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The article presents guidelines to the Federalist Papers, which have enjoyed a special reputation as an important source of evidence of the original meaning of the U.S. Constitution. It is a series of 85 essays written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison and John Jay. Meanwhile, Chief Justice John Marshall described it as a complete commentary of the nation's constitution and is appealed to by all parties in the questions to which that instrument has given birth.

The article offers information on "Federalist" papers and constituent power. It mentions that in "Federalist" No. 40, James Madison posed a question whether the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 had been lawfully authorized to frame and propose the new Federal Constitution of the United States. It also states that Madison wrote "Federalist" No. 40 as a response to widespread and persuasive Anti-Federalist claims that the Philadelphia Convention had outperformed the mandate granted to it by the Annapolis Convention of 1786 and the Congressional Act of 1787.

Focuses on the philosophical foundations of the document known as `The Federalist Papers,' by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay. Philosophical sources that influenced the authors; Criticism of the book by Francis Fukuyama and Thomas Pangle.

The article discusses the perceived inconsistencies of former U.S. president and member of the U.S. Congress James Madison concerning the U.S. Constitution and the powers of the U.S. federal government, identified by the author as the Madison problem. It examines Madison's views on states' rights, his commitment to civil liberties and individual rights, and the legitimacy of the U.S. government. It discusses Madison's role at the U.S. Constitutional Convention, his contributions to the series of essays known as the Federalist papers, and his view of the Bill of Rights.

Students of the history of administrative law in the United States regard the antebellum era as one in which strict common law rules of official liability prevailed. Yet conventional accounts of the antebellum period often omit a key institutional feature. Under the system of private legislation in place at the time, federal government officers were free to petition Congress for the passage of a private bill appropriating money to reimburse the officer for personal liability imposed on the basis of actions taken in the line of duty. Captain Little, the officer involved in one oftcited case, Little v. Barreme, pursued this avenue of indemnification successfully. As a result, the ultimate loss associated with that officer's good faith effort to enforce federal law fell on the government rather than on the officer himself. This paper fills out the picture of government accountability in the early nineteenth century by clarifying the practice of congressional indemnification. After identifying cases in which officers sought indemnity from Congress through a petition for private relief, we examine the way official liability, as administered by the courts, interacted with private legislation, as administered by Congress, to shape the incentives of government officers to comply with the law. We find that a practice of relatively routine indemnification took the sting out of sovereign immunity, a doctrine that key players-including James Madison and John Marshall-treated as thinly formalistic. We also find that Congress assumed responsibility for deciding when federal officers were entitled to indemnity for acts taken in the scope of employment. The antebellum system thus contrasts sharply with modern government accountability law. Jurists today tend to regard sovereign immunity as a barrier to relief, rather than a principle of forum allocation that preserves legislative primacy in the adoption of money bills. Moreover, courts today often refrain from deciding the question of formal legality in an effort to strike a proper balance between the victim's interest in accountability and the official's interest in immunity. Whatever the wisdom of the resulting body of qualified immunity law, the doctrine reflects judicial control of matters that the early republic had assigned to the legislative branch. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court begins the twenty-first century with increasing use of a cramped approach to Fourth Amendment interpretation. That approach, championed by Justice Scalia, gives determinative weight to outdated common law rules from the framing era in assessing the reasonableness of searches and seizures. In the annual James Madison Lecture, Judge Blane Michael urges a fundamentally different—yet still traditional—approach. He argues that Fourth Amendment interpretation should be guided by the basic lesson learned from the mischief that gave birth to the Amendment in 1791: Namely, there is a need for constitutional protection against intrusive searches of houses and private papers carried out under grants of open-ended discretion to searching officers. This need for Fourth Amendment protection remains compelling in today's ever more interconnected world. Above all, the Court should not weaken the Fourth Amendment's protection by exclusive use of antiquated common law rules from the framing era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the vision of Publius, a collective pseudonym for the authors of the publication "Federalist Papers" namely Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. It discusses the way Publius defends a Constitution that focuses on the creation of power that the U.S. government lacked during the Articles of Confederation period, but taking into considerations the tyranny that it may bring. It is noted that a system containing "auxiliary precautions" against tyrannical usurpations is created. The vertical competition model and the guard dog model proposed by Publius are presented, as well as the features and implications of such models.

Presents a critique of the 10th essay of the document known as `The Federalist Papers.' Definition of faction; James Madison's distinction between passion and interest; Causes of faction; Distinction between justice and public good.