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The article focuses on military policy of Australia according to the Defence White Paper community consultation program, with topics including Australian Defence Force, and Australia's relation with Indonesia.

This article maps the behaviours of two middle powers, Australia and Indonesia, as a response to the emergence and evolution of the Indo-Pacific concept. The background for this analysis is the emergence and development of the 'Indo-Pacific' concept as a response to crises of legitimacy enveloping the region and how countries in the region, including middle powers, respond to it. Using a minimalist definition which I have developed of a middle power as a country with a middle level of power capabilities and a penchant for cooperation, this article develops a framework based on two dimensions of outcome (ranging from status-quoist to reformist outlooks) and process (ranging from Lockean to Kantian strategies) to facilitate a more open-ended approach towards looking at middle-power behaviours beyond the common categorisation of traditional/emerging, and Western/non-Western. Using Australia's 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper and 2023 National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, and Indonesia's 2015 Defence White Paper and 2019 ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, this article concludes that while Australia is exhibiting a status-quoist/Lockean approach, Indonesia is demonstrating a reformist/Kantian approach towards the Indo-Pacific. The outcome-process dimension framework developed in this article is useful as a tool to map other middle power behaviours in various contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Forming more effective partnerships with national governments in the Asia-Pacific region has been an important policy focus for the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) since 2006. AusAID is increasingly engaging in sector-wide approaches and working through partner government systems. This paper explores how new partnerships are impacting education policy in the vastly different contexts of Lao PDR, Vanuatu, Indonesia, and the Philippines from 2006 to 2009. Conclusions are that policy discourse and current practice indicate an active effort to develop partnerships in education with donors and partner governments. But the reality in the field is that while sector-wide approaches are outlined in policy discourse, practice indicates loosely harmonized arrangements with like-minded donors, and slow progress toward sector-wide involvement.

This paper asks why it took ten years after a major famine in Indonesia in 1957 for Australia's food aid to increase in greater amounts, and why food aid was so significant in Australia's foreign aid to Indonesia during the late 1960s and 1970s. Indonesia's reluctance to apply for food aid under the Colombo Plan is the reason for the delay. A combination of humanitarian, commercial and international relations interests converged to shape Australia's rapidly growing food aid to Indonesia after 1966. Food aid contributed to alleviating food shortages and famines in Indonesia. It also supported Australian firms in regaining their share in the growing market for wheat‐based products in Indonesia, and in building market share for Australian rice exports, in competition with United States (US) producers and the US PL480 food aid program. Food aid also allowed Australia to expand its foreign aid program to Indonesia rapidly after 1966, in support of the government of new President Soeharto and improved bilateral relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the changing geo-political situation in the Asia-Pacific Region from an Australian defense policy perspective. The article focuses on China, the US, and Indonesia and examines Australia's strategic defense needs for the coming decade. The paper concludes by laying out four strategic defense options for Australia, 1. maintaining the US alliance, 2. going back to "fortress Australia," 3. towards Asian integrations, and 4. the "New Zealand" option. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Indonesia's vulnerability to climate change, and her position in the global climate change mitigation effort as a significant emitter with large potential for reducing emissions from forestry. It highlights the scope for Australia and Indonesia—both large emitters, one a developed country and potential buyer of emissions permits, the other a developing country and potential seller of per-mits—to play complementary roles in the global effort. The discussion outlines ways in which the two countries can cooperate with each other and with regional neighbours in mitigation initiatives and climate change adaptation. It suggests that their efforts could serve as a model for cooperation between developed and developing countries. The paper notes that the current global financial crisis is a short-term problem, while climate change has its effects over the long term. The recessionary effect of the financial crisis is not a good reason for delaying climate change mitigation efforts by Indonesia and other countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the Japanese position on East Timor and highlights tension in bilateral relations between Australia and Japan on East Timor during the year 1999. The sources of tension were over leadership, appropriate policy towards indonesia and the style of diplomacy conducted by Australia. In many respects the tension over East Timor shook complacency in bilateral relations. By January 2001 tension was resolved and bilateral ties have been strengthened in the areas of security and regional cooperation. What does this episode reveal about the bilateral relationship? Quite clearly, and despite the depth of networks that have been established over the decades, there was insufficient consultation on East Timor. In pan, the extraordinary events that unfolded after the results of the ballot in East Timor were announced on 4 September 1999 and Australia's leadership role in the international Force in East Timor (INTERFET) can explain the lack of consultation. Also, a drift in relations that had been evident for several years was a significant factor. Finally, the paper argues that despite the substantial improvement in bilateral relations, policy towards Indonesia will remain a potential source of friction between the two countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The community of Tenganan in eastern Bali, Indonesia, has requested technical assistance from Engineers Without Borders Australia (EWB) to improve the quantity and quality of water delivered through their water supply system. This is a unique development project in which the Tenganan people have identified their own needs and developed their own conceptual solution to the problem. For the first time, EWB is undertaking the design phase for the water system by an offshore design team and project assistance team (PAT) based in Australia. This allows EWB to draw on resources and experience of EWB members and their employing companies in Australia. It also enables young engineers to develop skills and experience in development work without having to leave the country. However, the innovative approach also presented significant challenges to the project members, particularly in establishing appropriate design criteria and the co-ordination of simultaneous activities across Australia. This paper describes the approach taken by EWB and makes a preliminary assessment of the benefits and limitations inherent in this approach. The overall aim of the project is to produce a successful "bottom-up" development action that will deliver a sustainable solution to the Tenganan community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From 1958 onwards, the Amsterdam–Jakarta dispute on the determination of sovereignty over the western half of New Guinea began to be affected by the developments of Indonesia's civil war and the tug of war between the US and the Soviet Union over Indonesia. This paper explains how this influenced Australia's WNG diplomacy. It argues that the major impact of Indonesia's internal war and of the US–Russian tug of war was that they destroyed Australia's assumption that the Dutch would maintain its presence in the Pacific permanently. The second principal impact was that Indonesia's internal war and the Washington–Moscow tug of war urged Canberra to set another new objective in relation to the WNG dispute, and produced a new policy for the achievement of this objective. With the outbreak of an Indonesian–Dutch war over Netherlands New Guinea becoming a real possibility, Australia set the avoidance of the war and the prevention of Indonesia falling into the communist orbit as another new objective. In order to keep a war from occurring in the Southwest Pacific, Canberra developed a policy of appeasing Jakarta. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In September 2000 the Australian government declassified thousands of pages of documents concerning the Indonesian invasion and annexation of East Timor in 1975. Some 68,000 pages of documents were released. About 2,600 pages of diplomatic documents were withheld, along with Cabinet papers, intelligence materials, and Defence Department records. The documents cover only the period from early 1974 to mid-1976 and do not document the Indonesian war and its human costs. What they do document is the process whereby Australia acquiesced in the Indonesian annexation of East Timor. Above all, they show that secret briefings by the Indonesians kept the Australian government closely informed of Indonesian intentions and operations at every step. In the light of these secret briefings and related documents, it is clear that Prime Minister Gough Whitlam's claim that he wanted to see a "genuine act of self-determination" by the East Timorese is and always was hollow. This was a fig leaf covering his desire to see East Timor incorporated into Indonesia as West Papua had been in the 1960s. Its patina of moral responsibility and legal respectability were his alibi or, as Richard Woolcott put it in late 1974, "escape clause," if and when Indonesian actions led to accusations of Australian complicity with Jakarta. Mr. Whitlam was complicit. The record is clear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]