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Aims: To discuss how Husserl's descriptive phenomenology, as a philosophy and approach, has been used and reported in researching the experiences of others, using the topic of foreign‐trained nurses. Design: Discussion paper. Data sources A systematic search of MEDLINE (PubMed), CINAHL, SCOPUS, British Nursing Database and PsycInfo was carried out in December 2021. The inclusion criteria were peer‐reviewed phenomenological research articles, grounded by Husserl's philosophy, conducted among foreign‐trained nurses and published in English from 2000 to 2021. Findings Two main themes were the outcome of critically reviewing relevant selected literature, 'referring to the original philosophy is not enough' and 'phenomenological findings need to be phenomenological'. These findings confirm some arguments about nurse researchers' discrepant use of phenomenology in their studies, including the proper application of phenomenological notions on the ground. Implication for Nursing: Nurse researchers need to clearly distinguish between phenomenology and other qualitative research approaches and consider the uniqueness of philosophical underpinnings that are essential in Husserl's phenomenology, which also need to be clearly applied and reflected in their studies. Conclusion: There are continually existing discrepancies and variations in using phenomenology by nurse researchers. These variations were uniquely evident when nurse researchers could not provide enough philosophical grounds and assumptions to their studies and underestimated the need to keep up with the various applications of Husserl's phenomenological notions, including the proper practice of phenomenological attitude. Therefore, it is recommended that nurse researchers should opt for different, less complex qualitative approaches if they do not adequately prepare and understand what constitutes phenomenology and the particulars of Husserl's philosophy. Impact What problem did the study address? Phenomenology remains popular in nursing. However, it can confuse nurse researchers and may result in an improper understanding of its core concepts. The use of phenomenology in nursing has been criticized over the years with nurse researchers being accused of conducting phenomenological research inconsistent with the original philosophy. What were the main findings? Using phenomenology by nurse researchers is various and includes some discrepancies. This variation is caused by not complying with essential philosophical grounds and underestimating proper applications of Husserl's phenomenological notions. Where and on whom will the research have impact? Outcomes of this paper illustrate examples of proper and improper uses of Husserl's phenomenology in nursing research, including critical considerations, which can guide nurse researchers aiming to conduct descriptive phenomenological research. Additionally, nurse lecturers can utilize this paper to show and emphasize the importance of philosophical grounds in phenomenology. No Patient or Public Contribution: Due to the nature of this discussion paper addressing philosophical and methodological aspects using examples from the literature, no direct patient or public contribution was required. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses the necessity of proposing an epistemological approach that focuses on both essential and empirical features of culture. Phenomenology, as we find in Edmund Husserl, is introduced as the main methodology enabling us to establish invariant or essential principles of human culture. We explain how phenomenology analyzes consciousness and its structures, showing a different approach from empirical studies of culture, such as cultural anthropology. Despite these epistemological divergencies, we argue that phenomenology and anthropology should collaborate, and we illustrate this through an analysis of particular Jewish rituals, as an instance of anthropological descriptions and phenomenological analysis. In the first part of the paper, we provide a brief introduction to phenomenology, by outlining the most important concepts to understand this methodology, such as intentionality, constitution, and experiential layers. In the second part, we will use the previous essential analysis of culture as guidelines to analyze a concrete culture, like Judaism, with a focus on specific rituals. While analyzing Judaism unavoidably requires empirical observations in their various forms, phenomenology provides us with a method through which enucleating universal principles underlying contextual and historical elements, which need to be considered as invariant in each human group. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relational turn in psychoanalysis can be identified by the replacement of Freudian drives for intersubjectivity as main regulative principle. "Intersubjective systems theory" is the name of one strand within the relational turn that explicitly locates its philosophical foundations in a number of phenomenological insights. In this paper, I investigate some of the essential phenomenological assumptions underlying intersubjective systems theory. I identify 2 main problems: 1. intersubjective systems theory relies on the premise that meaning is intersubjectively constituted, yet fails to offer an account of this constitution; 2. intersubjective systems theory is based on an ambiguous conception of the unconscious. The aim of this paper is to show how Husserlian phenomenology offers a valuable theoretical foundation for intersubjective systems theory in the sense that it presents a convincing account of the intersubjective constitution of meaning that in its very constitution allows for a dynamic and situational relation between consciousness and unconsciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes two episodes of Foucault's reading(s) of Hume's philosophy. In both cases Hume is important to Foucault's overall argument and aims. In particular, in both Foucault takes a fairly conventional philosophical description of Hume--as a 'skeptic' and 'empiricist'--for granted and shows that these disguise a worldhistorical significance. In section 1, the paper explores Hume's role in Foucault's (1966) The Order of Things. The paper argues Hume stands in for the hidden role of similarity in the human sciences of the so-called 'classical period.' The paper examines Hume's account of relations which do not fully support Foucault's claims about Hume. It is proposed that Foucault's reading is motivated by the role Hume plays in Husserl's philosophy. In section 2, Foucault's treatment of Hume on March 28, 1979, during the eleventh lecture of the series known as Birth of Biopolitics, is analyzed. There Foucault ascribes to Hume's account of the subject the key building blocks that allowed for the development of Benthamite radicalism and homo economicus. The paper situates Foucault's later analysis of Hume in Foucault's larger account of the development of the so-called radical (Benthamite) strain of liberalism that, on Foucault's telling, runs through Chicago economics. While Foucault's account of Hume is anachronistic, this anachronism illuminates the building blocks of modern liberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human consciousness is characterized by constant transitions in time. On the other hand, what is consciously experienced always possesses the temporal feature of "now." In consciousness, "now" constantly holds different contents, yet it remains "now" no matter how far it goes. This duality is thematized in Husserlian phenomenology as "the standing-streaming now." Although this phrase appears contradictory in everyday language, it has a structure that can be clearly understood and formalized. In this paper, we show that this structure can be described as a monoid in category theory. Furthermore, monoids can be transformed into the coslice category, which corresponds to the way of perceiving present moments as juxtaposed in succession. The seemingly contradictory nature of the "now" as both flowing and standing can be precisely structured and comprehended through the monoid, while the perspective of the "now" as discrete points on a timeline can be effectively formalized using the coslice category. This framework helps us more precisely understand the differences between ordinary consciousness and meditative consciousness, specifically the experience of the "eternal now." We illustrate how the meditative states of consciousness presented in the early Buddhist scriptures (Pali Canon) and Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō remarkably reflect a monoid structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a new philosophical account of vocations as deeply personal but at the same time also communal and generational forms of multimodal intending. It provides a reconstruction and a systematic development of Edmund Husserl's scattered discussions on vocations. On these grounds, the paper argues that vocational life is a general human possibility and not determined by any set of material values, religious, epistemic or moral. Rather, vocations are distinguished from other complexes of intentional acts and attitudes by certain structural features of their core valuations and volitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If a new generation of phenomenologists (Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Henry, Jean-Luc Marion, Jean-Louis Chrétien, Jean-François Courtine) in France sought to overcome the "methodic atheism" imposed on the phenomenological method by the fathers of phenomenology, it was at the price of going beyond experience immanent to existence which targeted the invisible, and therefore of lacking a discourse on the critical restriction of the phenomenological method and on the points of contact between phenomenology and theology. The task of this paper is to show how this lack is overcome by Marc Richir's "quasi theology" viewed from his articulation of the relationship between the phenomenological and the symbolical. This paper argues that whereas for the new French phenomenologists it is usually a question of a subreptitious crossing from one discipline to another, in Richir, what we have is an enigmatic relationship of the overlap between phenomenology and the symbolical. While Richir was only interested in the articulation of the relationship between the phenomenological, the symbolical and the absolute transcendence, his thoughts motivate us to explore, following Emmanuel Falque's approach, the reciprocal transformation between phenomenology and theology. The paper concludes, on the one hand, that experience remains the immanent ground for phenomenology and theological science and, on the other, that Richir's approach could be understood as a "metaphysical phenomenology". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent decades, phenomenology and hermeneutical phenomenology have taken the lead in addressing the question of personal identity through the inquiry of "who are you?". However, this lead has questionable aspects in capturing the relationality between self, others, and the surrounding world, characterized by its ever-changing state. To understand personal identity in its ever-changing state of becoming, the primary focus of this paper is twofold: firstly, exploring how to reconcile these complex relations into a unified conception of personal identity by following Husserl's notion of "indeterminate determinacy" and his theory of variation, and secondly, considering the limitations of defining this unity as an "autobiography or biography" in accordance with Arendt's notion of a "life-story". In the final analyses the notion of life-story will be revised together with Waldenfels's analyses on "radical alien" and Sözer's "in-between". This will prompt a reconsideration of personal identity as a process, leading to a genetic phenomenological perspective that recognizes the "indeterminacy of the self". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Husserl, Hume's empirical method was deeply flawed—like all empiricists, Hume did not, and could not adequately justify his method, much less his findings (PRP 113–114, LI 115–117, 406). Instead, Hume gives us a "circular" and "irrational" "psychological explanation" of "mediate judgments of fact," i.e. of inductive inferences (LI, 117). Yet Husserl was certain that he could justify both his own method and his own findings with an appeal to the phenomenological, pre-theoretical, pre-naturalistic "epoché" (I1 §§59–60). However, whether or not Husserl's notion of an epoché is justified, or even viable, is not our focus here. Rather, our issue is with Hume, particularly: How could Hume have responded? In this paper, I show that in Book I of the Treatise, Hume did—however implicitly—appeal to a "pre-theoretical" notion of belief, which meets Husserl's demands for a pre-theoretical grounding, i.e. a justificatory grounding. And so, his method is, at least in this respect, justified. But this belief is by no means "prenaturalistic." Rather, it is a function of empirical data. In particular, it is a product of the "constant and coherent" impressions that seem to naturally obtain of experience. As a result, Hume's method, which, in agreement with Husserl, we may characterize as psychology, does admit of a certain degree of regularity, but an empirical regularity. And according to Hume, contra Husserl's complaints, this is the best that we can hope for; regularity will have to suffice, not certainty. However, it must be noted up front that this justification is implicit—Hume is not nearly as forthright as he could have been. Thus, making his position more explicit is the task of this paper. I am not presenting my own position, where I offer my own arguments. Instead, I present textual evidence, contextualized with ample explication. It is my hope that by doing so, Hume may more effectively make his case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper argues that the dynamics of personal and collective individuation could be interrelated and bear ethical significance thanks to an analysis of the Lifeworld and intersubjectivity that link together the genetic and the generative perspectives of phenomenology. The first section of the paper recalls the epistemological and ontological implications of Husserl's and Stein's analysis of personal individuation in relation to what Husserl would call, later, the "Lifeworld" and the intersubjective constitution of communities. The second section of the paper turns to a phenomenology of the Lifeworld through an analysis of refugees' care and the intersubjective dynamics involved in the clinic of exile. Such an example will bring to light the importance of embodiment and intercorporeity to grasp the process through which the genetic constitution of the Lifeworld constitutes itself as a collective process of individuation trying to heal the scars of historicity. Consequently, individuation will appear as a personal and collective task, rather than a static and ego-centered achievement that would be forgetful of our fundamental interdependency. Finally, the last section argues that "healing the Lifeworld" does not amount to conceive of its "horizon" as being itself a predetermined "telos" of transcendental subjectivity, as if this open structure could be itself constituted. Rather, the varieties of the Lifeworld and its paradoxical movement of appropriation and differentiation point to a relational ontology that considers the becoming of a common and meaningful world as a limit-problem of phenomenology and, perhaps, its ethical and critical promise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Husserl's writings on sociality have received increasing attention in recent years. Despite this growing interest, Husserl's reflections on the specific role of communication remain underexplored. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by reconstructing the various ways in which Husserl draws systematic connections between communication and communalization. As will become clear, Husserl's analysis converges with much more recent ideas defended by Margaret Gilbert and Naomi Eilan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Eschatology is central to Christian theology: the significance of the death and resurrection of Christ is the promise of the "kingdom of God". This paper takes up this idea in discussion with contemporary Christian theologians and discusses it phenomenologically by recourse to Husserl's account of "horizon". The horizon is both finite and infinite: always limited in its actualization but with an infinity of potential actualizations. This is explored with respect to time and its relation to the eternal, as well as the dispositions of hope and fear with respect to the eschaton. The final section draws these insights together in a discussion of the eschaton to understand the eschatological destiny of nature in a "new heaven and a new earth" (Revelations, 21: 1) and conceiving of eschatological justice as a harmony of horizonal perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the puzzling question of what motivates the radical epistemological shift necessary for engaging in transcendental phenomenology. Husserl touches on the problem of motivation on many occasions, but it becomes an explicit issue in Fink's bold reimagining of the transcendental theory of method, as presented in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation. In the first section, I briefly introduce the problem as it appears in Husserl. The second section of the paper discusses Fink's Hegelian dissolution of it. Finally, I point to several historical, practical, and ethical aspects of transcendental phenomenology, and argue that a good account of motivation for phenomenology ought to find a way to address these without hastily bracketing them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to clarify Husserl's critical remarks about Kant's view of logic by comparing their respective views of logic. In his Formal and Transcendental Logic (1929, §100) Husserl criticizes Kant for not asking transcendental questions about formal logic, but rather ascribing an 'extraordinary apriority' to it. He thinks the reason for Kant's uncritical attitude to logic lies in Kant's view of logic as directed toward the subjective, instead of being concerned with a '"world" of ideal Objects'. Whereas for Kant, general logic is about laws of reasoning. Husserl thinks that formal logic should describe formal structures. Husserl claims that if Kant had had a more comprehensive concept of logic, he would have thought of raising critical questions about how logic is possible. This kind of criticism cannot itself use forms of judgments or syllogisms of logic, nor even the 'inferential' [schliessende] method more generally, but should be descriptive in nature. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is the method for such criticism. The paper argues that this results in reflection, and possibly revision, of the logical principles with respect to the normative goals governing the investigation in question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's insights on professor P. Hadreas' paper titled "Husserlian self-awareness and SSRIs." The author mentions that professor Hadreas should be praised by using Husserl's notion of pre-reflective consciousness in approaching phenomenologically the patients' testimony concerning on how selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) medication changed their self-awareness. He also comments that Hadreas' aims in writing the paper is unclear basing on his conclusions.

The peculiar legacy of Husserl's mereology, chiefly studied by analytic philosophers interested in ontology, has led to a partial understanding of the III. LU, which is too often reduced to a chapter of "formal ontology". Yet, the power of this Investigation goes far beyond: it enabled Husserl to deal, in the framework of a unified theory, with a vast range of particular problems. The paper focuses on one of these issues, namely abstraction, so as to expose how Husserl instrumentalizes his formal tools in order to tackle material issues. The existence of an up and down pattern is uncovered: Husserl first reinterprets the psychological problem of abstraction in ontological terms ("bottom-up"), before coming back to the original problem with new insights ("top-down"). The second, correlative aim of the paper is to emphasize the key role played by Friedrich Schumann, a forgotten yet crucial character for Husserl's conception of abstraction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that Husserl offers an important, although almost completely neglected so far, contribution to the reductionist/antireductionist debate about testimony. Through a phenomenological analysis, Husserl shows that testimony works through the constitution of an intentional intersubjective bond between the speaker and the hearer. In this paper I focus on the Logical Investigations, a 1914 manuscript now published as text 2 in Husserliana 20.2, and a 1931 manuscript now published as Appendix 12 in Husserliana 15. I argue that, in those texts, Husserl highlights three essential phenomenological features of testimony: a) testimony is personal, meaning that it only takes place among persons, b) testimony is social, meaning that it requires the joint effort of multiple cognitive agents, c) testimony is community-building, meaning that it generates a long-lasting social bond among the parts involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of «reassessing the relationship between explanation and phenomenology», the paper discusses the question in what ways Husserlian phenomenology as a descriptive science of consciousness has an explanatory potential in consciousness studies. It takes a very limited approach to the wide-ranging themes that may come to mind on this topic. At the center is an exploration of consciousness as an explanandum in its own right, building on Husserl's reflective-eidetic analyses of conscious experiences. It will concentrate on explicating acts of intuitive representification (anschauliche Vergegenwärtigungen) as intentional modifications of perception, making up higher, radical novel levels of intentionality. Acts of remembering, imagining, depicting something, as well as iterations and combinations of such acts, will serve as examples. A formal notation will be used with the intention to make the reflection-based theoretical language of phenomenology more precise and easier to survey. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an eminent tradition of thought that sees in the phenomenon of time something contradictory. This tradition has been recently revived by some contemporary proponents of dialethism – the view that there are true contradictions. In this paper, I will contribute to this line of thinking by tracing the first steps of a dialethic account of time-consciousness. In particular, I will argue that the experiential flow of time can be accounted for in the framework of an intentionalist approach to temporal perception if we conceive of time-consciousness as a quasi-multiplicity, i.e., a multiplicity of non-self-identical parts, hence the embrace of dialethism. Section 1 introduces dialethism, discusses Priest's dialethic theory of motion and time, and motivates the project of a dialethic account of time-consciousness. Section 2 introduces the intentionalist approach to time-consciousness and distinguishes pure intentionalism from sense-data intentionalism; both subscribes to a certain Principle of Simultaneous Awareness but interprets it differently. In Sect. 3, I offer an in-depth analysis of this principle and identify its core as the requirement of self-unification, i.e., the requirement that time-consciousness unifies itself in flowing without any higher-order act of unification. Section 4 then argues that pure intentionalism can satisfy this requirement by embracing dialethism. I conclude by noting how the dialethic account of time-consciousness incorporates a central extensionalist insight within an intentionalist outlook. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper identifies experiential processes through which social structures become taken for granted, termed processes of "structure marginalization". Passive processes of structure marginalization relegate social structures to the margin of experience without the use of higher-order cognitive acts such as evaluation and reflection. Examples include adapting to social structures via routine and habitual practices (material reification), a lack of conscious awareness of the complexity, historical formation, and other details of social structures (ignorance), and rendering social structures irrelevant when they are unreflectively judged to be of no value for achieving ends (nullification). Active processes of structure marginalization reflectively and discursively relegate social structures to marginal consciousness. Examples include the use of naturalistic and necessitarian explanations for the social order that implicitly justify it as inalterable or "just the way things are" (discursive reification), normative justifications for the status quo (legitimation), and conscious awareness of one's powerlessness to control social-structural conditions (helplessness). Active processes of structure marginalization originate in passive processes. The goal of the typology is to explain, at the level of experience, why social structures typically remain unproblematic and unnoticed in everyday life, even during periods of social crisis and change or when existing structures produce harmful effects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to develop a phenomenological account of community which would not be pervaded by Eurocentric assumptions. Such Eurocentrism is what Husserl's phenomenological framework has been accused of. I first reconstruct Husserl's phenomenology of community in his late transcendental phenomenology by examining the Vienna Lecture. I show that Husserl's Eurocentrism is encapsulated in his account of corporeity, which simultaneously recognizes the importance of corporeity and its necessary overcoming in theoria , which originates in the European philosopher. I then argue that Merleau-Ponty, through his rigorously embodied phenomenology, can offer a non-Eurocentric phenomenology of community. Elaborating on the Husserlian insight of corporeity, notably the perceptual experience and the écart at stake in the encounter with other bodies, allows Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the flesh to recast community from and with the body as an open, situated, and non-archeo-teleological structure, allowing phenomenology to reimagine inter-cultural encounters away from tropes of European exemplarity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the overlooked contributions of Husserl's Phenomenology of intersubjectivity in understanding anorexia nervosa. It highlights the intricate relationship between the self and others, emphasizing their mutual constitution while acknowledging inherent differences. The distorted body image approach often overlooks this perspective, leading to psychopathological issues in individuals with anorexia nervosa. By integrating subjective experience and external observation, a more balanced and equal intersubjective relationship can be established. Utilizing this philosophical framework allows for a deeper understanding of the disorder's dynamics and sheds new light on the subjective experiences of individuals with anorexia nervosa in relation to others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post‐Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the technologically-mediated constitution of auditory experience based on the analogy of a healthy natural soundscape as a well-balanced orchestra in which living creatures use the full range of acoustic frequencies to communicate and survive. Using the idea of (inner) horizonality proposed by Edmund Husserl, I argue that key technological inventions enabling the transmission and recording of sound made possible a new form of experience characterized by split horizonality. This new form of technologically-mediated auditory experience brought with it potential for both creative expression and manipulation. A broader historical trend driven by technology towards individualization that culminated with our present-day experience of constantly connected mobile phones deeply embedded in our everyday lives calls into question the soundness of thinking of our technologically-mediated auditory worlds in terms of the analogy of a healthy natural soundscape as a well-balanced orchestra. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the madeleine-memory (so-called from Proust's novel In Search of Lost Time) as a case of pre-reflective experience, from the genesis of its sedimentation into the body. Indeed, I aim to address the question of the literary protagonist Marcel on the roots of his happiness and the genesis of his memories. Until now, the madeleine-memory has been described as bodily and involuntary. In phenomenology, a wide literature has confirmed the relationship between the sense of body ownership and pre-reflective self-awareness. I aim to build upon such a mutual link and show that the pre-reflective roots of the madeleine-memory have to be traced back to the genesis of the involuntary recollections. To this purpose, I will illustrate that the epistemological relationship between the object and the subject plays a relevant role in the way the subject remembers. First, I will present that madeleine-memory is a unique case of bodily memory, by analyzing the main features that characterize it. Secondly, I will analyze the original experience of the madeleine within the phenomenological logic of transcendence in immanence. For this aim, I will rely on the Husserlian notions of "epistemological inadequacy of perception" and "background experiences". Through these notions, I will show that Proustian involuntary recollections are pre-reflective experiences because previously subjects have pre-reflectively experienced the content of recollections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that the gesture of being silent —or "subjective silence"— can be described as a specific modulation of attention, in which consciousness gains awareness of a specific realm of experience where the body appears as a transcendental dimension of the self. Taking Dauenhauer's typology as a point of departure, I will describe what I understand with the expressions "subjective silence" –and "the gesture of being silent"– and try to show its specific relation to "attention," according to Husserl's description of it. Second, that the noematic field of this "subjective silence" is the realm of the pre-predicative, since it allows consciousness to maintain a certain intentional tension that does not focus on any categorial object. Finally, I will try to show that in this realm of the pre-predicative, the body appears as an immanent dimension of consciousness and, therefore, not as a mere object but as a transcendental instance of the self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I show that a phenomenological concept of normality can be helpful to understand the experiential side of post-truth phenomena. How is one's longing for, or sense of, normality related to what we deem as real, true, or objective? And to what extent is the sense for "what (really) is" related to our beliefs of what should be? To investigate this, I combine a phenomenological approach to lived normality with a genealogical account of represented normality that sheds light on the social and historical contingency of definitions of normality and their intertwinement with structures of power. It is my contention that such an approach to normality is well-suited to investigate how is and ought are interrelated within subjective experience and practice. This might in turn help overcoming one-sided debates on post-truth, which rely on the strict opposition of objectivity versus subjectivity, universal truth versus subjective experience, facticity versus meaning, or reason versus stupidity. It also sheds light on the ambivalent or contested status of experience within debates of post-truth and feminist theory. I will conclude that post-truth is related to what Hannah Arendt has termed the lack of a common world (i.e., normality), arguing that a plurality of experiences is needed to let the "real world" stand its ground again. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the concept of the world elaborated by Heidegger in the early Freiburg lecture courses of the years 1919 to 1923, in which he proposes a renewed conception of phenomenology through a comparison with Husserlian phenomenology. First, I show that although the theme of the lifeworld became central only in late Husserlian works, especially in The Crisis of European Sciences, Husserl began to deal with this concept before 1920, anticipating some fundamental issues of the Crisis, as it results from the lectures of 1919 on Natur und Geist. Husserl had addressed the concept of the world already in the lectures of 1910/11, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, and, subsequently, in the second book of Ideas, which was published posthumously, but which was known to the young Heidegger. Then, I discuss the way in which Heidegger revisited the issue of the world in the early Freiburg lecture courses by means of a critique of Husserl's analysis, focusing on perceptual experience as "environmental experience" and on the "world-character" of life. Particular emphasis is placed on the distinction between "environing-world," "with-world," and "self-world," which Heidegger introduces in the lectures of 1919–1920. Finally, I point out that the Heideggerian rethinking of the concept of lifeworld is closely connected to the recognition of the immanent historicity of life, while Husserl only later takes into account the historicity of the lifeworld. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines a single relevant source regarding Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and his attempt to explain how we perceive and experience the Other. In the fifth chapter of the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl describes our encounters with others through a process of non-inferential analogy and details the ways we 'appresent' the Other. This unique and admittedly narrow approach to understanding intersubjectivity, I submit, offers significant insights regarding the nature of interactions between competing athletes and the meanings these experiences generate. The descriptive-explanatory account of the 'appresentation' of the Other in sport presented here will not be exhaustive. But it will, I anticipate, be informative, supplement existing works in the phenomenology of sport, and appeal intuitively to some of our intersubjective experiences in competitive sport. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to show that Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations should be regarded as one of the fundamental sources of structuralism. Husserl's version of structuralism is, however, quite original in many respects. Indeed, what Husserl advocates in his works can be defined, following and expanding a line of research inaugurated by scholars like Elmar Holenstein and Giovanni Piana (see Holenstein, E. 1975. Roman Jakobsons phänomenologischer Strukturalismus. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, Holenstein, E. 1976. Linguistik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik: Plädoyers für eine strukturale Phänomenologie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, Holenstein, E. In publication. Phenomenological Phenomenology of Language: Scattered Papers. Geneva: sdvig, Piana, G. 2013a. L'idea di uno strutturalismo fenomenologico. In G. Piana (ed.), Strutturalismo fenomenologico e psicologia della forma, 5-17. http://www.lulu.com/shop/giovanni-piana/strutturalismofenomenologico-e-psicologia-della-forma/paperback/product-21332317.html (accessed 20 February 2018), Piana, G. 2013b. Momento figurale e qualità ghestaltica. In G. Piana (ed.), Strutturalismo fenomenologico e psicologia della forma, 101-119. http://www.lulu.com/shop/giovanni-piana/strutturalismo-fenomenologico-epsicologia-della-forma/paperback/product-21332317.html accessed 20 February 2018), in terms of phenomenological structuralism or of structural phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]