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What is the role of thought experiments in scientific exploration? Can they provide us with new knowledge about the world? In a recent article, Lorenzo Sartori argues that thought experiments function like ordinary (material) experiments: Both material experiments and thought experiments are made in a specific context, which must then be extrapolated and generalized to say something true about the world. This article discusses and criticizes Sartori’s proposal. It suggests a new theoretical framework for understanding thought experiments, their argumentative role, and how they provide new knowledge about the world. The framework presented is a coherentist framework, where coherence has three aspects: consistency, cohesiveness, and comprehensiveness. The proposal is that the argumentative role of thought experiments is to demonstrate the presence or absence of consistency, cohesiveness, and comprehensiveness, thereby strengthening a theory, weakening a theory, or showing one theory to be better than another. This is the way thought experiments provides new knowledge about the world, since the way we learn something new about the world is by discovering which theories about the world are most coherent.

The semantic analysis of conditional sentences does not entirely align with their morphosyntactic structure. I substantiate this hypothesis with instances from both Czech and English that extend beyond conventional textbook examples. I also highlight that logicians and philosophers often make terminological errors when they disregard the insights from linguistic disciplines. Despite the early analytic philosophy’s emphasis on terminological precision, the practical application falls significantly short of this ideal. I firmly believe that a proper understanding of the morphosyntax and semantics of conditional sentences is a prerequisite for their classification and analysis. In our pursuit of a comprehensive exploration of conditional clauses, we must also grapple with methodological challenges that delve into the very core of the philosophy of language. The primary issue revolves around the fact that two out of the three a priori methods in philosophy rely heavily on the analysis of conditional sentences: thought experiments and modal metaphysics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Klíma's concept of so-called egodeism, attempting to interpret it as a rigorous thinking through of the problem of suffering. It's a problematic that draws from the various traditions (Buddhism, Stoicism, Schopenhauer) that Klíma builds on. The aim is to show that, while Klíma's egodeism is more problematic thought experiment than coherent theoretical concept, the path by which Klíma reaches egodeism is philosophically legitimate. The author indicates how Klíma develops his ideas by way of modern metaphysical idealism (Berkeley, Schopenhauer), as well as the more problematic stages of his progress (so-called extended Kantianism). As Klíma has been described as an epigone of F. Nietzsche, the author also -- using comparative method -- focuses on several aspects by which Klíma may be distinguished from Nietzsche. To some extent, J. Patočka's concerns are discussed as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Myšlenkové experimenty jsou populárním argumentačním nástrojem ve vědě i filosofii. Jejich kritika ze strany naturalistických a experimentálních filosofů vedla k vytvoření deflačních a minimalistických koncepcí, které oslabují epistemickou sílu myšlenkových experimentů a smiřují je s empirismem. Cílem článku je ukázat, že tyto pokusy nepřekonávají hlavní problémy, se kterými se myšlenkové experimenty ve filosofi i střetávají. Omezená lidská racionalita a představivost znemožňují experimentátorům řešit nereálné scénáře spolehlivým způsobem. Myšlenkové experimenty se ve filosofi i používají jinak než ve vědě, protože ty pravé jsou obvykle neuskutečnitelné a uzavřené vůči možnosti empirické falsifikace. Navíc jsou založeny na vadných analogiích a neoprávněně přenášejí důkazní břemeno. Persvazivní úspěšnost myšlenkových experimentů je velmi nízká, a proto nedokáží přispět k řešení filosofi ckých problémů. Závěrem článku je, že nejběžnější druhy myšlenkových experimentů by měly být odstraněny ze souboru fi losofi ckých metod. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is criticizing philosopher Frank Jackson's thought experiment (TE) "The knowledge argument". Jackson's goal of the experiment was to prove that qualia are non-physical entities. The TE turned out as having been built on premise which was not realizable from physical reasons. Furthermore, it appears that the experiment implicitly assumes biologically inadequate theory of the hierarchy of cognitive functioning domains of a (human) organism. David Hume's theory was reminded, contrasting to Jackson's related concept of propositional contents and phenomenal mental states. There were also two modern naturalistic qualia interpretations proposed. The first one gives qualia into direct relationship with the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio's theory of feelings. The second one refers to the neuroscientist Gerald Edelman's thoughts of the evolutionary value and structure of qualia. Naturalistic interpretation of qualia concludes that qualia are multidimensional cognitive contents -- processes whose meaning lies in the comprehensive evaluation of an experienced situation that is accessible to conscious experience. It is also argued in favor of the proposition that no amount of propositional information can replace qualia -- therefore sensory deprivation cannot be substituted by knowledge. This fact is due to limitations of reach of conscious or introspective structures of the human organism. Finally, the fundamental function of physicality in our mental life is reflected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]