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In the early period of Yi Dynasty of Korea, currency and physical transactions were parallel, and the market order was chaotic. During the reign of Emperor Taejong, the Banknote Law was established and carried out, and measures such as replacing physical objects with paper money, establishing joint purchase houses and determining the crime of hiding cloth were adopted to enhance currency credit. Although the law promoted circulation, monetary reform was not smooth. In this study, based on the economic historical data of the dynasty and the game theory method, the author find that the Yi Dynasty tries to improve the relationship between the state and the grassroots society and explore new economic policies through national finance and monetary reform. The failure of monetary reform is not only a policy failure, but also a consequence of uneven distribution of interests among different subjects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Control Theory & Applications / Kongzhi Lilun Yu Yinyong is the property of Editorial Department of Control Theory & Applications and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Automobile Technology is the property of Automobile Technology Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Railway Science & Engineering is the property of Journal of Railway Science & Engineering Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Engineering Management / Gongcheng Guanli Xuebao is the property of Journal of Engineering Management Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Chinese Journal of Intelligent Science & Technology is the property of Beijing Xintong Media Co., Ltd. and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Nankai Business Review is the property of Nankai Business Review Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Rural Water & Hydropower is the property of China Rural Water & Hydropower Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In view of the large number of joint power stations in the basin but the existence of disputes in the distribution of benefits, a more reasonable method of benefit distribution for cascade power stations is proposed. Based on Shapley value method and TOPSIS method, considering the contribution of power stations and the relative satisfaction of power stations with different objective allocation methods, this paper establishes a compensation benefit allocation model of cascade power stations based on TOPSIS-Shapley value method. At the same time, in order to solve the limitation of Shapley value method in solving the problem of joint scheduling gain allocation of multi-stakeholder cascade power stations, the paper introduces the idea of aggregation dimension reduction. The idea of the model is as follows : the increment of the cascade power generation benefits before and after the joint dispatching of the upstream power station is taken as the compensation benefit. Firstly, four different objective allocation methods are used to calculate the characteristic parameter indexes of the power station to form the basic decision matrix of TOPSIS. The TOPSIS principle is used to obtain the relative satisfaction of the power station to each allocation method. At the same time, the coalition game theory is used to calculate the power generation benefits of all possible coalition modes of the power station, and the compensation benefit allocation results based on Shapley value are obtained. Finally, the allocation coefficient obtained by TOPSIS principle is combined with the allocation coefficient obtained by Shapley value method to form a comprehensive allocation weight, which is applied to the compensation benefit allocation of eight-stage power station in the upper reaches of the Heihe River. The engineering application example shows that the method not only considers the marginal contribution of the union power station to the whole and the satisfaction degree of each power station, but also takes into account the difference of the characteristic index of the power station, and reasonably quantifies and distributes the power generation compensation benefit among the power stations. The allocation result is fair and reasonable and easy to be accepted by all parties, which can promote the power stations at all levels in the basin to participate in the joint dispatching so as to achieve the goal of maximizing the overall benefit. It has an important reference significance for the distribution of compensation benefits of a large number of cascade hydropower stations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to investigate the dynamic stress characteristics of runner and distributor of pump-turbine, this paper establishes the solid domain models of stay vanes, guide vanes and runner, and carries out the FSI-based computation of runner and distributor. The calculation results show that the stress concentration at the "T" junction between the runner blade and crown is related to the vortex development state at the runner inlet the dynamic and static interference between runner and guide vanes is the main source of pressure pulsation in the vaneless zone, where the main frequency is the blade passing frequency ; the dynamic stress of guide vanes and runner is generally high because the pump-turbine is easily involved in the unstable area while working under smaller GVO (guide vanes opening) or low head conditions. The dynamic stress of guide vanes is greater than that of the runner owing to its constraint guidance effect on water flow, and increased flow rate is beneficial to reducing the dynamic stress of the runner. So for the purpose of improving the dynamic stress of runner, the measures could be ime, in order to solve the limitation of Shapley value method in solving the problem of joint scheduling gain allocation of multi-stakeholder cascade power stations, the paper introduces the idea of aggregation dimension reduction. The idea of the model is as follows : the increment of the cascade power generation benefits before and after the joint dispatching of the upstream power station is taken as the compensation benefit. Firstly, four different objective allocation methods are used to calculate the characteristic parameter indexes of the power station to form the basic decision matrix of TOPSIS. The TOPSIS principle is used to obtain the relative satisfaction of the power station to each allocation method. At the same time, the coalition game theory is used to calculate the power generation benefits of all possible coalition modes of the power station, and the compensation benefit allocation results based on Shapley value are obtained. Finally, the allocation coefficient obtained by TOPSIS principle is combined with the allocation coefficient obtained by Shapley value method to form a comprehensive allocation weight, which is applied to the compensation benefit allocation of eight-stage power station in the upper reaches of the Heihe River. The engineering application example shows that the method not only considers the marginal contribution of the union power station to the whole and the satisfaction degree of each power station, but also takes into account the difference of the characteristic index of the power station, and reasonably quantifies and distributes the power generation compensation benefit among the power stations. The allocation result is fair and reasonable and easy to be accepted by all parties, which can promote the power stations at all levels in the basin to participate in the joint dispatching so as to achieve the goal of maximizing the overall benefit. It has an important reference significance for the distribution of compensation benefits of a large number of cascade hydropower stations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Power Generation Technology is the property of Power Generation Technology Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Engineering Management / Gongcheng Guanli Xuebao is the property of Journal of Engineering Management Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Railway Science & Engineering is the property of Journal of Railway Science & Engineering Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Nankai Business Review is the property of Nankai Business Review Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Control Theory & Applications / Kongzhi Lilun Yu Yinyong is the property of Editorial Department of Control Theory & Applications and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

[Objective] Sunflower is a cash crop grown in arid northwestern China. Improving its water use efficiency plays an important role in developing water-saving agriculture in that region. The aim of this paper is to find an optimal regulated and mulched deficit drip irrigation scheduling for it. [Method] The experiment was conducted in 2019-2020 in a sunflower field at Hexi Oasis. Water deficit was imposed at seedling and maturity stages, with soil water in other growing stages kept sufficient for roots to extract. Overall, there were six treatments, with the water deficit induced by keeping the soil water content at 75%~65% (mild), 65%~55% (moderate) and 55%~45% (severe) of the field capacity, respectively. The control was sufficient irrigation with the soil water content kept at 75%~85% of the field capacity. Each treatment had three replicas, which were designed using the completely random block experiment arrangement. The experimental results were analyzed using an improved fuzzy matter-element model coupled with the weighted game theory to quantify the effect of different water deficits on yield and quality, as well as water productivity of the crop. [Result] The effect of water deficit on the crop traits varied. A multi-level evaluation system revealed that in 2019, crop height had the highest weight (0.141) and the crude protein content had the least (0.083), while in 2020, crude fat content had the highest weight (0.162) and water use efficiency had the least (0.065). Comprehensive evaluation of the fuzzy matter-element model showed that the Euclidean degree was the best for a combination of mild or moderate water deficit at seedling stage and mild water deficit at maturity stage. [Conclusion] When water is sufficient, a mild regulated deficit irrigation (RDI) at the seedling stage coupled with a mild RDI at the maturity stage produces the highest seed yield, while when water is insufficient, a moderate RDI at the seedling stage combined with a mild RDI at the maturity stage works the best. The proposed model for optimizing regulated deficit irrigation is applicable not only for sunflower watered by mulched drip irrigation, but also for other crops irrigated by other methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Control Theory & Applications / Kongzhi Lilun Yu Yinyong is the property of Editorial Department of Control Theory & Applications and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Consensus algorithm based on credit has significant advantages in consensus efficiency and security, which has received great attention from academy and industry in recent years. This paper made a comparative analysis of the current consensus algorithms based on credit to provide reference for researchers to study in depth. Firstly, this paper systematically reviewed the state-of-the-art consensus algorithms based on credit, gave its development history, classification and core working principle, and summarized its credit calculation model and performance evaluation indicators. Secondly, it analyzed the creditbased consensus algorithms qualitatively and quantitatively, and pointed out their advantages and disadvantages. Finally, aiming at the problems of insufficient credit incentive and low integration with the consensus process in the state-of-the-art consensus algorithms, this paper proposed to optimize from the credit incentive based on game theory and designing efficient communication topology, and gave the future research direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As an active defense technology, cyber mimic defense uses heterogeneous redundancy and dynamic feedback mechanism to constantly adjust the execution envinument of defense system to resist attacks. However, in the face of diverse at tack methods of hackers, it is unsafe to resist attacks by only relying on cyber mimic defense. In order to enhance the security defense capability of the system, this paper proposed a more reasonable defense selection method based on the existing defense system. It applied evolutionary game theory of bounded rationality to cyber mimic defense, constructed a three-party evolutionary game model consisting of attackers, defenders and legitimate users, and proposed a solution method for the optimal defense strat- egy. This game model used the replication dynamic equation to obtain evolutionary stable strategy. The simulation results show that the system can reduce the loss and restrain the attack behavior by implementing the evolutionary stable strategy of reasoning, which has certain reference significance for the selection of defense strategy and security enhancement in cyber minie defense [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Pearl River is the property of Pearl River Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Railway Science & Engineering is the property of Journal of Railway Science & Engineering Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper studies the influence of government poverty alleviation policy and altruistic preference on supply chain decision-making in a supply chain consisting of one supplier and two manufacturers. The two manufacturers produce poverty alleviation products and non-poverty alleviation products (general products) respectively, which are competing in the same market, and the manufacturer who produces poverty alleviation products chooses a level of investment and receives government subsidies. The dynamic game model is established to analyze the influence of government subsidy rate, supplier altruistic preference and market share of poverty alleviation products on supply chain decision-making. Through numerical analysis, the effectiveness of supply chain in poverty alleviation is analyzed from the perspective of absolute poverty and relative poverty. The results show that enhancing these three factors (government subsidy rate, supplier altruistic preference and market share of poverty alleviation products) can effectively improve the level of poverty alleviation investment, the output of poverty alleviation products, the market price and the profit of poverty alleviation product manufacturers, however the profit of general product manufacturers is decreased. The market share of poverty alleviation products and the intensity of competition between these two products are key factors which are influencing the effect of poverty alleviation. Increasing the market share of government subsidies or poverty-relief products can effectively increase the profit of suppliers and the overall profit of supply chain, which provides a foundation for supply chain members to realize Pareto improvement. The conclusion provides theoretical reference for the stabilization and marketization of poverty-relief products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Acta Materiae Compositae Sinica is the property of Acta Materiea Compositae Sinica Editorial Department and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Industrial Minerals & Processing / Huagong Kuangwu yu Jiagong is the property of Industrial Minerals & Processing Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Shanghai Jiao Tong University (1006-2467) is the property of Journal of Shanghai Jiao Tong University Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Under the new media environment, while enjoying the convenient information interaction channels provided by different forms of online social networks, it is necessary to strengthen the management and guidance of information dissemination to prevent it from developing into a medium for the wanton dissemination of negative public opinion information. Combining traditional evolutionary game theory and complex network theory, this paper proposed a network dissemination game model of competitive public opinion information, and theoretically analyzed the profit conditions and the group size of positive public opinion information dissemination. Then, combined with actual cases, this paper compared and analyzed the evolution characteristics of network public opinion under three game environments through simulation experiments. In the three game environments, the dominant conditions of the positive public opinion information communication strategy were all related to the income, and the weak selection scenario h ad the most stringent requirements for the return parameters ;the conditions for the dominant strategy in the strong and weak selection scenarios were also related to the group size, the strong selection scenario had stricter requirements on the size of the group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Natural Disasters is the property of Gai Kan Bian Wei Hui and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the context of promoting the integration of smart cities, the pace of construction of smart chemical parks is gradually accelerating.Since accidents in China’s chemical industry have occurred frequently in recent years, causing great damage and loss to public safety, improving the safety management and emergency response capability of chemical parks is an urgent need to be solved.For this kind of safety problems, this paper proposed a game patrol strategy for hazardous gas leakage in chemical parks.Firstly, the convective diffusion model was used to describe the process of hazardous gas leakage.Secondly, game theory was introduced to model the confrontation process between the attacking and defending parties in the patrol problem, and the response time of the defenders to a safety incident was correlated with its benefit.Then, a multilinear programming-based GGC algorithm was proposed to solve this game model.Finally, the gains of the game model in this paper were compared with the other two basic methods in the scenarios of three real chemical park case with different sizes.The results show that the model can effectively improve the gains of the defender and reduce the gains of the attacker.

Copyright of Advances in New & Renewable Energy is the property of Editorial Office of Advances in New & Renewable Energy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Silk is the property of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University Magazines and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Natural Resources / Ziran Ziyuan Xuebao is the property of Journal of Natural Resources and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Water Conservancy Science & Techonlogy & Economy is the property of Water Conservancy Science & Technology & Economy Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Wool Textile Journal is the property of National Wool Textile Science & Technology Information Center and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Control Theory & Applications / Kongzhi Lilun Yu Yinyong is the property of Editorial Department of Control Theory & Applications and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Beijing University of Technology is the property of Journal of Beijing University of Technology, Editorial Department and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Shanghai University / Shanghai Daxue Xuebao is the property of Journal of Shanghai University (Natural Sciences) Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In order to alleviate the user's " knowledge obsession" problem and improve knowledge application and innovation efficiency, this paper proposed a knowledge matching method that combined three-way decision and GRA-Orthopair fuzzy sets . First, this paper used CRITIC-entropy method for weight configuration, and integrated sgame theory methods to enhance the objective weighting effect ; then, it used the FCM clustering algorithm to compress the matching space horizontally; and then, it used the three-way decision ideas to implement pre-classification, considered the inter-knowledge relevance degree, constructed Orthopair fuzzy similarity model based on gray relevance degree, and calculated the view similarity between user needs and case knowledge based on this, so as to determine the matching result. Experimental results show that this algorithm is better than traditional matching algorithms in knowledge matching accuracy and efficiency,and improves the matching effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the location service of the mobile user, people uses location k-anonymity technology to protect the privacy of users. However, it is difficult to ensure the honest cooperation behavior of the requesting user and the collaborative user in the user collaborative k-anonymous group. Aiming at the above problems, firstly, based on the complete information static game theory, this paper analyzed the behavioral policies of requesting users and honest users, and calculated the requesting users' integrity threshold. The collaborative user decided whether to participate in the anonymous group construction according to the comparison between the request threshold and the cooperation threshold. Secondly, this paper built a reputation mechanism to combine users' recent performance with the benefits, restricted the untrustworthy behavior of the requesting users and the collaborative users who participate in the anonymous group construction. Finally, it used the blockchain to store the game process and the location information of the collaborative users. When discovering the dishonest behavior of requesting users and collaborating users, this paper would punish the dishonest users by reducing their reputation and profit. Security analysis shows that this solution can effectively protect the user' s location privacy, promote the integrity cooperation between the requesting user and the collaborative user, and encourage more people to participate in the construction of the anonymous zone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Ordnance Equipment Engineering is the property of Chongqing University of Technology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Beijing University of Technology is the property of Journal of Beijing University of Technology, Editorial Department and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

To better solve the problem of defense lag in the APT attack-defense confrontation process, and make optimal active defense decisions under the limited resources, this paper analyzed the characteristics that attacker and defender' s objectives and strategies evolve over the APT attack phase, then established an multi-stage APT-oriented attack-defense stochastic game model ( AO-ADSG) based on the non-cooperative game theory. Aiming at the fact that the utility of APT attacker and defender were unequal, this paper designed the all-assets-elements utility quantification method conforming to the APT attack features based on non-zero sum game. Analyzing the game equilibrium, it proposed the optimal active defense strategy selection algorithm. Finally, the simulation experiment of Night Dragon verifies the feasibility and correctness of the proposed method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The traditional virus propagation models on WSN gives out the infection probability and recovery probability directly without analysis of the reasons for its value. From the perspective of the game theory, this paper analyzed the microscopic mechanism of virus propagation in WSN _ By building and analyzing the attack-defense game model, it obtained the mixed Nash equilibrium solution of the modeL With the solution, it deduced the infection probability and cure probability and then established the theoretical model for virus propagation in WSN _ Meanwhile, this paper simulated viruses' propagation process with cellular automata method. The theoretical analysis and simulation results reveal the relationship between the propagation speed and the game parameters. The results of this study have certain guiding significance for the formulation of measures to suppress the propagation of viruses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal on Communication / Tongxin Xuebao is the property of Journal on Communications Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper aims at the problem of ammunition scheduling strategies. The differences of demand for time and security among different forces are considered in the case of a fight. The multi⁃objective problem is measured by the game theory，and then the ammunition scheduling strategy is optimized by the genetic algorithm. The simulation results show that the game theory constructed in this paper can more rationally optimize the ammunition scheduling strategies with different demand in different cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Participants have the opportunity to enter into agreements with their neighboring participants to cooperate in network game. At this point, the game relationship between the participants constitutes a network structure, and can be represented by an undirected graph. Participants can cooperate between their neighboring participants according to the network structure and distribute surplus income between two participants through bargaining. Based on the bargaining theory and matching theory, this paper studies how to sign agreements to cooperate among participants in the network game environment, and analyzes how to allocate the benefit of surplus income through bargaining, which is called the network bargaining game, and find the form of the basic feasible solution. By limiting the number of agreements that participants can sign, this paper classifies the network bargaining game, and uses the bargaining and matching methods to study the specific forms of reasonable solutions for each type of network bargaining games. The results of this paper show that the cooperation of participants and the distribution of the benefits of cooperation are not only related to the network game itself, but also related to the number of cooperation agreements that participants can sign. The research expands the application of bargaining method for network bargaining game, and provides decision-making references for multilateral cooperation among participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Data Acquisition & Processing / Shu Ju Cai Ji Yu Chu Li is the property of Editorial Department of Journal of Nanjing University of Aeronautics & Astronautics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The intelligent container system improves the container operation efficiency through the real-time collection and transmission of information.In order to ensure the ultra reliable and low delay communication of container terminals,this paper pro-poses to transmit the information in the form of the short packets,and studies the sum rate maximization of the uplink transmission system for the railway container terminals in the multi cells.This paper proposes a spectrum resource allocation problem.Multiple cells share spectrum resources,and the terminals in the cells obtain the spectrum through competition.The game theory model is used to construct this competition relationship,and Nash equilibrium solution is proved.The best Nash equilibrium solution is the global optimal solution for system and rate maximization.Then,a distributed iterative algorithm is designed,which only needs local information interaction.It is proved theoretically that when the smoothing coefficient is small enough,the algorithm can converge to the best Nash equilibrium point with any high probability.Finally,the proposed algorithm is verified by simulation.Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm has fast convergence speed and is better than best response dynamics(BRD) algorithm and No-regret algorithm.

A network system is composed of a couple of subsystems connected with mechanisms or communication. Such a system has a high probability of faults because of its complex structure and changeable coupling mechanisms. With the rapid development of artificial intelligence technology in recent years, network systems are threatened by physical faults and malicious decisions. This paper summarizes current research results on fault-tolerant control and fault-tolerant optimization. Then, following the development of the fault-tolerant game, the relevant research results are summarized from the game control to the fault-tolerant game for physical faults and malicious agents. Further, the applications of the game theory on unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) swarms are summarized. Finally, several research directions that are worth investigating in the future are presented. This review could promote the development of fault-tolerant game in the field of aerospace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After comparing and analyzing the Chinese and Western traditional sports thoughts from the perspective of body philosophy, this paper holds that although there are differences between Chinese and Western traditional sports thought, there are also similarities. From the perspective of body philosophy analysis and comparison of Chinese and Western traditional sports thought, we can not only find the differences between the two ideological theory system in the cognitive style and practice, in practice level, but also find the direction of integration of Chinese and Western traditional sports. The theory of somatics is connected with the integration of body & mind in Chinese traditional sports. The integration of aesthetics and "body & morality" of Chinese traditional sports is theoretically integrated. The game theory and the "body & spirit" of Chinese traditional sports are integrated in thought. The integration of Chinese and Western traditional sports thoughts is not only the integration of Chinese and Western sports culture, but also the fusion of Chinese excellent traditional sports culture and modern Olympic culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public buses have unique characteristics, such as fixed moving paths and time periods, uniform vehicular device standards, low risk of privacy exposure. This paper designed a public bus network-based vehicular crowd sensing system, considering the characteristics of public buses. In the system, data center utilized public buses of the bus network to collect urban data which was required by data users. It also studied the task assignment problem and the data trading problem in the system. This paper proposed an optimized task assignment strategy based on a greedy algorithm to minimize the system energy consumption of data collection, and proposed an optimal data trading strategy based on game theory to maximize the system utility. Finally, numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]