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The expression “spiritual, but not religious” (SBNR) has gained considerable traction among sociologists of religion and culture, media outlets, and the broader public in recent years. Though the expression itself has achieved wide appeal, few studies have explored what SBNRs believe about God, religion, or spirituality. This paper uses survey data from Wave IV of the Baylor Religion Survey (2014) and draws from the theory of “cultural omnivorousness” to show that SBNRs have significant sociotheological differences when compared to those who are both religious and spiritual (RAS). The expression “spiritual, but not religious” is more than a manifestation of religious deinstitutionalization or “believing without belonging.” Rather, being “spiritual, but not religious” involves sociotheological boundary work that distinguishes SBNRs from traditional monotheists. When compared to RAS respondents, SBNRs are more likely to view God as a higher power or cosmic force instead of a personal being and are more likely to adopt an individualistic ethic as opposed to finding moral authority in God or Scripture. By examining the historical context and sociotheological characteristics of SBNRs, this paper locates a boundary between SBNRs and RAS monotheists and offers theoretical reasons why SBNRs engage in sociotheological boundary work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Christian Smith's paper 'The Incoherence of 'Culture' in American Sociology' is a valuable provocation that can prompt us to reflect on the role of concepts and on the role of agreement on the definition of concepts in scientific research. In this comment paper, I raise questions about Smith's empirical expectation that sociologists should agree on a concept of culture based on debates in the sociology of science. I also suggest that in terms of the future agenda for the sociology of culture, we should distinguish between dialogue and clarification on the one hand, which I agree is needed, and standardization on the other hand, which seems incompatible with open-minded empirical research. Rather than work on agreement on what culture is, we might work on clarifying relevant distinctions among dimensions of culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the strong criticism by Elias against the nation-state paradigm in sociology. Elias pointed his attention on sociologists of the twentieth century but particularly criticizes the analytical model of Parsons (AGIL), which seems to him an abstract combinatory of variables (pattern variables) without any references in social contexts. The sociology in the twentieth century is an apologetic of nation-state and, in Parsons, of the hegemonic role of the United States in the world. In fact, during the twentieth century many authors (historians and sociologists) tried to overcome the nation-state paradigm in the social sciences. The author of the paper analyses the contribution of Toynbee, Braudel, C. Schmitt, Huntington, Wallerstein and Hard-Negri. These attempts are based on different unit analysis: the civilization and its clash in the case of Toynbee and Huntington, the world economy in the case of Braudel and Wallerstein, and power in the case of C. Schmitt and Negri-Hardt. The author appreciates these attempts but his conclusion is that the concept of global society can better serve as unit analysis for a construction of a new paradigm in the social sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the practical implications of Wallerstein's call for the substitution of an existing culture of sociology by a culture of social science for the future of the sociological project in South Africa. South African sociology is examined in terms of Therborn's three spaces of identity in which sociology is located: a space of discipline, a space of everyday practice and a space of imagination and investigation. The paper argues that sociology in South Africa is responding creatively to the challenges of our society. In order to maintain this response we need to strengthen our discipline through institutional and intellectual engagement. In conclusion it is argued that sociology is distinctive through its sociological imagination, its emphasis on unmasking deceptions and illusions and its commitment to improving the world we live in. Analytical knowledge, technical know-how and the well-being of human beings are the heart and soul of sociology. Our contribution is best made not as social scientists but first and foremost as sociologists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethnomethodologists (or at least many of them) have been reticent about their theoretical sources and methodological principles. It frequently falls to others to make such matters explicit. In this paper I discuss this silence about theory, but rather than entering the breach by specifying a set of implicit assumptions and principles, I suggest that the reticence is consistent with ethnomethodology‘s distinctive research ‘program‘. The main part of the paper describes the pedagogical exercises and forms of apprenticeship through which Garfinkel and Sacks aimed to develop ethnomethodology as a practice. These efforts were not entirely successful, partly because ethnomethodological ‘practice‘ required an engagement with other fully-fledged practices. Aside from the difficulties of mastering such practices, it was unclear what an ethnomethodological study would add to, or take from, them. Whether successful or not, ethnomethodological research points to the specificity of discourse and action in any given practice which a general theory is bound to misconstrue. Current disputes about cultural constructivist versions of natural science illustrate the problems that arise when the terms of a general theory are used to describe and evaluate specific domains of practice. The paper concludes by recommending ethnomethodology as a way to dissolve an unbridgeable gap between cultural theories and socially located practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concern of this paper is to locate certain troubles and contradictions within Lucien Goldinann's avowedly sociological programme for the investigation of culture. It will be seen that these turn, generally, upon Goldmann's insistence on maintaining a central methodological position for the category of the subject and, more particularly, upon his conception of the subject as individual (rather than collective) subject. Part of these methodological troubles is seen to be connected with Goldmann's use of a metaphor connecting Piaget's individual/environment distinction with the distinction between social groups and history. To this degree, the paper is generally concerned with the severance of sociological studies of culture from psychologistic and belletrist preoccupations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In some forms of sociology, "culture" has come to replace "society" as the central object of study. This has encouraged an epistemological relativism that overrides a proper engagement with human ontology, while it has also allowed for the development of forms of reductionism where culture turns out to be determined by something deemed more fundamental, such as technology. Some influential contemporary accounts of the "information age" exhibit both these characteristics. The argument of this paper is that these do not offer a productive route forward for sociology in general, or for sociologists of religion in particular. It is argued that Durkheim's social realism not only helps to illuminate the inadequacy of those theories that ignore the human and religious dimensions of contemporary life in their intoxication with machine-mediated flows of information, but can also point towards a more productive way forward for the analysis of contemporary social and cultural realities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Selected writings from Reuel Denney's work as a social analyst are reviewed in order to establish and highlight his often-overlooked contributions to sociology. Denney's cultural studies of Americans at play, with specific reference to his writings on the subcultures of football and hot-rodding, and on television and the electronic media, advertising and architecture, are reviewed in examining some major themes emphasized in his sociology. These writings are discussed against the backdrop of Denney's early life experiences drawn from his autobiography to better enable readers to gain an appreciation of his sociological thinking. The beginnings of a Denney postmodern are sketched as a conclusion to this paper's major contention that Denney anticipated much of today's sociology as cultural studies. As one of Reuel's students, nearly forty years ago, I hope that this article serves not only to highlight Denney's contributions and place within the discipline of sociology, but also that my personal recollections will serve to reveal the strong attachments we students felt toward him as our teacher, mentor, and friend. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a few notable exceptions, Alexis de Tocqueville's contributions to the formation of the sociological canon have been ignored. Most sociologists are likely to recognize him as a key source for current work on social capital and the civil society. But, in this paper I argue that Tocqueville's importance for sociology extends far beyond those uses. Tocqueville is the author of a sophisticated and powerful theory of culture that solves the key problem of reconciling culture with the claims of methodological individualism. He does so by shunning the disciplinary boundaries that have sprung up after him, integrating political, historical, institutional and psychological building blocks of culture in a subtle yet powerful analytical framework. He thus avoids many of the pitfalls that plague other theories of culture, which makes his contribution to the sociological canon equal to that of many other canon-forming writers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]