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This article critically analyses the use of the persistent objector doctrine in unilaterally challenging the validity of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) rights and the related state obligations. The persistent objector doctrine gives effect to state sovereignty and provides a mechanism through which states can object to a customary norm preventing the objecting state from incurring any legal obligations once the norm has emerged. The aim of this article is to reflect on whether the persistent objector doctrine could legitimately be used to negate state obligations that would naturally follow from the crystallisation of customary norms in the area of SOGI rights. In this sense the article is both concerned with analysing (not concluding on) current state practice in terms of understanding if and how the persistent objector doctrine is applied, and with gazing forward in terms of analysing whether, if customary law emerges to protect SOGI rights, the persistent objector doctrine could in fact be applied to limit or comprehensively shield states from SOGI-related obligations. This analysis takes place within the framework of the UNHRC Resolution 32/2, which creates an Independent Expert on Protection against Violence and Discrimination based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, and of the responses of the seven African states that provided statements before the UNHRC in the process leading up to this resolution.

The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has worked as the continent's watchdog, under the ACHPR, for almost 30 years. Much has changed since the time of its inception. More institutions, set to ensure the implementation of the ACHPR, have been added. As the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights became operational, a two-tiered human rights system was created.This article explores the inter-relationship between the ACHPR, the Protocol Establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Procedural Rules of these two institutions within the specific context of the African Commission's mandate to refer communications to the African Court. The aim is to offer a purposeful interpretation of the Procedural Rules governing referrals, guided by the understanding of the principle of complementarity in the preparatory works. The author argues that an appropriate interpretation of complementarity, within the context of referrals, becomes vital in alleviating one of the long-term plagues of the African, protective, human rights system, namely the lack of resources and human capital. It is suggested that the African Commission and the African Court can only be effective if they take proper cognisance of the principle of complementarity, in referring and receiving communications.