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我國自 1996 年電信自由化以來，於電信市場上仍面臨新進業者無法與固網既有業者競爭的問題， 關鍵即在於未有效落實接取網路（ access network）的無差別待遇規範，致使在現今固網及有線寬頻市場上仍缺乏有效競爭。由於接取網路必須投入高度的沉沒成本，以將網路連結至各終端用戶， 因此不論在世界主要國家均認定其具有「樞紐設施」（ essential facility）性質，必須對其進行事前管制，以成本計價開放供其他電信事業接取使用，並防止其濫用因掌握此一設施所享有的市場支配地位。然而，對於接取網路的管制，世界主要國家電信監理機關的管制經驗顯示，若窮盡行為管制工具仍不足以改正既有業者的差別待遇行為時，則必須導入垂直分離此一結構管制工具。是以本文藉由美國AT&T 解體案、英國BT 功能分離及歐盟對於垂直分離規範，說明垂直分離所可能涉及的監理議題及相應規範內涵。最後再針對我國現行電信法應否及如何導入垂直分離，從比較法制經驗探討相關監理政策評估及應有配套規劃相關議題，期使我國電信市場進入深層的基礎建設競爭。 Fifteen years after the liberalization of telecom markets in Taiwan, newcomers still play no match for the former monopolist operator, especially when it comes to wireline-based services. Above all is deficient enforcement of the nondiscrimination rules on telecom access networks held responsible for this outcome. According to the experiences of telecom regulatory authorities in most OECD member states the access network is the “essential facility” and shall be to open access for competitive operators. The ex-ante regulations imposed on the incumbent operator, who owns the essential facility, aim to prevent the abuse of market power. The regulatory experiences on access networks further show that once behavior regulations alone help little to discourage the incumbent operator from discriminatory practices or cross-subsidization, the regulatory authorities shall have resort of some structural remedies such as vertical separation. In order to ascertain when and how vertical separation is engaged, the AT&T breakup case, the BT functional separation case and the vertical separation norms in EU Telecoms Reform are analyzed in this article. The principle of “competition drives investment”, which European Commission adapts for the NGA access, is referable for dealing with the CHT dominance in the access network in Taiwan. This article concludes that a thorough review of functionality of the Telecom Act regarding to introduce workable competition on the infrastructure level and amendments which incorporate vertical separation are recommended.