Germany's rare status as a Western European polity lacking a significant Populist Radical Right Party (PRRP). Some of this support comes from a group not usually expected to vote for PRRPs: immigrant-origin voters. Recent survey data shows high levels of support for the AfD especially within the group of Russian-Germans – immigrants from the former Soviet Union and its successor states. What motivates these immigrant-origin voters to support an anti-immigrant party? This article argues that support for the AfD – besides immigration-related preferences – can be best explained by their levels of assimilation or incorporation for different domains regarding the mainstream German society. Especially low levels of economic and social integration, and in particular a strong ethnic identity, relate positively to favouring the German radical right. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Little is known about the staff who support MPs in their work. The literature suggests that these staff serve different important roles in democratic systems. This article compares the size of parliamentary staff in 48 countries and in 66 houses over an eight-year period. It compares three explanations of staff size, which reflect different roles they can have: firstly, that these staff serve MPs as compromise facilitators, planners and scribes. In that case, their number reflects the number of MPs. Secondly, that staff members function as information brokers and advertisers and as such act as intermediaries between the population and MPs. In that case, staff size reflects population size. And thirdly, that these staff primarily serve as a source of independent advice for MPs. In that case, staff size reflects the strength of the house they serve. Population size is found to be the dominant driver of the size of parliamentary staff. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does ministries' capacity to draft legislation affect the political output of modern governments? This article combines a novel dataset describing the capacity of ministerial bureaucracies to attend to about 250 distinct policy issues with content-coded data on government legislation. The sample consists of Danish, Dutch and German governments, jointly spanning the time from 1995 to 2013. The analysis reveals three main findings: firstly, issue-specific bureaucratic capacity unconditionally increases governments' legislative activity; secondly, legislative activity is stifled if bureaucratic capacity is spread across different ministries; thirdly, against theoretical expectations the productive effect of bureaucratic capacity is not positively related to governments' issue salience. The results indicate that the design and resources of ministerial portfolios affect policy making in western governments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political participation has increasingly taken unconventional forms in advanced democracies. At the same time, the traditional party systems of Europe have been upended by the recent emergence of successful niche parties. While some studies have examined partisanship and protest in tandem, the literature lacks a theoretical framework that ties niche voters to political protest. This article argues that niche voters are more likely to protest than mainstream voters, especially when the politics of governing coalitions results in niche parties being unable to represent their voters. Specifically, niche voters are more likely to protest when their party joins a coalition with a PM who is ideologically distant from the niche party's position. Using all nine waves of the European Social Survey in Western Europe, the findings broadly support this argument. These findings have important implications for understanding conditions under which people engage in political protest, especially voters of niche parties. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2040237. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Populism and technocracy represent a challenge to pluralist party democracies. The first promotes the rule by 'the people', while the second demands the rule by independent experts. The literature on populism and technocracy as challenges to party democracy is burgeoning. Less is known about citizens' attitudes towards the ideas that underpin both populism and technocracy. In this article these opinions are explored in a survey conducted in Spain using a comprehensive battery of items tapping into technocracy and populism. It is found that populist attitudes correlate with two dimensions of technocracy: anti-politics and pro-expertise sentiments. A latent-class analysis shows that the largest sample group simultaneously endorses rule by the people and the enrolment of experts in political decision making. In the article this group is named technopopulists. The article challenges extant views of populism and technocracy as separate alternatives and spurs works on voter demand for the involvement of experts in politics. Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2027116. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]