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The political trajectory that characterised post-cold war epoch underscores a dangerous centrifugal trend in the nature of violent conflict; civil unrest and guerrilla warfare that undermine the charter of United Nations of promoting international peace and security, and the discourse of peace coexistence at the forefront of international cooperation agenda in Africa, South East Europe and Middle East. The international response to this new wave of conflicts has been articulated through the structural mechanism of United Nations as peacekeeping intervention. Despite the successes and failures associated with UN peacekeeping interventions, the trickle of studies spawned by this quest has, developed into a flood of normative and empirical analyses of various aspects and process of International peacekeeping, while limited in unravel the factor that responsible for these successes and failures. This paper argues that the national interests of the super-powers are the potent factors that will determine the success and/or failure of UN peacekeeping operations, using peacekeeping experience in the Democratic Republic Congo (DRC) as a potential case. In this paper, an attempt is made to look at the framework of global politics within which peacekeeping unfolds and how it applies not only in DRC but also in Macedonia, Liberia and Somalia, thereby making it possible to develop an analytical construct for International peacekeeping successes and failures. The paper then concludes that given the contemporary geopolitics and the established structure of UN Security Council, if all super-powers are overtly and strongly committed to any UN peacekeeping operations and genuinely committed to resolving disputes in the trouble spots of the world without any primary or secondary interest in the conflicts involved, then the UN peacekeeping operations will be successful in restoring and sustaining permanent peace in the affected state(s). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Operation Artemis , carried out in the Democratic Republic of Congo from June to September 2003 on the request of the United Nations, was the European Union's first independently launched military operation and its first operation in Africa. France, supported by Britain, was the driving political force working to secure EU engagement as well as the main military contributor to the operation. This article argues that Franco-British cooperation has been the main engine in the development of both EU military cooperation in general and of the EU's role in African security. Moreover, it argues that Operation Artemis will set a precedent for future EU autonomous operations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]