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This paper is an investigation into a triple homicide in the French Mandate of Syria in 1925. It first suggests that the official decision to single out the murder of three French land registry employees in the midst of the Great Syrian Revolt, a two-year war against French imperial rule, is revealing of the Mandate's attempts to legitimize its dominion over Syria. It then argues that the capacity in which the three slain agents operated, as employees tasked with the break-up of mushâ' properties, is central to their demise. Indeed the Mandate advertised the individualization of mushâ' holdings (based on a rotation of land use rights) as a rational measure meant to improve living standards in rural Syria. But Syrian rebels also perceived such interventions as an attempt by French authorities to circumvent the Mandate-imposed restrictions to their authority through the construction of what is here called 'material sovereignty.' [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

French policy towards Israel in the 1950s and 1960s depended on a number of variables. Above all, French diplomacy never considered Israel apart from broader Middle Eastern and international considerations. The collusion of the Sinai Campaign of 1956 transformed this situation only to a certain extent; parallel evaluation of the merits and limits of Franco-Israeli relations predated the establishment of the French Fifth Republic. A process of readjustment undertaken by de Gaulle's administration came to the fore in 1960. It combined elements of practical assistance with reserved association in public. The nature of transition defied simple classification. While Israel was concerned about allegedly waning support, the official French narrative denied the existence of a major shift in the substance of bilateral ties. In a way, each party misinterpreted the actions of the other: for Israel, ongoing French assistance did not fully outweigh the decline in overt expressions of 'friendship'; viewed from Paris, the reactions to every minor French 'no' seemed exaggerated. The limitations accompanying bilateral trade confirmed these diverging perspectives even further. Yet, seen in its proper historical context, the outcome of this process was not set in stone. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since their creation in the 1880s, holiday camps ('colonies de vacances') in France have experienced continued and increasing success. Organised for the most part by local associations or municipalities, they are structured and grouped into federations. A fact specific to France is that the French government took an active role in holiday camps from 1936 onwards. Contributing at first to the democratisation of leisure activities, they went on to become a real public education service after the Second World War, the State then setting up an effective subsidy and inspection system with respect to these camps. Within this context, holiday camps were also considered as important relays of France's foreign and colonial policy, due to their profound symbolic significance. Indeed, they portrayed a picture of a maternal France concerned with the well-being of its children and with national and international solidarity. Between 1945 and the mid-1950s, French holiday camps were then used to serve political and diplomatic agendas. Drawing on ministerial and audiovisual archives, this paper shows, in particular, that holiday camps were promoted abroad in order to further France's international influence, and were widely used to serve the policy established in French Algeria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1825, France recognized its former colony Haiti's independence, ending an over twenty-year struggle for the black republic to obtain legal recognition as a sovereign state but saddling it with a financial indemnity that crippled its economy. This article argues that France's formal recognition of the republic gave Haiti an important advantage to defend its sovereignty as a legitimate nation, as well as its political union with Santo Domingo in 1822. In doing so, the study brings together two bodies of literature that rarely speak to one another: nineteenth-century Haitian diplomatic history and works treating Dominicans' experience under Haitian rule. This article will focus on the aftermath of French recognition of Haitian independence that affected British commercial negotiations with Haiti. Finally, it will examine how Haiti's recognized independence forced the Spanish to enter diplomatic talks with the Haitians over sovereignty and rule in Santo Domingo. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article concerns textile industry dynamics. Using a new database covering French international trade between 1836 and 1938, it focuses on France's specialisation in various textiles. It demonstrates, for the first time, the major influence of trade policy on the French textile trade during the first globalisation. Tariffs appear to be key factors in specialisation, measured by the Lafay Index and intra-industry trade in textiles. By analysing changes in tariffs between textile raw materials and finished textiles and decorrelation between tariffs, we show that an effective trade protection approach was applied by successive French governments in order to sustain the industrial competitiveness of textile firms. Such trade policy slowed down textile de-specialisation in silk and wool fabrics until World War One. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on historical encounters between Thailand and France which known as crypto-colonialism and independence marks a symbolic as well as material dependence on intrusive colonial power. It mentions complex ways in which clothing has expressed Thai cryptocolonialism and it considers how the sartorial has served as a material marker of a transformation. It also mentions Siamese monarchy sought to modernize and protect its own interests in the face of European expansionism.

Diverging French and Portuguese approaches to imperialism complicated French diplomats' assessment of Portugal in the 1960s. As France relinquished the last of its African empire, Portugal fought to maintain its overseas provinces. Examining this relationship reveals the uneven evolution of French attitudes towards Africa. Within the French state, some opposed Portugal's bloody colonial wars, while others believed that Portugal, as the remaining European power in Africa, represented the last best hope for the civilising mission on the continent. Beyond the Cold War dynamics at play, ideologies of race and empire lay at the heart of this relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over 50 years after 1960's 'Year of Africa', most of Francophone Africa continues to be embedded in a set of associations that fit very well with Kwame Nkrumah's description of neocolonialism, where postcolonial states are de jure independent but in reality constrained through their economic systems so that policy is directed from outside. This article scrutinises the functioning of the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA), considering the role the currency has in persistent underdevelopment in most of Francophone Africa. In doing so, the article identifies the CFA as the most blatant example of functioning neocolonialism in Africa today and a critical device that promotes dependency in large parts of the continent. Mainstream analyses of the technical aspects of the CFA have generally focused on the exchange rate and other related matters. However, while important, the real importance of the CFA franc should not be seen as purely economic, but also political. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the conceptualization and interpretation of ‘European solidarity’ by the French President François Mitterrand. It discusses the relevance of former concepts of foreign and European policy. It differentiates between a European idea and European institutions, also taking into account personal experiences. Finally, it analyses the correlation between different concepts such as ‘European solidarity’, ‘transatlantic solidarity’, ‘West European solidarity’ and ‘pan-European solidarity’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

France’s hesitant stance on EU enlargement towards the Balkans is illustrative of a broader ambivalence among both French elites and citizens towards the European project. Despite principled support for the Balkans’ EU membership, achieving this step is no strategic priority for France. The official approach emphasizes strict conditionality and a rigorous monitoring of reform progress in aspirant countries. A hostile public opinion and superficial media coverage further strengthen the country’s reluctance to admit new, possibly unprepared candidates into the Union. Analysing the historical evolution of the French position on EU enlargement as well as its current political, institutional and societal expressions, this article construes France’s disinvestment from the Balkans’ EU perspective as the result of failed expectations and a growing disillusionment with the EU’s international role and its political future more broadly. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The conflict over French nuclear testing in the South Pacific has dominated discussion of Australia’s relations with France while Gough Whitlam was Prime Minister (December 1972 to November 1975). Nonetheless, other issues were also important. To an extent not previously appreciated, Whitlam took a very positive view of France, despite his opposition to French nuclear testing. He understood the implications for Australian interests of France’s leading role in Western Europe, notably with respect to trade access, and was attracted by French scientific and industrial expertise. He was open to possible French involvement in uranium enrichment in Australia, and to Australian participation in the French/European Airbus aviation project. The French government reciprocated Whitlam’s interest in closer engagement. His efforts to establish stronger relations with France (and Europe), though unsuccessful, provide a further example of his commitment to greater independence for Australia from its traditional allies and partners, the United States and Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The new Poland is no longer an engine of European integration, nor does it seem to value its relationships with Germany and France. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At 10:30 in the morning on 28 June 1992, a Dauphin helicopter landed at Sarajevo airport carrying a precious cargo: the French president, François Mitterrand. Since the beginning of the Bosnian War, Bosnian Serb forces had controlled the airport and restricted the delivery of humanitarian aid to the city’s destitute population, which formed an important cornerstone of their siege strategy. In reaching the airport, the president secured its re-opening and, with it, the commencement of one of the longest humanitarian airlifts in history. However, Mitterrand’s visit also had implications and significance beyond the Bosnian capital. The visit secured humanitarian intervention through the United Nations as the international community’s modus operandi for conflict resolution in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Through its permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council and enthusiastic engagement with humanitarian intervention, France would shape the intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina and thus continue to justify its position amongst the world’s Great Powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces the key tenets of French foreign and security policy during the Cold War, and illustrates the deep challenges to the French consensus raised by the emergence of a unipolar system. There is a growing gap between the rhetoric of French security policy, emphasizing ‘autonomy’ and ‘sovereignty’ out of habit from the Cold War, and the actual security practices showing a gradual embedding within the transatlantic security structures. In the absence of a new transpartisan grand narrative relevant for the contemporary international system, such embedding is easily portrayed in France as a ‘treason’ from a romanticized Gaullist foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In France and Europe today, claims arise defining so-called Muslim and European ‘worlds’ and labelling them irreconcilable. These claims ignore the intertwined history of France and North Africa. When the six founding members of the European Economic Community (EEC) signed the Treaty of Rome, French administrators still considered Algeria to be a constituent part of France, despite the ongoing war. The Algerian question was central to negotiations for the Treaty of Rome and during them, French officials attempted to inscribe Algeria within the founding documents of the European project through a policy of ‘Eurafrique’. Their partners, eager for France’s signature on the Treaty, accepted a vision of integrated Europe with borders crossing the Mediterranean. This decision raised thorny issues in the months and years to come, first in debates of how or even if the Treaty could be implemented overseas, then when independent Algeria attempted to define its relationship with the EEC. These episodes of negotiation and interaction reveal the centrality of the question of empire to the foundations of integrated Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the creation of the European Community, the Gaullist movement has never been united over the question of European integration. De Gaulle’s intergovernmental vision of the European project has largely been the dominant discourse. At times however, this narrative has been questioned—on the one hand by more supranational notions of European integration; and on the other by a more pro-sovereignty Eurosceptic discourse. Subsequently, in its various modern-day guises the Gaullist movement has faced a series of major internal divisions with regard to its position on ‘Europe’. This uncertainty has also manifested itself at the highest level as demonstrated by the changing discourse advocated by former French presidents Jacques Chirac and Nicolas Sarkozy. This paper analyses the internal tensions over the European issue within the Gaullist movement at elite level. It determines that despite Chirac’s and Sarkozy’s attempts to unite the party throughout their presidencies the Gaullist movement is far from having moved towards a united European stance. Accordingly, the authors identify that over the past three decades, it is possible to identify three distinct, and at times conflicting, Gaullist stances on European integration with which the party’s elites have vacillated, namely Euro-Federalism, Euro-Pragmatism and Euro-Populism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An introduction is provided to articles in the issue on theme of the relationship between France and Europe from the March 1957 Treaty of Rome through 2017 with topics, including European integration, French Algeria and the European Union (EU).

Studies of the relationship of political parties to the European Community/Union (EC/EU) increasingly use the perspective of ‘Europeanisation’ to measure such relationships. There is also a case, however, for looking at Europe from the perhaps narrower but no less necessary point of view of intra-party dynamics: in particular, what kinds of challenge does ‘Europe’ represent to party managers and how do they deal with it? By analysing the relationship of the Socialist Party to the EC/EU at three key moments in the history of European integration, the author identifies some common tropisms which continue to operate even as the effects of ‘Europeanisation’ increase. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Even though France is an active player on the world stage, its foreign and security think tank milieu is smaller than that of similar powers, most notably the United Kingdom. Comparing French think tanks with those in Denmark illustrates how French institutional structures constrain think tank activities. France’s political tradition of centralisation, its non-academic civil service education, and separation of academia and administration create an environment in which think tanks are underfunded and walk a fine line between an over-controlling administration and a suspicious academia. Some French think tanks perform well in spite of these structures, which indicates that they could flourish and compete at the highest international level if given better structural conditions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

By integrating French archives and untapped US intelligence records, this article uncovers a debate within US government circles about the accuracy of the entrenched image of France at the onset of the Cold War as decadent and teetering toward revolution. In exchanges with the White House, State Department and military, right-leaning French sources bolstered this view. French contacts in the Resistance meanwhile shaped Office of Strategic Services analysis that France was a strong, worthy ally. France became a contested idea with warring factions in both capitals seeking to influence US policy - with repercussions for Franco-American relations for decades to come. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article talks about the Egypt Plan formulated by philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, which aimed to convince King Louis XIV of France to invade Egypt. Topics discussed include scholars' contention that the plan was formulated to divert the King from invading Holland and German territories, the diversion hypothesis, and the authors opinion that the diversion account offers an incomplete reasoning for Leibniz's motives.

French policy towards UN peacekeeping reflects the ambivalence of what France wants to achieve in the field of conflict management and through which institutional frameworks it prefers to work. On the one hand, France is greatly involved in the design and decision-making process of contemporary UN-led peacekeeping operations. On the other hand, after having been present in the field during the early 1990s, France underwent a major policy shift that led it to distance itself from UN operations. This chapter offers a narrative of French policy and perceptionsvis-à-visthe virtues and limits of UN peacekeeping operations in the twenty-first century. It examines the French level of contributions, decision-making process, motivations and lessons learnt from past and current operations. It also analyses the dichotomy between the political role that France plays at the Security Council and its absence from UN-led operations. It seeks to determine how coherent this dichotomy is, its rationale, and how likely – and under what conditions – it will change in the near future, in particular through a hypothetical French return to UN-led peacekeeping operations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 2015 UN climate negotiations in Paris resulted in an inclusive, binding treaty that succeeds the Kyoto Protocol. In contrast to the failure at Copenhagen in 2009, the Paris negotiations are therefore seen as a major diplomatic success that has regenerated faith in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as a forum for dynamic multilateralism. The Paris Agreement provides a robust framework for ratcheting up efforts to combat global warming. However, the Agreement’s value will remain unclear for some time. The historical path to the Paris accord is outlined, and a preliminary assessment is offered of its key elements and outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two decades later, the Rwandan genocide has been broadly analysed and, to a certain extent, so has the French response to the genocide. Nevertheless, even though the literature covers extensivelyhowthe French executive responded to the genocide, it remains confusing when it comes to explainingwhyit responded in such a controversial way, since two—somewhat contradictory—accounts have been put forward. In order to address this lack of clarity, the article analyses these main accounts and concludes that they both present key weaknesses that prevent us from fully understanding France’s controversial response. Building on Prunier’s testimony, this article suggests a third explanation by arguing that the ‘Fashoda syndrome’ had a strong influence on President Mitterrand and should be taken into account more consistently, not only when studying the French response in Rwanda, but also Mitterrand’s foreign policy in Africa more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 1951 Franco-Indian bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement was the first such cooperation outside the Manhattan Project, and preceded President Eisenhower's 1953 ‘Atoms for Peace’ proposal. This cooperation on one hand upset the United Kingdom, which regretted losing leverage over its former colony to its colonial rival, and on the other, enhanced the United States' interest in playing a key role in the region. Based on multi-archival research, this paper explores the significance of Franco-Indian nuclear relations against the backdrop of Anglo-American endeavours to censor information related to atomic energy and to secure control of strategic minerals during the early Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The paper addresses the impact of the Rhine Crisis of 1840 on Italian countries and explains the role they played in the European State System when the Continent seemed to be on the eve of a general war. As the paper attempts to prove, the crisis seriously alarmed the ruling classes as well as the general public and revealed the internal problems of the Italian countries as well as their deep distrust towards the egotistic and self-serving policies of the Great Powers. The paper therefore introduces the history of Italy during late 1840 within the wider context of European diplomatic history and serves as a probe into the history of the European State System during the Pre-March period in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the middle of the Algerian War of Independence, the French military and government launched an elaborate campaign to ‘liberate’ Algerian Muslim women. The timing of its inception indicated one of the strongest motivations behind this elaborate series of policies. Indeed, French propagandists and officials, prompted by the appearance on the international stage of ‘modern’-looking female Algerian nationalist agents, scrambled to uphold the myth that Algerian Muslim gender relations in the territory were ‘backwards’ and only they could rectify this shortcoming in Algerian society. They consequently embarked upon the emancipation campaign mainly in pursuit of convincing outsiders of France's purported ability and duty to make Algeria ‘modern'. For this reason, the production of photographic evidence capable of visually demonstrating that Muslim women were becoming French and liberated under French guidance was one of the campaign's central aims. In order to obtain such evidence, military agents exploited and falsified representations of Muslim women, a process this article examines. The present work additionally elucidates many of the hypocrisies inherent in the French army's exploitation of Muslim women and their bodies through their elaborate propagandist efforts; through their actions on the ground in Algeria, French soldiers and military leaders, including individuals directly implicated in the ‘emancipation’ campaign, were actually confining, abusing, and torturing Muslim women rather than freeing them. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Historians have speculated over the existence of an 1841 plan by the French foreign minister François Guizot to internationalize Jerusalem as a Christian city, a plan holding major implications for the eventual emergence of a Jewish state and for European–Ottoman relations. This article aims, based on fresh archival and other sources, to provide a definitive evaluation of Guizot's plan, its scope, and its motivations. It broadens the field to encompass other great power plans mooted in 1841, including plans of a Protestant yet Zionist flavour, and it reassesses the political weight of early nineteenth-century European religious impulses with regard to Palestine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The French doctrine towards peace operations has, over the last two decades, reflected the ambivalence of France’s position, stretched between on the one hand a military culture that places the use of force at the centre of strategy and on the other hand multidimensional operations that by their nature integrate a large range of activities. As a consequence France has evolved as a ‘reluctant peacekeeper’: while it has been significantly involved in peace operations since the end of the Cold War, the military has never felt comfortable with the peacekeeping concept, seen as a dilution of their primary function of fighting wars. This tension has shaped both doctrinal development and operations. Twenty years after the French engagement in former Yugoslavia, lessons have been learnt, and policy-makers have become aware of the evolution of conflict management and the subsequent necessity to integrate the military dimension into a broader framework. Yet France’s policy is still shaped by a certain aversion towards the concept of long-term multinational peace operations, and a parallel preference for more focused and reactive operations. The merits of the use of force are central to these debates. While these policy preferences are responses to legitimate concerns about both the efficiency of foreign interventions and the soldier’s identity, they also raise questions as to their compatibility with the long term and multidimensional requirements of bringing sustainable peace in fragile states. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Durant la Première Guerre Mondiale, la presse parisienne de l'arrière évoque abondamment le génocide des Arméniens, tant pour dénoncer les massacres que pour alimenter un discours propagandiste visant à la mobilisation de guerre de la société civile. Les journaux voient en l'Allemagne l'instigatrice du génocide, plaçant la souffrance arménienne dans la continuité des exactions commises à l'encontre des Belges. Certains journaux parisiens se servent également du génocide des Arméniens pour opposer musulmans et chrétiens dans un discours aux accents de guerre de religion tandis que la presse de droite fait occasionnellement preuve de xénophobie à l'encontre des réfugiés et des victimes. La situation s'inverse même à la fin du conflit; le génocide des Arméniens étant dénoncé comme « bourrage de crâne » dans le but de promouvoir le rapprochement Franco-Turc. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The participation of many thousands of troops recruited in France's overseas colonies, including many Moroccan infantrymen, known as ‘goumiers’, has been overlooked by historians and left out of accounts of significant battles of the Second World War. Yet Moroccan soldiers took part in some of the fiercest combat in the Mediterranean region, in Tunisia, in Sicily and Corsica, in the liberation of Marseille, and went on to liberate Paris and provide manpower for the invasion of Germany at great cost. Tracing the trajectory of thegoumierunits in the later years of the war, this essay recovers many details of their suppressed history, situating the memory of their exploits, along with the recollection of some of their less heroic deeds, within new frameworks of interpretation informed by the idea of empire, the historiography of race, and narratives of colonial exploitation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In the 1960s, French president de Gaulle's ambition to create a ‘European Europe’ depended heavily on German support. This article illustrates and reinterprets the crucial attitude of Ludwig Erhard by focusing on his role after the signing of the Elysée treaty in January 1963, and his reaction to a secret (and since forgotten) French proposal for monetary union in March 1964. The evidence shows that Erhard, fundamentally a moderate Atlanticist, was profoundly affected by the pressure of the Kennedy administration not to harbour Gaullist ideas. Indeed, as German chancellor Erhard feared that America might cease to defend Europe if de Gaulle's idea of a more independent Europe were to gain ground in Germany. Hence Erhard simply ignored any French move perceived to be contradictory to US policy. The article adds an element to the complexity of Franco-German relations in the 1960s while providing an example of how American power was exercised during the Cold War. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]