Search

Copyright of China Quarterly is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper investigates how piloting programmes in China can promote local policy innovations. By using one of the piloting emission trading schemes (ETS) in Guangdong province as a case study, it is argued that the main features of the piloting experiments, particularly in the climate change domain, are largely different from previous local marketization experiments that dominate the reform period of China. Whereas previous experiments are often characterized as bottom-up or indigenous initiatives with strong patronage relations to the pro-reform politicians at central level, the current piloting programmes are often crafted in a top-down fashion that is often misaligned with local market or corporate interests. Hence, local policy innovations are designed, developed and brokered by the local state officers, in order to bridge this central–local interest gap. As a result, successful implementation of these policy innovations largely depends on local political traditions, bureaucratic culture and perceptions of distinctive development needs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because China has emerged as the largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter in total annual emissions, to accelerate the pace of GHG emission reduction in China is important to the success of global efforts in addressing climate change. Carbon trading is a market mechanism and key instrument in the mitigation of climate change. This paper explores the policy process and development state to date of China׳s carbon-trade market to understand the emergence and development of that market and to understand what barriers are hampering China׳s carbon-trade market development. To achieve this goal, this paper introduces and analyzes China׳s status in the international market, examines the factors driving carbon-market launching by the Chinese government, and traces the development of mandatory carbon-emission trading and voluntary emission trading. It is argued that China׳s carbon-trading market is confronted with challenges such as the absence of a functional carbon-trading market, inaccuracy of the quota allocation, an imperfect trading mechanism, and lagging legislation. At the present stage, shortcomings such as having no real-time carbon price and dominated spot transactions differentiate China׳s trade market substantially from a functional system. A quick market integration of China׳s carbon market appears remote. It is suggested that specific measures be taken to promote the development of the Chinese carbon-trading market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How have 30 years of development in energy and climate policies influenced long-term trends in China and what does this imply for future climate policies? To answer the question, this article examines three decades of energy and climate policies in China. By providing an overarching review, it contributes new and updated research on drivers behind long-term climate policies and whether China's long-term emissions trend can be broken by placing greater emphasis on innovation, technology and low-carbon development. Importantly, it analyses the most recent policy developments in China, such as the likely effects of China's recent 2060 carbon neutrality goal. We conclude that after the Paris Agreement, the biggest policy change has been technological innovation in the power and transport sector. China has prioritized measures, laws and policies for developing renewable energy, especially solar and wind. China has also embraced the 'green growth' approach for responding to the challenges of climate change. These efforts have yielded results, and China has emerged as a world leader in renewable energy. However, there is still a long way to go. The upcoming 14th five-year plan will be critical for accelerating the energy transition, including setting a cap on coal in the national energy-transition strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China hosts over half of global coal-fired power generation capacity and has the world's largest coal reserves. Its 2060 carbon neutrality goal will require coal-fired electricity generation to shrink dramatically, with or without carbon capture and storage technology. Two macroeconomic areas in which the socioeconomic impact of this decline is felt are losses in jobs and tax revenues supported by thermal coal mining, transport and power generation. At the national level, under a 'baseline' (B) scenario consistent with China's carbon neutrality goal, labour productivity growth in coal mining implies that significant job losses will occur nationally in the medium term, even if all coal plants continue operating as planned. Jobs supported by the coal power industry would decline from an estimated 2.7 million in 2021, to 1.44 million in 2035 and 94,000 in 2050, with jobs losses from mining alone expected to exceed 1.1 million by 2035. Tax revenues from thermal coal would total approximately CNY 300 billion annually from 2021–2030, peaking in 2023 at CNY 340 billion. This is significantly less than estimated subsidies of at least CNY 480 billion, suggesting coal is likely a net fiscal drain on China's public finances, even without accounting for the costs of local pollution and the social cost of carbon. As coal plant retirements accelerate, from 2034 onwards, fiscal revenues begin to fall more rapidly, with rates of decline rising from 1% in the 2020s to over 10% a year by the 2040s. More aggressive climate policy and technology scenarios bring job and tax losses forward in time, while a No Transition policy, in which all currently planned coal plants are built, delays but does not ultimately prevent these losses. At the provincial level, China's major coal-producing provinces will likely face challenges in managing the localised effects of expected job losses and finding productive alternative uses for this labour. Governments of coal-producing provinces like Inner Mongolia, with an industry highly dependent on exports to other provinces, are more exposed than others to declining tax revenues from coal, and more insulated from job losses, given their high current degree of labour efficiency. Although their provincial revenues are likely to remain stable until the early 2030s under the B scenario, the possibility of increasing policy stringency underlines the need for revenue and skill base diversification. At the firm level, China's 'Big Five' state-owned power companies were responsible for over 40% of both jobs and tax revenues in 2021. The number of jobs supported by the activities of each of the largest ten firms, with one exception, will decline by 71–84% by the early 2040s, with the tax contribution of each declining by 43–69% in the same period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]