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The article focuses on the vision of Publius, a collective pseudonym for the authors of the publication "Federalist Papers" namely Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. It discusses the way Publius defends a Constitution that focuses on the creation of power that the U.S. government lacked during the Articles of Confederation period, but taking into considerations the tyranny that it may bring. It is noted that a system containing "auxiliary precautions" against tyrannical usurpations is created. The vertical competition model and the guard dog model proposed by Publius are presented, as well as the features and implications of such models.

Presidential power to recognize foreign nations and governments, exercised since the dawn of the republic, has never been viewed as exclusive. Indeed, Congress has enacted legislation that conferred recognition upon foreign countries. Recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, asserted for the first time in American history an exclusive presidential power of recognition. This conclusion, built on a flawed historical record and faulty judicial premises stemming from United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., exaggerates executive authority and ignores the largely ministerial role assigned to the president in receiving ambassadors and foreign ministers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alexander Hamilton and James Madison agreed in the Federalist that the Constitution authorizes both political and judicial processes to define and safeguard the boundaries of federalism, but disagreed on public opinion's role in a republic and how to cultivate public sentiment for the Constitution. Hamilton preferred resolving intergovernmental disputes via political and public processes because public endorsement would legitimize broad national powers. Madison favored building public sentiment for the Constitution through strict limits on the national government enforced in part by the judiciary. He thought resolving intergovernmental disputes via public processes would confirm widespread suspicions of imperium in imperio and might provoke a popular backlash that would upset the constitutional equilibrium and undermine even legitimate national powers. This difference foreshadows Hamilton and Madison's later constitutional disagreements, reveals fundamental ambiguities in America's federal system, and confirms the need to consider how institutions and policies affect public sentiment for the constitutional order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]