Search

This paper argues that participants in the subjectivism/objectivism/hybridism debate, a central issue in recent meaning in life research, conflate two different distinctions marked by the terms objective and subjective, one having to do with the question of whether life's meaningfulness depends on factors internal or external to the agent, the other having to do with the question of whether there is any 'absolute' as opposed to 'relative' truth about the first question. The paper then argues that a distinctive type of hybridism with respect to the first sense is true. To vindicate this type of hybridism, the paper identifies, by using examples and counterexamples, internal and external necessary conditions for having meaningful lives. In this type of hybridism, internal states that are not directed at external factors, such as autonomy, serenity and contentment, are also taken account of, and, more generally, internal and external factors need not relate to each other at all. Further, although the more a combination of internal and external factors is valuable the more meaningful a life is, not any increase in the value of any relevant internal or external factor enhances meaning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventionalism about mathematics has much in common with two other views: fictionalism and the multiverse view (aka plenitudinous platonism). The three views may differ over the existence of mathematical objects, but they agree in rejecting a certain kind of objectivity claim about mathematics, advocating instead an extreme pluralism. The early parts of the paper will try to elucidate this anti‐objectivist position, and question whether conventionalism really offers a third form of it distinct from fictionalism and the multiverse view. The paper then turns to anti‐objectivism about logic, and suggests that here too conventionalism offers no distinct alternative, and that there are limits on the extent of pluralism/anti‐objectivism. It also argues that these limits can't be used to argue for more extensive objectivity within mathematics, and also that they do allow for more limited pluralism within logic, e.g. as regards resolution of semantic and property‐theoretic paradoxes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the views of leading Czech physicists regarding a physics curriculum for upper secondary schools. This paper presents the first part of an effort to define starting points for a new physics curriculum in Czechia (subsequent phases would analyze the opinions of other scientists, education experts, and physics teachers regarding the physicists' ideas) and create a new physics textbook for upper secondary schools. The methodology was inspired especially by the objectivist grounded theory. We conducted in‐depth interviews about the upper secondary physics curriculum with 29 leading Czech physicists and identified 56 ideas (categories) that they agreed on (according to the interview analysis). Subsequently, a questionnaire was created based on these 56 ideas. Two years later, the same group of physicists were asked to express their opinions on the ideas on a 7‐point Likert scale. The new survey sought to clarify the relevance and permanence of the ideas, and the physicists' willingness to collaborate on constructing a physics curriculum for upper secondary schools. Four core categories—students, physics, context, and math—were identified through a comparison of the relevance of the ideas. Additionally, we compared the questionnaire answers of a physicist with their opinions during the interview and identified 43 ideas as permanent (in the 2‐year interval). Surprisingly, 26 of the 29 researchers in the initial study completed the subsequent questionnaire survey and 13 among these expressed their willingness to contribute to the development of a physics textbook for upper secondary schools. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the received view, philosophy of action took a justified turn towards causalism because anti‐causalists failed the causalist challenge about efficacious reasons. This paper contests that view by examining the ways in which Georg Henrik von Wright responded to causalism in his later philosophy. First, von Wright attacked the subjectivism of causalism by arguing for an objectivist view that construes reasons not as subjective mental states but as external facts of the agent's situation. Second, von Wright fundamentally disagreed with the view of philosophical inquiry that underpinned causalism. For von Wright, the task of philosophy was conceptual: to explicate what one is looking for when one is looking for the real reasons for action. In contrast, for causalists the task was ontological: to determine what kind of item in the world the real reason for action is. Examining von Wright's account contributes to contemporary assessments of the metaphilosophical dimension of the reasons/causes debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the Chicago sociologist William F. Ogburn's (1886–1959) views about technological unemployment, which were intimately connected to his analysis of the social impacts of technological developments and resulting social problems due to cultural lag. We trace the development of his views as seen through his well‐known 1922 book, Social Change with Respect to Culture and Original Nature, his important contributions to the President's Research Committee on Social Trends (1933), and his lesser‐known pamphlets designed for a broader audience—Living with Machines (1933), You and Machines (1934), and Machines and Tomorrow's World (1938). He used these pamphlets to educate the public about the dangers of new machines and technological unemployment. In doing so, he drew upon sociological analysis in his professional scholarly writings and his long‐standing personal interests in social betterment and social reform. Our analysis also calls into question the adequacy of existing scholarship on Ogburn that has emphasized his commitment to a statistical, dispassionate, and "objectivist" approach to social science research. We call for a revised, richer, and more complex view of Ogburn's work and legacy as one of the nation's leading social scientists during the first half of the 20th century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article in this journal, Daan Evers and Gerlinde Emma van Smeden () defend Wolf's hybridism against objectivist counterexamples advanced by Metz, Smuts, and Bramble. They also offer their own new hybridism, which they take to be even less vulnerable to such counterexamples. In this paper, I argue that Evers and van Smeden's defense of their and Wolf's hybridizing from objectivist counterexamples is problematic and that they do not, in fact, succeed in meeting the challenge the objectivist counterexamples pose. Evers and van Smeden do not read the counterexamples charitably and, hence, are not coping with the strongest challenges the counterexamples have to offer. I conclude that Metz's, Smuts's and Bramble's objectivist counterexamples continue to pose serious challenges to hybridism, both in Wolf's and in Evers and van Smeden's versions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides an overview of Jacques Lacan's views on psychology, paying particular attention to how such critiques support a distinctively Lacanian view of the subject. Lacan attacked various facets of psychology, including: psychology's objectifying (and objectivistic) tendencies; the discipline's historical attempt to model itself on the natural sciences; its conceptual and practical prioritizations of the ego and consciousness; its frequent prioritization of developmental, biological and physiological paradigms above a careful analysis of the structures and operations of language and speech. The aim of the paper is not to systematically work through Lacan's various criticisms, still less to refute them. Ultimately, Lacan's historical attacks against psychology-apposite as they are-have their greatest value in helping us to strike some distance from commonplace assumptions and psychological assumptions about the nature of the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the problem of knowledge integration, and proposes a theory of knowledge construction systems, which consists of three fundamental parts: a knowledge construction system, a structure-agency-action paradigm, and evolutionary-constructive objectivism. The first part is a model of collecting and synthesizing knowledge, the second relates to necessary abilities of actors when collecting knowledge in individual domains, and the third comprises a set of principles to justify collected and synthesized knowledge. The paper starts with a brief introduction of our basic systems approach, called 'informed systems thinking', followed by a summary of our proposal: a theory of knowledge construction systems. The paper then explains its three fundamental parts, with a special emphasis on the types of knowledge integration, and finally gives a detailed explanation of the theory with an example. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article the author comments on the book "Action, Knowledge and Will" by John Hyman. Topics include Hyman's approach is stated to make a far better starting-point for the study of reasons than the crude and misleading dichotomy between objective and subjective reasons, and Hyman's equation of knowledge with an ability which the author denies.

Many philosophers have claimed that we might do well to adopt a hybrid theory of well-being: a theory that incorporates both an objective-value constraint and a pro-attitude constraint. Hybrid theories are attractive for two main reasons. First, unlike desire theories of well-being, hybrid theories need not worry about the problem of defective desires. This is so because, unlike desire theories, hybrid theories place an objective-value constraint on well-being. Second, unlike objectivist theories of well-being, hybrid theories need not worry about being overly alienating. This is so because, unlike objectivist theories, hybrid theories place a pro-attitude constraint on well-being. However, from the point of view of objectivists, hybrid theories are not objectivist enough, and this can be seen clearly in missing-desires cases. For instance, hybrid theories entail that, if someone lacks the desire for health, then health is not a component of her well-being. This, objectivists say, is implausible. It is obvious, objectivists say, that someone's life goes better for herself inasmuch as she is healthy, and, hence, that health is a component of her welfare. This paper focuses on the missing-desires objection (as leveled by objectivists) to hybrid theories of well-being. My argument is that the missing-desires objection can be answered in a way that is generally convincing and, in particular, in a way that pays a good deal of respect to objectivist intuitions about well-being. My hope, then, is that this paper will help to persuade objectivists about well-being to become hybrid theorists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although traditional instructional design and technology (IDT) has largely been based on objectivism, in the past 20 years, constructivism has emerged as a dominant framework for IDT. Both perspectives, however, present shortcomings. This paper explores enactivism—an emerging new philosophical world view—as an alternative paradigm. It also investigates the possibilities offered by this new paradigm to IDT. The philosophical world view known as enactivism is reviewed to illustrate the similarities and differences among the three philosophical paradigms, namely, objectivism, constructivism and enactivism. Finally, details of enactivism and its implications for IDT are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I have drawn a brief picture to map the nature of management in modern high-tech organizations from the viewpoint of critical systems thinking. First, I point out the difference between science and art. Then, following Jackson's classification of different systems approaches such as modernism and postmodernism, I connect modernism with objectivism and collective subjectivism, and postmodernism with individual subjectivism. Through clarifying three ways of knowing/understanding the world and introducing a new knowledge systems model of modern high-tech corporations, I argue that in the knowledge age, management is both a science and an art. Objects under consideration belonging to different parts of reality require different approaches to deal with. The purpose of this article is to give a brief explanation of why management is both a science and an art, and to inspire further debate and discussion on the essence of management among academics and practitioners. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that theTractatusclassifies names into constant names and variable names. A variable name, via the application of the existential quantifier against the background of picturing, picks out and denotes an unspecified object from the range of objects of the form shown by the relevant variable. A constant name labels an object picked out from a scope of the existential quantifier. I also refute two types of attempts to argue that the Tractarian relation between a name and its meaning is not realist, and to explain why it is more reasonable to hold that it is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I make a case for distinguishing clearly between subjective and objective accounts of undercutting defeat and for rejecting a hybrid view that takes both subjective and objective elements to be relevant for whether or not a belief is defeated. Moderate subjectivists claim that taking a belief to be defeated is sufficient for the belief to be defeated; subjectivist idealists add that if an idealised agent takes a belief to be defeated then the belief is defeated. Subjectivist idealism evades some of the objections levelled against moderate subjectivism but can be shown to yield inconsistent results in some cases. Both subjectivisms should be rejected. We should be objectivists regarding undercutting defeat. This requirement, however, is likely to be problematic for a popular interpretation of evolutionary debunking arguments in metaethics as it can be shown that existing objectivist accounts of defeat do not support such arguments. I end by discussing the constraints of developing such an account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Evolutionary debunking arguments ( EDAs) are arguments that appeal to the evolutionary origins of evaluative beliefs to undermine their justification. This paper aims to clarify the premises and presuppositions of EDAs-a form of argument that is increasingly put to use in normative ethics. I argue that such arguments face serious obstacles. It is often overlooked, for example, that they presuppose the truth of metaethical objectivism. More importantly, even if objectivism is assumed, the use of EDAs in normative ethics is incompatible with a parallel and more sweeping global evolutionary debunking argument that has been discussed in recent metaethics. After examining several ways of responding to this global debunking argument, I end by arguing that even if we could resist it, this would still not rehabilitate the current targeted use of EDAs in normative ethics given that, if EDAs work at all, they will in any case lead to a truly radical revision of our evaluative outlook. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Utilizing a characterization of pragmatism drawn from Joseph Margolis, and with reference to the thought of C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, this paper first exposes a pragmatist conception of rationality within the French philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It then explores how this praxical, biologically rooted understanding of rationality leads Merleau-Ponty to espouse the same broadly pragmatist conception of ethical life that we find in a recent work from Joseph Margolis: one that repudiates fixed principles and absolute ends in order to prompt us, under the pressing exigencies of life, to learn from radically different ways of thinking, thus committing us to negotiating peaceful solutions to our moral and political conflicts across diverse rational perspectives in a manner that, although taking us far from any form of objectivism, nevertheless refuses to renounce all claims to objectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When thinking about the notion of essence or of an essential feature, philosophers typically focus on what I will call the notion of objectual essence. The main aim of this paper is to argue that beside this familiar notion stands another one, the notion of generic essence, which contrary to appearance cannot be understood in terms of the familiar notion, and which also fails to be correctly characterized by certain other accounts which naturally come to mind as well. Some of my objections to these accounts are similar to some of Kit Fine's compelling objections to the standard modal account of (objectual) essence (Fine 1994). In the light of these objections, Fine advances the view that it is metaphysical necessity which has to be understood in terms of essence, rather than the other way around, and takes essence to be unanalyzable. When formulating this view, Fine had only objectual essence in mind (or had both concepts in mind, but assumed that the generic is a special case of the objectual), and for that reason, I will argue, his account fails. I will suggest that Fineans should modify their view, and take it that metaphysical necessity is to be understood in terms of the two notions of essence - a view I myself find appealing. Finally, I will end by suggesting a further move which reduces the objectual to the generic, making metaphysical necessity reducible to generic essence alone - a move with which I myself have some sympathy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I focus on the central role faith plays in the thought of Polanyi and Voegelin. I begin by indicating how both find the modern conception of scientific knowing seriously wanting. What Polanyi terms“objectivism” and Voegelin calls“scientism” is the modern tendency to reduce knowledge to only that which can be scientifically demonstrated. This errant view of knowledge does not occur in a vacuum, though, and both men draw a connection between this and the political pathologies of the twentieth century. I then show the complementary ways in which these two thinkers believe recovery is possible: an epistemological solution encompassed in Polanyi's personal knowledge and an ontological reorientation that is the core of Voegelin's insistence that we must recover an awareness of human participation in transcendent reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the relation between interpretation and the objects of interpretation, principally, but not exclusively, in the realm of art. Several theses are defended: that interpretation cannot proceed without prior determination of the kind of thing being interpreted; that the mode of interpretation is determined by the nature of its object; that interpretation, of a meaning-determining rather than generic kind, focuses at the level of works, not descending to a bedrock of “mere objects”; that because works and their appropriate mode of interpretation are constituted by convention-bound practices, it follows that no clear line can be drawn between properties “in” a work and those “imputed to” it through interpretive procedures endorsed by the practice. The debate over constructivism or “imputationalism” – between Margolis and Krausz, on the one hand, and Stecker and Levinson, on the other – is engaged with an attempt to show a core of truth in each of the conflicting theories, once the right distinction between object, work, and interpretation is in place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue below for the view that non‐moral truths entail moral ones. I first argue that moral claims do have truth values which are objectively true or false. I then argue that this objectivism does not entail non‐relativism. I produce a simple possible worlds argument for the entailment view. I then give some examples where p entails q but many intelligent people have thought it does not, and where it does not, but many intelligent people have thought that it does. I also try to evaluate a somewhat neglected argument by Hume. In the final section, I further consider some moral and meta‐moral opinions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers the author's insights on the issues on the difference between objectivism and realism. The author examines the distinction between the concepts in conjunction to its applications in different areas of philosophy like metaethics and normative ethics. He states that realism could have the possibility that speakers may not know if a particular nontrivial affirmation of a significant kind is accurate, while objectivism does not demand for standards of correctness in any form.

In the vast literature on human rights and natural law one finds arguments that draw on science or mathematics to support claims to universality and objectivity. Here are two such arguments: 1) Human rights are as universal (i.e., valid independently of their specific historical and cultural Western origin) as the laws and theories of science; and 2) principles of natural law have the same objective (metahistorical) validity as mathematical principles. In what follows I will examine these arguments in some detail and argue that both are misplaced. A section of the paper will be devoted to a discussion of arguments relying on the historical and cultural specificity (and intrinsic superiority) of Western science. The conclusion is that both science and mathematics offer little help to anyone wanting to make use of them as paradigms of universality, objectivity, and rationality. Finally, I will draw some consequences for the idea of human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Expressivism can make space for normative objectivity by treating normative stances as pro or con attitudes that can be correct or incorrect. And it can answer the logical challenges that bedevil it by treating a simple normative assertion not merely as an expression of a normative stance, but as an expression of the endorsement of a proposition that is true if and only if that normative stance is correct. Although this position has superficial similarities to normative realism, it does full justice to the core expressivist thesis that, at bottom, a normative assertion expresses a normative stance rather than a factual belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I defend the widely‐held view that acting with moral worth does not require a desire for rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of luck that their argument employs. Consequently, the argument provides no reason to doubt the popular view that a desire for rightness as such is no part of virtue. I conclude by suggesting that a family of worries about merely accidentally right action presuppose one side of the recent debate about objectivism and perspectivism concerning moral rightness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article investigates into the nature of morally relevant avoidable harm on other morally relevant concepts. It mentions the nature of the morally relevant notion of avoidable harm will motivate the moral relevance or provide indirect support for both Objectivism and Possibilism; also focuses on suffering a harm depends on whether those threatened with the harm could avoid it.

This passage might support Joyce's fictionalist interpretation had Mackie written, "In so far as I moral values and obligations i are not only a natural but also a useful fiction...." But that is not what Mackie writes. But on the standard interpretation, which holds the claim to objectivity to be, for Mackie, a I non-negotiable i part of I all i moral thought and discourse, it is altogether unclear why Mackie would include that ever-present qualifier. Mackie says almost nothing about these delicate issues, so it is difficult to know even what his subjectivism amounts to, on my reading.[18] Thus, rather than urging metaethicists to investigate the merits and faults of the position that Mackie in fact defends in his widely read, widely taught, and - if I am correct - widely misunderstood chapter on the subjectivity of values, instead I want to draw a different lesson from the exegetical arguments I have been offering here. 7 Other places where Mackie's subjectivist second-order commitments are explicitly brought to bear during his first-order arguments include 150-51, 159-60, 165, 173, 199, and 208-9. 8 Beyond these, see also Mackie [17], 108; Mackie [19], 171; Mackie [22], 152-53; and Mackie [24], 198. [Extracted from the article]

The article presents the author's respond to his article regarding philosophical debate in which he focuses on the treatment of visual similarities and stimulating objections and questions. It focuses on the treatment of visual similarities to treatment of phenomenology; and also mentions the difference of phenomenology and presentation which is constituted by objects and perceptible features. It highlights the epistemic forces into a Cartesian conception of experience.

According to the Reasoning View about normative reasons, facts about normative reasons for action can be understood in terms of facts about the norms of practical reasoning. I argue that this view is subject to an overlooked class of counterexamples, familiar from debates about Subjectivist theories of normative reasons. Strikingly, the standard strategy Subjectivists have used to respond to this problem cannot be adapted to the Reasoning View. I think there is a solution to this problem, however. I argue that the norms of practical reasoning, like the norms of theoretical reasoning, are characteristically defeasible, in a sense I make precise. Recognizing this property of those norms makes space for a solution to the problem. The resulting view is in a way analogous to the familiar defeasibility theory of knowledge, but it avoids a standard objection to that theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on subjectivism which means that knowledge is merely subjective and that there is no external or objective truth. Topics discussed include need for having full information and cognitive psychotherapy for understanding what is good for someone; idealized or counterfactual pro-attitudes make critiques differ; and an information that critique from tacit objectivism makes critical reference to the inability of subjectivist theories to accommodate the heart of subjectivism.

I offer a new objectivist theory of the contents of color language and color experience, intended especially as an account of what normal intersubjective variation in color perception and classification shows about those contents. First I explain an abstract account of the contents of (utterances of) color and other gradable adjectives; on the account, these contents are certain objective properties constituted in part by contextually intended standards of application, which are in turn values in the dimensions of variation associated with the adjectives. Then I propose an explanation of normal variations in linguistic color classification; these are postulated to be effects of differences in intended standards for the color adjectives appearing in the classifying predicates. Next, I consider a potential objection to this explanation, based on the suggestion that contextual content should be more accessible than the explanation predicts. In reply, I point out that contextual content is occasionally opaque to unsophisticated reflection. Finally, I present a companion account of the contents of color experiences on which these represent an object as lying on certain salient intervals in the chromatic dimensions, and I show how the account accommodates intersubjective variation in color perception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Redefining the discourse toward a 'better fit' cultural framework of beliefs, thought, language, and action through ultrasociality, a constructivist meme can help nurture an epistemological break (or rupture) from the traditional objectivist paradigm in education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the related problems concerning the possibility of infinite worlds. There are no comparative utility facts concerning worlds. The problems cannot easily be dismissed on the grounds that it is reasonable to have infinitesimal credence that the world is infinite. One may claim that the problem of infinite worlds is a pseudoproblem.

The article discusses the concept of ambivalence with particular focus on the problems of opposed value judgments. Topics discussed include difficulties with ambivalence of value judgment, objectivist ambivalence of value judgment, and deliberation to resolve ambivalence. Several approaches in solving ambivalence in its diverse forms are also mentioned.

The analogy between colors and values is strongly interlinked with the idea that these properties are by nature dispositions or response-dependent properties. Indeed, that colors are essentially visible, and values are inherently motivational, cries out for a dispositional or a response-dependent account. Recently, Primitivism has challenged the viability of the dispositional account of colors, taking the apple, for instance, to be 'gloriously, perfectly, and primitively red.' Unsurprisingly, the attack on the dispositional account of colors has found a moral analogue in the view that values are sui generis irreducibly primitive properties. The question this article addresses is whether given Primitivism the analogy between colors and values is preserved; or in other words, whether Primitivism breaks the bond between the dispositional account and the analogy between colors and values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the two factors to perceive about the objective ought. It states that the appropriate account of objective oughtness is to have any relevance towards practical deliberation in which the things that have deontic status require to be sorts of things. Moreover, the conditional under-specification and the ought of most reason point out that there is a relation between good practical reasons and practical reasons.

Current debate in metaethics includes the question of objectivity. What does it mean for a moral prescription to be objective? It is easy to see how matters of fact are objective, and it is also easy to see how matters of taste are subjective. But what about matters of morality? Given the diversity in moral beliefs and practices it appears these cannot be matters of fact. Are they thus matters of taste? If so, we are left with the unlivable conclusion that all moral prescriptions are beyond rational scrutiny. David Hume expressed these problems in a way that continues to be influential today: ‘Tis as little contrary to reason to prefer even my own acknowled'd lesser good to my greater’ ( Hume, 2003 : 2.III.ii). Resolving problems about moral objectivity is further complicated by the philosophical presuppositions of analytic philosophy that have dominated the 20th century, initiated in the work of G.E. Moore, and promulgated in theories such as logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy. Contemporary thinkers from both the cognitivist and the non-cognitivist camps have tried to demonstrate that moral claims are objective in the sense of being subject independent. By considering contemporary appeals to the ideally rational self to establish objectivity, and objections to rationality as a ground for objectivity, it will be argued that objectivity can be grounded in the good which in turn is grounded in human nature. This approach can be found in the Socratic denial of knowingly doing evil, and out of this a foundation for moral objectivity can be developed that does not require an appeal to the individual's mental state and which preserves individual responsibility for knowing the good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's view regarding the truth and fallacy issues of welfare objectivism. It mentions the discussion of welfare objectivism's basic adaptive preferences. However, it highlights the challenges of the adaptive preference, particularly overgeneralization, and asking question. The welfare objectivism's adaptive preference model is also noted.

The article presents the author's view regarding the link between reason and will and their philosophical views. The author explores the variation of judgment and action and cites the will's possible weakness. The author elucidates the reason and will's answerability. Moreover, the author also notes the alternatives and objectives of reason and will.

The article provides information on the ethical and philosophical views regarding how to achieve objectivity. It elucidates the explanation of objectivity in several approaches including Fact of Commonality, Fact of Conflict, and Fact of Stability. It highlights the objectivity's normative judgments. Moreover, the objectivity's epistemology is also noted.

The article presents a study regarding the normative reason's publicity. It highlights the teleology, publicity, and privacy of the normative reason and cites the formulation of its distinction by Thomas Nagel. Meanwhile, it notes the reason's non-teleological interpretation in terms of the justification's practicality. The reason's language as well as judgment are also discussed.

The procurement of pharmaceuticals from electronic channels is drawing widespread attention from marketing decision makers, public policymakers, and the popular media. The focus on online retail channels for pharmaceuticals may be, in part, attributable to the potential risks and safety issues that underlie consumers' self-initiated pharmaceutical acquisition and consumption decisions. Clearly, there exist an unprecedented number of consumers employing this nontraditional channel for procuring both over-the-counter (OTC) and prescription pharmaceuticals in the U.S. This study explores the potential impact of consumers' cognitive characteristics on their decision making as it relates to procuring pharmaceutical products via online retail channels. The results of the study indicate that both powerful others health locus of control and objectivism determine the propensity to procure pharmaceuticals via electronic retail channels. Moreover, health value is identified as a portentous moderator of the relationship between consumers' health locus of control, objectivism, and pharmaceuticals procurement via electronic retail channels. The implications of the findings and recommendations for future research are offered, as well. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author expresses his views on the mental reference being determined by description. The author mentions that the main difference between his two views concerns the logical form of the propositional contents of thoughts about objects. The author also explains his theory against the most serious objection it faces.

Background. The quality of child care is of social and economic significance worldwide. The beliefs that child care workers hold about knowing and knowledge (epistemological beliefs) influence the quality of their professional work. However, attention to epistemological beliefs is rarely a focus in vocational education programmes. Aim. The aim of this study was to investigate the nature of child care students' epistemological beliefs. Sample(s). All first- and second-year students completing a Diploma of Children's Services at three separate training institutes in a large metropolitan area in Australia were invited to participate in the study. There were 46 first- and 31 second-year students (77 in total, 71 females). Method. This study used semi-structured interviews based on a child care scenario to enable students to articulate their epistemological beliefs. A descriptive-interpretative approach in which interviews were analysed for patterns of meaning was used in the content analysis. The categories, based on the work of Kuhn and Weinstock (2002), included objectivism, subjectivism, and evaluativism. While this proved to be a useful framework, the authors remained open to new categories emerging. This constituted the interpretive component of the analysis. Therefore, the data were analysed using both data-driven and theory-led approaches to analysis, which still made it possible to take account of many viewpoints before arriving at the categories of beliefs. The categories were audited by a second researcher to establish trustworthiness and credibility. Results. The findings of this study revealed a range of epistemological beliefs; however, a new way of thinking about evaluativistic beliefs called 'basic evaluativism' emerged. This view of knowledge relates to the construction of evidence-based practice rather than knowledge as is typically the case in evaluativistic beliefs. Conclusions. Implications for the need to address epistemological beliefs in vocational education programmes for child care workers are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In order to establish that judgments about practical reasons can be objective, it is necessary to show that the applicable standards provide an adequate account of truth and error. This in turn requires that these standards yield an extensive set of substantive, publicly accessible judgments that are presumptively true. This output requirement is not satisfied by the standards of universalizability, consistency, coherence, and caution alone. But it is satisfied if we supplement them with the principle that desire is a source of minimal reasons. This principle is justified despite currently fashionable arguments against the claims of desire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Part of Sellars's general attack on the Myth of the Given is his endorsement of psychological nominalism, a view that implies that awareness of our own mental states is not given but must be earned. Sellars provides an account of how such awareness might have been earned with the Myth of Jones. Such an account is important for Sellars, for without it the Given can look necessary after all. But a problem with such accounts is that they can look extremely implausible. Sellars himself seems unconcerned to make his account plausible, and so others have stepped in here. But, I argue, they have done so in ways that fail to respect his psychological nominalism. This evinces, as well as reinforces, a lack of sensitivity to the scope of Sellars's attack on the Given, the aim of which is the dismantling of "the entire framework of givenness." In this essay, I show how one can make Sellars's Myth of Jones plausible, while still respecting his psychological nominalism, by seeing how Jones's thought is governed by the norms of rationality as interpretability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I defend externalism about color experiences and color thoughts, which I argue color objectivism requires. Externalists face the following question: would a subject's wearing inverting lenses eventually change the color content of, for instance, those visual experiences the subject reports with "red"? From the work of Ned Block, David Velleman, Paul Boghossian, Michael Tye, and Fiona Macpherson, I extract problems facing those who answer "Yes" and problems facing those who answer "No." I show how these problems can be overcome, leaving externalism available to the color objectivist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Donald Davidson has long maintained that in order to be credited with the concept of objectivity – and, so, with language and thought – it is necessary to communicate with at least one other speaker. I here examine Davidson's central argument for this thesis and argue that it is unsuccessful. Subsequently, I turn to Robert Brandom's defense of the thesis in Making It Explicit. I argue that, contrary to Brandom, in order to possess the concept of objectivity it is not necessary to engage in the practice of interpersonal reasoning because possession of the concept is independently integral to the practice of intrapersonal reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most act-utilitarians now reject the direct utilitarianism of Bentham. They do so because they are convinced of what I call the paradox of utilitarianism—the thought that one cannot maximize happiness if one is trying to maximize happiness. Instead, they adopt some form of indirect utilitarianism (IU), arguing that the optimal decision procedure may differ markedly from the criterion of rightness for actions. Here I distinguish between six different versions of indirect utilitarianism, arguing that the weaker versions of IU also fall prey to the paradox of utilitarianism, while the stronger versions of IU violate an overwhelmingly plausible moral principle, the principle that one ought to V only if one can V intentionally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does a particular experience evidence a particular perceptual belief for us? As Alvin Plantinga (Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 98) puts it, "[W]hat makes it the case that a particular way of being appeared to—being appeared to greenly, say—is evidence for the proposition that I see something green?" Promising, but unsuccessful, answers cite a reliable connection between our having the experience and the belief's being true, our having good reason to believe in such a connection, the proper functioning of our faculties, and objective epistemic norms. A superior view, developed here, is that our experience of being appeared to greenly evidences for ns that something is green because we have learned to identify green objects by experiences of that sort. Our learning to do so amounts to our adopting an epistemic norm directing us to form that belief on the basis of that experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Environmental ethicists will often say that in dealing with natural entities we need the guidance of an ethic rooted in ‘the intrinsic value of nature’. They will add that subjectivist value theories are unable to account for the normativity of intrinsic value discourse. This preoccupation with normativity explains why many environmental ethicists favour value objectivism. As I see it, value theories must address not only the problem of normativity but also the problem of motivation. In fact, my approach to the question as to which type of value theory does most justice to our intuition regarding the value of nature is primarily in terms of the motivational perspective. I argue that neither the usual objectivist theories nor their subjectivist counterparts can accommodate and explain the fact that those who agree that nature has intrinsic value may well differ in motivation to support its preservation. I suggest that such difference in kinds of motivation is related to distinct kinds of value judgement in which belief in the intrinsic value of nature is expressed. To clarify my view I discuss the subjectivist value theory of Gerald Gaus[1] . Gaus regards the distinction between personal and impersonal value judgements to be deeply embedded in his theory. His internalism about the relation between reason and motivation however, leads him to the mistaken conclusion that independent impersonal value judgements do not provide reasons for action. Next, I introduce the distinction between identity-neutral and identity-constitutive reasons. This distinction allows me to formulate more clearly the differences between the kinds of reasons provided by personal and impersonal value judgements. The resulting theory explains how it is that people who do not (personally) value nature may still be motivated to support nature preservation. It also explains why not everyone who endorses natural values will join movements for the preservation of nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]