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This paper explores Thomas Kuhn's mature conception of incommensurable theories as collective structured lexicons that are not mutually translatable. As will be argued, his view on this issue can profitably be approached in the light of the broad pragmatist attitude that one finds at the core of Wittgenstein's late philosophy of language, which can also consistently be ascribed to Kuhn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information about the paper presented by an American physicist Thomas S. Kuhn titled "Rhetoric and Liberation" at the University of Iowa Humanities Symposium on the Rhetoric of the Human Sciences on March 28, 1984 is presented. Topics include the book "The Rhetoric of the Human Sciences: Language and Argument in Scholarship and Public Affairs," historical development of rhetorical scholarship and rhetorical analysis of scientific and mathematical language.

This paper explores Thomas Kuhn's intellectual history by examining sources that have been understudied so far: the Lowell Lectures of 1951 (The Quest for Physical Theory) and the hitherto unpublished Notre Dame Lectures of 1980. The analysis of these texts aims to reconstruct Kuhn's development of a semantics that can account for scientific progress. This analysis will show that the alleged "linguistic turn" attributed to the author is actually a renewed interest in problems that existed well before publishing The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Despite the importance of the "historiographical revolution" in Kuhn's work, he did not carry out a specific study about it. Without a systematic investigation into it, he even affirms that the "old" historiography of science (OHS) is unhistorical, suggesting its summary disqualification in the face of his "new historiography" of science (NHS). My wider project, of which this paper is a part, is to better discuss the issue of the justification of the NHS. In this paper, I discuss the justification (and the genesis) of the OHS, focusing on Condorcet and Comte and resorting especially to Koyré. This will allow us to understand that the relation between the OHS and the NHS is a new instance of inter-theoretical incommensurability. And, indeed, that the NHS is not stricto senso a new historiography. It is the same historiography used for other disciplines (art, philosophy), which in the twentieth century begins to be applied to science as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History & Foundations of Science is the property of Universidad del Pais Vasco, Servicio Editorial and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This article praises a paper written by Elvira Panaiotidi regarding the nature of paradigms and paradigm shifts in music education. In her paper, Panaiotidi discusses the debate over the approaches in music education by Reimer and Elliott in the context of paradigm shifts. The term, paradigm shift, was introduced by Thomas Kuhn in 1962 in his highly influential book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn proposes that almost every significant break-through in the field of scientific endeavor is first a break with tradition, with old ways of thinking, with old paradigms. Panaiotidi discusses the need for change in theory and practice in music education. She suggests a solution in terms of a paradigm shift from the recent polemic between aestheticians and praxialists. Undoubtedly, Panaiotidi is dismissing the true concept of the theory of Kuhn that in order for there to be a paradigm shift, one must break from tradition or old paradigms so that new thinking will emerge. Moreover, There must be a true paradigm shift in music education .This kind of shift must be a transformation or metamorphosis that does not just happen through random events, but rather is a gradual process driven by agents of change.

For Kuhn, there are a number of values which provide scientists with a shared basis for theory-choice. These values include accuracy, breadth, consistency, simplicity and fruitfulness. Each of these values may be interpreted in different ways. Moreover, there may be conflict between the values in application to specific theories. In this short paper, Kuhn's idea of scientific values is extended to the value of academic freedom. The value of academic freedom may be interpreted in a number of different ways. Moreover, there are other values which play a role in the functioning of our academic institutions. As with the possible conflict between scientific values, there may be conflict among the academic values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the book The Essential Tension (1979) Thomas Kuhn described the conflict between tradition and innovation in scientific research—i.e., the desire to explore new promising areas, counterposed to the need to capitalize on the work done in the past. While it is probable that along their careers many scientists felt this tension, only few works have tried to quantify it. Here, we address this question by analyzing a large-scale dataset, containing all the papers published by the American Physical Society (APS) in 26 years, which allows for a better understanding of scientists' careers evolution in Physics. We employ the Physics and Astronomy Classification Scheme (PACS) present in each paper to map the scientific interests of 103,246 authors and their evolution along the years. Our results indeed confirm the existence of the "essential tension" with scientists balancing between exploring the boundaries of their area and exploiting previous work. In particular, we found that although the majority of physicists change the topics of their research, they stay within the same broader area thus exploring with caution new scientific endeavors. Furthermore, we quantify the flows of authors moving between different subfields and pinpoint which areas are more likely to attract or donate researchers to the other ones. Overall, our results depict a very distinctive portrait of the evolution of research interests in Physics and can help in designing specific policies for the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay argues that the most fruitful place for historians of science to look for and investigate science’s imagined pasts is in the literature reviews and bibliographies of scientific papers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the Kuhnian view of theory choice, theories, as a matter of empirical fact, often score differently with regard to the standard theoretical virtues. The case I discuss in this paper, however, is a case in which there was one theory which was more virtuous than all its competitors. In such cases practitioners' disparate weighting preferences, which Kuhn is so keen to emphasize, make no difference to theory choice: practitioners' choices will converge on one theory despite their different weighting preferences. The case I discuss in this paper concerns the Glashow-Weinberg-Salam (GWS) model of electroweak interactions in the early 1970s. After considering the contemporary experimental evidence in its favor in detail, I argue that the GWS model was chosen not because the evidence in its favor was compelling, but rather because its virtues exceeded those of its competitors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I challenge Gareth Eaton's recent claim that Theodore Richards should be counted among the discoverers of isotopes. In evaluating Eaton's claim, I draw on two influential theories of scientific discovery, one developed by Thomas Kuhn, and one developed by Augustine Brannigan. I argue that though Richards' experimental work contributed to the discovery, his work does not warrant attributing the discovery to him. Richards' reluctance to acknowledge isotopes is well document. Further, the fact that he made no claim to having made the discovery also undermines Eaton's argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the nature of the academic field of finance as it looks in the early 21st century. Using Kuhn’s structure of scientific revolutions as a framework, the paper examines the development of the field over the last 50 years with particular emphasis on intellectual shifts in the last decade: shifts emanating from cross-disciplinary research that are manifesting in approaches at odds with the traditional rational expectations paradigm. These approaches are based on previously disparate fields, such as psychology, neuroscience, evolutionary biology, and sociology. By critically examining the nature of the new approaches, the article determines whether they indeed offer ‘alternative’ paradigms as claimed. In light of the variation of these new approaches, the paper also makes a case for finance to engage more meaningfully in dialogue on epistemological issues and engage in self-appraisal as a force for change and innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History & Foundations of Science is the property of Universidad del Pais Vasco, Servicio Editorial and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper argues that Ludwik Fleck's concepts of thought collectives and proto-ideas are surprisingly topical to tackle some conceptual challenges in analyzing contemporary innovation. The objective of this paper is twofold: First, it strives to establish Ludwik Fleck as an important classic on the map of innovation analysis. A systematic comparison with Thomas Kuhn's work on paradigms, a concept highly influential in various branches of innovation studies, suggests a number of pronounced yet under-researched advantages of a Fleckian perspective in the context of technological change and innovation. Secondly, the paper links these advantages to some recent changes in the organization of innovation. Due to the rising pervasiveness of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), configurational innovation has become commonplace that cuts across the boundaries of established trajectories of knowledge generation. Fleck's graded understanding of the closedness of thought collectives and his weak notion of incommensurability provide powerful metaphors to grasp the peculiarities of configurational innovation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In his account of scientific revolutions, Thomas Kuhn suggests that after a revolutionary change of theory, it is as if scientists are working in a different world. In this paper, we aim to show that the notion of world change is insightful. We contrast the reporting of the discovery of neon in 1898 with the discovery of hafnium in 1923. The one discovery was made when elements were identified by their atomic weight; the other discovery was made after scientists came to classify elements by their atomic number. By considering two instances of the reporting of the discovery of a new chemical element 25 years apart, we argue that it becomes clear how chemists can be said to have been responding to different worlds as a result of the change in the concept of a chemical element. They (1) saw, (2) did, and (3) reported different things as they conducted their research on the new chemical elements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The thesis of this paper contends that many sociologists who have attempted to apply Kuhn's argument in analyzing the status of sociology have misunderstood, or have refused to accept, the central meaning of his paradigm concept. In this paper we first clarify the notion of paradigm as explicated by Kuhn and by Margaret Masterman, and note that the "exemplar" is the central element in the concept. We then analyze the usage of the concept by sociologists who have attempted to ascertain the paradigmatic status of sociology and we focus in particular on the work of Friedrichs and that of Ritzer. In so doing, we show that they have concentrated almost exclusively on the less important, more general meanings of the paradigm concept and thus lose the major thrust of Kuhn's argument. Possible reasons for this misuse are discussed. Finally, we argue that sociology has relatively few exemplars, lacks a clear-cut puzzle-solving tradition, and tends to operate from discipline-wide perspectives. In this regard, sociology is not a mature science; attempts to treat it as such within Kuhn's framework are misdirected. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Canadian Journal of Sociology is the property of Canadian Journal of Sociology and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Across the nations of the world, serious attention is now being paid to the environment because of the increase in environmental disasters. Most of these disasters are not natural but as a consequence of the activities of human beings and their science including their technological apparatuses and deployments. Issues such as global warming, climate change, flooding, desertification, air, water and land pollutions, deforestation, wild fires among so many debilitating issues that affect the environment today have become a source of concern to world leaders, environmentalists, philosophers and other concerned individuals. But the question is; what is the cause of the increase in environmental disasters? Is anything being done to change the narrative? Are the 'ordinary people' aware of the impact of their use and enjoyment of science and technology on the environment? Who takes the lead in shifting the paradigm? Thomas Kuhn had opined in his magnus-opus -- The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, that every paradigm has relevance in the age to which it is accepted and practiced by the scientific community. But a time will come when anomalies would begin to be noticed in accepted paradigms. These anomalies will lead to crisis that will finally lead to a shift in paradigm thus heralding a scientific revolution. A shift in paradigm means a deliberate departure from the old way of doing things in other to face new challenges that may have been caused by the former way things were done. Using the analytic and critical methods, this paper attempts to situate the impact of science and technology and the activities of the ordinary people on the environment. The Kuhnian notion of 'paradigm shift' shall be adopted as a framework to establish a workable panacea to change the narrative. The idea is to canvas for a paradigm shift in the management of the environment by co-opting 'ordinary people' to participate in shifting the environmental paradigm of this age. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Estonian philosopher Rein Vihalemm (1938-2015) wished to reform realism in the philosophy of science. He was dissatisfied with the mainstream analytic philosophy of science--scientific realism and the various anti-realisms alike. He considered these approaches theory-driven and hence too distanced from actual scientific practice. His alternative, which he called practical realism, was inspired and influenced by Joseph Rouse's original reading of Thomas Kuhn. Moreover, Vihalemm viewed as important some lessons from Marxism, which was prevalent in Estonian philosophy during the Soviet occupation. For him, Marx himself inaugurated practical realism with his novel notion of practice that does not consider agency distinct from nature. He also mentions Kant, interpreted in a realistic manner, as a significant influence for his thesis that concepts only apply to practice. In this article, I will critically examine practical realism from the standpoint of classical pragmatism. My primary question is: what kind of realism practical realism can possibly be. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the development of Kuhn's metaphilosophical position concerning the proper relationship between the history and the philosophy of science. I reconstruct Kuhn's model of scientific change presented in Structure as having the logical status of a Weberian explanatory theory; the philosophy of science and the history of science were of equal importance in its development and defense. However, Kuhn's metaphilosophical position changed in the 1990s, when he gave primacy to philosophy over the history of science in response to the challenge new sociology of science presented to his views. I analyze Kuhn's seldom discussed 'first principles' and argue that the locution should be understood as marking this metaphilosophical shift. Kuhn's project in his last writings was to develop epistemology and metaphysics capable of withstanding relativism and of selecting cognitive internal historiography as the appropriate historiography for the philosophy of science. I sketch the contours of this project which Kuhn was unable to complete in his lifetime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to examine in detail the similarities and dissimilarities between Werner Heisenberg's account of closed theories and Thomas Kuhn's model of scientific revolutions. My analysis draws on a little-known discussion that took place between Heisenberg and Kuhn in 1963, in which Heisenberg, having just read Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions, compares Kuhn's views to his own account of closed theories. I conclude that while Heisenberg and Kuhn share a holist conception of theories, a revolutionary model of theory change, and even a notion of incommensurability, their views diverge fundamentally when it comes to the issue of scientific realism. I show that, contrary to popular opinion, Heisenberg is not an instrumentalist, but rather a pluralistic realist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the nature of paradigms and paradigm shifts in music education. Underlying this project is the idea that theory development in music education can be adequately grasped and appraised in terms of more general units than specific theories which shall be called paradigms. The motivation for dealing with the paper of Peter Abbs about the paradigms and paradigm shifts in arts education stems from two circumstances. The first is the lack of relevant analogue and second is the assumption that art belongs together. This assumption therefore implies that the inferences he draws in his paper equally apply to music education. Abbs argues that a paradigm shift occurs when fundamentally different categories are used to understand the new phenomenon. The main claim of Abbs is that there has been a dramatic shift in the paradigm of arts teaching in British education in 1980. On the other hand, the ultimate aim of Thomas Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was to challenge the prevailing picture of science associated with logical positivism as a rational continual process of accumulation of uncontroversial observable facts. His studies in the history of science led him to realize that the normatively-oriented positivist tradition fails to adequately explain the past and present practice of science.

Simple Summary: Complementary and alternative medicines have gained increased popularity in the veterinary field. Among them, Traditional Chinese Veterinary Medicine, including acupuncture, has emerged as one of the main alternatives to conventional veterinary medicine. This paper relies upon an epistemological approach to investigate conceptual, historical and scientific assertions about veterinary acupuncture made by their advocates. Argument by analogy is used to demonstrate that Traditional Chinese Veterinary Medicine is based on pre-scientific principles, similar to those of humoral medicine and bloodletting, and that acupuncture is, in effect, a placebo. The paper concludes with recommendations for veterinary regulators and colleagues. Within the last few decades, complementary and alternative medicines have gained increased popularity in the veterinary field. Although many authors have exposed the scientific fallacies and historical misconceptions used to justify such therapies, those efforts have not succeeded in detracting veterinary practitioners from embracing them. Notably, Traditional Chinese Veterinary Medicine (TCVM), including acupuncture, has emerged as one of the main alternatives to conventional veterinary medicine. In this paper, analogical reasoning is used to investigate conceptual, historical and scientific assertions made by the advocates of TCVM. The paper is divided into two parts: The first aims to appraise conceptual and historical claims made by veterinary acupuncturists. I defend that TCVM is a pre-scientific construct, similar to humoral doctrine, and that acupuncture is analogous to bloodletting. The second part is focused on scientific evidence of clinical application of acupuncture in the dog, showing how science is yet to validate veterinary acupuncture and defending that claims of efficacy are due to placebo effect. It is suggested that veterinary acupuncture needs to abandon Traditional Chinese Medicine and embrace science-based medicine tout court. On the other hand, high quality scientific studies, including randomized controlled trials, need to be presented. Veterinary regulators must bring the issue of non-conventional therapies into their agendas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article traces the career of the concept scientific community through three discernible stages. The formative stages is presented by Ludwik Fleck's Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact. It was learned that one of the early expositions of the theme that scientific knowledge is socially conditioned, Fleck's work revolves around the correlative concepts of thought collective and thought style. Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, was discussed. Stage three in the career of the concept scientific community is marked by criticism and the development of alternative models. During the 1960s and 70s, the view prevailed among metascientists that scientific knowledge is produced by communities of specialists. In the works of leading contemporary philosophers of science, as in many historical studies, the existence of scientific communities was assumed without question or argument. Kuhn's paper represents a watershed in the histories of both the concept itself and the entire discipline of sociology of science. Social integration in science was considered a result of a consensus about strategic norms or standards. Findings on the examination of the concept scientific community through the related works of Kuhn and Fleck, the Polish scientist and scientist knowledge, was presented.

In contrast to Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions, the economic discipline appears to progress in a piecemeal, path dependent way continuously being dominated by the same paradigm. Instead of paradigmatic shifts, the history of economic thought is characterized by considerable paradigmatic resilience. Drawing on the philosophy of science of Ludwik Fleck, this article demonstrates the basis of this resilience, as well as potential dangers to which it gives rise, and—while giving special consideration to research on the employment impact of minimum wages recently introduced in Germany—examines whether a necessary "thought style compulsion" may eventually turn into a "harmony of illusions." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the narratives that guide the history of science? Certainly one of the more recent ones is "science in action," the emphasis on practices and the imperative of studying science as performed. Perhaps not surprisingly, this story itself has a history; it starts in the early 1960s, when the project "Sources for History of Quantum Physics" was established. The main task of Thomas S. Kuhn, John L. Heilbron, and Paul Forman's work, lasting three years, was to interview the old heroes of quantum mechanics and to archive the spoken word. While giving an account of the project's history, this essay will focus on the process of interviewing and characterize its wider context. Not only does their approach offer us important insights into the shaping of the persona of the scientist; it also represents an important step toward the post-Kuhnian way of doing history of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The evolution of science has intrigued countless scientists. Many philosophers hold that scientific evolution is linear and constantly adding to the overall body of knowledge. Thomas Kuhn changed this view. In his famous work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, he proposes a route to normal science. He explains that paradigm shifts are arduous and require long time periods to occur. Using qualitative research combined with a Kuhnian model, we explain the evolution of Supply Chain Management (SCM) from its origins. Some authors have traced SCM evolution with a focus on chronological and linear order. This paper brings a new approach using Kuhnian elements to explain how SCM has matured to its present form. This broad picture manifests the strenuous path of SCM's evolution and helps to explain how it is close to becoming a normal science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on Thomas S. Kuhn's work on taxonomic concepts and how it relates to empirical work from the cognitive sciences on categorization and conceptual development. I shall first review the basic features of Kuhn's family resemblance account and compare to work from the cognitive sciences. I shall then show how Kuhn's account can be extended to cover the development of new taxonomies in science, and I shall illustrate by a detailed case study that Kuhn himself mentioned only briefly in his own work, namely the discovery of X-rays and radioactivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the paper I maintain that there is a connection between Thomas S. Kuhn and Stanley Cavell as regards novelty and revolution in the history of science and in the arts. I argue that the influence is not unidirectional, from Cavell to Kuhn, as it is usually taken to be the case, but, rather, that Kuhn's understanding of revolution contributed to a similar understanding of novelty by Cavell in relation to the arts. Novelty, in this latter conception, is tied to tradition and it is brought about to preserve the integrity of the practice to be changed. In this sense, radical novelty or revolution combines the original meaning of revolution as restoration but also the modern meaning of radical break and new beginning. Kuhn's contribution to the concept of revolution is that he disassociates it from modernity's idea of progress giving it a postmodern twist. I further examine a possible dissimilarity between Cavell and Kuhn, namely that Cavell, but not Kuhn, in invoking tradition, is in pursuit of essence. I show that neither is involved in an essentialist project and that the alleged dissimilarity is only apparent. Finally, I consider several problems that their common view faces and offer a possible way to address them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses how well Kuhn’s general theory of scientific revolutions fits the particular case of the chemical revolution. To do so, I first present condensed sketches of both Kuhn’s theory and the chemical revolution. I then discuss the beginning of the chemical revolution and compare it to Kuhn’s specific claims about the roles of anomalies, crisis and extraordinary science in scientific development. I proceed by comparing some features of the chemical revolution as a whole to Kuhn’s general account. The result will be that Kuhn’s general description of scientific revolutions fits the chemical revolution extraordinarily well. However, this result should not be taken as an empirical confirmation of Kuhn’s theory, but rather as an indication that the chemical revolution is a constitutive part of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract  Wesley Salmon and John Earman have presented influential Bayesian reconstructions of Thomas Kuhn’s account of theory-change. In this paper I argue that all attempts to give a Bayesian reading of Kuhn’s philosophy of science are fundamentally misguided due to the fact that Bayesian confirmation theory is in fact inconsistent with Kuhn’s account. The reasons for this inconsistency are traced to the role the concept of incommensurability plays with reference to the ‘observational vocabulary’ within Kuhn’s picture of scientific theories. The upshot of the discussion is that it is impossible to integrate both Kuhn’s claims and Bayesianism within a coherent account of theory-change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the concept of convention in the social sciences. It presents the two major neo-Humean philosophical approaches to convention and challenges their intuitive appeal and research implications. The weaknesses of these approaches are examined and a new direction is suggested for the study of convention. The paper goes onto develop a framework for the analysis of conventions, using the notion of `the exemplar' introduced by Thomas Kuhn. An illustration of this alternative approach is provided using the example of the `wage relation'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I examine a cognitive mechanism of incommensurability. Using the frame model of concept representation to capture structural relations within concepts, I reveal an ontological difference between object and event concepts: the former are spatial but the latter temporal. Experiments from cognitive sciences further demonstrate that the mind treats object and event concepts differently. Thus, incommensurability can occur in conceptual change across different ontological categories. I use a historical case to illustrate how the ontological difference between an object and an event concept actually caused incommensurability in the context of nineteenth-century optics. The cognitive and historical analyses indicate that incommensurability can be a local phenomenon and does not necessarily imply incomparability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is critical of constructivism. It examines the philosophical underpinnings of the theory, it outlines the impact of the doctrine on contemporary science education, it details the relativist and subjectivist interpretation of Thomas Kuhn's work found in constructivist writings, it indicates the problems that constructivist theory places in the way of teaching the content of science, and finally it suggests that a lot of old-fashioned, perfectly reasonable educational truisms and concepts are needlessly cloaked in constructivist jargon that inhibites communication with educationalists and policy makers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Incommensurability between successive scientific theories—the impossibility of empirical evidence dictating the choice between them—was Thomas Kuhn's most controversial proposal. Toward defending it, he directed much effort over his last 30 years into formulating precise conditions under which two theories would be undeniably incommensurable with one another. His first step, in the late 1960s, was to argue that incommensurability must result when two theories involve incompatible taxonomies. The problem he then struggled with, never obtaining a solution that he found entirely satisfactory, was how to extend this initial line of thought to sciences like physics in which taxonomy is not so transparently dominant as it is, for example, in chemistry. This paper reconsiders incommensurability in the light of examples in which evidence historically did and did not carry over continuously from old laws and theories to new ones. The transition from ray to wave optics early in the nineteenth century, we argue, is especially informative in this regard. The evidence for the theory of polarization within ray optics did not carry over to wave optics, so that this transition can be regarded as a prototypical case of discontinuity of evidence, and hence of incommensurability in the way Kuhn wanted. Yet the evidence for classic geometric optics did carry over to wave optics, notwithstanding the fundamental conceptual readjustment that Fresnel's wave theory required. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper continues my application of theories of concepts developed in cognitive psychology to clarify issues in Kuhn's mature account of scientific change. I argue that incommensurability is typically neither global nor total, and that the corresponding form of scientific change occurs incrementally. Incommensurability can now be seen as a local phenomenon restricted to particular points in a conceptual framework represented by a set of nodes. The unaffected parts in the framework constitute the basis for continued communication between the communities supporting alternative structures. The importance of a node is a measure of the severity of incommensurability introduced by replacing it. Such replacements occur incrementally so that changes like that from the conceptual structure of Aristotelian celestial physics to the conceptual structure of Newtonian celestial physics occur in small stages over time, and for each change it is in principle possible to identify the arguments and evidence that led historical actors to make the revisions. Thus the process of scientific change is a rational one, even when its beginning and end points are incommensurable conceptual structures. It is also apparent, from a detailed examination of the conceptual structure of astronomy at the time of Copernicus, that the kind of conceptual difficulty identified as incommensurability may occur within a single scientific tradition as well as between two rival traditions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In response to a charge of subjectivism, Kuhn in his Postscript emphasizes the importance of "values" (accuracy, simplicity, explanatory power, etc) that are shared by scientists generally. However, Kuhn adds, these values are applied differently by different scientists. By employing a comparison with partially subjective views of Carnap on confirming evidence, this paper raises questions about Kuhn's position on values by considering ways it might be interpreted as subjective and ways it may not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Important to Kuhn's account of scientific change is the observation that when paradigms are in competition with one another, there is a curious breakdown of rational argument and communication between adherents of competing programs. He attributed this to the fact that competing paradigms are incommensurable. The incommensurability thesis centrally involves the claim that there is a deep conceptual gap between competing paradigms in science. In this paper I argue that in one important case of competing paradigms, the Aristotelian explanation of the properties of bodies in terms of matter and form as opposed to the Cartesian mechanist paradigm, where the properties of bodies are explained on the model of machines, there was no such conceptual gap: the notion of a machine was as fully intelligible on the Aristotelian paradigm as it was on the Cartesian. But this does not mean that the debate between the two sides was conducted on purely rational terms. Rational argument breaks down not because of Kuhnian incommensurability, I argue, but because of other cultural factors separating the two camps. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of cultural studies as a scholarly programme and its adoption in science education are outlined; problems flowing from its commitment to Thomas Kuhn's epistemological relativism and ontological idealism are detailed; the gulf between the citing and the reading of Kuhn is noted; the malaise of obscurantist writing is documented; finally, problems of pursuing cultural studies research without philosophical input are indicated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Science entails history writing: scientists are continuously engaged in creating ''imagined pasts'' for their own specialisms, both on the small scale of the ubiquitous literature review and on a much broader scale. This aspect of science has been considered in very different ways in decades-old, yet largely neglected, contributions by Thomas S. Kuhn, Augustine Brannigan, and Simon Schaffer. Inspired by these pieces and by the missing dialogue between them, this essay argues that their concealment is itself an instance, on the broadest possible scale, of the power of “imagined pasts”—in this case the imagined continuity, inscribed in the very name of our discipline, between Isaac Newton and ourselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first manuscript of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, probably written in late 1958, is available in the Kuhn Archive at MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology)1. It is the first version of Chapter 1, which is the introduction to the book, and is completely different from the version that was published. In this article, I turn to the manuscript to show that at that time Kuhn considered the comparison between the image of science and the image of art as the most appropriate way to announce his project: to change the image of science by bringing it closer to the image of art. As I try to demonstrate, this appeal to the history of art is not merely occasional. And it allows us to understand Kuhn's intriguing retrospective statement, according to which Structure was a belated product of his discovery of the parallels between science and art. Some passages from Kuhn's unpublished manuscript are transcribed in the article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Continuing our occasional series of 'Historic Papers; inaugurated in the February 1996 issue, we are reprinting here a paper by Trevor Pinch, originally published in the 4S Newsletter, VOL7, No. 1 (Spring 1982), 10-25. It was not widely noticed at the time, and is now difficult to locate. In the shadow of our tributes to Thomas Kuhn, we thought it appropriate to resurrect it. As is our custom, we are reprinting it in its original form. We have asked Trevor to add a brief 'Epilogue: Otherwise, what follows is essentially what readers read in 1982. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My paper picks up a long ignored suggestion of Sheldon Wolin - that we use Thomas Kuhn‘s analysis of scientific revolutions to examine the crisis of "normal" political science. This approach allows us to see the connection between the state of the discipline and the larger crisis of meaning afflicting modernity. I then use Eric Voegelin‘s notion of a multicivilizational "truth quest" - or search for meaning - to make a case for institutionalizing "extraordinary" or "revolutionary" political science. I attempt such a discipline by following Voegelin - reflecting on "the full amplitude of human experience." Such a meditation takes place within the "first reality of existence" - Plato‘s metaxy or the "in-between" - the experience of human existence between the sacred and the mundane. I bring to Voegelin‘s exploration of the metaxy the realm of experience which is most radically "other" for modernity - the primal political order of paleolithic and contemporary hunting gathering societies. I argue that shamanic "Urreligion" and Socratic discussion share a boundary crossing logic which provides a basis for a discipline of "extraordinary political science." Finally I suggest that such a discipline is both the quest for, and, in a sense, a realization of, the ’Good Life‘ - a source of order for the individual and society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To correct the misconception that incommensurability implies incomparability, Kuhn lately develops a new interpretation of incommensurability. This includes a linguistic theory of scientific revolutions (the theory of kinds), a cognitive exploration of the language learning process (the analogy of bilingualism), and an epistemological discussion on the rationality of scientific development (the evolutionary epistemology). My focus in this paper is to review Kuhn‘s effort in eliminating relativism, highlighting both the insights and the difficulties of his new version of incommensurability . Finally I suggest that some of Kuhn‘s difficulties can be overcome by adopting a concept of rationality that filly appreciates the important role of instruments in the development of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thomas Kuhn's book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" has generated a great deal of controversy in the philosophy of science, but its treatment in sociology has been rather different. Generally, Kuhn's analysis has been used as a framework to explain why social science is not like natural science with its developed "paradigms." Jeffrey C. Alexander's recent paper in this journal, "Paradigm revision and Parsonianism," follows a rather different strategy; it uses the development of thought among the followers and students of Talcott Parsons to argue that theoretical change, at least in social science, does not conform to Kuhn's model. Alexander's brief account of theory revision is very close indeed to the account which Kuhn gives of normal science and written in almost Kuhnian language. Alexander disagrees not with Kuhn's view of normal science but with a caricature of Kuhn's view of scientific revolutions extrapolated to all science. This critical comment will show that Alexander seriously distorts Kuhn's views both of the development of natural scientific theories and of the applicability of the natural science model to social science.

As Thomas Kuhn stated in his book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions", revolution is an example of advanced science made by a successful paradigm shift from one to another. At that time, Kuhn's idea was a revolution in itself, becoming the primary method for scientific change. It became a basis for science paradigm policy shift and since, has been a model for gradual reform. Identifying and incorporating this model into the countries' scientific policy and reform is extremely important. The applicability of the used model can be judged by the outcomes resulting in the paradigm shift. By the way, not every scientific progress results in revolution. However, we would like to note that a laggard period with weak mental development is ended by an intellectual outburst. In other words, although in the 17th century, Mongols accepted Tibetan medicine within the framework of the "Four Medical Tantras" with recognition and common scientific mind, later in the 18th century, they thought beyond the box of the "Four Medical Tantras" and created the opportunity to develop a new paradigm. This shift made a valuable contribution to the establishment of, in a broader sense, Mongolian medicine and, in a narrow sense, traditional Mongolian medicine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In the capital market and financing theory, we are currently observing major upheavals. For decades, the neoclassical paradigm has dominated in science and practice. Triggered by economic and political crises, transformations, the COVID-19 pandemic, and political instabilities, a paradigm shift is currently occurring in finance. This paradigm shift leads to models and theories that can explain imperfections in capital markets and provide decision support for managers. The aim of this article is to analyse the paradigm shift and to demonstrate it using an example of business valuation theory. We draw on the insights of the philosopher Thomas Samuel Kuhn. He vividly explains the paradigm shift in science in his major work "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions". A paradigm shift in science always encounters resistance. The reasons for this include the strong neoclassical school in finance and the dependence on research funds. Funders expect the use of established methods and the simplicity and dissemination of the models that have prevailed so far. On the other hand, the neoclassical models are unsuitable to explain the transformation processes on financial markets. This fact has been empirically proven. We show a variety of arguments that speak clearly about this paradigm shift. Their importance clearly outweighs the reasons to continue subscribing to the old paradigm. Accordingly, new theories and models have been developed to better explain the changes in the markets. With the simulation-based business valuation, an approach has been developed that considers different degrees of market imperfections. The simulation-based valuation can also depict the special case of the neoclassical paradigm, so that all market constellations can be covered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]