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The action by stages was introduced into the Croatian civil procedure law by the 2003 Law on Amendments to the Civil Procedure Act, with the aim of increasing the general quality and ef)ficiency in providing legal protection and improving the general functioning of civil procedure. Courts do not keep records of the number of received actions by stages lawsuits but available case law indicates that difficulties do exist and thus the need for a serious approach to this issue. The aim of this paper is to point out the importance of understanding the legal institute of action by stages with an emphasis on its practical application. Participants in court proceedings who apply to the court by filing an action by stages must be aware of its legal effects at certain stages of civil proceedings. On the other hand, the court must also ensure the lawful application of this institute so as not to commit procedural violations that would jeopardize the litigants’ legal position. In this regard, the analysis of this legal institute is necessary in order to remove practical doubts and ensure its legal function. Research results of this paper have confirmed that practical doubts should not be neglected and that there is room to consider a more efficient solution than the one in existence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the views of domestic civil law theory and case law on inherently dangerous objects and activities, and, in particular, the interpretations of maritime law theory and case law on whether a ship is an inherently dangerous object presupposing the application of a strict liability regime. The central part of the paper is devoted to a critical analysis of the courts’ interpretation of the question of whether a berthed boat is an inherently dangerous object and whether the activity of a marina operator is an inherently dangerous one. Furthermore, the criteria relevant for assessing the legal issues in question are investigated in detail. Finally, determining the relevant criteria leads to guidelines that can be used for theoretical generalisation which can be applied by the courts when deciding in cases involving the legal question of whether a berthed vessel is an inherently dangerous object and the business of a marina operator an inherently dangerous activity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with two spheres of application of extraordinary cognition - criminal and civil law, while outlining its organizational and functional rules viewed in development from Augustus to Justinian. Analysis of cognitio extra ordinem in the protection of individuals' interests shows that this public-law procedure appeared as an exception to regular, formulary procedure of a private-law character, and that it was applied by new organs created by Augustus' delegation of judicial powers drawn from tribunitia potestas and imperium proconsulare. The gradual development of the Roman state to absolute oriental-type monarchy led to the consolidation of a network of hierarchically organised judicial organs, as well as of rules for a single dual-instance procedure, which in the time of Justinian took on their final shape of an exclusive judicial procedure of a libellar (written) type. Similarly, analysis of cognitio extra ordinem in the protection of the interests of the Roman community (at first, especially of the person of the princeps) shows that this public-law procedure of an inquisitory nature (with a written judgment containing not only the decision on the sanction, but also the legal grounds) appeared as extraordinary in relation to the regular system of quaestiones perpetuae characterised by an accusatory procedure. It was applied by new organs formed by delegation of Augustus' auctoritas. However, up until the 2nd century the Senate court operated, and developed its specific procedure, the so-called cognitio senatus. Further strengthening of imperial power during the 4th and 5th centuries highlighted the principles of singular and efficient cognitional criminal procedure, but also limited the principles of publicity, oral litigation and judges' freedom of ruling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]