Search

The scarcity of resources in the environment determines the inevitable conflict between economic growth and environmental protection, and the environment as a public good determines that environmental protection and ecological management should be included in the scope of government regulation. Taking the panel data of 30 Chinese provinces (municipalities and autonomous regions) as the sample, this study first constructed the index system of high-quality economic development with the five major development concepts of 'innovation, coordination, openness, greenness, and sharing' as the guide. Based on the shortcomings of the existing measurement methods in equalizing the weight distribution of indicators, we proposed the combination of the coefficient of variation method with the entropy weight method to measure the comprehensive index of high-quality economic development. Secondly, the random forest algorithm was used to filter the variables based on the importance of model variables. Finally, we empirically investigated the heterogeneity in the impact of environmental regulatory policy synergies on high-quality economic development using penalized panel quantile regressions that fully accounted for the characteristics of data outliers. The results showed that there was significant heterogeneity in the impact of environmental regulation policy synergies on high-quality economic development. Specifically, the result showed that: 1 The combination of Policy 2 and Policy 3 had the best synergy effect in regions with lower levels of high-quality economic development (0.1 quantile), and the synergistic effect of the three policy combinations was optimal in regions with more developed levels of high-quality economic development. 2 Policy synergies had a positive impact on high-quality economic development, with a 'U'-shaped change, i.e. as the degree of policy synergies increased, the level of high-quality economic development tended to fall first and then rise. 3 The output elasticity value of policy synergies did not cross the 'inflection point' in regions with less developed levels of high-quality economic development. This result somewhat inhibited high-quality economic development, supporting the 'cost of compliance' argument. However, the output elasticity values of the better developed regions crossed the 'inflection point'. The findings supported the 'innovation compensation theory'. Therefore, to reduce inter regional differences, cooperation between governments at all levels and relevant departments should be strengthened to continuously promote policy synergies and improve the efficiency of policy combinations, which will not only benefit the ecological environment, but also improve factor productivity and energy efficiency, thus promoting quality inter-regional economic development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Dalian University of Technology / Dalian Ligong Daxue Xuebao is the property of Journal of Dalian University of Technology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Population Resources & Environment is the property of Shandong Normal University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Technology Economics is the property of Chinese Society of Technology Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Population Resources & Environment is the property of Shandong Normal University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of China Population Resources & Environment is the property of Shandong Normal University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

As urban agglomerations have become the main spatial organization form in China, it is of great significance to carry out environmental cooperative governance based on urban agglomerations. Research on the interaction of environmental regulation enforcement among cities can provide a new explanation for the competition and cooperation in terms of pollution control in urban agglomerations. This article selected three types of environmental regulation policy tools: market-incentive, command-and-control, and their combinations, and analyzed the interaction pattern of environmental regulations based on the theoretical mechanism derivation and the two zone spatial Durbin model by using the panel data of 103 cities in China. Then, the SLX model was used to explore the impact of the interaction of environmental regulations on the cooperative governance of pollution in five urban agglomerations. The results showed that the market-incentive environmental regulation was not fully implemented, which meant that some cities adopted a 'race to the bottom' strategy in response of the competition with their neighbors. After combining market-incentive environmental regulation with command and-control environmental regulation, the pattern of environmental regulation interaction between cities changed from ' race to the bottom' to 'race to the top'. This interactive characteristic was particularly significant in the Yangtze River Delta and the Chengdu Chongqing urban agglomerations. However, the 'racing to the top' characteristic of these two urban agglomerations had different effects on the intercity environmental cooperation: there was a synergy effect caused by strong spillover effect of environmental regulation implementation in the Yangtze River Delta urban agglomeration rather than in the Chengdu-Chongqing urban agglomeration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Central China Normal University is the property of Huazhong Normal University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Xi'an Polytechnic University is the property of Editorial Department of Journal of Xi'an Polytechnic University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Central China Normal University is the property of Huazhong Normal University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

There is an obvious disparity between different regions in our country, which is well reflected in our empirical study on the relationship between the environmental regulation and the economic growth in the eastern, middle, and western parts of China through giving an econometric analysis to the panel data of 30 provincial regions from 1998 to, 2006. In the long run, there is a causal relationship between the level of environmental regulation and the economic growth in these regions. In the short run, the influence of environmental regulation on the economic growth in the eastern region is significant and that in the middle region is weak; but in the western region, to some extent the economic growth promotes the environmental regulation. Therefore, it is necessary to take some effective measures to enhance the productive interaction and coordinated development of the environmental regulation and the economic growth in different regions of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environment protection attracts more and more attention all of the world. The governments are reinforcing the regulation on firms and encourage them to adopt new environment protection technologies. Aimed at the debate whether the environment regulation can stimulate firms to adopt new technologies to deal with waste materials, the effect of regulations on monopoly firms adopting new technologies was analyzed with a model. The result shows that the charge to pollution is important for governments to encourage firms to adopt new technologies. The subsidies decreased with rime going can encourage the adoption behavior of firms more efficiently than the fixed subsidies. Furthermore, the adoption cost varying with time going, the discount rate and the efficiency of new technologies can affect the effect of regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To establish a paradigm for the studies on the Environment Law is not only crucial for building the theoretical system of the Environmental Law but also for guiding us to solve the environmental problems. At present, the revolutionary paradigm of "the integration of the subject and the object" , strongly advocated by some scholars, has not only demonstrated their clear awareness of the necessity of paradigm construction but also enabled the theory of the Environmental Law to develop in a pluralistic fashion. With human existence in the order of values ignored to some extent and with a focus on theoretical construction at the cost of its feasibility, this paradigm, however, encounters a lot of difficulties especially when it comes to coping with the environmental problems in practice. Therefore, the paradigm change in the studies on the Environmental Law should make a shift to the practice-orientedness under the guidance of the principles of "people-orientedness" and "balanced development". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Green credit policies are effective tools to promote green and low-carbon transitions, but green credit limits the commercial bank credit lines of high-polluting industries, which are an important part of the local industrial economy. Therefore, green credit poli⁃ cies will cause local governments to resort to industrial trade-offs between economic development and environmental policy require⁃ ments in the implementation of environmental regulations, which could influence the development of green credit. Under the back⁃ ground of the implementation of green credit policies, this article firstly used the evolutionary game model to analyze the impact of local government environmental regulation intensity on the development of green credit by analyzing the game between local governments and highly polluting enterprises. Secondly, based on the panel data of 30 provinces in China from 2007 to 2019, this article empirically examined the impact of environmental regulation intensity on the development of green credit. Finally, the influencing mechanisms and regional heterogeneity were discussed. The results showed that: ① There was a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between local government environmental regulation and green credit development. Among them, public supervision had a certain moderating effect. ② Corporate environmental information disclosure, financing constraints, government subsidies, and tax levels were the main influencing mechanisms. ③ Further heterogeneity test results showed that environmental regulation could not effectively improve the development of green credit when the region was dominated by energy-intensive industries, and the impact of environmental regulation on the development of green credit was more significant in the eastern region than in the central and western regions. The results also showed that in order to further promote the development of green credit, the intensity of local government environmental regulation should be appropriately strengthened and the leading role of government-oriented policies in green finance should be further enhanced. It is suggest⁃ ed that we should improve public environmental awareness and promote the positive moderating effect of public supervision on environ⁃ mental regulation in the process of green credit; enhance corporate social responsibility awareness; strengthen corporate environmental information disclosure; increase the degree of financing constraints of financial institutions on high-polluting enterprises; and accelerate the green transformation and upgrading of high-polluting enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of achieving the 'dual carbon' goals of peaking carbon emissions and carbon neutrality, meeting emission reduction targets while ensuring stable economic growth is the economic development model China is seeking now. Therefore, exploring the mechanism of environmental regulation in China's economic growth, especially on technological progress, will help to analyze the mechanism of environmental policy on sustainable economic development. In this article, we used the SBM model to measure the green total factor productivity in the subdivided industries of the manufacturing industry in China from 2003 to 2018, and decomposed technological progress to examine the factor preference characteristics of biased technological progress, and finally used a panel regression model to empirically test the mechanism of environmental regulations on green total factor productivity and technological progress and their decomposition terms. The results showed that: 1 Green total factor productivity in China's manufacturing industry was generally increasing year by year, and technological progress was the main source of its growth. Environmental regulation showed an inverted U shaped relationship with green total factor productivity and technological progress, and the intensity of regulation was currently on the left side of the inflection point, and the increase in environmental regulation intensity helped to promote the growth of green total factor productivity and technological progress in China's manufacturing industry. 2 From the internal influence mechanism of technological progress, the results of biased technological progress factor preferences showed that the characteristics of input-biased technological progress factor preferences changed with the stage of economic development, and output-biased technological progress was more biased toward CO2 output, but it showed an improving trend year by year. The effects of environmental regulations on input-biased technological progress, output-biased technological progress, and scale technological progress were all significant, and the increase in the intensity of environmental regulations helped to enhance input-biased technological progress and reduce output-biased technological progress so as to save the input of production factors and reduce CO2 output. 3 The degree of opening to the outside world, capital intensity, and government subsidies all had positive effects on green total factor productivity and technological progress, and strengthening these factors could help to improve the economic development of the manufacturing industry. The study found that current technological progress had a certain 'carbon lock-in' effect on carbon emissions, and environmental regulations were not effective in reducing coal use. By measuring the current situation of China's manufacturing economy and the effect of environmental regulations, this study provides theoretical support for promoting China's green and high-quality economic development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Green innovation is the key to achieving a win-win situation between economic growth and environmental pollution control. Informal environmental regulation, represented by ENGOs, is playing an increasingly important role. This article used the 'Pollution Information Transparency Index' (PITI) of 113 cities in 2008, jointly published by two ENGOs (IPE and NRDC), as a quasi-natural experiment, and evaluated the 'net effect' of green innovation of informal environmental regulation by the identification methods of DID and DID-PSM. The main research conclusions were as follows: (1) Informal environmental regulation did induce urban green innovation. After passing a series of parallel trend tests, DID-PSM regression tests and placebo tests, the results were still robust. (2) From the perspective of regional heterogeneity, it was concluded that more attention was paid to informal environmental regulation in the eastern and western regions, which responded more positively to the release of PITI, while the central region received less impact. From the perspective of time trend, the green innovation effect induced by informal environmental regulation was the strongest in the first year of policy implementation, and then showed a trend of weakening year by year. (3) The green innovation effect of informal environmental regulation was more obvious in cities with higher level of government environmental information disclosure. In addition, the information diffusion level of cities also affected the green innovation effect to a certain extent. In comparison with the level of urban information diffusion, the green innovation effect of informal environmental regulation was more significantly affected by the level of environmental information disclosure. (4) After eliminating a series of other environmental policy shocks that were likely to affect urban green innovation activities, such as carbon emissions trading pilots in the same period, carbon emissions trading pilots in five provinces and eight cities, and sulfur dioxide emissions trading pilots, the green innovation of informal environmental regulation still existed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

New pollutants have three major characteristics: 'high biotoxicity,' ' environmental persistence,' and ' bioaccumulation,' and they tend to cause ' cumulative environmental health risks,' ' diffuse ecological environmental risks,' and ' sudden environmental and social risks.' In the face of these compounded risks and challenges, traditional environmental regulation is confronted with multiple dilemmas: First, the current environmental regulatory system may fail to address the proactive preventive demands of new pollutants on environmental health risks. Second, conventional environmental regulatory frameworks struggle to cope with the collaborative governance requirements of new pollutant-induced environmental risks. Third, the traditional environmental regulatory model tends to be inadequate in meeting the urgent response and control demands of new pollutant-induced social risks. To cope with the challenge of these overlapping risks, this study proposes the following environmental management optimization strategies that meet the requirements of new pollutant control in response to the difficulties in traditional ecological environmental management: updating the existing ecological environmental management system to address the health risks posed by new pollutants, filling the gaps in ecological environmental management by focusing on the ecological environmental risks of new pollutants, and resolving the failure of ecological environmental management in response to the social risks posed by new pollutants. In the face of the risks posed by new pollutant control, the tasks of ecological environmental management transformation should include the following three aspects: First, establishing the goal of ' active prevention ' of risks to update the ecological environmental management system; second, strengthening the ecological environmental management chain with a comprehensive and dynamic risk coordination and control approach; and third, improving the ecological environmental management model by constructing an elastic governance mechanism for environmental and social risks. According to the above ideas, the optimization of environmental management for new pollutant risk control should also involve the need to explore institutional improvements in terms of legislative goals, regulatory scope, and normative systems. The specific regulatory content should include establishing the principle of ' active prevention' of risks in general environmental laws and its applicable rules, adopting a typology of rules for comprehensive risk coordination and control of new pollutant risks based on the concept of ' lifecycle governance,' and constructing an elastic governance system for environmental and social risks posed by new pollutants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of China Population Resources & Environment is the property of Shandong Normal University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Technology Economics is the property of Chinese Society of Technology Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Technology Economics is the property of Chinese Society of Technology Economics and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)