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This article maps the behaviours of two middle powers, Australia and Indonesia, as a response to the emergence and evolution of the Indo-Pacific concept. The background for this analysis is the emergence and development of the 'Indo-Pacific' concept as a response to crises of legitimacy enveloping the region and how countries in the region, including middle powers, respond to it. Using a minimalist definition which I have developed of a middle power as a country with a middle level of power capabilities and a penchant for cooperation, this article develops a framework based on two dimensions of outcome (ranging from status-quoist to reformist outlooks) and process (ranging from Lockean to Kantian strategies) to facilitate a more open-ended approach towards looking at middle-power behaviours beyond the common categorisation of traditional/emerging, and Western/non-Western. Using Australia's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and 2023 National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, and Indonesia's 2015 Defence White Paper and 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, this article concludes that while Australia is exhibiting a status-quoist/Lockean approach, Indonesia is demonstrating a reformist/Kantian approach towards the Indo-Pacific. The outcome-process dimension framework developed in this article is useful as a tool to map other middle power behaviours in various contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Indonesia's vulnerability to climate change, and her position in the global climate change mitigation effort as a significant emitter with large potential for reducing emissions from forestry. It highlights the scope for Australia and Indonesia—both large emitters, one a developed country and potential buyer of emissions permits, the other a developing country and potential seller of per-mits—to play complementary roles in the global effort. The discussion outlines ways in which the two countries can cooperate with each other and with regional neighbours in mitigation initiatives and climate change adaptation. It suggests that their efforts could serve as a model for cooperation between developed and developing countries. The paper notes that the current global financial crisis is a short-term problem, while climate change has its effects over the long term. The recessionary effect of the financial crisis is not a good reason for delaying climate change mitigation efforts by Indonesia and other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the Japanese position on East Timor and highlights tension in bilateral relations between Australia and Japan on East Timor during the year 1999. The sources of tension were over leadership, appropriate policy towards indonesia and the style of diplomacy conducted by Australia. In many respects the tension over East Timor shook complacency in bilateral relations. By January 2001 tension was resolved and bilateral ties have been strengthened in the areas of security and regional cooperation. What does this episode reveal about the bilateral relationship? Quite clearly, and despite the depth of networks that have been established over the decades, there was insufficient consultation on East Timor. In pan, the extraordinary events that unfolded after the results of the ballot in East Timor were announced on 4 September 1999 and Australia's leadership role in the international Force in East Timor (INTERFET) can explain the lack of consultation. Also, a drift in relations that had been evident for several years was a significant factor. Finally, the paper argues that despite the substantial improvement in bilateral relations, policy towards Indonesia will remain a potential source of friction between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 1958 onwards, the Amsterdam–Jakarta dispute on the determination of sovereignty over the western half of New Guinea began to be affected by the developments of Indonesia's civil war and the tug of war between the US and the Soviet Union over Indonesia. This paper explains how this influenced Australia's WNG diplomacy. It argues that the major impact of Indonesia's internal war and of the US–Russian tug of war was that they destroyed Australia's assumption that the Dutch would maintain its presence in the Pacific permanently. The second principal impact was that Indonesia's internal war and the Washington–Moscow tug of war urged Canberra to set another new objective in relation to the WNG dispute, and produced a new policy for the achievement of this objective. With the outbreak of an Indonesian–Dutch war over Netherlands New Guinea becoming a real possibility, Australia set the avoidance of the war and the prevention of Indonesia falling into the communist orbit as another new objective. In order to keep a war from occurring in the Southwest Pacific, Canberra developed a policy of appeasing Jakarta. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In September 2000 the Australian government declassified thousands of pages of documents concerning the Indonesian invasion and annexation of East Timor in 1975. Some 68,000 pages of documents were released. About 2,600 pages of diplomatic documents were withheld, along with Cabinet papers, intelligence materials, and Defence Department records. The documents cover only the period from early 1974 to mid-1976 and do not document the Indonesian war and its human costs. What they do document is the process whereby Australia acquiesced in the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. Above all, they show that secret briefings by the Indonesians kept the Australian government closely informed of Indonesian intentions and operations at every step. In the light of these secret briefings and related documents, it is clear that Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's claim that he wanted to see a "genuine act of self-determination" by the East Timorese is and always was hollow. This was a fig leaf covering his desire to see East Timor incorporated into Indonesia as West Papua had been in the 1960s. Its patina of moral responsibility and legal respectability were his alibi or, as Richard Woolcott put it in late 1974, "escape clause," if and when Indonesian actions led to accusations of Australian complicity with Jakarta. Mr. Whitlam was complicit. The record is clear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the passing of Jamie Mackie in April 2011, the intellectual and policy community in Australia lost a scholar, mentor and advocate who charted understandings of Indonesia, Southeast Asia and Australia's relations with Asia for over half a century. Mackie provided effective leadership and quiet inspiration for the development of Indonesian and Asian studies in three of Australia's top universities and throughout the nation. His intellectual contribution ranged across politics, international relations and economics. He urged students, fellow scholars, policy makers and the broader community to remember the historical basis of events in the region, strove to understand what 'makes things tick' in Indonesia and promoted racial tolerance in Australia. His style was low-key and personal, mentoring individuals and bringing together groups of like-minded people. While not dodging difficult issues, he was generally optimistic that sensible and sensitive approaches would enable Australia to live in greater harmony with its neighbours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents an analysis of the 1993 Australian Election Study indicating that the increase in perceptions of threat from Indonesia is primarily held by older Australians, those who hold protectionist trade views and those who are concerned about East Timor. Themes in Australia-Indonesia relations; Themes examined in the Australian Election Study.

This article analyses the Bali Process in the context of Australia's securitised approach to migrant smuggling, and the consequences this has for both the Australia-Indonesia diplomatic relationship and the Bali Process overall. The Bali Process is the premier regional forum for combating migrant smuggling and is well placed to discuss and develop regional cooperation policies on irregular migration within the region. In particular, the Bali Process remains a key domain where Australia and Indonesia can contest and amend the norms and practices around the human rights of refugees and asylum-seekers. This article traces and analyses the emergence of Australia's bilateral agreements for offshore processing and resettlement between 2011 and 2014, which Australian political elites aligned rhetorically to the Bali Process, but which the authors argue remain in tension with stated Bali Process objectives in terms of rights and protections for asylum-seekers and refugees. This article identifies that Australia's security-driven policies and regional disagreements over humanitarian responsibility remain an ongoing tension within Bali Process states, and provides commentary on the implications of this for future Australian policy relating to regional cooperation on irregular migration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia's decision to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and forego the acquisition of nuclear weapons was taken on medium-term strategic grounds. While similar circumstances prevail today, it is possible to identify three conditions for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Australia to be a credible option: the existence of a major threat to Australia; a loss of confidence in US guarantees; and allied acquiescence to an Australian nuclear program. These conditions interact with Australia's relationship with Indonesia and the technological and industrial feasibility of “tactical” and “strategic” nuclear weapons postures, respectively. The only Australian nuclear posture that does not lack credibility in light of all these factors is the use of “tactical” weapons to deter major landings on the Australian mainland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the fact that much has been written about the relationship between Indonesia and Australia with emphasis on the role of government, little has been done in terms of examining Indonesia's changing domestic politics and the role of non-state actors in maintaining the bilateral relations between the two countries. With the emergence of democratic governments in Indonesia since 1998, there has been an increasing public interest in Indonesia in debating the complexity and the importance of this bilateral relationship. This article examines the deepening of democracy under the Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) government and its impact on Indonesia's foreign policy towards Australia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a result of globalisation and changing technologies, young people are increasingly required to engage with the broader world beyond their local and national communities. This raises significant questions about the ways and spaces in which young people will need to engage as active citizens, and the new tools and resources that young people will need to equip them for their futures. The Global Connections Program has been developed to address these identified needs. It is a youth-led global learning initiative which aims to provide an opportunity for connection and learning among young people in Australia and Indonesia. This article explores Plan's youth-led approach to global learning, with a focus on the implementation and evaluation findings of the Global Connections Program, as well as the challenges faced thus far. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the modes by which Australian scholars construct knowledge of Indonesia with particular reference to the debates on West Papua in the post-Suharto period. It examines their perceptions, beliefs and attitudes towards human rights issues with a view to analysing the underlying forces, motivations and implications of activism. This article casts doubt on a common, yet often unacknowledged, perception in Indonesia about Australian Indonesia-specialists who are categorised as: intellectuals who always see Indonesian government policies as 'negative'.2 I demonstrate that the theorisation of Indonesian society has been diverse in Australia as exemplified by the West Papua debates. Australian scholars' social positions and mobility, not government policy, shape their beliefs, attitudes and knowledge construction of Indonesia. Thus, considering Australian scholars from a monolithic perspective misses the reality that contemporary intellectual culture in Australia is no longer based on a traditional class.3 I argue there are two major opposing groups in West Papua studies which I label as the 'affirmative revisionist' scholars who tend to be more optimistic towards resolution of conflicts in West Papua and the 'sceptical reformist' scholars who are dubious about any major changes in West Papua. This latter group believes the people of West Papua should be given the opportunity to remain integrated with Indonesia or to opt for selfdetermination. They tend to use the perceived failure of Indonesia in the protection of human rights in West Papua to attack the Indonesian government and Australian governmental agencies dealing with Indonesia. This article argues that this criticism may adversely impact on future Australia-Indonesia relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article assesses the truth behind the West New Guinea policy implemented by Australia towards Jakarta, Indonesia in January 1959. The conflict between Jakarta and Australia began in mid-1949 during the final phase of negotiations for Indonesia's independence, when the delegations from Indonesia and Netherlands were unable to reach agreement on its transfer.

Explores the purported and actual motives of the Australian government's response to West Papuan refugees from 1963 through 1969. Views on Australian refugee policies; Types of border crossers; Relations with Indonesia.

In late 1999, former Australian Prime Minister, Paul Keating, attacked the Howard government's handling of the East Timor crisis, arguing that John Howard had neglected the most important priority in the management of Australia's relationship with Indonesia. Citing the enormous population imbalance between the two countries, Keating argued that Howard had failed to 'square away' the potential threat arising from Indonesia's population of more than two hundred million people. Keating's invocation of this reason to be fearful seems distinctly at odds with his confidence and pride in Australia's relationship with Indonesia and his own personal closeness to former President Suharto during his period as Prime Minister. But the use of fear to win a political point in debates about Australia-Asia relations or to discipline Australian voters is far from unusual. Indeed, fear has been perhaps the dominant factor in shaping Australia's relations and policies towards Asia and the perceptions of a sceptical community. This article argues that fear is an integral and inescapable element of Australia's relations with Indonesia. However, rather than presenting fear as evidence of flawed diplomacy or as being necessarily irrational, I argue that fear is a constitutive element of relations with Indonesia in much the same way that trust has been an enduring feature of Australian relations with the United States. There have been, of course, many critics of unquestioning Australian alignment with United States' foreign policy and, equally, there have been critics of the various manifestations of Australian policy towards Indonesia over the years. It is not my intention to suggest that Australian attitudes to Indonesia have been without contradictions or that they remained unaffected by changes in Australia, Indonesia and the region more generally. Among politicians on both sides of parliament and among journalists and academics there have been many who have sought to improve what has been a troubled relationship. But despite these efforts, Australian attitudes towards Indonesia are partly constructed in immutable discourses of fear and anxiety. The images and metaphors used to describe Indonesian society and assumptions about 'our' and 'their' national character reflect an enduringly negative view of Indonesia. Moreover, politicians, journalists and academics alike are caught up in this historical web of anxieties and fears. Seemingly routine and benign descriptions of Indonesia's 200 million plus population, its low levels of political and economic development and its status as the world's largest Muslim nation, all play deeply on white Australian fears of Asia even if the authorial intention is to alleviate concerns about Indonesia among Australians. This article explicitly discusses the politics of fear in modern Western societies and explains how domestic anxiety about the policies of multiculturalism and immigration overlap with other concerns about events and peoples external to the Australian nation. Later, I analyse particular images that have been used to describe Indonesia and argue that not only do they have antecedents in colonial depictions of Indonesia but also tend to imply that Australian values and attitudes are superior. Finally, I argue that the key to establishing better relations with Indonesia is not a clearer understanding of 'them', but an ongoing and thoughtful unpacking of the values and fears that constitute 'us'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Analyzes the dynamics of policy debate and implementation with focus on Australia's policy towards East Timor. Evaluation of the contents of the published document, 'Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation of Portuguese Timor 1974-1976.' Central figures in the making of Australian policy; Australia's preference to the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia; Profile of the Australian policy concerning East Timor.

Discusses the relations between Australia and Indonesia. Origins of the East Timor problem; Dispute about Australian policy over East Timor; History of East Timor from 1974 to 1976; Australia's failure to prevent Indonesia's resort to the use of force in its efforts to achieve the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesian territory in late 1975; Implications to the Australian policy-making.

Examines the flaws in the foreign policy of Australia that led to the crisis in East Timor. Need to reappraise the foreign policy of the country; Errors which marked the evolution of Australia's policy action in the months before the deployment of forces in East Timor; Analysis on the arguments advanced by the government in defense of its policy actions.

Australia and Indonesia are among the most dissimilar neighbours in the world. During their five decades of political interaction various issues have bedevilled their relationship. As a result of geopolitical and geo-economic considerations, since the mid-1960s Australia has been tolerant of the Indonesian regime's poor human rights record. With the economic meltdown since 1997 and the emerging regime change Australia has a new opportunity to assist in the development of human rights in Indonesia, but even now this pursuit is somewhat compromised by other Australian interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on foreign policy in Australia, with emphasis on the country's handling of Indonesia's confrontation of Malaysia, in relation to crisis management. Why confrontation is important in Australian foreign policy; Information on foreign policy in Australia; What insured the success of Australia's management in Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia.

Discusses the foreign policy and `security agreement' between Indonesia and Australia. Status of agreement; Significance of policy; Suggestions from the agreement as it relates to Indonesia.