Search

In the contemporary policy debate regarding the efficacy of strategic ambiguity as an appropriate policy for today’s Taiwan Straits conflict, there are presently on the table three main proposed policy solutions for the US role in the Taiwan Straits security situation: 1) abandon strategic ambiguity and specify in advance US defense commitment to defend Taiwan; 2) abandon strategic ambiguity and declare that the US will punish whichever player first moves to upset the status quo; or 3) continue to be ambiguous about US commitment to defend Taiwan. In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model to study the conditions under which an ambiguous security commitment can actually work to preserve the status quo by preventing both China and Taiwan from provoking each other. The game model helps clarify why in dual deterrence cases like the Taiwan Straits conflict, the first two strategy alternatives are less effective than the strategic ambiguity policy option. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the interaction of domestic and international factors in determining relations and policies associated with Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. It considers the possibility of direct military confrontation between the U.S. and its regional challenger, China, over Taiwan. A review of the literature on cross-Strait and the triangular relations of U.S.-China-Taiwan is presented. It considers the impact of U.S. presidential elections on the China policy since 1980.