Search

Infrastructure has played an agential role in the securitisation of everyday life in the Karakoram high mountains of north Pakistan. Geopolitics bear heavily on this region where Pakistan shares borders with China, with whom it has aligned its foreign and security policy, and with India, with whom Pakistan remains embroiled in a long‐standing territorial dispute. Consequently, in the Karakoram, geopolitical anxieties have reflected inwards onto local populations through both security infrastructure and securitised infrastructure. In this postcolony frontier space, statecraft also frequently bypasses normative legal and administrative structures; such exceptions to normative law and administration have antecedents in colonial statecraft on the territorial margins of empire. This paper also argues that long cycles of military rule have allowed the military to acquire and project technocratic expertise, become custodians of state‐led development, and recently, to assume guardianship of, and to enter into joint financing with China on, construction projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The unipolar international order led by the USA has given way to a multipolar order with the emergence of China as a great power competitor. According to many commentators, the deterioration of Sino–US relations in recent years heralds a "new Cold War." The new Cold War differs from its namesake in many respects, and in this paper we focus on its novel territorial logic. Containing the USSR was the overriding objective of American foreign policy for nearly four decades, but in contrast, the USA and China are engaged in geopolitical‐economic competition to integrate territory into value chains anchored by their domestic lead firms through the financing and construction of transnational infrastructure (e.g., transportation networks and regional energy grids). We show this competition poses risks as well as opportunities for small states to articulate and realise spatial objectives. We present cases from Nepal and Laos that demonstrate that by hedging between China and the USA and its partners, their governments are able to pursue spatial objectives. In order to achieve them, however, they must implement significant reforms or state restructuring. The result is the emergence of what we term the 21st‐century infrastructure state, which seeks to mobilise foreign capital for infrastructure projects designed to enhance transnational connectivity. The "rise" of China has precipitated a multipolar international order and, according to some commentators, heightened US–China tension heralds a "new" Cold War. In this context, small states hedge between the USA and its partners and China, as they pursue longstanding state spatial objectives. This necessitates state restructuring, which in some cases leads to the emergence of the 21st‐century infrastructure state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The One Belt One Road (OBOR) project is perhaps China's most significant international relations initiative in recent times. It is based on openness, harmony, inclusivity, mutual benefit and market operations and aims to connect the economically vibrant East Asia and the developed Europe by land and by sea, and in the process, it brings growth and development to tens of countries along the modern Silk routes. In this paper, we compare the impact of the main initiatives of OBOR, namely enhancements in physical infrastructure and improvements in border administration, on the trade of countries that have signed on to this project, especially countries along the six economic corridors. We find overwhelming evidence that shows improvements in border administration has the greatest impact on exports of corridor countries. Although physical infrastructure is important for trade, the Chinese government should place equal attention to improvements in trade facilitation to ensure trade routes operate seamlessly across the various corridors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]