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• The evolution of cooperation hypothesized that individual selection is inevitable is investigated. • Distinct from the traditional models, our model studied the effects of wealth-based rule when individual selection is inevitable, where only the top V individuals with relatively high cumulative payoffs in each group can be selected for costly PGG. • The effects of participation costs on the proportion of cooperation, the proportion of different individuals, and the gap between rich and poor individuals are distinctly different under different V. Individual selection, as an effective mechanism, is often used in spatial evolutionary games to promote cooperation. Previous research assumes that, individual selection usually occurs with people who fail to meet a certain criterion. However, individual selection is usually inevitable, regardless of whether players in population cooperate or defect. This paper studies the effects of wealth-based rule in costly public goods games when individual selection is inevitable. Specifically, we assume that only the top V individuals with relatively high cumulative payoffs in each group can be selected for costly PGG. The results show that when V is large, the increase of participation cost has slight inhibitory effects on the evolution of cooperation, but it alleviates the polarization of individuals. However, when V is small, the increase of participation cost within a certain range promotes cooperation prosperity, but it also causes an increase in the proportion of polarized individuals and a widening of the wealth gap between rich and poor individuals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]