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Structuralists typically appeal to some variant of the widely popular 'mapping' account of mathematical representation to suggest that mathematics is applied in modern science to represent the world's physical structure. However, in this paper, I argue that this realist interpretation of the 'mapping' account presupposes that physical systems possess an 'assumed structure' that is at odds with modern physical theory. Through two detailed case studies concerning the use of the differential and variational calculus in modern dynamics, I show that the formal structure that we need to assume in order to apply the mapping account is inconsistent with the way in which mathematics is applied in modern physics. The problem is that a realist interpretation of the 'mapping' account imposes too severe of a constraint on the conformity that must exist between mathematics and nature in order for mathematics to represent the structure of a physical system. • This paper presents a critique of the 'mapping' account of mathematical representation. • The 'mapping' account requires that physical systems possess an assumed structure. • This structure is at odds with modern physical theory. • I argue that a realist interpretation of the account imposes a severe constraint on the conformity between math and nature. • The argument is defended through two case studies concerning the differential and variational calculus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]