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Copyright of South Architecture / Nanfang Jianzhu is the property of South Architecture Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Society: Chinese Journal of Sociology / Shehui is the property of Society: Chinese Journal of Sociology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Smart Rail Transit is the property of Smart Rail Transit Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Population Resources & Environment is the property of Shandong Normal University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China mentioned that China is facing tightening resource and environmental constraints, environmental pollution, and other issues, and the energy-consuming right trading policy is a key measure to promote green, circular, and low-carbon development in China. Under the dual consideration of ecological benefits and economic benefits, this paper took the pilot launch of energy-consuming trading as a quasi-natural experiment and used panel data from 31 provinces in China from 2009 to 2020 and the different-in-differences method to explore the impact of this policy on the optimization and upgrading of China's industrial structure. The study showed that: (J) The energy-consuming right trading policy could promote the optimization and upgrading of the industrial structure, and the promotion effect on the upgrading of the industrial structure outweighed its adverse impact on the rationalization of the industrial structure, as evidenced by a series of robustness tests. © The mechanism analysis showed that the realization paths of industrial structure upgrading were the upgrading of technological innovation and that of energy consumption structure, and the policy suppressed the adverse impact on the rationalization of industrial structure by improving the input structure and output structure of some industrial sectors. © In addition, the pilot policy of energy-consuming rights had obvious regional heterogeneity for the optimization and upgrading of industrial structure, which significantly promoted the upgrading of industrial structure in the central and western regions and the rationalization of industrial structure in the eastern regions. This study provides some policy references for the optimization and upgrading of industrial structure from the perspective of improving the energy-consuming right trading market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, there is a debate among scholars on the issue whether the CCP will maintain its upward resilience that has been attained since the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown or has begun a trend of decaying toward ultimate distinction. On the one hand, Andrew Nathan, a political scientist at Columbia University, among others, has argued that, despite the numerous severe challenges, the authoritarian Communist regime has successfully found a way out in how to survive in the new era. British scholar Martin Jacques goes so far as to argue that the CCP has been constructing an advantageous "civilization state" on the basis of the Confucianism as opposed to the declining "nation state" in the West. On the other, while acknowledging the achievements of the CCP, political scientist Minxin Pei points out that China's prosperity is not sustainable and will inevitably decay once the economy starts recession. This paper examines three major cases of the administrative litigation such as "The Virgin Prostitute," "Wang Peirong vs. Local Government," and "The Waitan Garden" all of which occurred in the new century and have attracted national attention. This paper argues that there is no doubt that the CCP has made certain headways in protecting people's right. Yet, all three cases show that the progress has been quite limited and much needs to be done before people could challenge governmental misconducts. The linchpin to improve the administrative litigation and avert a downturn in the fate of the CCP lies in no other than the hands of the CCP itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Central China Normal University is the property of Huazhong Normal University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Corruption is one of the major issues that hinder the national governance and national development of Mainland China. Scholars of development studies in China have paid much attention in this issue. Also, the Chinese government tries to impose effective control to prevent corruption from damaging Communist Party rule. Taking these factors into account, this paper is going to present, through analysis and induction, all of the possible factors which have resulted in China's political corruption. These corruption factors, though complex and diverse, can be categorized into two major types: intrinsic and extrinsic. This paper also reckons that "the existence of a solicitous margin", "a weak monitoring and countering mechanism", "opportunistic cost of lesser corruptive act", "the motivation of government pillage", "the absence of a positive official motivation system", and "the disturbance of a negative motivation system against corruption" are among the major intrinsic variables which have led to government officials' political corruption, while "administrative monopolization" is an extrinsic variable which has exacerbated the problem of corruption. If, in fact, they are indeed the key factors leading to corruption within China, then finding solutions to them could be a feasible way to curtail the government officials' corrupt practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Technology Economics is the property of Chinese Society of Technology Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Technology Economics is the property of Chinese Society of Technology Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)