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This paper seeks to contextualize the internet as a tool for democratization in China. Scholars have argued both for and against the prospect of the internet serving as a vehicle for political change in China, and authoritarian regimes more broadly, without reaching a consensus. We argue that part of the reason for the lack of consensus is that the internet's potential should be seen in more nuanced terms. The internet has served to open up the Chinese public sphere and democratize discussion. For reasons of demographics, history, and state control, however, the internet has not been the center of political mobilization against the regime. We begin by reviewing the literature on democratization and the internet in China. We find that much of the discussion focuses on the overly general and binary question of whether the internet leads to democratization, which is often too broadly defined. Instead, we suggest that the term democratization generally encompasses two concepts that should be analytically separate. The first aspect of democratization is the democratization of public discourse and the development of a Habermasian public sphere, through which the state loses its agenda setting ability. This is distinct from explicitly political democratization, in which the internet serves as a tool to achieve specific policy outcomes. We argue that the history of the internet in China has strongly influenced disparate outcomes in these separate spheres. Early on, China's history of dissent emerging from universities and its legacy of state controlled media led leaders to be suspicious of the mobilization potential of the internet. At the same time, the marketization of China coupled with the limitations of state media, has allowed for relatively more open discussion online. Next, we review more recent evidence of how the internet contributes to a public discourse in China but how it has not had a similar impact on political mobilization. We find that, outside of certain sensitive topics, the internet has allowed netizens to set the agenda for public discussion. This is innovative relative to the previous status quo: the state set the framework for public discourse via state media vehicles, with citizens maintaining little power to change the direction of conversation. Yet, at the same time, we also show that a number of factors and tactics mean the state has been able to limit and channel the internet's potential for political mobilization. As previous research has found, any attempt to use the internet for policy advocacy elicited swift and decisive action by the authorities. Overall, the Chinese experience suggests that the term democratization, when used in relation to the potentiality of the internet, has been used in an overly broad way. We thus end with a call for more attention to be paid to the specific mechanisms and circumstances through which the internet can lead to (limited) democratization in specific contexts. Research in this direction is more likely to lead to productive advances in our understanding of how technology shapes and is utilized by authoritarian societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we explore the impact of globalization on the relationship between the state and the media in China. We argue that China's participation in the global economy and community has not necessarily weakened the state's control of the media, but it has changed the relationship between the state and the media. Some of these changes are potentially democratizing, but thus far they have produced mixed political results. Section I examines how China's participation in the neoliberal economic order has reshaped state-media relations in that country. Section II discusses the impact of China's encounter with the global media industry on the relationship between the Chinese state and the media. Section III explores how exposure to international norms on state-media relations has changed the norms and practices of state-media relations in China. In the conclusion, we briefly speculate the consequences of these changes for the future of democracy in China. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Will China become democratic? This is a critical question highly debated among scholars and pundits. While optimistic proponents suggest that China is experiencing a gradual or inevitable democratic transition, pessimists argue that China is either stagnating in its "trapped transition" or becoming a "resilient authoritarian regime." One of the key issues of the debate focuses on different perceptions of the role of Chinese leaders in China's democratization. This paper intends to shed some light on this widely debated question by exploring the belief systems of Hu/Wen. Using operational code analysis from political psychology, I examine public speeches and statements delivered by Hu and Wen especially regarding domestic issues from 2005-2007. I suggest that Hu and Wen as the fourth generation of China's leadership share a similar belief system especially regarding domestic issues. Both of them have democratic-oriented beliefs perceiving a tolerant and cooperative political universe. In addition, both Hu and Wen are inclined to use cooperative and democratic means to achieve their political beliefs. However, both of them are weak in terms of implementing their political goals. China's future as a democracy depends on whether Hu and Wen can consolidate their political power and strengthen their beliefs in order to lead the political transition. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States—a liberal democracy—responded to the communist regimes' transition to market economies but not necessarily democratic politics by separating trade from security policy: opening trade to reforming economies but maintaining military superiority over non-democratizing military powers. Congressional attempts to use trade sanctions against market opening economies accused of human rights violations or weapons proliferation failed, while heavy investment continued in developing weapons to deter such countries. In Congress, this "liberal-realist" foreign policy emerged by "ends-meet-the-center" voting, in which bipartisan centrists prevail over extremists of both parties, or by "ideological bipartisan" voting, in which lawmakers on the same ideological side of both parties coalesce. Such patterns persisted in spite of majority party changes, divided governments, or economic downturns. The requirements for such voting patterns: an exogenous agenda setter, issue compartmentalization, inter-party politics, and ideological overlap between the two parties, strongly suggest the existence of a bipartisan, centrist, and pro-business group of lawmakers who serve as the domestic anchors of U.S. trade and security policy. Empirical evidence corroborates this claim, implying that to further understand foreign policymaking, it is necessary to tailor the standard models of Congressional lawmaking, incorporate empirically established policy preferences, and to go beyond the unitary actor-single preference models. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alexander Gerschenkron's notion of "late-developer" economic development contends that in a late-developing country, the state normally plays a more important role than does the state in an early industrialized country. Consistent with this critical notion, it has been argued that the state plays a decisive role in creating such new social classes as the new middle classes, and hence in shaping their socioeconomic and political traits. In a late-developing country, therefore, the middle class is most likely to support the state and the political system that is sanctioned by the state. To explore this proposition, this study examines the levels and sources of the Chinese middle class's support for a set of democratic values and institutions, based on data collected from a representative-sample survey conducted in three Chinese cities. The findings are consistent with the proposition and have important political and theoretical implications. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article compares electronic government (e-government) in the U.S. and China. In the U.S., e-government has become a tool to empower citizens. China's e-government is used as a tool of administrative reform, specifically to decentralize administration and enhance oversight of government activities. The implications of e-government on democracy in both countries are discussed.