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Copyright of Journal of Beijing University of Civil Engineering & Architecture is the property of Journal of Beijing University of Civil Engineering & Architecture Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Agricultural Outlook (1673-3908) is the property of Institute of Agricultural Information, Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Nankai Business Review is the property of Nankai Business Review Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In the context of economic globalization, more and more equipment manufacturers (OEM) begin to consider creating their own brand to achieve partly role of original design manufacturer (ODM). Obviously, there are significant impacts on related firms and supply chains if ODMs build up their own brands. We consider a two-echelon supply chain system which consists of an ODM and an OEM. Under different game theory framework, we analyze the ODM's optimal entry strategy and its consequences on channel system. Our results show that ODM's market entry effectively alleviates the "double marginalization" of the distribution channel, and this positive effect decreases as OEM's channel cost advantage strengthens. And when the cost of OEM channel is sufficiently low, ODM's market entry may also be beneficial to the OEM, then ODM and OEM can achieve a "win-win" situation. Finally, we verify the robustness of our model by considering the cases of Nash bargaining and Bertrand price competition model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to discuss the relationship between multimarket contact, market entry and firm performance as a starting point to provide suggestions for firms how to adopt rational and effective competitive strategy in the dynamic competitive environment. The proposed hypotheses were verified by regression analysis and robustness test. The results show that: firstly, multimarket contact has an inverted U-shape influence on market entry; secondly, market entry has a shadowing effect on the relationship between multimarket contact and firm performance. That is, the positive direct effect of multimarket contact on firm performance is greater than the negative indirect effect multimarket contact on firm performance through market entry; and then the political background of CEO has a negative moderating influence on the relationship between multimarket contact and market entry. Therefore, based on the above analysis results, this paper argues that the firm takes the initiative to increase the degree of multimarket contact with competitors can be regarded as an important non-market strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The definition of synergistic effect and three synergistic functions have been proposed for the competitive facility location problem with synergistic effect of product or service market. And the competitive facility location model with maximal captured market share has been built. For fragment type synergistic function, the relationship between the optimal solution of the new problem P1 with synergistic effect and the original problem P0 have been analyzed. When the optimal solution of original problem P0 takes different values, how the optimal solution of the new problem P1 changes with the parameters of synergistic function were presented at last. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper studies two sellers' entry decisions when the two sellers have their own market but share the same supplier. The authors analyze the cases that one firm enters the other's market and the two firms enter each other's market, and derive the supplier's optimal pricing decision, the sellers' procurement quantities and firms' outputs in the two markets. The results show that in most conditions the Nash equilibrium for the sellers is to enter each other's market. However, when the market size and the price elasticity of the two markets are similar, the sellers face a "Prisoner Dilemma"--The Nash equilibrium is to enter the other's market, but both sellers' profits are less than if they do not enter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Market entry strategies of service products with quality differentiation in mobile commerce environment are studied. The game equilibrium results of simultaneous and sequential market entry strategies of service products are compared. The results show that service products with high-quality obtain high market price and profit than those with low-quality no matter what kind of market entry strategy is used; the strategy that service products with high-quality first enter the market is the best for two mobile operators in all strategies. With coefficient of network externality increasing, market price differentiation degree of service products is decreasing and share differentiation degree is increasing, price decreasing degree on low-quality service products is greater than that of high-quality ones in the best strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]