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What explains regulators’ preferences concerning the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)? The paper answers this question by providing an alternative account of the creation of the SSM using an institutionalist perspective. It is argued that the creation of the SSM does not simply reflect the material interests of governments and domestic financial firms, but that regulators’ positions were also significantly affected by the institutional environment in which they operated. Two characteristics of domestic supervisory governance are identified: the institutional responsibilities of banking regulators (microprudential and/or macroprudential) and the fragmentation of supervisory and monetary policies. The empirical analysis demonstrates the relevance of these factors for shaping regulators’ preferences both within and across countries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Constitutional courts are often considered to be 'veto players' or 'third chambers of parliament'. However, no attention has been paid to the composition of European constitutional courts and how they make decisions. Do European judges exhibit political preferences as their US counterparts do? If so, it is important to know who selects the judges as the selection determines the outcome. This article analyses the composition of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the French Conseil constitutionnel. It tests the correlation between the party affiliation of the pivotal judge and oppositional success empirically for all abstract reviews filed between 1974 and 2002. In both countries the likelihood of an oppositional victory or defeat varies with the ideological position of the pivotal judge. This leads to the conclusion that European judges decide on the basis of their political preferences like their US counterparts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the beginning of the migration crisis in the 1990s, Italy and Germany have been considered to be the two showpieces of different migration control systems in Europe, where an 'inefficient' South is contrasted with an 'effective' North in terms of immigration control and humanitarian protection. Italy is often considered to have a lax immigration regime with weak border controls and few guarantees for asylum seekers and refugees, whereas Germany, in contrast, is shown as having an ideal asylum machinery with lower irregular immigration and no need for regularisation processes. This article challenges such a bipolar vision of the European immigration and shows that the 'North-South axis' dividing European control systems is not based on empirical evidence but on a myth which fails to take into account the logic of controls and the socio-economic contexts in which they are enforced. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]