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The three types of transnational capitalism emerging in Central-Eastern Europe are neoliberal, embedded neoliberal and neocorporatist.

The global financial crisis has ushered in a major housing crisis in many European countries. The paper seeks to shed light on why, despite massive housing crises, there are few policy efforts at tackling it. Probing into the policy paradigms that have informed housing policies, the paper demonstrates a shift towards housing as an asset before the crisis. Increasingly, housing policies have become interwoven with financial markets. This has led to a major policy mismatch after the crisis: while the return of the 'housing question' would have required renewed efforts at establishing housing as a social right, de facto policy makers sought to stabilise financial markets. The result is a paradoxical outcome, where neoliberal market-driven programmes are embedded in increased dependence on family wealth. The article demonstrates the shift from housing as asset to housing as patrimony in three different varieties of residential regimes, represented by Ireland, Denmark and Hungary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focusing on the critical Hungarian case, this article analyses the fate of embedded neoliberal capitalism in the wake of the global financial crisis. The changes include policies to combat foreign dominance in the financial, energy, and retail sectors, and efforts to reform and retrench the hitherto relatively generous welfare state. Nevertheless, the article finds no less evidence of continuity than of change: the politicisation of fighting dependency is combined with the quiet politics of subsidising foreign direct investment in manufacturing, and the noisy politics of protecting pensioners and middle-class families parallels the erosion of future-oriented social investment. Notwithstanding the radical turn in development rhetoric, the actual path correction has merely shifted the pattern of dependency without breaking out of it: financing socio-economic development in Hungary (as in other Visegrád states) is still largely dependent on foreign sources, albeit of a more diversified nature, including not only manufacturing FDI, but the EU's structural funds and migrant labour's remittances as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]