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This paper identifies and examines a number of long-term trends reshaping the security environment in the Taiwan Strait in ways that might produce a military conflict. Focusing on long-term trends is a useful analytical approach that highlights the possibility that political leaders may knowingly take risky actions in response to perceptions that adverse trends are eroding their security. Taiwan?s democratic transition and growing sense of a separate Taiwan identity have changed the political considerations governing Taiwan?s policy toward the mainland. China worries about growing pro-independence sentiment in Taiwan, but lacks the political tools to build support for unification. As a result, China has sought to deter movement toward Taiwan independence while developing the military capabilities to deter U.S. intervention in support of Taiwan. China?s goal is to force the United States to choose between continuing its support for Taiwan or sacrificing Chinese cooperation on economic and security issues. The perceived Chinese military threat to Taiwan has caused the United States to increase its support for Taiwan, included increased security cooperation. These trends are gradually undercutting the basis for the ?one China? framework that has served U.S. interests effectively for the past thirty years. The paper examines these long-term trends and assesses their implications for the stability of the security environment in the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper employs both historical and rational choice institutionalist approaches to answer the research question of why Taiwan abandoned its "no haste, be patient" policy which aimed at slowing economic integration with mainland This paper employs both historical and rational choice institutionalist approaches to answer the research question of why Taiwan abandoned its "no haste, be patient" policy which aimed at slowing economic integration with mainland China. I explain this policy reversal by modeling a game of pigs in a box between expatriate business people and the Taiwanese government. I conclude that, in the pre-2000 institutional setting, policy change was unlikely. However, post-2000 political developments, in particular the emergence of a split within the KMT and the electoral victory of an opposition (DPP) candidate for president, created an opening for business people to exploit their control over significant remittance flows and thereby force a change in policy. A study of voting behavior confirms with the institutional analysis that voters receiving remittances were more likely to vote for the DPP opposition. Hence, the increased ease of movement of money and people across the strait that separates China and Taiwan will further opportunities to increase contestation in Taiwanese politics. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to understand how and why China has been portrayed as the primary military threat in Taiwanese security discourse through an examination of offence-defence theory. It is based on the premise that those events or factors that one identifies as dangerous come to be ascribed as such only through an interpretation of their various dimensions of dangerousness. The paper first introduces the protracted debate among the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government, the 'Pan-Blue' opposition parties and US officials and analysts over the 2004 Special Defence Budget controversy. In defence of its arms procurement program, the Chen Shui-bian administration resorted to a particular mode of interpreting danger, that is, the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has been shifting in China's favour and thus it is imperative to correct the imbalance through fielding the weapons systems provided by Washington. The paper then explores the underlying assumption of that pervasive interpretation in the official articulation of Chinese military threat in Taiwan and the United States, which holds that offensive advantages make war more likelyâ??a principal hypothesis of offence-defence theory. Rather than questioning the methodological ambiguities about how to define and measure the 'offence-defence balance', the paper argues that it is precisely these ambiguities that make China's threat image in Taiwan possible. The special budget case is indicative as to how Taiwan's defence policy is better understood as a political practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of a peace-loving Taiwanese identity contrary to the belligerent Chinese than as an instrument to build and maintain a capable defence posture against potential attacks from the mainland. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of economic sanctions in Taiwan's decision to reverse its nuclear weapons efforts. Sanctions have long been derided as an ineffective tool of foreign policy, particularly in "high politics" issues such as nuclear weapons programs. Contrary to the prevalent view, in this paper I demonstrate that economic sanctions led to nuclear reversal in Taiwan through the "compellence" mechanism. Drawing on the literature on coercive diplomacy, the paper concludes that Taiwan's dependence on the United States for its very survival facilitated successful US coercion to reverse its nuclear weapons program. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise as an economic and political power constitutes both an opportunity to promote regional stability as well as a threat to derail regional stability in Asia. One of the major factors effecting China's international role in the coming years will be the management of the so-called Taiwan question. Taiwan's unresolved future, as well as Sino-Japanese relations will, in turn, become increasingly significant issues within Chinese domestic politics. At present, China is doing its best to reassure its neighbors of its peaceful rise to the role of regional power. China wants to be seen as the pragmatic promoter of multilateralism to ensure regional stability, opposed to the China of previous decades, which created instability in numerous Southeast Asian countries by pursuing ideological objectives. On the other hand, when dealing with what Beijing calls a domestic affair, the so-called Taiwan question, China's stance threatens to destabilize the region, a cause of great concern throughout Asia. Increasingly, as Chinese society becomes more pluralistic, the leaders of China could conceivably come under intense pressure from factions within several domestic constituencies to adopt an even tougher stance toward Taiwan, to ensure that the goal of reunification is not nullified forever. Moreover, in the event of economic stagnation, a domestic crisis could propel the Chinese leaders to force a settlement in the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to divert public opinion away from problems at home. This paper will focus on Chinese policies in Asia, describing the development of these policies as they become more accommodating, on the one hand, while simultaneously, due to domestic constraints, more uncompromising and hard-line in the Taiwan Strait and vis-à-vis Japan. The paper will attempt to analyze the effect that the diversification of Chinese politics as well as the emphasis on China's century of humiliation have on China's dual-track Asia policy and its effects on stability in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Working mainly from historical and sociological version of new institutionalism (NI) divergent from the mainstream IR regime theory and secondarily in line with Gramsci?s idea of hegemony, this paper explores the global dominance of the "one China" order and its discontents. It is argued that the hegemonic ?one China? order in favor of Beijing?s interest, created in a specific historical condition, has been established through the extensive and intensive institutionalization of rules concerned in both fundamental level and detailed policy realms. It is demonstrated that the ?one China? institution functions as a filter that forecloses other possibilities of historical development which were relatively open in the past, that limits Taiwan’s freedom of policy action and marginalize its diplomatic space, and that legitimates the PRC’s action in interfering in Taiwan’s international relations. Meanwhile, Beijing’s interests are embedded and entrenched in the "one China" hegemonic order. Moreover, while the institution shape agents’ organization of interests in a divergent way, its persistence hinges upon continuing practices and reproduction by the PRC or countries concerned. Finally, the state of the "one China" institutionalization was argued to be more influential than its predecessor in light of the coherence of its cultural-cognitive, normative and regulative elements and their consolidation within the hands of the PRC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has the United States remained interested in Taiwan’s security in the post-Cold War era? Recent critiques of the American military presence in East Asia maintain that Washington developed an imperial mindset with respect to the region during the Cold War, a perspective that sustained interest in forward deployment following the Soviet Union’s demise. As an American Cold War ally, Taiwan was naturally included in this neo-imperial project. In this paper, I offer an alternative view, focusing on two critical episodes in the history of U.S.-Taiwan relations: the Sino-American normalization negotiations in the late 1970s and the confrontation over Taiwan in the mid-1990s. Drawing upon historical materials as well as interviews with key U.S. officials from the Carter and Clinton administrations, I argue that the U.S. has refused to abandon Taiwan as a result of interests created through several decades of close interaction. Moreover, rather than sustaining U.S. hegemony in East Asia, the American relationship with Taiwan has seriously complicated Washington’s pursuit of broader strategic goals in the region. Accordingly, notwithstanding recent interest in American empire among neo-conservatives, the persistence of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan reflects the long history of close association more than neo-imperial ambitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing literature surveys how democracy changes the government?s spending priorities in Latin America. This paper extends study to the Asian-Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) to evaluate how specific democratic procedures ? elections and legislative fragmentation ? affect military and civilian allocations. It also considers how the sequence and rules of the budgetary process affect results. The analyses of government spending in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore from the 1960s to 2000 reveal two important findings. First, the budgetary process significantly influences how the effects of elections and legislative fragmentation are manifested; indeed, the effects of elections and legislative fragmentation on the government?s spending priorities are clear and robust only when the sequence and rules of budget making are modeled. Second, democracy does not affect government spending separately from elections and legislative fragmentation in South Korea and Taiwan ? it has a distinct effect only on spending in Singapore. These findings add nuances and new perspectives to the study of democracy?s effects on the government?s military and civilian allocations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea is one of the few countries that are making a transition from a "limited access order" to an "open access order." This paper explores how the transition has taken place and what has made this transition possible, comparing South Korean experience with those of Taiwan and the Philippines. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the primacy of unification in China's strategic thinking. Sinocentric wisdom upholds China's "great unity." Unification is regarded as the guarantor of stability and prosperity while division the recipe for chaos and sufferings. I highlight that the Chinese term for China, zhongguo, originally meant "central states" in plurality. I develop a rigorous definition of unification and show that zhongguo was more often divided than unified. I also demonstrate that the drive to achieve and maintain unification produced wars of annihilation, wars of repression, and wars of conquest. Moreover, unification did not necessarily contribute to human welfare. Singular zhongguo tended to repress dissent, stifle trade, and dominate its neighbors. In contrast, plural zhongguo was favorable to the development of state-society bargains, commercial activities, and diplomatic relations. Paradoxically, it was unification that brought about "great disorder under heaven," and division that had the potential to realize "great unity under heaven." This contrast is more pronounced if we extend the analysis from the Chinese heartland to the periphery. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mainstream discourse on cross-strait relations tends to reproduce the "crisis" than transform it. Analysts in Taiwan are complicit by loyally following US concepts, prescriptions, and strategies for the region. Some, however, are beginning to contest this traditional subjugation of Taiwan's interests and identity to US and Chinese hegemony. Nonetheless, they still abide by the US paradigm of triangular relations. This paper notes a third, emerging discourse that reframes US-China-Taiwan relations through a postcolonial understanding of sovereignty, cross-strait relations, and Taiwanese subjectivity. We characterize these three options, in reverse order, in Hirschman's terms of "exit," "voice, and "loyalty." But we amend these with Ling's differentiation of "formal" and "substantive" mimicry for "loyalty" and "voice," respectively. Both reflect conditions of postcolonial hybridity that mature, eventually, into a paradigmatic breakthrough or "exit." ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In previous work I argue for a connection between different military doctrinal cultures and the failure of coercive diplomacy. Different military cultures in the United States and China affected signaling, communication, perception, and assessments of the balance of power. This led to failures of deterrence and coercion during the Korean War. In this paper, I extend this idea into two additional naval cases: the deterrence of conflict in the Taiwan Strait in 1950 and today. I argue that Chinese naval doctrine today is, for cultural and organizational reasons, distinct from that of the United States. I assess the potential dangers this poses to the conduct of military diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait, and offer proposals to overcome or limit these challenges. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Taiwan, the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) method is the major electoral system used in both legislative and local elections. One significant feature of the Legislative Yuan election is that each voter casts their vote for a specific candidate in a multimember district, and seats are allocated by the plurality rule to the top vote-getters. SNTV would be more proportional as the distribution of seats is able to match parties’ share of votes. Nevertheless, since the votes won by candidates are nontransferable in that the vote goes to individual candidates instead parties, whether the candidate will get elected of all relies on his or her individual vote share. Therefore, SNTV motivates parties to ensure that their supporters evenly distribute their votes among the party’s candidates.Under SNTV, a party usually maximizes its seat share by strategically allocating its vote equally among its candidates, which makes most members of a dominant party electorally insecure. Since major parties may win more than one seat in a district under SNTV, party strategists are motivated to nominate an optimum number of candidates, and allocate the votes evenly among the party’s candidates in a way that the distributed votes can maximize the number of seats won by the party. My paper will focus on the Vote Distribution Strategy (VDS) employed by the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) in the 6th Legislative Yuan election and examine how the features of SNTV direct the DPP’s electoral strategies and the efficacy of VDS. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April 2005, the Kuomintang (KMT) leader, Mr. Lian Zhan, made his initial visit to the Mainland China and met with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Secretary General, Mr. Hu Jin-Tao, at the Cross-Strait Party Summit, which had been the first historical meeting between KMT and CCP leaders after 60 years since 1945. In 2006, the KMT and CCP jointly held “The Cross-Strait Economic Forum,” “The Cross-Strait Agriculture Forum, and “The Cross-Strait Youth Forum,” during which extensive cross-strait measures beneficial to Taiwan’s agriculture, fishery, medicine, education, and culture were reached to draw Taiwanese people’s feelings. This paper examines and analyzes the dynamic interactions between the KMT and the CCP since KMT’s ice-breaking visit to Beijing in 2005. It concludes that, with the formally established contact and exchange between the two parties, the KMT’s push for the KMT-CCP forums was aimed to show that the party was more capable and competent than the incumbent Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in dealing with cross-strait relations, while the CCP intended to deter the Taiwan-independence forces through the KMT-CCP cooperation. Unfortunately, such exchange mechanism has been unable to affect the incumbent DPP power structure, thus making it difficult to receive DPP government’s support for achieving any concrete implementation outcomes. On the other hand, once CCP’s “playing softer-and-softer” beneficial strategy fails to draw Taiwanese people’s feelings or to facilitate the Pan-blue’s victory in the 2008 presidential election in Taiwan, the cross-strait relations would very possibly evolve into a more insecure and dangerous situation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How best to avoid a possible crisis over Taiwan, which might escalate into the most unwanted war of this century? Traditional studies of Taiwan crises focus mainly on a rational choice theory of deterrence. However, they fail to account for risk-taking behavior that seems irrational but can be well explained by prospect theory. This paper employs prospect theory to explain China's different policies toward Taiwan under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. By using regime security as a reference point to define the domains of action, we suggest that Chinese leaders are more likely to use military coercion, a more risky policy, against Taiwan's pro-independence movements when they are in a domain of losses, i.e., when their regime security faces serious domestic and international challenges. On the contrary, Chinese leaders are more likely to employ political pressure, a less risky policy, to oppose Taiwan's pro-independence forces, if their decision making takes place in a domain of gains, i.e., when their regime security is insured. We conclude that maintaining a good U.S.-China relationship is the best strategy for the United States to avoid military crises in the Taiwan Strait. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2004 Presidential and Legislative Elections in Taiwan have affected Taiwan's political, economic and social development as well as Taiwan's national security and the future trend of the cross-strait relations. More importantly, the election outcome involves both the issue of military balance between the two sides and mutual political interactions, economic and trade exchanges, and social impacts across the Strait. Indeed, the cross-strait issues involve the sophisticate, strategic triangular relationship among the United States, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan, as well as U. S. policy toward Taiwan and vice versa. Based on the outcome of the 2004 presidential and legislative elections, this paper attempts to explore the internal political rearrangements, possible orientation of the new public opinions in Taiwan, and the election impacts on Taiwan's policies towards PRC and the cross-strait relations. In fact, the passage of the first Referendum Act in Taiwan has certainly opened up possible referendum channels for deciding and executing critical political policies on Taiwan and cross-strait relationships such as drafting a new constitution and establishing a new nation, which intensifies PRC's discontent and worries. Despite President Chen's 2004 reelection, his plans to "retitle Taiwan," "draft a new constitution" and "build a new nation" have encountered setbacks due to lacking of legislative majority support. However, Chen's plan to implement a new constitution in 2008 stays firm. Under the conflicting standoffs between Taiwan's "amending or drafting the Constitution" and PRC's "Anti-Secession Law," it is anticipated that the future cross-strait relations will entail significant variations in a harsh atmosphere even though the two sides have, for the first time in 56 years, brought about two-way direct charter flights for the 2005 Chinese New Year showing that the political tension has not deterred a closer and closer economic, social and cultural exchanges across the Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. I begin with an examination of Cold War foreign policy across the various presidential administrations. I then move to an examination of post-Cold War foreign policy concentrating on the Clinton and Bush presidencies. I focus on comparing various administration approaches to the Taiwan crisis and how and why policies varied within and between administrations. I discuss the numerous international and domestic factors that have contributed to U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China. Throughout, I attempt to capture the competing interests involved and how these actors and events have complicated both foreign policy processes and outcomes. I conclude with a discussion of policy implications for the present and future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the role of the United States in Sino-Japanese relations since the end of World War II. Special emphasis is placed on three major debates between China and Japan where the American role appears to have been critical: (1) the history issue; (2) the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute; and (3) the Taiwan issue. The central argument is that a series of institutional innovations, in Sino-Japanese relations introduced by the United States after the end of World War II, reinforced the U.S. alliance with Japan, and often rather indirectly accounts for the continuing tense relations between China and Japan. These developments, including the Tokyo War Crime Trials, the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, the Okinawa reversion treaty in 1971, and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, have had a major influence on Sino-Japanese relations that endures today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Being one of the international "hot spot", the cross-strait relation could not only influence the future of China, but the stability of East Asia area and even the global system. To majority of researchers, what they pay the main attention should not be the past of the cross-strait relations, that is, why Mainland and Taiwan begin to fight each other, but how could they solve these problems in the future. From the perspective of liberalists, they think the so-called "Democratic Peace" or "Peaceful Transformation" maybe the key answers, it means when Mainland China finish the economic reforms and therefore lead to the political transformation, the problem of cross-strait relations would be solved in the same time. Nonetheless, to the realists who believe the concept of "Power Politics", before we construct an appropriate international regime to deal the conflict effectively, they are afraid that the cross-strait relations should be decided by power contrast between Mainland and Taiwan. In this paper, I will review the standpoint of liberalism and realism first, and then try to analyze and realize which one would be the possible choice to resolve the deadlock of cross-strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States, as institutions, need good leadership to govern effectively. However, the power of charismatic leadership, historically perceived as a positive quality sought by institutions to achieve their objectives, has been weakening in the past decade. And traditional perceptions on the effectiveness of charismatic leadership in public institutions have thus gradually shifted from focusing on one-man (charismatic leader) focusing on group or community that collaboratively exercise leadership power. Whether it is a trend or emergence, the power of collaborative leadership has been displacing that of charismatic leadership since the end of the twentieth century. Yet, more research still exists on positive aspects of charismatic leadership that brings efficiency or effectiveness to institutional development, but less effort is made on charismatic leadership that results in ineffective or even destructive institutional practices. In general, the study of charismatic leadership has not resulted in profound understanding of the impacts of charismatic leadership, and the lack of comprehensive theories on such leadership is evidenced in a variety of definitions furnished by various scholars and practitioners. This paper intends to reveal the downside impact charismatic leadership in the state governance of both China and Taiwan based on critical reassessment of existing charismatic leadership theories and search for strategies that might help avoid or mitigate negative consequences of charismatic leadership to modern institutions. By employing the descriptive-inductive method, it aims to achieve a comprehensive analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of negative charismatic leadership practices mostly found in China and Taiwan. And it further attempts to enrich charismatic leadership theory as well as facilitate future research and understanding of charismatic leadership impacts on institutional development on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a conference paper titled "Policy Adaptability to Great Power Leadership: Taiwan's Foreign Policy Discourse and Room for Policy Change" presented at the "International Studies Association 46th Annual Convention" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It offers a brief discussion of the historical background for Taiwan's foreign policy adaption, trends in the Public Policy Analysis (PPA) literature, and the development and transformation of policy argumentation.

The article presents the conference paper titled "Modeling Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan's Linkage Politics: Foreign Policy Implications for China-Taiwan-U.S. Relations" prepared for presentation at the "International Studies Association 2005 Annual Convention" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It emphasizes that China and the U.S. should avoid getting connected into any issues related to the Taiwan election.

The article presents a conference paper titled "Idea and Authority: The Roles of Intellectuals in Environmental Justice Campaigns in China and Taiwan" prepared for the "2005 International Studies Association (ISA) Convention" in Honolulu, Hawaii. It discusses the evolution of environmental justice campaigns in Taiwan and China and the factors that affect the destiny of these campaigns. It offers a review of literature on social movements and highlights the importance of epistemic communities in both countries.

The article presents the conference paper "Environmental Governance for Peace? Environmental Peacemaking on Cases of China and Taiwan" that was prepared for 2005 ISA Convention. It discusses the three traditional peacemaking approaches, namely the hegemonic leadership/ intervention, confidence-building measures (CBM) and interdependence. It examines the factors on how environmental peacemaking will work between China and Taiwan.

The dominant issue in Taiwan's politics concerns the island's relationship with China. Since 1949, Taiwan has resisted the control of the government on the mainland, tranforming itself into a more economically advanced and politically democratic society than the one on the mainland. But whether or not it should become an independent nation or seek to rejoin the mainland is the central issue cleavage in Taiwan's politics. In this paper, I will examine the role of this issue in Taiwan's politics by going beyond traditional measures of attitudes on this question to include consideration of conditional preferences toward national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientific knowledge plays a role in shaping and influencing political decision-making on international environmental negotiation and domestic resource management. In the climate regime, the role of climate change research and its epistemic communities are considered as instrumental in fact finding, issue framing, interpreting research results, and developing policy options. More specifically, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1988) plays exactly such a role in climate negotiations and subsequently in formulating Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) and Kyoto Protocol (1997). Using the 2001 IPCC scientific assessment as the case study, this paper examines how research results from scientific assessment are integrated into policy making, how these results are used to influence policy making and what lessons we learn for the future. Three sets of questions will be addressed: Is climate change a salient issue in Taiwan; is climate change science in Taiwan credible; and most importantly, how does one initiate a Taiwan-IPCC to assure maximum participative process. Given Taiwan’s international status and present domestic structures, this paper outlines an approach for policy recommendations at local and regional levels in decision-making process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central Asia occupies a growing role in Chinese security policy. However, an examination of China?s Central Asian policies reveals that they are essentially external projections of Beijing?s vital interest of internal security in neighboring Xinjiang. Accordingly this article examines Xinjiang?s importance for China?s overall security policies. Through this examination it becomes clear that the Xinjiang problem very much resembles that of other discontented provinces within a multinational state with a continuing imperial vocation. Therefore China?s problems in Xinjiang will continue and have important repercussions for its domestic and foreign policies , and other key issues like Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although much attention since 11 September 2001 has been focused on conflicts in the Near and Middle East, areas of the Far East also have the potential to become future scenes of great discord. One area in East Asia that remains a locus of international tension is the Taiwan Strait. The Chinese threat across the Strait is the single greatest factor in the political landscape of Taiwan and its effect is seen in fundamental questions of national identity in Taiwan. These national identity questions, in turn have are of profound influence on the future of cross-strait relations. Using both narrative analysis and public opinion surveys as guides, I ask whether the majority of Taiwan?s people subscribe to a Taiwanese national identity, and if so, why, and what the implications of this are for cross-Strait relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Study will determine the external and internal influences on the Eisenhower adminstration in its making of U.S. policy toward Tibet. Using the Kegley-Wittkopf model, research will focus on foreign influence from external sources such as China, India, Taiwan and the Tibetans themselves. Internally, the study will determine which governmental, societal, role and individual sources influenced Eisenhower in determining policy outcomes. It is hoped that the study will further illuminate U.S. foreign policy deliberations and implementation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the dominant explanatory epistemology, two rationalistic approaches have dominated the field: while Liberalism/Neo-Liberal Institutionalism would empathize how a state may seek to strategize its policy in an institutional setting, Realism/Neo-Realism would posit that a state’s policy is decided by its position in the international system. In this study, we would adopt a constructive approach by examining how Taiwan, as an agent, may have pondered over interacting with the structure, defined here as the systemic social norm of free trade under the World Trade Organization (WTO). As Taiwan has long been isolated in the international stage, it has to construct its national identity and understand its nationa security and national interests within the emerging social context in the age of globalization, when the state has to adjust its functions. With this understanding, the new global norms are no longer perceived as merely constraints or accelerators of Taiwan’s foreign policy behavior. Rather, Taiwan is endeavoring to challenge the international political structure of no-recognizing Taiwan by being actively engaged in the WTO, alternatively perceived as the Economic United Nations. Hence, Taiwan is adjusting its agricultural policy from protective input subsidies and price supports to direct payments to the farmers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Broadly speaking, the research project focuses on the relationship between economics and national security; specifically how states can successfully use economic power to achieve their security objectives. This paper examines the use of private sector actors to achieve national foreign policy objectives in the context of the Taiwan-China FDI relationship from 1987-2004. The case identifies a framework for analyzing the factors driving private sector behavior. The paper argues that states seeking to use economics to pursue their strategic goals begin by fostering economic interaction then leveraging the security externalities generated by the behavior of private sector actors. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A series of surveys sponsored by Taiwan?s Mainland Affairs Council (2001) indicate that the percentage of people in Taiwan who considered themselves either only as Chinese or as both Chinese and Taiwanese had fallen from 80.5% in 1992 to 53.3% in 2000, whereas the percentage of people who considered themselves only as Taiwanese increased from 16.7% to 45% in the meantime. However, the Taiwanese identity politics has been facing many challenges and setbacks since late 2004. From a poststructuralist perspective on identity, this paper analyzes the discursive economy that has constructed the new collective imagination by many people in Taiwan to regard themselves as members of an independent Taiwanese nation.The research question of this paper is how the post-1949 national identity of Taiwan has been discursively transformed since the late 1980s. The task of this paper is to clarify the discursive regime and symbolic economy underlying the rise of the Taiwanese national identity since the late 1980s as well as its recent setbacks. Treating the discourses regarding Taiwan?s status and its relationship with mainland China as a site of struggle and viewing speeches, documents, policies, and events as discursive practices, this paper analyzes who speaks, what their positions are, what makes the speaking possible, and the power relations involved in the discursive construction of the ?self? and ?other? of Taiwan and China. By doing so, this paper focuses upon the contingency and fluidity of the Taiwanese national identity and the conditions behind the on-going development of identity politics in Taiwan. The implications of the Taiwanese identity politics to the security of the West Pacific is also explored. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the formation and evolution of the worldview of the Republic of China (Taiwan), whose government is being controlled by the party favoring Taiwan independence and denying the Chinese root of its past. This paper explores the formation of the ruling party's worldview, and accesses the transformation of such a worldview since May 2001. This paper indicates that there is a dual development in Taiwan's worldview: "realist" in security and "pluralist" in economics (and the former seems to win over the latter in practice). In the last section how Taiwan adjusted and carried out its East Asia foreign policy through the lens of worldviews is presented. It will be risky if Taiwan continues to conduct its foreign policy under such a seemingly dyadic worldview. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses how and to what extent the international norm concerning the prohibition of the death penalty plays a role in East Asian democracies. In stark contrast to the worldwide abolitionist trend, the death penalty remains most entrenched in Asia, where more than 90 percent of all known executions take place. Why does the norm against the death penalty, which is apparently so important for most parts of the world, seem to have no impact on East Asia? How do domestic factors ? political leadership, public opinion, and institutional structures ? contribute to the rejection of the universally promoted human rights norm? With regard to the three major democracies in East Asia at different stages of the anti-death penalty movement (South Korea, most active in the abolitionist movement; Taiwan in the middle; and Japan least active), it investigates what accounts for the current varying impact of the norm in the same region. Analyzing how public and elite opinion interact with each other on capital punishment and what roles domestic institutional structures play, this paper aims to assess norm diffusion and to measure the norm?s capabilities and limitations for helping to shape new death penalty policy in this region. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taiwan is an island endowed with limited energy resources. With its coal reserves amounting to only 99 million tons and oil and natural gas reserves totaling 0.4 million tons and 2,400 billion cubic feet, respectively, it is not surprising that imported energy contributes the bulk of energy supply (98%) to meet Taiwan?s needs.Since the 1990s, issues related to anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases have received growing attention in the world as well as in Taiwan. Taiwan's per capita CO2 emissions are relatively high compared to the majority of its neighbors in Asia. In 1990, Taiwan's per capital CO2 emissions registered 5.54 metric tons, second only to Japan in Asia. In 2003, the per capita CO2 emissions reach around 11.15 tons. Taiwan is not the signatories of the UNFCCC, however. But the country's response to the climate change issue was more aggressive than most of the developing world. Taiwan is among few developing countries that announced specific targets to reduce its greenhouse gases emissions. The country made a commitment to stabilize its CO2 emissions at year 2000 levels by the year 2020.This paper intends to explore what factors lead Taiwan to pursue or eschew the adoption of renewable energy policies in the transitions toward a sustainable energy system. While there is widespread acceptance among scholars and environmental activists that renewable energy should be a key factor in combating global climate change, renewables still play a marginal role in Taiwan. The paper will examine the current energy paradigm of the country, the capacity and extent of renewable energy development, and analyze the opportunities and obstacles for past failures and the key features of successful renewable energy and climate protective policies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper focuses on Chinese foreign policies towards Taiwan, Japan and the Korean peninsula and the consequences of these policies for Asia-Pacific security. Northeast Asia is a strong-hold of the US alliance system and China's near abroad, thus affecting China's influence on global security. If China cannot accommodate the region into its overall foreign policy strategy, its suggestions for a post-Cold War security order are likely to appear unconvincing to the international community. The paper emphasizes the weaknesses inherent in China's contemporary foreign policy strategy, thereby pointing to the possibility that China might fall into the rank of secondary powers. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The episode of Chen Shui-bian transit diplomacy bypassing the United States and his earlier decision to put the National Unification Council and Guideline into abeyance in 2006 had put Beijing-Taipei-Washington relationship into serious tests. It remains to be seen if Taipei's most recent steps of renaming some state-owned enterprises may escalate into tensions as before. While Chen's New Year address and state visit to Nicaragua via US homeland in 2007 caused little problem for the State Department, the PRC's discontent remained evident. It was against this backdrop that the paper was proposed.This paper examined the role the US played in the institutionalization of the status quo across the Strait from a sociological new institutionalist perspective. My research questions are: In what way did the United States help institutionalize the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait? And in the process, how did the US act through "cross-Strait peaceful co-development" institution to shape the interest or identity of Beijing and Taipei?It was maintained that there existed an ongoing institutionalization process through which the US constructed the status quo that was supported with varying degree by Beijing and Taipei. The three joint communiqués and the TRA could be seen as setting the first stage of institutionalization through formal codification which emphasized the peaceful process in any attempt for final resolution by both sides. Since the late 1990s, the construction and reproduction of the CSPCD institution by the Americans, which generally follows a pattern of "neither use of force nor de jure independence," has been undertaken primarily through policy statements or actions. They normally uphold such core values as "prosperity," "stability" or "peace," and help sustain the regulative, normative or cognitive elements of the CSPCD institution. The main purpose is to shape the policy discourses, preferences, interests or identity of Beijing and Taipei. It was also argued that although the detailed record of what the institution has achieved was certainly mixed, there appears to be an overall tendency for Beijing and Taipei not to incessantly challenge the status quo. As such, it might be concluded that the institutionalization of status quo was considerably effective, though not completely successful. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the One Country Two Systems concept, China, keeping its socialist system (with Chinese characteristics), allows Hong Kong?s capitalistic system and way of life to continue. The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) is to exercise a ?high degree of autonomy?, with ?fifty years no change?. Deng Xiaoping, China?s paramount leader, who heralded China?s opening to the world in 1979, held that this could be a model to resolve international relations problems left over by history. In early 2005, HK once again topped the Heritage Foundation?s annual index of economic freedom, for the eleventh year. Yet HKSAR has seen tensions, with mass demonstrations. The State Department?s Country Report on Human Rights Practices ? 2004 suggested it ?has been tested severely this year?. And Amnesty International?s 2005 Report noted ?a mainland ruling in April restricting Hong Kong?s freedom to push ahead with political reform heightened concerns about an erosion of human rights in Hong Kong.? Clearly the 1C2S concept as practised in HK is under challenge. It raises the question: has China managed HK?s return well or not? The nine years of experience offers a glimpse into China?s foreign policy and how HK fits into China?s scheme of things as a rising global power. Much as China guards jealously its sovereignty over HK and fears HK is being used as a base of subversion by foreign interests, notably the United States, HK is a matter of international concern. Since HK has been running an open economy, and as China is increasingly integrated into the international community, the interactions among the three levels ? the sub-state actor, the sovereign and the international community ? present opportunities as well as dilemmas. Specifically, the paper seeks to elucidate the origins of the 1C2S concept, to examine its application in HK thus far, and to identify the factors affecting its success (or failure). In fact, the 1C2S concept was designed in the first instance by China to re-unify the ?renegade? province of Taiwan. HK is supposed to demonstrate to Taiwan that all would be well under Chinese sovereignty. Yet, President Chen Siu-bian categorically stated that Taiwan is not HK. Beijing?s passage of the anti-succession law has rattled cross-straits relations, yet the visits by Lien and Soong, the opposition leaders, to the Mainland represented a class united front play of Beijing to isolate Chen and raised hope for some kind of accommodation between Taiwan and the Mainland. The paper will conclude with a discussion on the implications of the HK experience for Taiwan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the evolution of domestic Taiwanese politics came a corresponding internationalization of the Taiwanese independence movement. The importance of Taiwanese independence not only impinges on the lives of 21 million or so Taiwanese living on the island, but also affects the strategic environment of the Asia Pacific region as China has declared that it would not hesitate to resort to force should circumstances dictate that it becomes necessary to do so. Taiwan is often cited to be one of the two potential flashpoints in the Asia Pacific, and a conflict between the PRC and Taiwan may more worrying for many countries evolve into one between PRC and the United States. While Taiwan’s role in Sino-US relations have been widely studied, the importance of Taiwan in affecting Chinese bilateral relations beyond its relations with US is a relatively unexplored field. This paper attempts an exploratory study of the evolving role Taiwan plays in Sino-Japanese relations. It attempts to under how the historical role of Taiwan in Sino-Japanese relations affect the island’s contemporary diplomatic dynamics with China and Japan. The role of Taiwan in Chinese and Japanese national security strategy will also be scrutinized to understand the possible divergence or convergence of China and Japan over the Taiwan issue. This is crucial as Japan’s stance is important as Japan is considered one of US allies within region but may not necessarily deem it in its best interests to go along with the US against China. This difficulty presents it with an extremely tricky choice. A slip either way will affect the regional stability and prosperity of the Asia Pacific as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes as its starting point the debate surrounding developmentalism in post-crisis Korea and Taiwan. This debate has taken place between those who consider the state to have metamorphosised into a neoliberal model, and those who argue that the ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces the basic features of the Cross-Strait Interactions Databank (CSID) and reports a number of findings of a preliminary analysis of these event data. The CSID data set was recently created by the present author and a group of gradu ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

IR is in search of a newer and more visionary methodological toolkit. Scenario building based on expert knowledge of historical trends and theoretically informed analysis appears to offer insights for IR scholars as well as policy-makers. This paper aims ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The linkage between domestic and international determinants of foreign policy has long been a widely debated topic in the field of international relations, and foreign policy analysis in particular. The paper takes a unique approach to examine the domestic vs. international determinants of foreign policy by looking at the empirical evidence for the case of China and Taiwan. Findings suggest that, from China’s perspective, Taiwan’s domestic political changes do have significant influence on China’s decision making towards Taiwan. Although such changes may have been caused by Taiwan’s internal democratization, China is not directly reacting to Taiwan’s democratization per se; rather it is reacting to policy changes as a result of Taiwan’s internal democratic changes. Moreover, China’s policy towards Taiwan does not seem to be directly linked to China’s internal power politics. Rather, Taiwan’s policy toward China and Taiwan’s internal politics seem to be playing a more important role in determining China’s Taiwan policy. From Taiwan’s perspective, however, democratization has significantly influenced Taiwan’s behavior towards China. Cross-Strait decisions from both sides are significantly related to Taiwan’s internal relations. Therefore, for China’s Taiwan policy, evidence supports international or external determinants of foreign policy; whereas for Taiwan’s China policy, evidence supports domestic or internal determinants of foreign policy. A direct speculation is that regime type matters in what kind of factors matter more for states’ foreign policy. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the major power relationship in Northeast Asia has undergone some significant transition and reconfiguration. Among other things, Sino-South Korean relations began to show some new momentum that has the potential to reshape the geopolitical environment in the region. On a series of important political and security issues, Beijing and Seoul share more common interests than their respective relations with the other two major powers in the region: Japan and the United States. On the war history issue, China and South Korea formed a united front against Japan. On the North Korean nuclear issue, the six-party talks have clearly demonstrated that China and South Korea have more in common in terms of approaches and tactics than they do with both the United States and Japan. On the core issue of China’s national interestâ€"Taiwan, Seoul’s position is much closer to Beijing than both the U.S. and Japan. On the issue of Korea’s reunification, China and South Korea are also more likely to find common ground. In additional, both China and South Korea have territorial disputes with Japan. Both China and South Korea have strong anti-Japanese and to less extent anti-American sentiment in the public. By examining the new dynamics and developments in Sino-South Korean relations, this paper tries to argue that with Japan moving closer to the status of a normal power and China’s sustainable rise, a strategic realignment in the region is inevitable in which a potential China-ROK “strategic partnership” is emerging and will be pivotal to a possible regional security framework in Northeast Asia. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East Asia anticipates two important political transitions: Chinese democratization, and Korean unification under a democratic regime. This paper draws upon international relations theory in order to shed light on the effects of these transitions on regional stability. Whereas democratization and war theory would expect instability, theories of economic interdependence predict the opposite. This article tests these theories in the cases of three democratizing states: Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea. Like the future cases, these countries were pursuing export-led growth strategies, and faced potentially high costs from bellicose behavior. Although war did not occur in any of these cases, I test for lesser increases in hostility. Through process tracing, I also test for the occurrence of the theories’ expected mechanisms: nationalism and “logrolling” by political coalitions, orâ€"converselyâ€"pressure from the business community for foreign policy restraint. I find little evidence that supports the democratization and war thesis; instead, evidence from all three cases supports the theory of economic interdependence and peace. The study thus contributes to two prominent literatures within international relations theory. It provides a valuable test of largely quantitative literatures that have focused on demonstrating correlation, instead of substantiating their causal claims through process tracing. It argues for greater specification of the conditions under which democratic transitions will promote international instability. Findings from this study also provide support for foreign policy strategies of engagement, and suggest optimism for the stability of the future Korean and Chinese transitions. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A great deal of reports by various different international research institutes and NGOs have addressed the impacts of liberalization/ globalisation, in particular the WTO, on national economy. Taiwan entered the WTO in 2002 as the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. According to the official reports by the Taiwanese government and the WTO secretarial, the entry of the WTO does not have a significantly negative impact upon Taiwan’s economy. For example, in the industrial sector, Taiwan’s average normal tariff rate only reduced from 6.03% in 2001 to 4.8% in 2006. Taiwan’s commitments on non-tariff measures mainly influenced the automobile, motorcycle and food industries. For a manufacturing-based developing country since the mid-1960s, why does the multilateral trading system not have a profound impact on it? My paper will argue that it is incorrect to merely assume Taiwan’s access to the WTO commences the start of Taiwan’s liberalization. In fact, Taiwan has gradually liberalized the trading system since the late 1970’s, the liberalization path was mainly based on the GATT achievements via US-Taiwan trade talks. Taiwan’s application to the GATT in 1990 and the competition with China in regards to the entry, both lead Taiwan to further liberalize national economy (e.g. in the service sector and TRIPs) in the 1990s. As such, my attempt is to identify the evolution of Taiwan’s liberalization process in the 1980s and the 1990s. Such a historical evolution determinates Taiwan’s strategy after the Doha Round was postponed in 2006. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite of the fact that China and Japan are becomingthe biggest trade partner with each other in recent years, politicalrelations between both countries have deteriorated. Many people in Chinastill concern over potential Japanese military resurgence, while more andmore people in Japan worry about China's military modernization and growingnationalism. The tension is unlikely to improve in the near future.The role of Taiwan in this China-Japan dispute is worth attention. WhileTaiwan has enjoyed de facto independence since 1949, it is still regarded byChinese leaders as a renegade province, and the recovery of the island wasconsidered in China as the sacred and ultimate goal. In recent years, Taiwanhas increasingly attempted to act as a truly independent state, adevelopment that could be attributed to political democratization on theisland since the late 1980s. The question is whether the leaders in Taiwanwill continue to push the envelope to a point short of de jure independencethat will be intolerable to the leaders in Beijing. On the other hand, bothTaiwan and Japan have shown strong intention in improving politicalrelations between both sides. Creation of a Japan-Taiwan alliance isbecoming a popular view in Taiwan's strategic circle, and Japanese publichave shown more sympathy to Taiwan's international isolation. Japanesegovernment even adjusted its policy toward the island state by including theTaiwan Strait into the sphere of concern in Japan-US Security Treaty. Thesedevelopments have been unthinkable in the past, because both China and Japanhave committed to the One China policy and because the Taiwan issueused to be excluded from China-Japan relations.This paper will examine the Taiwanese perspective of China-Japan relations.The author will outline the developments of Taiwan-Japan relations, identifythe strategies Taiwanese government have utilized to strengthen therelations with Japan, and to assess the Taiwan factor in future Japan-Chinarelations. In addition to analyses of secondary data, the author will alsointerview strategic scholars and even government officials to gain firsthand information. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite of the fact that China and Japan are becoming the biggest trade partner with each other in recent years, political relations between both countries have deteriorated. Many people in China still concern over potential Japanese military resurgence, while more and more people in Japan worry about China?s military modernization and growing nationalism. The tension is unlikely to improve in the near future.The role of Taiwan in this China-Japan dispute is worth attention. While Taiwan has enjoyed de facto independence since 1949, it is still regarded by Chinese leaders as a renegade province, and the recovery of the island was considered in China as the sacred and ultimate goal. In recent years, Taiwan has increasingly attempted to act as a truly independent state, a development that could be attributed to political democratization on the island since the late 1980s. The question is whether the leaders in Taiwan will continue to push the envelope to a point short of de jure independence that will be intolerable to the leaders in Beijing. On the other hand, both Taiwan and Japan have shown strong intention in improving political relations between both sides. Creation of a Japan-Taiwan alliance is becoming a popular view in Taiwan?s strategic circle, and Japanese public have shown more sympathy to Taiwan?s international isolation. Japanese government even adjusted its policy toward the island state by including the Taiwan Strait into the sphere of concern in Japan-US Security Threty. These developments have been unthinkable in the past, because both China and Japan have committed to the ?One China? policy and because the Taiwan issue used to be excluded from China-Japan relations. This paper will examine the Taiwanese perspective of China-Japan relations. The author will outline the developments of Taiwan-Japan relations, identify the strategies Taiwanese government have utilized to strengthen the relations with Japan, and to assess the Taiwan factor in future Japan-China relations. In addition to analyses of secondary data, the author will also interview strategic scholars and even government officials to gain first hand information. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China has become a popular topic among pundits and practitioners of East Asian security since the last decade or so. Although there is no short of alarmist voices in the marketplace of ideas warning of America's coming conflict with China, few of them are theoretically informed. It is in this regard that John Mearsheimer's argument deserves our especial attention. His offensive realism, itself a modification of Kenneth Waltz's structural realism, argues that states that are merely concerned with their own survival nevertheless have to seek power-maximisation at the expense of other states and, if the circumstances allow, to establish hegemony. Mearsheimer predicts that the distribution of material capabilities and the compelling logic of anarchy will drive the US-Japan alliance and a rising China into an inevitable security competition, which could end up in a shooting war in the Taiwan Strait. Hence the United States should seek to contain China much the way it did to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. If Taiwan wishes to defend its de facto independence, according to his view, it has no alternative other than being a US 'aircraft carrier' against China. Under careful scrutiny, this paper demonstrates that even if a Strait shooting war did happen, it would not validate the predictive power of offensive realism, because it is theoretically impermissible for its exponents to make such a prediction in the first place. Great powers go to war is not simply because 'there is nothing to prevent it'; rather, human deliberation is involved and the question of responsibility is unavoidable. Mearsheimer not only neglects the moral implications behind the disastrous series of events, but also prevents himself (as well as his audience inside and outside the walls of academia) from coming to consider what could have been done to change the collision course and thus learns nothing from the past. In this sense, tragedy and scholarship are intimately intertwined. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]