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The subject of this paper is the analysis of the process of establishment and organization of public administration during the Austro-Hungarian rule. At the Berlin Congress in 1878, Austria-Hungary was given a mandate by the great powers, with the consent of the Ottoman Empire, to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. The occupation brought about various social, military, political, and legal issues that needed to be resolved. In fact, these issues that arose represented the classical domains of state administration, such as the army, police, foreign affairs, justice, and finance. The new authority, represented by the Joint Ministry of Finance, maintained the existing administrative-territorial structure with certain necessary adjustments. Operationally, these tasks were handled by the Bosnian Office, which was superior to the Provincial Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The administrative-territorial organization was defined by the decree of the Provincial Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1882, which prescribed that all administrative tasks be carried out in district offices with broad and diverse jurisdiction. It is important to note that the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina, within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, had territorial affiliation instead of citizenship, which represented a special legal relationship between individuals and the state. The state administration functioned based on a hierarchical principle of subordination and responsibility, where lower organs were subordinate to higher ones. All general acts of the Provincial Government were previously submitted to the Joint Minister of Finance for approval and only came into force after obtaining such approval. The Provincial Government consisted of four departments: the political-administrative department, the financial department, the judicial department, and the civil department. The departments were headed by heads of departments. The challenges set by Austria-Hungary in the context of establishing a new administrative structure required a state administration with loyal and capable officials. A significant challenge in achieving this goal was the problem of the lack of suitable personnel, both due to the lack of professional qualifications and the departure of a significant number of educated individuals. Considering the demands of modern state administration, good education was required from officials, which, among other things, led to a significant number of officials in both central and local administrative structures being foreigners. They were mostly Austrians, Hungarians, Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks. Many of them stayed in Bosnia and Herzegovina for only a short period, but there were also those who permanently remained. The districts were divided into district offices led by district heads. A special characteristic of the administrative organization was that district offices, to a large extent during the Austro-Hungarian rule, also performed judicial functions. After the occupation, the Austro-Hungarian administration began establishing local self-government. Urban and rural municipalities were formed, and local people participated in their organs. Although municipalities were conceived as units of local self-government, analyzing their scope of authority, it can be determined that they mostly performed delegated tasks of the state administration with a very low degree of autonomy. The public administration operated on a hierarchical principle of subordination and responsibility, within which lower administrative organs were subordinate to higher ones. This paper aims to provide insight into the complexity of administrative organization and structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Austro-Hungarian period. This is significant because during that period, the foundations of modern public administration in Bosnia and Herzegovina were established, encompassing not only state administration but also local self-government and public services.

In her work and on the basis of archival material, the author presents and analyzes the discursive practices of writers gathered in the Union of Writers of Yugoslavia, and articulated through the work of its governing bodies – Congresses, Assemblies, and the Presidency – throughout 1985. Namely, that year, at the 9th Congress of Writers in Novi Sad, one part of Serbian writers, gathered in the Association of Writers of Serbia, opened and actualized the so-called Kosovo issue within the Union, by constructing uniformly structured, and persistently repeated ideological narrative about the endangerment and persecution of Serbs in Kosovo, claiming that it was – genocide. The paper presents and summarizes the main features of the aforementioned congress, which indicate that the Yugoslav socio-political crisis of the early 1980s deeply affected the Union during 1985 and that it revealed deep conceptual divisions among Serbian and other writers in Yugoslavia. The dividing line was built around the rejection of the 1974 Constitution and the denial of national-cultural and republican identities and borders within Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and their defense and plea for them, on the other. The text seeks to clarify what the concept of freedom of literary creation and politicization of literature, which was advocated and defended by the Serbian cultural intelligentsia at the 9th Congress, essentially meant, as well as to point out that the period of the 1980s was marked by the ambition of writers to affirm themselves as significant socio-political factor through criticism of dogmatic and repressive political authorities of socialist selfgovernment. The author then focuses on the work of the Literary Union Presidency during 1985, and on the discursive practices of some Serbian writers, gathered in the Association of Writers of Serbia and the Association of Writers of Kosovo, articulated through The Open Letter and other letters of the UKS administration, which insisted on further opening of the so-called Kosovo issue and made serious accusations against the Albanian administration of the Kosovo Writers' Association. This encouraged the continuation of the crisis production process within the Union. She concludes that behind all of these discursive efforts was a concrete goal of recentralizing the federal literary organization, mastering the Kosovo literary association and discursively supporting the Serbian political elite, which at the same time, at the federal political level, insisted on opening and resolving the so-called Kosovo issue and the issue of unity of the Serbian federal and state unit within Yugoslavia. The author started from the hypothesis that (war) violence, specifically that in Kosovo, against Albanians, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was conceived, among other things, in the words of the Serbian humanistic intelligentsia, which produced discursive/ideological knowledge through which interpreted the past and present of the national community and which aimed to encourage national mobilization and homogenization and put them at the service of a certain political project – the recentralization of the Yugoslav state, of Serbia, strengthening and unification of the imagined and scattered Serbian national-cultural society in Yugoslavia. Through the aforementioned discursive knowledge, a stigmatic image of the barbaric Albanian Other was built, which served to legitimize his exemption from the legal order, i.e. the imposition of a state of emergency and the normalization of violence in Kosovo throughout 1990s. Given that the aim of this paper was to give a meticulous overview of a conjuncture episodes in the work of the Union of Writers of Yugoslavia during 1985 and discursive strategies that would lead to its disintegration in the continuation of the process, and since this topic is still largely subject to politicization, the author let the sources “speak” in the text to the greatest extent possible.

In this paper, we analyze the role and activities of the Supreme Defense Council (SDC) of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) according to the Constitution of FRY from 1992. The decision to establish the FRY, encompassing Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, represented a continuation of the political and territorial restructuring of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ), as well as a basis for further military and political actions aimed at realizing expansionist project. Through the establishment of the SDC and its role in managing the military, especially during the period of aggression, it is evident how political decisions directly influenced military operations, as well as the international position and sanctions that followed in response to the aggressive policy of the FRY. SDC sessions were important for making decisions on military issues, including the appointment, promotion, and dismissal of officers, as well as decisions on military activities. Analysis of SDC session transcripts reveals details about FRY's military involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the formation of the so-called Army of Republika Srpska (VRS). SDC members, the President of FRY, and the Presidents of Serbia and Montenegro, along with other attendees including the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army (VJ), actively participated in military matters and decision-making. This paper also explores the role of FRY in the wars in the former Yugoslavia during the early 1990s, with a particular focus on its relationship with the self-proclaimed Republika Srpska (RS) and participation in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through the lens of logistical, military, and comprehensive support provided by FRY, including attempts to conceal the involvement of military personnel through the 30th Personnel Center, we shed light on its direct involvement in military operations that had a decisive impact on the course of the war. Despite efforts to conceal the role of FRY and its structures in the aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, documents and SDC transcripts reveal enough evidence confirming FRY's crucial role in the preparation, support, and execution of aggression against the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina through RS. The SDC organized and supported activities aimed at supporting the VRS and other military formations, often with a conspiratorial approach. Discussions at SDC sessions covered funding for the VRS, logistics, organization of soldier training, and defense strategy. Military operations, as well as political and military relations within Bosnia and Herzegovina, were particularly analyzed. „Controversial topics“ such as arming the population in Serbia and crimes committed against Bosniaks in Sandžak and Bosnia and Herzegovina were also discussed at the sessions. Relations with the political leaderships of RS and the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK), as well as reactions to losses and defeats, were also important topics at SDC sessions. The sessions also included analysis of political and military events and presentations of the views of FRY President Slobodan Milošević on peace negotiations, military operations, and territorial goals achieved. SDC transcripts provide insight into Slobodan Milošević's acknowledgment of the involvement of the State Security Service (SDB) in the formation, arming, and support of „paramilitary units“ sent to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to the direct involvement of VJ in the aggression, plans for joint military operations were extensively documented, aiming to create a „united state of the Serbian people“. Key figures, such as Ratko Mladić, who were in VRS, remained members of VJ even after the aggression. The SDC continued to exist until 2001 but lost its significance compared to the period from its establishment to the end of 1995.

The authors of this paper analyze the relationship between the two regions from their unilateral declarations until the second half of 1992. The Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina (later the Republic of Serbian Krajina) in Croatia and the Autonomous Region of Krajina (ARK) in the northwestern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina were the first, as formal-legal successors of municipal communities, to be unilaterally formed autonomous regions based on ethnic principles in the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Both were proclaimed by unilateral decisions of the republican organizations of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) both in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina before Slovenia and Croatia declared independence. Immediately after these declarations, politicians from both Krajinas analyzed and publicly presented their views on the future status of the newly formed regions. One of the options was the unification of these two regions into one administrative unit or state, with the most prominent advocates being the leading politicians from both regions. In order to justify the formation of such an administrative unit, reports were published on the necessity of its formation as a separate entity within the “fragmented Yugoslavia” or Greater Serbian state. However, the question arose of how much such unification would diminish the influence of SDS political leaders from Bosnia and Herzegovina and who would actually be the new national leader among the Serbs west of the Drina River? This question, as it turned out, burdened the entire relationship between the political and military leadership in both the Republic of Srpska (RS) and the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) in various phases of the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Despite disagreements and different positions on the unification of the two Krajinas and the question of their status, political and military cooperation was unquestionable in the first two years of aggression against the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cooperation was particularly intense in the second half of 1992 when the 1st and 2nd Krajina Corps of the Army of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/Army of the Republic of Srpska, in cooperation with the police structures of the RSK and the Serbian Army of Krajina (SAK), were jointly tasked with implementing the Six Strategic Goals of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina/Republic of Srpska. This cooperation was particularly evident in the “battle for establishing the corridor” between Krajina and Semberija as the Second Strategic Goal, or joint action in Operation “Corridor '92”. In this paper, we will analyze the period from the end of 1990 and the first half of 1991 when the unilateral declarations of the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina and the Community of Municipalities of Bosnian Krajina (ZOBK), later ARK, occurred, until September 1992 when the decision was made to cease the existence of autonomous regions in the RS. This is the period when mass atrocities were committed against Bosniak and Croatian civilian populations in the RSK and RS. In the second half of 1991, the Bosnian Krajina was a direct war zone from which units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) carried out aggressive operations against Croatia, and in 1992, it became a symbol of crimes against civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Areas under Serbian control became “ethnically cleansed”, and Bihać, as a city under continuous military action from the RS and RSK military forces, became one of the symbols of the siege. The question arises as to whether the strategic goals of the RS could have been realized if the two Krajinas had not closely cooperated? This is precisely one of the questions we will answer. In order to answer such and similar questions, an analysis of the role of military and police structures of both regions is necessary, both in crimes and in military operations in the Bihać region.

The 1992-1995 war in Bosnia generated a significant interest across the Atlantic. For three-and-a-half years, Bosnia was present in the American public life with continuous media reports of the war and the genocide being perpetrated in this part of the Balkans. American policymakers in the George H. W. Bush and the Bill Clinton Administrations grappled with formulating a response to the war. While the executive branch took hesitant steps in response to the war, a number of American legislators led the way in seeking an assertive US role in Bosnia. Before the war broke out in Bosnia in spring 1992, several American legislators had taken an interest in the crisis in the rapidly dissolving Yugoslavia. Bob Dole, the Kansan Republican, was a leading voice calling for a tougher response. From 1992 onwards, Dole was joined by a number of other senators and congressmen on both sides of the aisle in advocating for air strikes and a lifting of the UN-imposed arms embargo on Bosnia. These congressional Bosnia hawks led a sustained campaign aimed at keeping the US focused on Bosnia and adopted landmark legislation in support of the newly independent state in Southeast Europe. Senator Richard Lugar, an Indiana Republican and an influential voice on foreign affairs, did not belong to this core group of congressional Bosnia hawks. These hawks, including Senators Bob Dole and Joseph Lieberman, and Representative Frank McCloskey, along with a dozen other legislators, were at the forefront of congressional efforts to shape America’s policy towards Bosnia. Unlike these Bosnia hawks, Lugar did not lead the charge in seeking to steer US policy towards Bosnia. The Indiana Republican was neither a persistent advocate on Bosnia which was a characteristic of the congressional Bosnia hawks. But, he did weigh in on Bosnia starting in 1992 and advocated the use of American force in response to the war in Bosnia. Lugar also voted in favour of a series of legislative efforts aimed at supporting Bosnia from the Capitol Hill. This moderate support was still significant for Bosnia as the state mounted a determined defense of its statehood and citizens from 1992 to 1995. Lugar’s Senate papers located at Indiana University Libraries in Bloomington, IN offer insights into how the veteran senator viewed Bosnia and the policies that he advocated. To date, no study of Lugar’s policy towards Bosnia has been researched and his papers on Bosnia represent a first in-depth look at the senator’s views on the war. Drawing on these original documents, this paper seeks to piece together the story of how Senator Lugar reacted to the Bosnian War. It is a story of his support for Bosnia but one which was neither persistent nor forceful compared to Bob Dole and other pro-Bosnia voices on Capitol Hill. Still, as an independent and internationalist Republican, Lugar left a mark on his nation’s foreign policy including towards Bosnia. This paper, then, further seeks to contribute to the existing literature on the variety of America’s responses to the Bosnian War but also to shed light on Senator Lugar’s little-known effort to shape the US policy towards Bosnia in the early 1990s.

In the Journal of the Institute for Recent History of Serbia, Belgrade – “Tokovi istorije”, 3/2022, among other articles, an “Original scientific paper” was published, in English, by dr. Zoran Janjetović, a scientific advisor in the mentioned Institute, on the Emigration of the Kosovo Albanians into Turkey during the 1950s of the 20th century. In the same article, the author rightly partially referred to the question of the emigration of the rest of the Muslim population of Yugoslavia to Turkey, before and after the Second World War. After reading and analysing the such article, I came to the conclusion that the mentioned paper is certainly original, but, in my opinion, by no means scientific. In other words, in the time when almost all archival material is available for the research of the mentioned problem, to conclude that the emigration of Albanians, Turks, Boshniaks and other Muslims of Kosovo and the FPR of Yugoslavia as a whole, in Turkey, after the Second World War, was free/ according to their free will, in my opinion and deep conviction, is beyond all logic and historical truth. For example, the conclusions of Mr. Zoran Janjetović: a) „…partial emigration of ethnic Turks was acceptable, but the emigration of all Muslims, especially Albanians, was considered politically harmful. To prevent this, the Macedonian territory was divided into 'blocks' based on the number of ethnic Turks. Emigration was permitted from areas with a larger number of Turks, but not from those with a smaller number“; b) „The Yugoslav and Serbian authorities opposed the emigration of non-Turks from the very beginning, and this policy remained in place for a long time, especially for Muslims outside of Macedonia. Claims by some Western authors that the 'Serbian' authorities allegedly wanted to expel Albanians are unfounded. On the contrary, until 1957, the authorities in Serbia were against emigration from Kosovo, and the Federal government also wanted to limit emigration only to Macedonian Turks “; and, c) „The Muslims started to emigrate to Turkey after a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ of 1953 between Tito and Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü. The agreement foresaw emigration of ethnic Turks from Macedonia, but other Muslims tended to join them. Because of that the Yugoslav authorities strove to limit emigration only to Turkish - inhabited parts of Macedonia. This failed because Muslims came to Macedonia from other parts of the country in order to emigrate. Among these emigrants there was a certain number of Kosovo Albanians. Like the Turks, they emigrated for religious, economic and social reasons… The article shows that the Yugoslav authorities in no way supported Albanian emigration, but rather that they tried to stop it“, in my opinion, are untrue and scientifically unfounded. In other words, according to my knowledge, and as cited in my book and in several of my articles on this subject, the mass emigration of the Muslim population, including the emigration of the Albanians from Yugoslavia to Turkey, after the Second World War started аs a result of the flagrant abuse of the mentioned bilateral agreement, by the Yugoslav/ Macedonian authorities. The emigration to Turkey was allowed not only to a small portion of Turks, as previously was agreed upon, but rather to the Turkish and the rest of the Muslim population as a whole. That the stated conclusions of Mr. Z. Janjetović are not correct, among other things, is confirmed by the final result of the mass emigration not only the Turks, but also a large number of Albanians and other Muslim populations.

When Austria-Hungary occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, it brought many social and cultural changes. One of them was suppressing the widespread culture of holding and carrying arms that existed in Ottoman Bosnia. Holding arms was still possible but under strict control. Firearm holders were, therefore, a very tiny, privileged group inside society. In this paper, we analyze the ethnic/religious and social structure of this group in the case of the Tuzla Circle in 1904. How large was this group? Were there differences along ethnic and social lines in terms of firearm holding rates? These are the key questions we are seeking answers to in this paper, with an aim to get the first insight into the broader picture of firearm holding in the entire province under the Monarchy’s control.

Digital technologies permeate almost all spheres of human lives in contemporary times, affecting a number of aspects of people’s lives. Such is the case with cultural rights as well, especially in the cases of certain groups. The paper is focused on the impact of digital technologies on these rights of d/Deaf and hard-of-hearing people. The theoretical framework of the paper defines the concepts of culture and general and specific cultural rights, as well as the labels of deaf, Deaf and hard-of-hearing. Then, an overview of relevant digital technologies is provided, with an evaluation of the impact they have on these cultural rights. Finally, possible strategies for improvement are broadly defined, and a conclusion is provided, summarizing the results of the research done.

In the introductory part of the paper, the most important explanations about the concept and nature of digital assets are given, serving as a guide in understanding the titled topic. The subsequent sections focus on some of the challenging practical issues related to it: whether digital assets can be a contribution to a company, can dividend be paid to shareholders in the form of digital assets, and what are the key conditions that companies must meet in order to provide digital asset services. The last lines of the paper summarize the findings and contain observations on the legal and practical potential of digital assets in the context of companies’ business operations, both in current and the times to come. The research is conducted from the perspective of basic group of regulations of the Republic of Serbia, i.e. provisions that are most relevant for the analysis of the aforementioned questions.

Would the neuroscientist who does not feel pain know what he is studying? In this paper, the author analyzes the subjective ontology of conscious mental states and its origin – the subject’s first-person perspective. The ontology of the mental is irreducibly first-person ontology. In the thought experiment with neuroscientist Peter, it will be shown that a comprehensive science of consciousness requires a combined approach, as the phenomena of neuroscience are internally defined. The asymmetry between first-person and third-person perspectives regarding mental states will be strongly emphasized. The third part of the paper will offer a perspectival approach to the hard problem of consciousness. In conclusion, a truly objective science of subjectivity, a genuine science of consciousness, would have to engage scientifically with the subject’s egocentric first-person perspective.

This paper aims to illustrate the constant quest of the leadership of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) for an effective economic policy after 1965 and to provide an answer, among other things, to the question of how much the projected economic decentralization due to reform measures contributed to overall socio-political dispersion. Faced with serious financial and economic challenges, the state leadership sought to find a model that would keep them on ideologically defined tracks while also allowing for breadth and integration into global economic currents. In these efforts, the general geopolitical position of Yugoslavia as a country that remained “somewhere in between” by the agreement of major powers after Second World War was reflected, thus best illustrating the historical destiny of the entire Balkan Peninsula, especially the area predominantly inhabited by South Slavs. To explain the topic as a materialized concept and to question it in this way, works of authors who dealt with the political economy of Yugoslavia as both creators and critics were used. Using the example of the implementation of autonomous economic policy by the Bosnian-Herzegovinian political elite during this period, the aim is to open up space for critical thinking about the actual possibilities and roles of the republics, and to try to discern whether they could truly be fully independent in their economic programs. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced economic momentum alongside overall social transformation during this period, the actions of its political leadership did not always encompass all economic flows of the republic through their actions and planning. This is most vividly evidenced by well-known examples of economic manipulation behind which central authorities (so-called “guardians and executors of the revolution”) stood, and which were subsequently abused before and during the disappearance of the common state. In this regard, an overview of the development of the idea of self-management by Yugoslav ideologues is provided, the phases of ideological development are presented, as well as the difficulties faced by the concept itself, and the independent political course of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian political leadership, or the overall socio-political context in which “independence” began to be practiced. Specifically concerning the position of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian political elite towards reforms, a quite interesting detail was noticed. Namely, although a high level of decentralization was achieved through constitutional amendments (1968-1971) and clearly defined separate republican markets, decisions were made differently at the level of the Federation, i.e., in its remaining functions. By outvoting. Taking this into account, a conclusion naturally emerged and set the development of the self-management economic system between the utopian aspirations of ideologues and the realpolitik actions of party and military hawks, which then created significant cracks within the system and favored the emergence of gray areas whose existence partly generated the great economic crisis during the 1980s.

This paper explains that Bulgaria took the responsibility to be the only country to recognise the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina already in January 1992, with the deep conviction that only in this way equality could be achieved between all former Yugoslav republics, and specifically for Bosnia and Herzegovina – the impending tragedy could be prevented. The chronological framework of the article presents Bulgarian foreign policy from the mid-1980s to the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s statehood in April 1992. In the early 1990s Bulgaria had a special interest and a specific concern regarding the process of rethinking the existing relations between the detached republics in the multinational Yugoslav federation. When negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia ended in failure in the spring of 1991, the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry developed a new approach in relations with Yugoslavia. The emphasis shifted from contacts with the leadership of the federation to contacts with the leaderships of the republics. As soon as Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence on June 25, 1991, the official Bulgarian position followed that of the European Community (EC), which had initially advocated the preservation of the Yugoslav federation. At the same time, Sofia expressed its principled view that the individual Yugoslav republics were free to exercise their inalienable right to self-determination. Already during the early autumn of 1991, Sofia officially received guests at government level from Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia. After them, Bulgaria’s attention turned to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Bulgarian ambassador in Belgrade visited Sarajevo on 22 and 23 October 1991. He held an impressive number of meetings covering the whole spectrum of state and party institutions. At the end of 1991 Bulgaria was preparing to establish full relations with the Yugoslav republics. It was ready to recognise their independence, but it had stated an official position that it would synchronise concrete steps in this respect with the moves of the EC. The positions of Turkey and Greece were also important for Bulgaria. On January 13, 1992, the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry decided to include Bosnia and Herzegovina „in a package” with the other Yugoslav republics to be recognised as independent states. The Bulgarian government’s decision was officially announced on 15 January 1992. Some Bulgarian politicians had some concerns about Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had not even yet held a referendum on secession from Yugoslavia. The opinion of the Bulgarian Prime Minister Philip Dimitrov was decisive: „It was more beneficial for me to look incompetent in constitutional and legal terms on the issue of Bosnia than to create a mess for me and be one of the people who encouraged Milosevic to enter Bosnia”. Although it claimed that it was relying on the criteria adopted by the EC, Bulgaria actually went much further than the EC, which only recognised Slovenia and Croatia. Sofia’s recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina was symbolically important because it came in a moment of rising extreme internal conflict when the whole of Europe was silent and hesitant how to react.

This work provides an analysis of the “Safarnameh” written by the Persian traveler Haji Pirzada Naeini in 1887. The focus of this paper was specifically on those segments which detail his passage through Romania and Bulgaria, through the cities of Bucharest, Giurgiu, Ruse and Varna. In his travelogue he provides interesting descriptions of these settlements, as well as giving information on presence of Persian citizens in these areas during the second half of the 19th century.

Hans Seybolt was a monastery scribe from Lower Bavaria who lived in the second half of the 15th century. In 1476, he attended the wedding between the Hungarian king Matthias Corvinus and the Neapolitan princess Beatrix as an envoy of the count of the Palatinate. He left a detailed report about that event, which is preserved as a transcript in the only copy that is in the State Library of Bavaria under the signature Cgm 331. Seybolt's report also contains brief information about the Bosnian king Nicholas of Ilok and his son Lawrence, which are the subject of this paper's analysis.

During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1992-1995, the special library of the Oriental Institute was destroyed. A significant contribution in the process of restoration and replenishment of the library fund in the post-war period was made by the Hamid Hadžibegić’s personal library, which arrived as a gift at the Oriental Institute in 2001. The library has over 1,000 publications that belonged to this established scientist and researcher of the past of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose basic research had a strong influence in the scientific universe of Ottoman history researchers. This paper presents the dedications of colleagues and friends in his books and journals as cultural reminders and documentary records that, with their structure, text, dating and signature, represent a source of significant information about the life and work of this scientist.

The goal of this article is to explore – from the given theoretical framework – the effectiveness of the European Union’s data protection capabilities, namely through the General Data Protection Regulation. The first and second sections develop the theory of control societies – as well as its historical background – and connects it with the theory of surveillance capitalism as its essential component. The third section delas with some critiques that have arisen in the few years after the GDPR came into force. The conclusion of the paper is that, only a few years after the GDPR came into force, it is still too early to decisively say what effect will it have on the big data industry. However, from the problems that have been elaborated, it seems unlikely that the big data industry will be meaningfully challenged when it comes to data protection.