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Arriving in the UK after exile from Nazi Germany, Karl Mannheim taught sociology at the London School of Economics and then also at the London Institute of Education, where he was awarded a chair just a year before his untimely death in 1947. In his later writings and teaching, Mannheim argued that the sociology of education could make a crucial contribution to the new type of society he regarded as essential if the problems of liberal democracy were to be overcome, and the slide towards totalitarianism avoided. And the period immediately after his death was a key phase in the development and establishment of the sociology of education in Britain. Jean Floud, who took over teaching the subject at the Institute of Education after Mannheim's death, played a central role in this, but, while she had studied with him and served as his research assistant, she adopted a very different approach. This focused, in particular, on whether the existing structure and operation of educational institutions restricted social mobility. As a result of this change in focus, Mannheim's work had a very marginal role in the subsequent history of British sociology of education. In this article, I compare Mannheim's and Floud's competing conceptions of the character and role of the subdiscipline, and how these fared in later developments within the field.

It is widely assumed that researchers must normally secure informed consent from participants if research is to be ethical. But what exactly are people being asked to consent to? Most obviously, it is to supplying, or providing access to, data; but are they also agreeing that this data can be used in any way relevant to the research, or do they retain a right to control its use? A third question is: are they consenting to themselves being included within the focus of study, so that asking for consent amounts to assigning a right not to be researched? A further question concerns whether there can be group rights not to supply data, to control the use of data, and/or not to be researched? Such claims have been made by spokespersons for the disabled, indigenous groups, commercial organisations, governments, and religious cults. Justifications for these various rights usually appeal to the principle of autonomy, in one form or another. Yet this principle, being universal, must also apply to researchers themselves. So, does this imply that researchers have a right to carry out research? As this makes clear, there are conflicting rights-claims around research. This paper will examine these and their implications.

‘Critical’, ‘activist’, or ‘engaged’ forms of social research are influential in many fields today. They insist that researchers ‘critique’ the phenomena being investigated, and they demand that research should be designed to bring about ‘social change’. A variety of political arguments have been used to support this commitment. Among the main ones is that ‘uncritical’ research detached from practical progressive action is either trivial or reinforces the status quo – that any claim to objectivity is inevitably ideological. However, there are three other arguments, of an ethical character, that have also been employed to justify social research being ‘critical’, ‘activist’, or ‘engaged’. These appeal to: urgency of the social issue being investigated; the reciprocity that ought always to operate between researcher and researched; and researchers’ complicity in the status quo, especially where they are taken to be a member of a privileged group. In this paper, I will critically examine these arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past few decades, there have been efforts to transform qualitative inquiry, drawing on resources from both imaginative literature and art. There have long been tensions within social science that have encouraged the use of these resources, but the recent "literary turn" is more radical. The assumptions underpinning it are examined, and it is argued that what is most important is the purpose for which modes of expression are employed and how well they serve this. The problem with the literary turn is that it frequently involves substitution of the purposes of art or politics for those of social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the concept of vulnerability in the context of social research ethics. An ambiguity is noted in use of this term: it may refer to an incapacity to provide informed consent to participate in a research project, or it may imply heightened susceptibility to the risk of harm. It is pointed out that vulnerability is a matter of degree, and that there are different sources and types of harm, which must be taken into account in any judgment about whether additional precautions are required to protect particular categories of research participants. Furthermore, such judgments must be sensitive to the particular context in which research is taking place. This is one of several considerations that raise questions about the desirability of the sort of pre-emptive ethical regulation that has become institutionalized in many countries over the past few decades, a form that is more appropriate to medical rather than to social research. However, this is not to deny that a concern with the vulnerability of research participants is necessary on the part of social researchers. Furthermore, it must be recognized that researchers themselves may be vulnerable to harm in the research process. Finally, some discussion is provided of the way in which a concern with vulnerability can conflict with other considerations that researchers need to take into account in doing their work. The key point is that vulnerability is a complex and controversial concept, and it requires careful handling in thinking about social research ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper responds to some recent discussions in the Journal about how interview data can be used. While recognising the value of detailed analysis of the discourse employed in interviews to identify its formal features, it is argued that such analysis is not essential for all the purposes for which interview data can be employed in social research; that informal understanding of everyday language use, built up through ordinary experience and during the course of inquiry, can often be relied upon. It is also argued that practical cautions against taking interview data at face value must not be conflated with philosophical doubts about whether interview data can serve as a source of evidence about anything beyond the interview context. [For the original article, "Beyond Performative Talk: Critical Observations on the Radical Critique of Reading Interview Data," see EJ1259552.]

This article is a brief reply to David Byrne's perspective on the goal of academic social science. The author, Martyn Hammersley, disagrees with Byrne on the fundamental goal of social science but agrees on other matters. Hammersley criticizes "critical" and "activist" conceptions of social research and defends a concept of objectivity based on Max Weber's position. Hammersley argues that partisan research increases bias and undermines discursive democracy. The article also addresses ethical arguments in favor of a critical or activist position and emphasizes the importance of recognizing the distinction between academic research and political action. [Extracted from the article]

This paper notes that, in the field of education and beyond, the term "ethnography" has acquired a range of meanings, and comes in many different versions, these often reflecting sharply divergent orientations. I argue that this is a major problem that requires attention; particularly since today there are some serious threats to the practice of ethnographic work, on almost any definition. However, while we need to forge greater agreement about the meaning of the term, this is a challenging task. Indeed, if we take "ethnography" to refer to a whole methodological approach little agreement will be possible. I argue that it "may" be feasible if we treat ethnography as one methodological strategy among others, each having varying advantages and disadvantages for the purposes of investigating particular topics. However, the fundamental disagreements among ethnographers today about ontological, epistemological, and axiological matters render even this by no means unproblematic.

In this paper some fundamental criticisms of Max Weber's conception of the vocation of science are addressed. These well-known criticisms focus on his admission that science cannot demonstrate its own value, and his broader claim that there can be no rational basis for committing oneself to one set of ultimate values as against another. Instead, he insisted that the adoption of such values is necessarily a matter of individual decision. Influential critics have argued that this amounts to relativism, or even nihilism: that, if it were true, neither science nor anything else could have genuine value, all value-judgements would be arbitrary or entirely instrumental (e.g. a matter of self-interest). I will outline Weber's position, and then examine the arguments of some of his critics: focussing particularly on Midgley and Strauss. This provides the basis for a careful reassessment of Weber's position, and for some suggestions about how he could respond to these critics. It is argued that fundamental values operate in a dialectical relationship with specific evaluations, and that they arise naturally out of more or less universal features of human beings' life experience. While this does not provide a compelling rational basis for commitment to those values, even less for prioritising one over another, it tells us why we often feel a need to uphold them. Furthermore, despite the fact that it does not guarantee agreement, rational clarification of these values and their implications, as well as appraisal of their relative significance in particular cases, is possible. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers what it could mean to say that epistemologies and methodologies are racially just or unjust. It has been argued that this has nothing to do with whether an individual researcher is racist: he or she could be anti-racist but still use an epistemology that is racially biased. To explore this issue, some pioneering research by Allison Davis, an influential African-American scholar in the 1940s and 1950s, is examined. This research dealt with the effects of social class cultures on academic achievement in the United States. While Davis was well-known at the time, his work in this field is now largely forgotten. Two senses of 'racially-just' are examined in this paper, relating: to the intrinsic character or origin of epistemologies and methodologies; or to the implications for and likely consequences of their use. Davis's investigations employed methods and assumptions that are rejected by many educational researchers today. I will address the question of whether these can be criticised as racially unjust; and, if so, on what basis. This evaluation will lead to a consideration of the broader question of the terms in which it is appropriate to assess educational research, and in particular the epistemologies and methodologies on which it depends. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely recognised that academic freedom is currently under threat. But there is also considerable dispute about the meaning of the term. In this paper I examine two recent and important accounts of the nature of academic freedom that seek to distinguish it clearly from free speech. Such a distinction is, in my view, essential. The aim of the paper is to clarify and resolve differences between these two accounts, and thereby to develop further the conceptualisation of academic freedom.

This article investigates the value of ethnographic re-studies, and some of the theoretical and methodological issues that carrying out a re-study can generate. It is argued that the disputes that arose around some classic examples in anthropology and community studies are particularly illuminating. For example, Mead's work on Samoa and Redfield's study of Tepoztlán, and the re-studies of these, generated considerable discussion, and this still offers lessons for today. Three key functions of re-studies are discussed: replication, mapping change, and producing a fuller portrait of a community or institution. Also explored is the role of the personal characteristics and the theoretical orientations of researchers. It is concluded that re-studies reveal threats to validity that are present in all social research. At the same time, there is a danger that the discrepancies in findings between study and re-study will be exaggerated, indeed that the methodological problems involved will be mistakenly treated as representing a logical impasse.

It is argued in this paper that a significant number of definitions of terms provided in currently available methodological texts are inadequate or positively misleading. Some do not cover the main meaning of the term but focus instead on a non-standard one. Others fail to pick out the distinctive features of what is being defined. There are also those that fail to indicate relationships to related terms or those with similar meanings. Finally, there are some definitions that are simply incorrect in significant respects. It is argued that defective definitions are worse than useless and are a disservice to students.

In some quarters today there are arguments to the effect that research ethics codes should be formulated in terms of principles, rather than specific prescriptions and proscriptions. This derives in part from what is probably the most influential approach to bioethics: principlism. What is provided here is an exploration of the nature of ethical principles as these relate to social research, and of the debates around them. It is argued that principles are useful, so long as they are treated as reminders of what ought to be taken into account, rather than as premises from which specific ethical judgments can be derived. At the same time, it is concluded that any move towards formulating codes in terms of principles is likely to make little difference in practice for researchers under the present regime of ethical regulation.

Fassin, Didier (Ed.). If Truth Be Told: The Politics of Public Ethnography. Durham N.C.: Duke University Press, 2017. $27.95, 358 pp., paper (9780822369776). In this edited collection, ethnographers discuss their [...]

The parallels and differences between current forms of populism and early 20th-century fascism have been the focus for much discussion. This article examines the relevance today of Karl Mannheim's analysis of fascism and of its relationship to democracy in the 1930s. He argued that the threat of fascism arose from the very nature of liberal democratic society, rather than being a product of external forces. He claimed that liberal democracy is transitional, rather than stable in character, and that the new emerging form of governance that was required to replace it shared a key component with fascism: a high level of social and economic planning. At the same time, he insisted that, as a pathological development, fascism served to illustrate the disastrous consequences that a failure to engage realistically with the process of societal development can have for upholding Western civilisational ideals. This article explores Mannheim's arguments against the background of current thinking about populism and 'post-democracy'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent times, the relationship between research and teaching has often been framed in terms of experimental investigations demonstrating what are effective pedagogical techniques. However, this is only one of several influential models of that relationship. While research literacy plays a key role in all of them, these models vary according to the type of research knowledge and skill felt to be of value to teachers, and in how teaching and education are conceptualised. This can be illustrated by the diverse forms of educational action research, and by different interpretations of "reflective practice". To further explore the role of research literacy, I examine the case of research on teaching about research methods, addressing the following questions: What role does pedagogical research play in research methods teaching? What might this tell us about the relationship between research and teaching more generally? What does it say about the notion of research literacy? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, titled "Dangerous Liaisons in the Wasteland? A Found Document," discusses the author's experience with reviewing research proposals related to waste reduction. The author expresses surprise and confusion at the unconventional and theoretical approaches proposed by researchers, such as examining capitalism as the root of waste, exploring structural racism in waste production, and investigating waste through artistic expressions. The author questions the value and practicality of these proposals and suggests that further research should be conducted on the issue of waste in social science. The article raises concerns about the potential wastefulness of research activities and the use of public funds. [Extracted from the article]

It is, perhaps, necessary to reiterate that the article was not primarily about ethnomethodology, or even about ethnomethodological work in Science and Technology Studies (STS), but about a particular line of argument - what can crudely be called radical constructionism - which has long been part of STS and continues to be influential in some quarters there, as Lynch acknowledges. Keywords: ethnomethodology; representation; science and technology studies; constructionism; Michael Lynch EN ethnomethodology representation science and technology studies constructionism Michael Lynch 268 271 4 07/07/22 20220701 NES 220701 I welcome Mike Lynch's response to my article and thank him for it. Reply to Michael Lynch's Comment on "Is Representation a "Folk" Term?". [Extracted from the article]

An influential strand within Science and Technology Studies (STS) rejects the idea that science produces representations referring to objects or processes that exist independently of it. This radical 'turn' has been framed as 'constructionist', 'nominalist', and more recently as 'ontological'. Its central argument is that science constructs or enacts rather than represents. Since most practitioners of science believe that it involves representation, an implication of the radical turn must be that 'representation' is a folk concept; perhaps even a myth or an ideology. This paper explores this anti-representationalism and its implications for the relationship between STS and mainstream social science, in part through drawing parallels with ethnomethodology. 1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Karl Mannheim's work, particularly his book Ideology and Utopia, has considerable relevance to current concerns about the public role of sociology. However, this is not widely recognised, and key aspects of his thought have frequently been neglected or disparaged. In this article the background to Mannheim's work is outlined, and a summary provided of the central argument of Ideology and Utopia, comparing this with the positions taken by Max Weber and Georg Lukács, both of whom were important influences on Mannheim. The major criticisms of, and problems with, Mannheim's argument are then addressed. While he was by no means completely successful in putting forward a convincing conception of sociology's public role, there is a great deal to be learned from his work, and from the manner in which he pursued it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mary Beard writes ('No competitive martyrdom', December 20) that 'half a century ago there may have been an illusion of free speech on campus, but this was sustained by the [...]

It is widely assumed that researchers must normally secure informed consent from participants if research is to be ethical. But what exactly are people being asked to consent to? Most obviously, it is to supplying, or providing access to, data; but are they also agreeing that this data can be used in any way relevant to the research, or do they retain a right to control its use? A third question is: are they consenting to themselves being included within the focus of study, so that asking for consent amounts to assigning a rightnot to be researched? A further question concerns whether there can be group rights not to supply data, to control the use of data, and/or not to be researched? Such claims have been made by spokespersons for the disabled, indigenous groups, commercial organisations, governments, and religious cults. Justifications for these various rights usually appeal to the principle of autonomy, in one form or another. Yet this principle, being universal, must also apply to researchers themselves. So, does this imply that researchers have a right to carry out research? As this makes clear, there are conflicting rights-claims around research. This paper will examine these and their implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Alfred Schutz's concept of 'multiple realities', and in particular, his portrayal of science as one of these realities. It is noted that, while this concept has been widely cited, it has often been interpreted in ways that are at odds with key features of Schutz's original formulation. A careful assessment is made of the main article he wrote dealing with this topic, focusing on the respects in which the 'multiple realities' he discusses are held to differ. Particular attention is given to the relationship between science and what Schutz calls 'the paramount reality', that of 'daily life'. It is suggested that there are some serious problems with the distinctions he makes and that these relate to an ambiguity in his position: that he starts from within phenomenological psychology, drawing on the work of Husserl and James, but moves in a more naturalistic and sociological direction in his account of 'the world of daily life'. This raises some fundamental questions about the nature of phenomenology and its relationship to social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the "methodology," or philosophy of social science, developed by Felix Kaufmann in the second quarter of the 20th century, with the aim of determining its influence on the early work of the sociologist Harold Garfinkel. Kaufmann's two methodology books are discussed, one written before, the other after, his migration from Austria to the United States. It is argued that Garfinkel took over Kaufmann's conception of scientific practice: as a set of procedural rules or methods that determine whether or not new propositions will be accepted into the corpus of scientific knowledge, and whether previously accepted propositions should be retained or abandoned. However, Garfinkel deployed this methodology not so much as a model for sociological inquiry, but rather for the processes by which the lifeworld is constituted—an area of investigation that is epistemologically prior to the focus of most social science, and one which had been opened up in the writings of Edmund Husserl and (especially) Alfred Schutz. It is suggested that Kaufmann's "methodology" was an important complement to the work of these other two philosophers in their influence on Garfinkel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article, titled "Is There Quality in Qualitative Research?" by Martyn Hammersley, explores the concept of quality in qualitative research. The author questions whether quality can be objectively measured in qualitative research and suggests that it may be subjective and dependent on individual perspectives. Hammersley, an Emeritus Professor of Educational and Social Research, has written extensively on methodological issues in social inquiry. The article raises important considerations about the nature of qualitative research and invites readers to reflect on their own beliefs and perspectives. [Extracted from the article]

This paper responds to some recent discussions in the Journal about how interview data can be used. While recognising the value of detailed analysis of the discourse employed in interviews to identify its formal features, it is argued that such analysis is not essential for all the purposes for which interview data can be employed in social research; that informal understanding of everyday language use, built up through ordinary experience and during the course of inquiry, can often be relied upon. It is also argued that practical cautions against taking interview data at face value must not be conflated with philosophical doubts about whether interview data can serve as a source of evidence about anything beyond the interview context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]