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Global scarcity of COVID‐19 vaccines raises ethical questions about their fair allocation between nations. Section I introduces the question and proposes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share globally scarce COVID‐19 vaccines. Section II distinguishes justice from charity and argues that beneficiaries of unjust structures incur duties of justice when they are systematically advantaged at others expense. Section III gives a case‐based argument describing three upstream structural injustices that systematically advantaged wealthy countries and disadvantaged poorer countries, contributing to global disparities of COVID‐19 vaccines. Section IV examines more closely the duties of justice owed, including a duty to relinquish holdings, restitute victims, and restore relationships. Section V concludes that wealthy nations have a duty of justice to share COVID‐19 vaccines with poor nations and to restore relationships damaged by injustice. All nations should take steps to transform unjust structures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Societies of the East are often contrasted with those of the West in their stances toward technology. This paper explores these perceived differences in the context of international ethics guidance for artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics. Japan serves as an example of the East, while Europe and North America serve as examples of the West. The paper's principal aim is to demonstrate that Western values predominate in international ethics guidance and that Japanese values serve as a much-needed corrective. We recommend a hybrid approach that is more inclusive and truly 'international'. Following an introduction, the paper examines distinct stances toward robots that emerged in the West and Japan, respectively, during the aftermath of the Second World War, reflecting history and popular culture, socio-economic conditions, and religious worldviews. It shows how international ethics guidelines reflect these disparate stances, drawing on a 2019 scoping review that examined 84 international AI ethics documents. These documents are heavily skewed toward precautionary values associated with the West and cite the optimistic values associated with Japan less frequently. Drawing insights from Japan's so-called 'moonshot goals', the paper fleshes out Japanese values in greater detail and shows how to incorporate them more effectively in international ethics guidelines for AI and robotics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for global sharing of COVID‐19 treatments during the COVID‐19 pandemic and beyond based on principles of global solidarity. It starts by distinguishing two types of COVID‐19 treatments and models sharing strategies for each in small‐group scenarios, contrasting groups that are solidaristic with those composed of self‐interest maximizers to show the appeal of solidaristic reasoning. It then extends the analysis, arguing that a similar logic should apply within and between nations. To further elaborate global solidarity, the paper distinguishes morally voluntary, sliding‐scale, and mandatory versions. It argues for an all‐hands‐on‐deck approach and gives examples to illustrate. The paper concludes that during the COVID‐19 crisis, global solidarity is a core value, and global sharing of COVID‐19 treatments should be considered a duty of justice, not of charity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While people are still alive, we owe them respect. Yet what, if anything, do we owe the newly dead? This question is an urgent practical concern for aged societies, because older people die at higher rates than any other age group. One novel way in which Japan, the frontrunner of aged societies, meets its need to accommodate high numbers of newly dead is itai hoteru or corpse hotels. Itai hoteru offer families a way to wait for space in over‐crowded crematoriums while affording an environment conducive to grieving. Drawing on conversations with itai hoteru employees, we delineate the values this contemporary death practice expresses and show how these values comprise part of the broader idea of a good death. A good death implies duties on both sides of death's divide: to both the dying and the newly dead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is now a default obligation to provide cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), in the absence of knowledge of a patient's or surrogate's wishes to the contrary. We submit that it is time to re-evaluate this position. Attempting CPR should be subject to the same scrutiny demanded of other medical interventions that involve balancing a great benefit against grievous harms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author offers a defense of the Texas Advance Directive Law (TADA). Topics covered include how TADA's approach achieves a balance that recognizes the physician's duty to provide competent and professional care that helps the patient and the value of respecting the preferences of patients and surrogates and how it offers a method for overriding futility judgments made by individual providers while leaving medical decisions to people who are trained and experienced at making them.

The author discusses the ethics of rescue medicine. The author states that in tragic situations, rescue medicine renews hope and has the power to restore faith in human beings. The author notes that despite strong positive emotions, rescue efforts provoke chaos. The author mentions that when rescue medicine prevents other values such as long-term care and universal access to health care, it becomes unjust and an irrational system for allocating health care.

The author comments on ethical issues concerning kidney commercialization. Topics covered include the views of people opposing human organ commercialization as well as harms associated with kidney sales. Also mentioned are the different approaches to address problems associated with the proliferation of kidney sales in some countries.

Is there a rational and ethical basis for efforts to rescue individuals in dire straits? When does rescue have ethical support, and when does it reflect an irrational impulse? This paper defines a Rule of Rescue and shows its intuitive appeal. It then proceeds to argue that this rule lacks support from standard principles of justice and from ethical principles more broadly, and should be rejected in many situations. I distinguish between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons, and argue that the Rule of Rescue qualifies only in a narrow range of cases where agent-relative considerations apply. I conclude that it would be wise to set aside the Rule of Rescue in many cases, especially those involving public policies, where it has only weak normative justification. The broader implications of this analysis are noted. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Comments on Catherine Myser's article 'Differences from Somewhere: The Normativity of Whiteness in Bioethics in the United States.' Reason why the sources of normativity matter; Views of Myser on whiteness; Determination of the merit of favorable versus unfavorable interpretations.

The article discusses expanded access programs describing the usage of experimental therapy that benefits research participants. Topics discussed information on Food and Drug Administration's approval of nusinersen for the treatment of spinal muscular atrophy (SMA), justification for patient selection criteria on the bases of utilitarian and deontological arguments, and incremental improvement in well-being.