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In 1845, John Henry Cardinal Newman wrote a treatise describing the development of Christian doctrine. Since then, his ideas have been challenged, in particular by Protestant theologians who have argued that the development of doctrine does not progress in either a smooth or linear path. In the philosophy of science, Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has challenged the idea that science is purely driven by objective and rational motives. In this paper, Kuhn's ideas are applied to the development of Christian doctrine. Drawing from historical examples, it is shown that Kuhn's contextual approach to describe the progress of science aids in understanding the way doctrines themselves develop. Although this is not the first time that theology and Kuhn have conversed, the notion of doctrinal development being systematically and methodically shown to have parallels with Kuhn's ideas is novel. Ultimately, this work is another important step in building interdisciplinary links between science and theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the demarcation problem from the perspective of four philosophers: Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend. To Popper, pseudoscience uses induction to generate theories, and only performs experiments to seek to verify them. To Popper, falsifiability is what determines the scientific status of a theory. Taking a historical approach, Kuhn observed that scientists did not follow Popper's rule, and might ignore falsifying data, unless overwhelming. To Kuhn, puzzle-solving within a paradigm is science. Lakatos attempted to resolve this debate, by suggesting history shows that science occurs in research programmes, competing according to how progressive they are. The leading idea of a programme could evolve, driven by its heuristic to make predictions that can be supported by evidence. Feyerabend claimed that Lakatos was selective in his examples, and the whole history of science shows there is no universal rule of scientific method, and imposing one on the scientific community impedes progress. These positions are used in turn, to examine the scientific status of therapeutic touch theory. The paper concludes that imposing a single rule of method can impede progress, in the face of multiple epistemologies, and the choice of scientific approach should be a pragmatic one based on the aims of the programme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Beginning by offering a conceptual analysis of change – a statement of what change of any kind is – the paper sets out to examine possible ways of understanding a very common and important variety of change that may be called ‘evolutionary’. These changes include anything from the production of a clay pot on a potter's wheel to the emergence of a system of management, or from the effects of an analgesic drug to the development of a new programme of care. As few philosophers have discussed such topics, theories are borrowed from the philosophy of science that attempt to explain the development and rationality of science. The ideas of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn are discussed and criticized, before turning to evolutionary theories: Darwinian and Lamarckian. The paper ends by offering a model that, it is hoped, may help in thinking about a wide range of changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article traces the career of the concept scientific community through three discernible stages. The formative stages is presented by Ludwik Fleck's Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. It was learned that one of the early expositions of the theme that scientific knowledge is socially conditioned, Fleck's work revolves around the correlative concepts of thought collective and thought style. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was discussed. Stage three in the career of the concept scientific community is marked by criticism and the development of alternative models. During the 1960s and 70s, the view prevailed among metascientists that scientific knowledge is produced by communities of specialists. In the works of leading contemporary philosophers of science, as in many historical studies, the existence of scientific communities was assumed without question or argument. Kuhn's paper represents a watershed in the histories of both the concept itself and the entire discipline of sociology of science. Social integration in science was considered a result of a consensus about strategic norms or standards. Findings on the examination of the concept scientific community through the related works of Kuhn and Fleck, the Polish scientist and scientist knowledge, was presented.

History of Science and Philosophy of Science. Introductory Remarks. This article introduces two special issues of the journal History of Science Reports ( Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte) with contributions on the relationships of history and philosophy of science since the seventeenth century. The introduction begins with a brief reminder of Thomas Kuhn's provocative discussion of the relationship in the 1970s, placing it in the context of the debate of the period over whether the foundation of university departments for History and Philosophy of Science in the United States had led to a mere 'marriage of convenience' or something more. Following this the paper briefly outlines the transformative impact of the 'practical turn' in both philosophy and history of science since the 1990s, and contends that the relationship of history and philosophy of science has nonetheless become increasingly distant over time. This is due in large part to the professionalisation of history of science and to the recent turn to cultural approaches in that field; both trends have led to the adoption of strictly historicist rather than analytical perspectives on knowledge. General historians, too, are paying more attention to the increasing impact of science and technology, but have at most instrumental use for philosophical perspectives. Thus, the distinct possibility arises that the debate between historical and analytical approaches in philosophy of science is becoming a conversation within one discipline rather than a dialogue between two disciplines: what was once a 'marriage of convenience'︁ could end in respectful separation or amicable divorce. The article concludes with brief summaries of the articles published in the two special issues, indicating their relations to specific aspects of the broader topic at hand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Beginning by offering a conceptual analysis of change – a statement of what change of any kind is – the paper sets out to examine possible ways of understanding a very common and important variety of change that may be called ‘evolutionary’. These changes include anything from the production of a clay pot on a potter's wheel to the emergence of a system of management, or from the effects of an analgesic drug to the development of a new programme of care. As few philosophers have discussed such topics, theories are borrowed from the philosophy of science that attempt to explain the development and rationality of science. The ideas of Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn are discussed and criticized, before turning to evolutionary theories: Darwinian and Lamarckian. The paper ends by offering a model that, it is hoped, may help in thinking about a wide range of changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a response to Harvey Siegel's paper "On the Distortion of the History of Science in Science Education," which appeared in the previous issue of "Science Education." The author claims that Siegel's article expresses similar views to his own article. He criticizes the claims of Siegel that the Project Physics Course is a counterexample of a successful use of an accurate historical account in science education. Lastly, the author correct himself to the impression that he is the critic of Thomas Kuhn's recommendation that the history of science should be distorted in the training of scientists.

The first part of this article explores the assertion that strategic theory, is inchoate and incomplete, and hence consistent with the conditions of a ‘pre-paradigm’ first described by Thomas Kuhn (1970). The article exposes the conflicting definitions and positions held by some of the strategy gurus and, taking a methodological stance, relates these positions to the ideas of paradigms and pre-paradigms developed by Kuhn in his work on scientific revolutions. The second part of the article to be published in the next edition of the journal, will examine the idea of postmodernism and show how a postmodern style of thinking might help the development of a new strategy paradigm. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to place the UK's present economic 'moment' in historical context. Over the course of the decade since the 2007 financial crisis, it has increasingly been acknowledged that a cyclical crisis has become a structural crisis. The failure of most economists to predict the financial crash in the first place, and the inadequacy of economic policy in responding to its lasting effects, has led many to conclude that economics itself is in crisis. This article seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the present period of disjuncture. Drawing on theories of paradigm shift from both the physical and social sciences, we argue that the speed of change in UK economic policy is comparable to the two major historical transitions that ended with the post-war consensus and neoliberalism. We conclude by offering some remarks on how and where the present change might take us. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT Michel Foucault's The Order of Things is uniquely relevant to historians because it is about the contradictions of writing history in the present day, and because it makes claims absent from other books often seen as similar, such as Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. For Order, the present-day modern episteme is characterized by unconscious elements that connect Man through time. These unconscious elements are only vaguely discernible to himself and are deformed in the process of representation, that is, by putting experience into words. At the same time, history-writing presumes to pull these unconscious elements out of the depths of human experience, time, and space. These assumptions create contradictions for historians in the present day and warrant particular interpretations of evidence that override alternative plausible interpretations. The inescapable contradictions of writing history in the modern episteme are most apparent in histories of what philosopher Ian Hacking calls 'moral kinds,' as shown by an extended analysis of a recent history article on medical experimentation on prisoners. The overarching aim of this essay is to identify stronger, weaker, and usefully plausible interpretations of historical evidence-and, inspired by Foucault, to extend the imaginative possibilities for writing history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that, in analysing the structure and development of moral traditions, MacIntyre relies primarily on Kuhn's model of scientific tradition, rather than (as is held by at least two influential commentators) on Lakatos' model. I unpack three foci of Kuhn's conception of the sciences, namely: the 'crisis' conception of scientific development, what I call the 'systematic conception' of scientific paradigms, and the view that successive paradigms are incommensurable. I then show that these three foci are integrated into MacIntyre's account of the development of moral traditions with a surprising degree of faithfulness to Kuhn. And crucially, I argue against the overall cogency of his account, given the disparities I pinpoint between scientific and moral traditions. My overall critique is, however, fundamentally friendly, since nothing I have to say invalidates the very notion of a moral tradition, and all I am calling for are less problematic construals of that notion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should educational research be contracted? And is there anything wrong with the way that public funding of educational research is currently administered? We endeavour to answer these questions by appeal to the work of two of the most prominent philosophers of science of the twentieth century, namely Popper and Kuhn. Although their normative views of science are radically different, we show that they would nonetheless agree on a number of key rules concerning the extent to which scientific practice should be influenced 'from the outside'. We then show that these rules are often broken in the way that research is publicly funded in the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the role played by historicity in Christian tradition and theology. It discusses the effect of philosopher Thomas S. Kuhn's thoughts on modern technology, particularly in a 1983 symposium titled "A New Paradigm for Theology." It offers an expository look at the work of Kuhn as a whole. It highlights how rationality and scientific knowledge are founded on communal consensus, the paradox of historical contingency, and the incommensurability problem between paradigms.

Revision in history is conventionally characterized as a linear sequence of changes over time. Drawing together the contributions of those engaged in historiographical debates that are often associated with the term "revision," however, we find our attention directed to the spaces rather than the sequences of history. Contributions to historical debates are characterized by the marked use of spatial imagery and spatialized language. These used to suggest both the demarcation of the "space of history" and the erasure of existing historiographies from that space. Bearing these features in mind, the essay argues that traditional, temporally oriented explanations for revision in history, such as Thomas S. Kuhn's "Structure of Scientific Revolutions," miss the mark, and that a more promising line of explanation arises from the combined use of Michel Foucault's idea of "heterotopias" and Marc Augé's idea of "non-places." Revision in history is to be found where writers use imagery to move readers away from rival historiographies and to control their movement in the space of history toward their desired vision. Revision is thus associated more with control than with liberation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay is an account of the "revisionism" movement of the 1970s and 1980s in Soviet history, analyzing its challenge to the totalitarian model in terms of Kuhnian paradigm shift. The focus is on revisionism of the Stalin period, an area that was particularly highly charged by the passions of the Cold War. These passions tended to obscure the fact that one of the main issues at stake was not ideological but purely disciplinary, namely a challenge by social historians to the dominance of political history. A similar challenge, this time against the dominance of social history on behalf of cultural history, was issued in the 1990s by "post-revisionists." Although I was a participant in the battles of the 1970s, the essay is less a personal account than a case-based analysis of the way disciplinary orthodoxies in the social sciences and humanities are established and challenged, and why this happens when it does. In the case of Soviet history, I argue that new data and external events played a surprisingly small role, and generational change a large one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to explain how thought experiments work, and also the reasons why they can fail. It is divided into four sections. The first argues that thought experiments in philosophy and science should be treated together. The second examines existing accounts of thought experiments and shows why they are inadequate. The third proposes a better account of thought experiments. According to this account, a thought experimenter manipulates her worldview in accord with the“what if” questions posed by a thought experiment. When all necessary manipulations are carried through, the result is either a consistent model or a contradiction. If a consistent model is achieved, the thought experimenter can conclude that the scenario is possible; if a consistent model cannot be constructed, then the scenario is not possible. The fourth section of the article uses this account to shed light on the circumstances in which thought experiments fail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Kuhn has had an impact in all academic fields. In science education, Kuhnian themes are especially noticeable in conceptual change research, constructivist theorizing, and multicultural education debates. Unfortunately the influence is frequently compromised by researchers having a limited understanding of Kuhn's original ideas, little exposure to the tradition of philosophical opposition to Kuhn's theories, and minimal appreciation of how Kuhn progressively qualified his initial "irrationalist" views of scientific development. One lesson to be learnt is that the science education community should more seriously and effectively engage with on-going debates and analysis in the history and philosophy of science. This is the same lesson that was learnt from the science education community's wholesale embrace of logical empiricism during the 1950s and 1960s. Another lesson is that there are powerful disciplinary, institutional, and subcultural barriers that mitigate against science educators seriously engaging with historical and philosophical scholarship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the introduction of the notion of "paradigm" into the language of educational research and curriculum evaluation. The introduction is based on a misunderstanding or inaccurate representation of Kuhn's work. The term can also lead to unclear thinking among educationists especially those involved with curriculum evaluation. It can also lead to unproductive debate and misrepresent the educational research enterprise. There are also dangers posed by the too easy acceptance of the concept by educational researchers.

The article discusses the arguments of Thomas Kuhn to the nature of paradigmatic shifts in science education. Kuhn criticized paradigmatic shift because of its emphasis that science does not go through simply by jumping during scientific revolution period. However, it was found that there were misleading intension in connection with Kuhn's scientific revolution and normal science. In addition, the article also argued the essence of being a scientist with being a puzzle solver in which science students should learn.

The article discusses about changes in philosophical thought in the Western World. Now the philosophy is turning to the conceptual models that avoid certain forms of inquiry and confrontation. This change in the spirit could be sensed at the end of the Gulf War. French philosophy rejected the postmodernist and poststructuralist tendencies pursued by Derrida, Deluze and the French feminists. It has returned to theologically motivated problems. German philosophy has retired Hegelian and Marxist themes and replaced them with Kantian philosophy. The marginalizing of Thomas Kuhn's efforts to historicize science and thought, is perhaps the best example of ignorance of historical approach. An extraordinarily large part of Anglo-American philosophy has retrogated in its motivation and enthusiasm and Western philosophy flirting with the idea of yielding to the hegemony of American analytic philosophy.

The article discusses the rationality and progress in science and meta-science. It mentions the views of philosopher Thomas S. Kuhn for such rational progress and its relation to professional competence. It states the logical schema offer revealing philosophical progress with regards to the collective response to Kuhn's concept.

The article explores the role of the history of science in science education, with emphasis on the suggestion by historian of science and philosopher Thomas S. Kuhn that science education should distort the history of science. The author contradicts Kuhn's claims and argues that the history of science must be nor should be distorted in science teaching. He asserts that Kuhn has offered little more than unfounded speculation regarding effective and morally acceptable science education. In addition, the author presents the Project Physics Course, an existing science education program, and argues that it diverts from the Kuhnian notion in its goals and methods, but produces its share of competent scientists.

The article discusses the need for conceptually-based research in science education in the U.S. The absence of conceptually-based research in science education may come from two sources including an attempt to conduct scientific research based on misperceptions of the essence of science and the inability to distinguish the appropriate conceptual model. The characterization of science by science philosopher Thomas S. Kuhn as a paradigm-guided enterprise serves to dispel this kind of misperceptions of science. The usefulness that Kuhn provides for science education lies in his understanding that the foundations of science reside in the formulation and articulation of paradigms.

The article discusses the advantages of prepared mind and flexible management of program in exploring photo-enhanced toxicology. It relates the book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions," by Thomas Khun which explains how normal science works and how seminal discoveries happen, such as the photo-enhanced toxicity of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). The authors mentions the study being conducted at the University of Georgia on environmental fate modeling of organic chemicals.

The article presents the author's response to S. de Shazer's criticism of his article about systemic paradigm in family therapy theory. The author comments on and criticizes de Shazer's understanding of the sense of paradigm according to T. S. Kuhn and explains the distinction between paradigm and theory as used in his article. The family therapy paradigms described by E. H. Auerswald and the use of the concepts of power and causality in the systemic paradigm and in the family therapy theory are also discussed.