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"The Collapse of Nationalist China: How Chiang Kai-shek Lost China's Civil War" by Parks M. Coble is a book that revisits the reasons behind the Kuomintang's (KMT) defeat in China's civil war. Coble focuses on Chiang Kai-shek's fiscal policies, which led to hyperinflation and corruption, alienating the urban population and compromising the morale and combat effectiveness of the KMT's armies. The book draws on primary sources such as Chiang's diaries and the papers of KMT leaders T.V. Soong and H.H. Kung. Coble argues that Chiang's financial policy was a disaster, attributing it to his belief in the importance of a large army and his habit of covering budget deficits by increasing the money supply. The book also acknowledges the complexities of economic recovery in the aftermath of Japanese occupation and the legacy of colonialism. Overall, this concise and engaging reassessment of the KMT's defeat will be of interest to historians and accessible to students. [Extracted from the article]

American scholars of Chinese history have generally explained the outcome of China's civil war (1945-1949) by reference to social, economic, and political factors rather than by looking at the conduct of the war itself. Recently, military historians have begun to shift the focus to Communist strategy and operations. However, the question of how the Chinese Communist forces made the transition from guerrilla to conventional warfare has still not received sufficient attention. Using Mao Zedong's theories of guerrilla warfare and Peter Senge's model of the "learning organization" to analyze Lin Biao's conduct of the war against the Nationalists in Chinas Northeast (Manchuria), we can better understand how the Northeast People's Liberation Army transformed itself from a force characterized by "guerrilla-ism" to the powerful army capable of defeating Jiang Jieshi's best troops. The Communists performed poorly when they first encountered American-trained Nationalist units in the Northeast. Lin Biao and his staff responded to defeat by devising principles of tactics which they applied in a series of campaigns beginning with the "Three Expeditions/Four Defenses" (winter 1946-47). The Communist forces continued to derive lessons from their experience and to incorporate those lessons into programs of education and training. As a result, they made great strides forward in terms of the coordination of infantry, artillery, and armor in order to be able to pull off a conventional combined arms operation on the scale of the Liao-Shen Campaign. The Communist forces would bring these strengths with them when they entered the Korean War in 1950. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The article presents discussion concerning the book "The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China," by Jay Taylor, its potential influence as a historical biography, and the nature of popular historical reception in the United States. The author points out how popular historical works, particularly revisionist ones, are successful only in relation to how they interact with the dominant ideologies and narratives of the culture. Analysis is then given evaluating whether Taylor's depiction of the Chinese military and political leader Chiang Kai-shek successfully confronts U.S. preconceived biases towards the figure.

In sponsoring COMMENTARY, the American Jewish Committee aims to meet the need for a journal of significant thought and opinion on Jewish affairs and contemporary issues. The opinions and views [...]