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Copyright of Systems Engineering & Electronics is the property of Journal of Systems Engineering & Electronics Editorial Department and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Electric Power Automation Equipment / Dianli Zidonghua Shebei is the property of Electric Power Automation Equipment Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

As a market liberalization policy to replace the unified feed in price, the reverse auction for energy projects has effectively improved the cost reduction efficiency of all kinds of energy all over the world, but in recent years, the project bidding operators have fallen into a profit bottleneck. In view of this phenomenon, this study modified the Associated Value Model and constructed a dynamic bidding decision-making framework to evaluate the optimal bidding price decision of energy projects with dynamic expectations when the project cost and output were uncertain. This article used the sample data of electricity price bidding and later operation of more than 3 000 large-scale power stations in Europe, America, and the Asia Pacific from 2006 to 2020. The results found that: ‡@ Almost all global energy investment enterprises would fall into the strange circle of ewinnerf s cursef caused by eoverly optimisticf expectations, and the actual operating income of the projects they held was far lower than expected. Driven by the pressure of business expansion, bidders were often more likely to underestimate the cost pressure and risk of project construction and operation and overestimate the power output and income stability of the project. In particular, after the cancellation and prohibition of the joint bidding mechanism, the bidding results became even more radical. Due to the unexpected technological progress and the continuous correction of the expectations of the bidding subject, the overly optimistic expectations exceeded the endogenous technological progress of the industry and became an important driving force for the continuous pressure on the decline of electricity prices. ‡A The current energy industry, especially wind and solar energy, failed to give full play to its potential. With the technological innovation of the new energy industry, it showed a more radical bidding strategy than thermal power projects. Under the pressure of involution bidding, endogenous cost optimization hindered the potential of new energy projects, and the current cost became the most important reason for them to fall into the ewinnerf s curse.f ‡B After considering many factors, such as the learning curve effect, in addition to the financing cost advantage of enterprises, the sample data did not find that internal and external factors, including experience and the market environment, could make enterprises jump out of this strange circle. Even in the past five years or so, the decline in project investment profits caused by the ewinnerf s cursef exceeded the factor of market technological progress and once became the main factor in the decline of power prices for wind power and solar energy projects. Therefore, a healthy and sustainable energy industry policy needs to be based on upstream continuous technological innovation, improve the capital market system based on green finance, ensure the provision of high-quality projects to serve energy consumers, and provide recognition and support from the capital market for energy project investors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rationality evaluation of construction project cost covers the whole process of construction project management. It is of great significance to identify and control the errors of compiled cost in time, which assists in improving the investment benefit of construction projects. This paper aims to address the shortcomings of the foundation and methods for the traditional cost evaluation. First, the construction engineering characteristic index is constructed, and the data similar to the project to be reviewed is identified from the large-sample-size data of the engineering projects by fuzzy C-means clustering, which is used as the training sample. Second, considering the nonlinearity of cost characteristic index and project cost, LSSVM is used to develop a prediction model for sample training. Finally, the prediction model is applied to analyze the cost prediction interval of the project to be reviewed, and the evaluation is completed by judging whether the construction value of the project to be reviewed is within the cost prediction interval. The results show that FCM clustering can identify similar engineering samples quickly and effectively. This evaluation model can improve the efficiency and reliability of construction cost evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on the auction model formulated by Riley and Samuelson, by introducing the factors of online auction like the entry fee, the commission, the penalties and the stochastic arrival of bidders, online auctions' decision-make models of maximization of seller's expected revenue in open reserve price and private reserve price are investigated, respectively. The online auction's optimal open reserve price and optimal private reserve price are also investigated. The general form of optimal reserve price is given. By analyzing the optimal reserve price, it is shown that the sellers' optimal open reserve price is the same as the optimal private reserve Price. Moreover, the further comparison analysis between the optimal reserve price in online auction and the reserve price in traditional offline auction is made. The effect of the bidders' arrival rate on the optimal re-serve Price is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]