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Collective action, like public goods game, often requires mechanism intervention to avoid exploitation by free-riders. Reward and punishment are two widely studied solutions, but the balance of budgets and diverse behavioral motivations need further emphasis. Here, we introduce a heterogeneous distribution system based on peer rating (PRHDS), a disguised reward and punishment mechanism under budget balancing, and consider a comprehensive range of behavioral motivations. Preliminary studies show that PRHDS has the potential to promote cooperation, but is too sensitive to random exploration. This vulnerability is attributed to the exploitation of prosocial cooperators by egoistic cooperators. Afterward, we propose three punishments for minority raters and find that two monetary punishments can compensate for the above limitation. A notable finding is that the cooperation potential at medium multipliers seems to exceed that at high multipliers. In addition, our further analysis suggests that PRHDS may perform better when strategy differentiation is considered. This study reveals the possible limitations of PRHDS as a solution to collective social dilemma, and may have some enlightening significances for seeking the countermeasures. • We study a potential solution to the collective dilemma under balancing budget. • Diverse rating motivation and strategy knowability condition are considered. • The proposed mechanism is found to be too sensitive to random exploration. • We further propose remediations for stable cooperation under noise conditions. • The existence and role of interactive diversity individuals is also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]