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The article offers information on "Federalist" papers and constituent power. It mentions that in "Federalist" No. 40, James Madison posed a question whether the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 had been lawfully authorized to frame and propose the new Federal Constitution of the United States. It also states that Madison wrote "Federalist" No. 40 as a response to widespread and persuasive Anti-Federalist claims that the Philadelphia Convention had outperformed the mandate granted to it by the Annapolis Convention of 1786 and the Congressional Act of 1787.

Focuses on the philosophical foundations of the document known as `The Federalist Papers,' by James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay. Philosophical sources that influenced the authors; Criticism of the book by Francis Fukuyama and Thomas Pangle.

The article examines the circumstances surrounding early drafts of the U.S. Constitution, focusing upon the work of Pennsylvania delegate James Wilson and the Committee of Detail during the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, in 1787. The article reviews the chronology of the convention including the debate over Virginia delegate Edmund Randolph's proposed "Virginia Plan" regarding the structure of the federal government and Wilson's relationship with Virginia delegate James Madison. The article discusses the Committee of Detail's review of texts of various proposals, state constitutions, and the Articles of Confederation. The authors argue that the Committee of Detail must be carefully studied to grasp the historical context of the convention's accomplishment.

This article argues that in his "Party Press Essays," James Madison expounds a psychology of public opinion that is identifiable, but less developed, in his earlier writings. In these essays, Madison explains how a territorial mean, or a "practicable sphere," contributes to a psychological mean that creates a context for the emergence of an enlightened majority capable of mobilizing against an abusive regime. Attending to Madison's psychology of public opinion highlights the political importance of affect in Madison's thought and clarifies his position regarding the appropriate role of the people in a republic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an exploration into the development of the concept of public opinion within U.S. political discourse during the Federalist era. Details are given noting the onset of the term and its impact in public discourse in the late 18th century, particularly as it related to economic political debate in connection to public finance issues of credit and debt. Discussion is offered mapping the correlations between the financial history of the U.S. in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War and the appropriation of "public opinion" into the political discourse of major figures such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton.

According to James Madison, "the most important and fundamental question" he ever addressed was the meaning of and relation between the general welfare clause and the enumeration of particular powers. This question is the most "fundamental" because the answer determines the very "idea" or "nature" of the U.S. Constitution. Commentators virtually agree on the answer Madison proposed and defended in Federalist 41, namely, that the general welfare clause is neither a statement of ends nor a substantive grant of power. It is a mere "synonym" for the enumeration of particular powers, which are limited and wholly define its content. From this answer, it follows that the primary meaning of the national dimension of the federal Constitution is limited government, understood as a government with a limited number of powers or means. The thesis of this essay, however, is that, contrary to the commentators' claims, Madison argued that the clause was a substantive grant of power for the generally stated end and that the primary purpose of the ensuing enumeration was to define more particularly the ends alluded to by the phrase "general welfare." Hence, the meaning of the general constitutional government in the American federal system is a government oriented to a limited number of limited ends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Religion Clauses contained in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the history of church and state in America, and former U.S. President James Madison's formative experiences with religious establishments. The U.S. Supreme Court Justices and their reliance on the historical record when rendering legal decisions are addressed, along with the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791. The authority of the Anglican Church in Virginia is also examined.

An essay is presented on the Presidential proclamations issued by several U.S. Founding Father Presidents from 1789 to 1825. It says that the Founding Father President with the most proclamations was James Madison, the only U.S. President in the 1789-1825 period who presided over a declared war. It tells that the proclamations during the period were inclined to engage foreign policy issues, domestic rebellion, and trade relations.

Discusses the political thought of James Madison, the 4th U.S. President and considered as the father of the U.S. Constitution, towards public opinion and the formation of civic character based on his Republican Theory. Claims of professor Alan Gibson regarding the character of the political thought of Madison, as highlighted in his book "The Sacred Fire of Liberty"; Source of Madison's conception of public opinion expressed in his 1791-1792 writings; Views of Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume on the role of public opinion in the British government.

Some interpretations of James Madison tend to treat him as an enemy of "community," or as indifferent to that concept. These interpretations also tend to base their argument on selected readings from the Federalist Papers. This approach is mistaken because it relies on a part of the Madisonian corpus to define the whole of the Virginian's thought. This mistake leads to a distortion of Madison's treatment of community. Close scrutiny of Madison's life, letters, and essays reveals a theorist-politician committed to building and nurturing community in the new United States, a community linked across time and miles by shared values, common institutions, and ongoing public dialogue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the author's claims regarding a liberal movement aimed at undermining free speech in America as of 2015, and it mentions the U.S. Alien and Sedition Acts, the views of former American Presidents such as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, and the promotion of liberal ideology at U.S. colleges and universities. Intolerance and arrogance are examined, along with ignorance and the efforts to stifle conservative viewpoints. Several U.S. constitutional law cases are assessed.

The article discusses the bill of rights in the U.S. Constitution, former American President James Madison, and a reported increase in the monitoring of the Muslim community in New York, New York by the city's police department as of April 2012. Other topics include comprehensive policing practices, the protection of constitutional rights in America, and several legal matters such as the U.S. Supreme Court cases Miranda v. Arizona and Mapp v. Ohio. Terrorism prevention is also examined.

Students of the history of administrative law in the United States regard the antebellum era as one in which strict common law rules of official liability prevailed. Yet conventional accounts of the antebellum period often omit a key institutional feature. Under the system of private legislation in place at the time, federal government officers were free to petition Congress for the passage of a private bill appropriating money to reimburse the officer for personal liability imposed on the basis of actions taken in the line of duty. Captain Little, the officer involved in one oftcited case, Little v. Barreme, pursued this avenue of indemnification successfully. As a result, the ultimate loss associated with that officer's good faith effort to enforce federal law fell on the government rather than on the officer himself. This paper fills out the picture of government accountability in the early nineteenth century by clarifying the practice of congressional indemnification. After identifying cases in which officers sought indemnity from Congress through a petition for private relief, we examine the way official liability, as administered by the courts, interacted with private legislation, as administered by Congress, to shape the incentives of government officers to comply with the law. We find that a practice of relatively routine indemnification took the sting out of sovereign immunity, a doctrine that key players-including James Madison and John Marshall-treated as thinly formalistic. We also find that Congress assumed responsibility for deciding when federal officers were entitled to indemnity for acts taken in the scope of employment. The antebellum system thus contrasts sharply with modern government accountability law. Jurists today tend to regard sovereign immunity as a barrier to relief, rather than a principle of forum allocation that preserves legislative primacy in the adoption of money bills. Moreover, courts today often refrain from deciding the question of formal legality in an effort to strike a proper balance between the victim's interest in accountability and the official's interest in immunity. Whatever the wisdom of the resulting body of qualified immunity law, the doctrine reflects judicial control of matters that the early republic had assigned to the legislative branch. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court begins the twenty-first century with increasing use of a cramped approach to Fourth Amendment interpretation. That approach, championed by Justice Scalia, gives determinative weight to outdated common law rules from the framing era in assessing the reasonableness of searches and seizures. In the annual James Madison Lecture, Judge Blane Michael urges a fundamentally different—yet still traditional—approach. He argues that Fourth Amendment interpretation should be guided by the basic lesson learned from the mischief that gave birth to the Amendment in 1791: Namely, there is a need for constitutional protection against intrusive searches of houses and private papers carried out under grants of open-ended discretion to searching officers. This need for Fourth Amendment protection remains compelling in today's ever more interconnected world. Above all, the Court should not weaken the Fourth Amendment's protection by exclusive use of antiquated common law rules from the framing era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the vision of Publius, a collective pseudonym for the authors of the publication "Federalist Papers" namely Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. It discusses the way Publius defends a Constitution that focuses on the creation of power that the U.S. government lacked during the Articles of Confederation period, but taking into considerations the tyranny that it may bring. It is noted that a system containing "auxiliary precautions" against tyrannical usurpations is created. The vertical competition model and the guard dog model proposed by Publius are presented, as well as the features and implications of such models.

The article focuses on "The Federalist," a set of essays written by U.S. founding fathers Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay under the pseudonym Publius, published serially between October 1787 and May 1788. The author analyzes the essays as campaign documents and considers them not in light of political theory or intellectual origins, but as works whose original purpose and principal objective was to help the Federalists achieve victory in the ratification contests of 1787-1788. He further discusses Publius' various appeals to his audience by expounding the voices and the strategies of rhetoric and persuasion put to use.

Presents a critique of the 10th essay of the document known as `The Federalist Papers.' Definition of faction; James Madison's distinction between passion and interest; Causes of faction; Distinction between justice and public good.

The article discusses the author's views about the creation of the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment and the impact of the amendment on the founding principles of constitutional federalism in the country. The 39th U.S. Congress in 1865 is addressed, along with the post-American Civil War era, former slaves in the nation, and the views of the late U.S. President James Madison. The attitudes of Radical Republicans and Democrats are assessed.

This article assesses the association between ethnic identity and political factionalism in the thought of Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971), the American theologian, ethical philosopher, public commentator, and former professor at Union Theological Seminary. It is the first study to offer an extended assessment of his interest in the political theory of James Madison, the chief architect of the US Constitution. In doing so it sheds new light on the interaction -- but also the dissonance - between Niebuhr's ideas on racial factionalism and the ideology of 'colour-blind conservatism' that developed in the decades after his death. Niebuhr queried those who believed that federal institutions could accomplish racial equality merely through top-down acts of legislation. However benevolent governments seemed, he asserted, they were likely comprised of fallible individuals whose support for racial equality masked more selfish interests. From the 1970s to the present day, some conservative policy commentators have tried to use Niebuhr's ideas in opposition to affirmative action and other large-scale government initiatives, many of which are intended to impact positively against the continuing disadvantages of African-American communities. Alongside their reading of Niebuhr, they have tended to stress the necessary neutrality of government interventionism, as supposedly promoted by America's constitutional architects during the late-eighteenth century. A desire for neutrality, they suggest, provides a framework to oppose any further state and federal initiatives in racial matters following the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Yet in contrast to their ideology of colour-blind conservatism, Niebuhr's diagnosis of intractable race-pride did not require citizens to eschew the importance of state and federal institutions in diminishing racial inequality. Partially influenced by his reading of Madison on faction, Niebuhr suggested that the intractability of racial distinctions required continued federal activity even after the legal dismantling of segregation; so as to channel ethnic tensions through representative mechanisms, rather than simply wishing them away. During the last three decades, color-blind conservatism has tended to eschew the radical implications in Niebuhr's discussion of the relationship between American government and ethnic factionalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should the federal government be organized--and who (i.e., which departments, agencies, bureaus, and commissions) should do what? The issue is not new: President James Madison addressed governmental organization in his 1812 State of the Union Address, and, in the last century, it is the rare President that does not propose to reorganize some part of the federal government. On many occasions during the past century, nearly every part of the federal government has been repeatedly reorganized and reconfigured. In previous work, we have examined the dynamics that influence the assignment of regulatory duties to an agency, how those dynamics (and the allocation of responsibilities) can change over time, and how the specific combination of regulatory functions and purposes affects agency decisionmaking. We apply the framework developed in previous work to examine the costs and benefits of the design choices made by the architects of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and make some (appropriately hedged) predictions about the future prospects of this recent addition to the federal bureaucracy. We also briefly consider the implications of our analysis for the implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on the historiographic influences of American legal historian William E. Nelson's work on judicial review. Topics discussed include the decision of the U.S Supreme Court in case Marbury v. Madison, Supreme Court's issuance of a writ of mandamus to Secretary of State James Madison, and deployment of the Court's power of judicial review. It also discusses the legal history of Supreme Court case Cooper v. Aaron.

The article offers the author's insights on the economic interpretation of historian Charles Beard about the politics of slavery, the Beardian Legacy, and the Madisonian Moment. He says that former U.S. President James Madison has been called by Beard as a profound student of politics. He mentions the four facts in understanding slavery, Madison, and the U.S. Constitution including the lack of point in Beard's life, national politics in Virginia, and the political sensibility of slavery.

It has become impossible, or so it seems, to reach agreement on reasonable solutions to the problems confronting American government. Many claim that our political system is broken, our unique Constitutional scheme of governance - separation of powers, checks and balances, federalism, pluralism—dysfunctional or obsolete. Would James Madison, the principal author of that scheme, agree? It Truem the way our political system works can undermine the general welfare. Often our politics seem farcical. Bur Madison would know why. Our governing structures do not fail. We, the people, do. Liberty and justice cannot be secured, Madison argued, unless the people embrace the principle that the stronger parties among them submit to a government that protects all parties, the weaker as well as themselves. When the people abandon this principle - when, for example, wealth rules and joblessness persists - liberty and justice for all, the goals of our republican democracy, are in jeopardy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The location of a government's capital can profoundly influence the nature and quality of political representation. Yet scholars know very little about what drives the siting of political capitals. In this article, we examine the location and relocation of political capitals in the United States, including the choice of Washington, DC, as the nation's capital and the location and relocation of capitals in the 48 contiguous American states. We argue that the location of capitals in the United States followed a systematic pattern in accord with the theory of representative government developed in the new nation, especially as articulated by Madison. Based on an empirical analysis of historical census and political boundaries data from 1790 to the present, we find that decision makers consistently tended to locate—and especially relocate—the seat of government as near as possible to the population centroid of the relevant political jurisdiction, consistent with the principle of equal representation of citizens. Our analysis contributes to the study of institutional design and change, especially in the area of American political development, as well as to a burgeoning literature on the effects of geographical factors on political outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The framers designed a constitutional system in which the government would play a vigorous role in securing the liberty and well-being of a large and diverse population. They built a political system around a number of key elements, including debate and deliberation, divided powers competing with one another, regular order in the legislative process, and avenues to limit and punish corruption. America in recent years has struggled to adhere to each of these principles, leading to a crisis of governability and legitimacy. The roots of this problem are twofold. The first is a serious mismatch between our political parties, which have become as polarized and vehemently adversarial as parliamentary parties, and a separation-of-powers governing system that makes it extremely difficult for majorities to act. The second is the asymmetric character of the polarization. The Republican Party has become a radical insurgency- ideologically extreme, scornful of facts and compromise, and dismissive of the legitimacy of its political opposition. Securing the common good in the face of these developments will require structural changes but also an informed and strategically focused citizenry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars disagree about the role of impartiality in James Madison's political thought after the loss of his proposal for a universal veto of state laws at the Constitutional Convention. This essay argues that impartial administration remained an abiding concern within Madison's political thought after the Convention and indeed throughout his career, that he had a far more complex understanding of impartiality than has often been attributed to him, and that he hoped to institutionalize the formation of impartial majorities in Congress primarily through extent of territory—not elections from expanded electoral districts. This interpretation serves as an alternative to existing pluralist, elite republican, and neo-Aristotelian interpretations of Madison's political thought. It also draws attention to a broad thread of consistency within Madison's political thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

James Madison has long been seen as a liberal thinker and in many respects an elitist one. More recently, a few efforts have been made to understand him as a consistent and even “fervent” democrat, at least after 1790. This article re-examines a classic source for Madison's early liberalism, the “Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments” (1785), to establish Madison's pre-1790 analysis of—and genuine commitment to—the popular element of popular government. As a result, the article challenges elitist, conservative interpretations of a “Hamiltonian” Madison as well as those who chart a major philosophical shift in the 1790s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the ratification of the U.S. Constitution and Sanford Levinson's view on the defects on the Constitution. Series of defects include unequal voting power of citizens due to the existence of the Senate and the Electoral College, unacceptability of the thirteen states' power to veto constitutional amendments, and partiality toward localism inherent in territorially based electoral districts. The author mentions James Madison's insights on the threshold for ratification.

The author discusses his theory of constitutional failure of the U.S., which is associated with faulty foundation. He cites the constitutional theory of James Madison, an architect and constitutional thinker. He presents several points emphasizing the theory of Madison as well as highlighting several flaws in the Madisonian Theory. He further emphasizes the need for the constitution to be repaired to prevent constitutional collapse.

This article examines several claims about how James Madison's acquaintance with political theory affected his performance in office. These “theories about theory” come in two varieties: content-based and “nature of theory itself” arguments. The content-based arguments posit that a politician has accepted and used the ideas of a specific political theorist. The nature of theory itself arguments suggest that it is the act of theorizing or applying theory to practice that produces an effect. After describing various examples of each, I introduce a framework for the kinds of evidence required to demonstrate both types of claim. A conclusion outlines what we learn about the effect Madison's penchant for political theory had on his administration. It also suggests that greater attention to these arguments is required to understand the practical effect that political theory has had in the hands of presidents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the essay "The Great Divergence Reconsidered Hamilton, Madison and U.S.- British Relations, 1783-89," by Michael Schwarz. It explains the criticism of Alexander Hamilton, first Treasury Secretary to James Madison, fourth U.S. President for his 1812 ideological confusion on the demise of Federalism due to the influenced of a Virginian sentiment by Thomas Jefferson. However, Madison and Hamilton had worked together to resolve the troubling issues of Anglo-American relations.

Alexander Hamilton and James Madison agreed in the Federalist that the Constitution authorizes both political and judicial processes to define and safeguard the boundaries of federalism, but disagreed on public opinion's role in a republic and how to cultivate public sentiment for the Constitution. Hamilton preferred resolving intergovernmental disputes via political and public processes because public endorsement would legitimize broad national powers. Madison favored building public sentiment for the Constitution through strict limits on the national government enforced in part by the judiciary. He thought resolving intergovernmental disputes via public processes would confirm widespread suspicions of imperium in imperio and might provoke a popular backlash that would upset the constitutional equilibrium and undermine even legitimate national powers. This difference foreshadows Hamilton and Madison's later constitutional disagreements, reveals fundamental ambiguities in America's federal system, and confirms the need to consider how institutions and policies affect public sentiment for the constitutional order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding what James Madison's opponents sought and won at the US. Constitutional Convention revises our understanding of the founders' original intentions for the durable framework that has structured American political development The Constitution is the by- product of expedient accommodations forced on Madison. Madison sought broad national authority independent of state governments and a swift victory for population -based congressional representation. Delegates from economically disadvantaged states opposed these plans, seeking instead to nationalize only selective public goods, to maintain most state policy autonomy, and to minimize contingencies imposed by other governments. Connecticut's delegates, particularly Roger Sherman, played a pivotal role in spoiling Madison `s agenda and altering his substantive plans for Constitutional design. Madison `s Convention opponents are responsible for a Constitution that nationalized only enumerated public goods and imposed potentially high transaction costs on any further nationalization of policy authority. They helped make federalism a lasting political weapon used to win substantive policy outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the political standpoint of James Madison, the 4th U.S. President and considered as the father of U.S. Constitution, on issues of democracy, property and civic education in response, to the questions raised by professors Richard Matthews and Colleen Sheehan on an essay on Madison and public opinion. Argument of Sheehan against considering Madison as a genuine partisan of democracy; Views of Matthews on Madison as a partisan of democracy; Source of Sheehan's case that Madison conceived of public opinion as a censorial power.

This essay examines the evolution from 1785 to 1800 of Madison's understanding of the proper role of public opinion in the American political system. It provides an insight into Madison's transformation from the leading architect of the Constitution during the 1780s to the opposition leader of the Jeffersonian party during the 1790s. The essay challenges the contention that Madison's writings on public opinion establish his support for using governmental institutions and statesmanship to improve the souls of the citizenry and to develop a common character among them. Instead, it is argued, Madison defended the sovereignty of public opinion as a means for citizens to influence and monitor their representatives' actions in an extended republic where these tasks were at once difficult and imperative. In the course of this defense, Madison contributed to a developing libertarian tradition of political thought in America based upon the broad protection of freedom of speech and the belief that political truths best emerge from the free flow of ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the causes of the dispute between James Madison and Alexander Hamilton in the early 1790s. Though Hamilton initially believed that Madison `s opposition to the Federalist administration was probably motivated by personal animosity and political advantage, in later years he concluded what Madison had long argued: the controversy between Republicans and Federalists stemmed from a difference of principle. For Madison, republicanism meant the recognition of the sovereignty of public opinion and the commitment to participatory politics. Hamilton advocated a more submissive role for the citizenry and a more independent status for the political elite. While Madison did not deny to political leaders and enlightened men a critical place in the formation of public opinion, he fought against Hamilton's thin version of public opinion as "confidence" in government In 1791- 92 Madison took the Republican lead in providing a philosophic defense for a tangible, active, and responsible role for the citizens of republican government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A direct comparison between the U.S. Bill of Rights and prominent English common law documents shows that the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution have only a limited relationship to English antecedents. Nor were the amendment proposals by the state ratifying conventions the primary source of the U.S. Bill of Rights. Instead, this famous addition to the federal Constitution was a summary of the common core found in the seven existing state bills of rights. James Madison's use of this source rested upon colonial developments in rights theory, contrasting notions of rights in England and America, competing notions of liberty in America in the 1780s, and the political exigencies surrounding the ratification of the U.S. Constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the Fourteenth Amendment has been the vehicle for a number of transformations in the protection of rights, there has been no consensus on what it means. The amendment is sometimes held to have revolutionized the Constitution, in effect replacing the traditional federal system with a more national system. It is also argued that the amendment essentially reaffirmed the prewar Constitution. The truth appears to lie with neither side: the drafters of the amendment attempted to "complete the Constitution," neither to reform it radically, nor to reaffirm it simply, in doing so, they unwittingly followed in the tracks of the original "father of the Constitution, "James Madison, who believed the original Constitution to be defective in important ways. Proper attention to the context and the structure of the text of the amendment reveals just how the amendment was to "complete the Constitution." So examined, the amendment reveals itself to be a precisely stated, clearly drafted text, containing a number of new constitutional principles. Properly understood, the amendment affords constitutional protection far rights already possessed in some sense, but therefore unprotected in the old Constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The excessive entanglement standard is part of the Supreme Court's three-pronged test for determining the constitutional validity of government aid to religion. This article challenges in turn the validity of that standard and its two components, namely the criteria of administrative entanglement and political divisiveness. The administrative entanglement criterion is flawed because it violates the principle of equality. The political divisiveness standard, on the other hand, not only misreads the intention of the Founding Fathers but also ignores the value of religious conflict in a democracy and the strategy for handling such conflict proposed by James Madison. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article proposes a more useful typology of the separation concept used U.S. president James Madison in relation to the relationship between church and state. His determination to establish religious freedom was easily interpreted in light of the "wall of separation" metaphor used by U.S. president Thomas Jefferson in his letter to the Danbury Baptists. Structural separation involves severing formal legal and systemic ties between religion and the polity.

The article examines the evolution of the political ideology of democratic Republicanism in the U.S. and how its founders framed such ideology as well as its influence at present. It highlights on the Republican founders John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton and the transformation of their ideologies from classical thought to modernism. It also discusses how the classical thinkers like Niccolo Machiavelli interpreted freedom relative to American democracy.

Focuses on former US President James Madison's argument in favor of term limits for elected officials of Congress. French diplomat Louis Guillaume Otto's comments on term limits for American officials; James Harrington's concept of rotation of offices; Madison's proposed use of legislative term limitation as a means to control special interests; Rise of career politicians in the United States.