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To date, the effect of both fixed and time-varying individual, social, psychological, environmental, and behavioral characteristics on temporal growth trends in physical activity (PA) among younger individuals remains an under-studied topic. In this paper, we address this gap in previous work by examining how temporal growth trends in PA respond to changing social, environmental, and behavioral characteristics using a large sample of college students (N = 692) who participated in the NetHealth project at the University of Notre Dame and from which fine-grained longitudinal data on physical activity and social interaction were collected unobtrusively via the use of wearables for 637 days (August 16, 2015 to May 13, 2017). These data are augmented by periodic survey data on fixed sociodemographic and psychological variables. We estimate latent growth-curve models for daily activity status, steps, active minutes, and activity calories. We find evidence of both a generalized friendship paradox and a peer effect for PA, with the average PA level of study participants' contacts being on average larger than their own, and with this average level exerting a statistically significant effect on individual PA levels. Notably, there was limited evidence of temporal growth in PA across the 637 days of observation with null temporal effects for three out of the four PA indicators, except for daily steps taken. Finally, we find that social, psychological, and behavioral factors (e.g., large network size, high extroversion levels, and more courses taken) are systematically associated with higher PA levels in this sample. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social, environmental, and behavioral factors (such as peer networks and daily sociability) in modulating the dynamics of PA levels among college students. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Political orientation is one of the most important and consequential individual attributes studied by social scientists. Yet, we know relatively little about the temporal evolution of political orientation, especially at periods in the life course during which individuals are forming new social relationships and transitioning to new relational contexts. Here we use Stochastic Actor-Oriented models (SAOMs) to examine the co-evolution of political orientation and social networks using two feature-rich, temporal network datasets from samples of students making the transition to college at the University of Notre Dame (i.e. the NetSense and NetHealth studies). Overall, we find a great deal of stability in political orientation, with a slight tendency for the 2011 NetSense study participants to become more conservative during their first four semesters in college, but not the 2015 NetHealth study participants. Partisanship is the best predictor of changes in political orientation, with students who identify or vote as Republicans becoming more conservative over time. Neither network influence nor selection processes seem to be driving observed changes. During this formative period, relatively stable identities such as party affiliation predict changes in political orientation independently of local network dynamics, selection processes, socio-demographic traits, and dispositional factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the prevalence of identity in cultural patterns, importance of cultural resources in allowing for negotiation and expression of identity, and the centrality of schema accessibility in identity construction.

We empirically evaluate the proposition that the very same situational mechanisms that tend to evoke multiple identities—the processing of cognitive and affective information from the standpoint of discordant self-identifications—also produce variations in the experience of embarrassment. We integrate the classic Goffmanian model of the social sources of embarrassment with recent theorizing on the ecological features of encounters that invoke multiple identities (audience size, multiplexity, and audience heterogeneity). We use survey data obtained via the experience sampling method to show that these same mechanisms are connected to the higher self-reported levels of embarrassment in systematic and predictable ways net of fixed individual-level factors. We close by outlining the implications of our results for the revitalization of sociological research on embarrassment, specifically an approach that connects systematic features of the structural and relational position of persons with the concrete characteristics of situations in which interaction occurs. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In this article, we show that large-scale macro-political change can powerfully condition how institutional practices shape individual cultural choice. We study the paired comparison of Portugal and Spain, two long-similar societies that moved from authoritarianism to democracy through divergent pathways in the 1970s. Data from the 2001 Eurobarometer indicate that while the cultural choices of persons born before democratic transition are comparable across the two cases, Portuguese youth born under democracy are substantially more omnivorous than their Spanish counterparts. We shed light on this puzzle through a structured, focused comparison. Our argument is that whereas revolution in Portugal overturned hierarchies in numerous social institutions and unleashed an ambitious program of cultural transformation, Spain’s consensus-oriented transition was largely limited to remaking political institutions. We show that this macro-political divergence resulted in a key cross-case difference at the institutional level. Whereas pedagogical practices in Portugal encourage young people to adopt the post-canonical, anti-hierarchical orientation toward aesthetics constitutive of the omnivorous orientation, corresponding practices in Spain restrict omnivorousness by instilling a hierarchical, largely canonical attitude toward cultural works. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Scores of sociological studies have provided evidence for the association between broad cultural taste, or omnivorousness, and various status characteristics, such as education, occupation, and age. Nevertheless, the literature lacks a consistent theoretical foundation with which to understand and organize these empirical findings. In this article, we offer such a framework, suggesting that a mechanism-based approach is helpful for examination of the origins of the omnivore-univore taste pattern as well as its class-based distribution. We reground the discussion of this phenomenon in Distinction (Bourdieu 1984), conceptualizing omnivorous taste as a transposable form of the aesthetic disposition available most readily to individuals who convert early aesthetic training into high cultural capital occupational trajectories. After outlining the genetic mechanisms that link the aesthetic disposition to early socialization trajectories, we identify two relational mechanisms that modulate its manifestation (either enhancing or inhibiting it) after early socialization. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay responds to article 'How Has Bourdieu Been Good to Think With? The Case of the United States,' which appears in this issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relationship between social networks and cultural taste. It presents the results of research which indicated that individuals with stronger and narrower cultural preferences are more likely to have members in their networks who are also connected to each other. People with milder and more diffuse cultural preferences are more likely to have social networks with patterns of disconnection between the other participants. These patterns of disconnection are characterized as structural holes, and the implications of these findings are discussed.

In this article, I attempt to address some enduring problems in formulation and practical use of the notion of structure in contemporary social science. I begin by revisiting the question of the fidelity of Anthony Giddens' appropriation of the idea of structure with respect to Levi-Strauss. This requires a reconsideration of Levi-Strauss' original conceptualization of 'social structure' which I argue is a sort of 'methodological structuralism' that stands sharply opposed to Giddens' ontological reconceptualization of the notion. I go on to show that Bourdieu's contemporaneous critique of Levi-Strauss is best understood as an attempt to recover rather than reject the central implication of Levi-Strauss' methodological structuralism, which puts Bourdieu and Giddens on clearly distinct camps in terms of their approach toward the idea of structure. To demonstrate the-insurmountable-conceptual difficulties inherent in the ontological approach, I proceed by critically examining what I consider to be the most influential attempt to resolve the ambiguities in Giddens structuration theory: Sewell's argument for the 'duality of structure.' I show that by retaining Giddens' ontological focus, Sewell ends up with a notion of structure that is at its very core 'anti-structuralist' or only structuralist in a weak sense. I close by considering the implications of the analysis for the possibility of developing the rather neglected 'methodological structuralist' legacy in contemporary social analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Current theories in the sociology of emotions posit contradictory expectations regarding the relationship between status and the relative experience of anger, with some predicting a negative relationship and others proposing a positive one. We test the compatibility of these opposing hypotheses by examining the relationship between anger and a key dimension of socioeconomic status - the occupational status score of an individual's occupation - for a representative sample of Americans. We connect different strands of theory and research in the social psychology of emotions to posit a non-linear relationship between occupational status and the experience of anger. Analyses of data from the 1996 General Social Survey's emotions module (N = 1460) are consistent with this integrative account. Individuals located at the two opposite ends of the status and prestige hierarchy are more likely to experience anger than those of middle status. We use insight from Blau's macro-structural theory to help elucidate this complex relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most sociological research assumes that social network composition shapes individual beliefs. Network theory and research has not adequately considered that internalized cultural worldviews might affect network composition. Drawing on a synthetic, dual-process theory of culture and two waves of nationally-representative panel data, this article shows that worldviews are strong predictors of changes in network composition among U.S. youth. These effects are robust to the influence of other structural factors, including prior network composition and behavioral homophily. By contrast, there is little evidence that networks play a strong proximate role in shaping worldviews. This suggests that internalized cultural dispositions play an important role in shaping the interpersonal environment and that the dynamic link between culture and social structure needs to be reconsidered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the article the author examines the debate between sociologists Emile Durkheim and Herbert Spencer concerning the rise of individualism. The author believes that Durkheim's model of individualism, a consequence of division of labor, is different from Spencer's model. He asserts that Spencer is a theorist of bio-psychological individualism with issues such as survival, pain avoidance and reproduction. Durkheim discusses the development of sociological individualism in his paper "The Division of Labor."

The fact that women are more religious than men is one of the most consistent findings in the sociology of religion. Miller and Stark (2002) propose that a gender difference in risk preference of origin might explain this phenomenon. While acknowledging the utility of their risk-preference mechanism, we believe that their assumption regarding the genesis of this difference is a premature concession to biology. Returning to Miller's original paper on gender, risk, and religiosity, we draw on power-control theory (PCT), developed in the work of John Hagan and colleagues, to introduce a plausible socialization account for these differences. We evaluate these claims using data from the General Social Survey. Women raised by high-socioeconomic status (SES) mothers are less religious than women raised by low-education mothers, but mother's SES has little effect on men's chances of being irreligious and father's SES has a negligible effect on the gender difference in religiosity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this short response, we selectively address some of the key issues and criticisms raised by our esteemed commenters. First, we our standpoint vis à vis “biological” arguments, underscoring that our article is not to be read as hostile to all forms of explanations that incorporate biology into the explanation of religious behavior and belief, but only against those explanations that attempt to imply that socialization plays no role (“the it's all biology” argument). Second, we the explanatory scope of our proposal by showing that our argument is not vulnerable to the “simpler” counterexplanation proposed by Hoffmann. Finally, we where our contributions fit in terms of more encompassing arguments regarding the operation of gender and gendering processes as multicausal, multilevel phenomena, as well as explicitly stating our perspective on the role that “risk” should play in the explanation of religious behavior and belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Has the image of Che Guevara lost its power to evoke radical politics in the face of pervasive commodification? The commercialization of this 1960s political icon has called into question the power of the market to shape collective memories. Meanwhile, antisystemic movements of the left continue to erect his image at protest events. In light of this contest over how Che Guevara is remembered, we investigate, using data from a survey of Spanish citizens, who is most likely to recall him. We find qualified support for the theory of generational imprinting—Che is more often recalled by those generations who saw him rise to prominence during their formative years, although prominent as a collective symbol rather than as a living person. Our results also corroborate the claim that historical figures or events are more salient for, and therefore more likely to be remembered by, some subgenerational units than others. Thus, although the younger generations are in general more likely than their elders to recall Che, he is most frequently remembered by the highly educated leftists who espouse postmaterialist and posttraditionalist values and identify more with their local regions than with the nation of Spain. These patterns suggest that, in contrast to the dire predictions of mass culture theorists, the memory of Che Guevara has become increasingly tied to markers of social, ethnic-regional, and political identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between different forms of cultural taste and the density of social contacts across alternative types of network relations classified by average tie strength. The author builds on Bourdieu's ([1986] 2001) classic statement on the "forms of capital" (economic, social, and cultural) and the conversion dynamics among them, and on DiMaggio's (1987) connection between cultural tastes and sociability. He hypothesizes that (1) in addition to cultural tastes being determined by network relations, cultural tastes are used to form and sustain those networks. Furthermore he expects that (2) highbrow culture taste will be less likely to be converted into social capital beyond immediate strong-tie circles due to its more restricted, "asset-specific" nature. Because of its generalized appeal, taste for popular culture will be more likely to be associated with weak-tie network density. The results broadly support these hypotheses: a model that specifies an effect of culture on network density provides a better fit to the data than the traditional conception of networks as determining taste. In addition using log-linear models and instrumental-variable methods, I show that popular culture consumption has a positive impact on weak-tie network density but not strong-tie network density, while highbrow culture consumption selectively increases strong-tie density but has no appreciable effect on weak ties, net of standard socioeconomic variables. These findings help to shed light on the mechanisms that translate mastery of different types of cultural knowledge into integration across distant social positions or closure around strong group boundaries. The author also discusses the implications of the results for current models describing the transformation of cultural into social resources. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theories of international terrorism are reviewed. It then is noted that waves of terrorism appear in semiperipheral zones of the world-system during pulsations of globalization when the dominant state is in decline. Finally, how these and other factors might combine to suggest a model of terrorism's role in the cyclical undulations of the world-system is suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Understanding why people join, stay, or leave social groups is a central question in the social sciences, including computational social systems, while modeling these processes is a challenge in complex networks. Yet, the current empirical studies rarely focus on group dynamics for lack of data relating opinions to group membership. In the NetSense data, we find hundreds of face-to-face groups whose members make thousands of changes of memberships and opinions. We also observe two trends: opinion homogeneity grows over time, and individuals holding unpopular opinions frequently change groups. These observations and data provide us with the basis on which we model the underlying dynamics of human behavior. We formally define the utility that members gain from ingroup interactions as a function of the levels of homophily of opinions of group members with opinions of a given individual in this group. We demonstrate that so-defined utility applied to our empirical data increases after each observed change. We then introduce an analytical model and show that it accurately recreates the trends observed in the NetSense data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]