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There are a variety of reasons for which one might claim an exemption from a public health mandate such as a required COVID-19 vaccine. Good-faith exemption requests—for medical, religious, or other reasons—are generally recognized as legitimate and granted to individuals when the imposition of the mandate on the requestor is perceived to outweigh the corresponding risk their lack of vaccination poses to the health and rights of others. This paper develops a method of analysis rooted in Western analytic philosophy designed to examine these issues and arrive at a framework for assessing the scientific, moral, and religious claims for exemptions from COVID-19 vaccinations. I argue that some empirical and moral beliefs are epistemically superior to others when they have a correspondence with agreed-upon facts about the world, are grounded in shared human experience, employ strong and substantive reasons for their claims, and embrace common convictions evidenced in the character of moral agents. Such facts must be demonstrable in the form of observably verifiable evidence and reliable testimony. Only then should a request for an exemption to an otherwise-required public health mandate (including a vaccine) be recognized. The alternative creates various difficulties, including the problem of moral arbitrariness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On March 9, 2020, Italy has gone into "lockdown" because of COVID-19 pandemic, with a national quarantine. All non-essential working activities and schools of all levels have been temporarily closed: consequently, the entire population have been forced to dramatically change their daily habits. The pandemic raised important psychological, moral, social, and economic issues. Our research focused on the moral decision-making of people during an emergency. This paper reports two studies. The aim of Study 1 was to evaluate moral decision-making, level of perceived stress, ability of mentalizing and empathy in university students and Italian workers. 224 front-line workers (FLW), 413 second-line workers (SLW), and 663 university students (US), during Italian Phase 1 of lockdown, completed an online questionnaire. The results of Study 1 showed that participants in the FLW group are more likely to choose utilitarian solutions and judge as morally acceptable actions finalized to saving lives of more people if this requires sacrificing a low number of individuals. At the same time, decision-making was experienced as less unpleasant and less arousing with respect to the other two groups, demonstrating a greater ability to keep emotional control under pressure. In Study 2, we compared the same variables used in Study 1, selecting two professional categories from the FLW group engaged in emergency during COVID-19, namely healthcare providers (n = 82) and public safety personnel (n = 117). Our results showed that healthcare providers were more stressed and emotionally involved than public safety personnel, with higher empathic concern and arousal in moral decision-making. We suggest it is essential providing immediate psychological support and monitoring physical and emotional well-being for workers in the front-line during emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, in order to prevent experiences of moral distress or mental health problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is predicated on the understanding that clinical encounters between clinicians and patients should be seen primarily as inter-relations among persons and, as such, are necessarily moral encounters. It aims to relocate the discussion to be had in challenging medical decision-making situations, including, for example, as the end of life comes into view, onto a more robust moral philosophical footing than is currently commonplace. In our contemporary era, those making moral decisions must be cognizant of the existence of perspectives other than their own, and be attuned to the demands of inter-subjectivity. Applicable to clinical practice, we propose and justify a Habermasian approach as one useful means of achieving what can be described as dialogic consensus. The Habermasian approach builds around, first, his discourse theory of morality as universalizable to all and, second, communicative action as a cooperative search for truth. It is a concrete way to ground the discourse which must be held in complex medical decision-making situations, in its actual reality. Considerations about the theoretical underpinnings of the application of dialogic consensus to clinical practice, and potential difficulties, are explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How moral decision-making occurs, matures over time and relates to behaviour is complex. To develop a full picture of moral decision-making, moral development and moral behaviour it is necessary to understand: (a) how real-time moral decisions are made (including relevant social and contextual factors), (b) what processes are required to develop to enable mature moral decisions, (c) how these processes develop over time, and (d) how moral decisions relate to behaviour. In this paper, psychological and social neuroscience theories of moral decision-making and development are briefly reviewed, as is the development of relevant component processes. Various component processes and factors are seen as required for moral decision-making and development, yet there is no comprehensive framework incorporating these components into one explanation of how real-time moral decisions are made and mature. In this paper, we integrated these components into a new framework based on social information processing (SIP) theory. Situational factors, and how both cognitive and affective processes guide moral decisions was incorporated into the Social Information Processing-Moral Decision-Making (SIP-MDM) framework, drawing upon theories and findings from developmental psychology and social neuroscience. How this framework goes beyond previous SIP models was outlined, followed by a discussion of how it can explain both real-time moral decisions and moral development. We concluded with how the SIP-MDM framework could be used to guide future research and theory development in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the ever-increasing presence of artificial intelligence in the public's day to day lives, the issues surrounding this rapidly growing technology are also growing. Specifically, moral and ethical issues are at the forefront of society's concerns with artificial intelligence. While it might seem useful to survey people of all ages, economic status, countries, and genders for their concerns about artificial intelligence, if one is concerned for the future of AI, it may be better to survey and study the younger generations, the future developers of AI. Having grown up surrounded by smart technology and the beginnings of artificial intelligence, the relationship AI has with younger people will likely differ from their older counterparts. This paper will identify the methodology of surveying college age students on their familiarity and interest with artificial intelligence and present them with a collection of morally and ethically questions about AI in general, the use of AI in the workforce, the problems with black box communication between AI machines, and AI response in life-or-death situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discrete choice models (DCMs) for moral choice analysis will likely lead to erroneous model outcomes and misguided policy recommendations, as only some characteristics of moral decision-making are considered. Machine learning (ML) is recently gaining interest in the field of discrete choice modelling. This paper explores the potential of combining DCMs and ML to study moral decision-making more accurately and better inform policy decisions in healthcare. An interdisciplinary literature search across four databases – PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, and Arxiv – was conducted to gather papers. Based on the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic and Meta-analyses (PRISMA) guideline, studies were screened for eligibility on inclusion criteria and extracted attributes from eligible papers. Of the 6285 articles, we included 277 studies. DCMs have shortcomings in studying moral decision-making. Whilst the DCMs' mathematical elegance and behavioural appeal hold clear interpretations, the models do not account for the 'moral' cost and benefit in an individual's utility calculation. The literature showed that ML obtains higher predictive power, model flexibility, and ability to handle large and unstructured datasets. Combining the strengths of ML methods with DCMs has the potential for studying moral decision-making. By providing a research agenda, this paper highlights that ML has clear potential to i) find and deepen the utility specification of DCMs, and ii) enrich the insights extracted from DCMs by considering the intrapersonal determinants of moral decision-making. • Explores the potential of using machine learning for studying moral decision-making. • Using traditional choice models for moral choice analysis will likely lead to misleading insights. • Machine learning is gaining interest in the field of choice modelling. • Remains unclear how to combine both paradigms for studying moral decision-making. • A research agenda is being put forward for the field of health preference research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emotions play an important part in moral life. Within clinical ethics support (CES), one should take into account the crucial role of emotions in moral cases in clinical practice. In this paper, we present an Aristotelian approach to emotions. We argue that CES can help participants deal with emotions by fostering a joint process of investigation of the role of emotions in a case. This investigation goes beyond empathy with and moral judgment of the emotions of the case presenter. In a moral case deliberation, the participants are invited to place themselves in the position of the case presenter and to investigate their own emotions in the situation. It is about critically assessing the facts in the case that cause the emotion and the related (moral) thoughts that accompany the emotion. It is also about finding the right emotion in a given situation and finding the right balance in dealing with that emotion. These steps in the moral inquiry give rise to group learning. It is a process of becoming open towards the perspectives of others, leading to new insights into what is an appropriate emotion in the specific situation. We show how this approach works in moral case deliberation. A physician presents a situation in which he is faced with a pregnant woman who is about to deliver multiple extremely premature infants at the threshold of viability. The moral deliberation of the case and the emotions therein leads to the participants' conclusion that 'compassion' is a more adequate emotion than 'sadness'. The emotion 'sadness' is pointed towards the tragedy that is happening to the woman. The emotion 'compassion' is pointed towards the woman; it combines consideration and professional responsibility. Through the shift towards compassion, participants experienced more creativity and freedom to deal with the sad situation and to support the woman. The paper ends with an analysis and reflection on the deliberation process. In the conclusion we argue for more attention to emotions in clinical ethics support and offer some directions for doing this in the right way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past decade, research on the dark triad of personality (Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy) has demonstrated a strong relationship to a number of socially aversive moral judgments such as sacrificial utilitarian decisions in moral dilemmas. This study widens the scope of this research program and investigates the association between dark triad personality traits and anti-natalist views, i.e., views holding that procreation is morally wrong. The results of this study indicate that the dark triad personality traits of Machiavellianism and psychopathy are strongly associated with anti-natalist views. Further, depression is found to be both standing independently in a relationship with anti-natalist views as well as functioning as a mediator in the relationships between Machiavellianism/psychopathy and anti-natalist views. This pattern was replicated in a follow-up study. These findings add to the literature on dark triad personality traits and their relationship to moral judgments, suggesting that personality and mood play a substantive part in variation in anti-natalist views in a lay population. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A wide range of decision-making models have been offered to assist in making ethical decisions in the workplace. Those that are based on normative moral frameworks typically include elements of traditional moral philosophy such as consequentialist and/or deontological␣ethics. This paper suggests an alternative model drawing on Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialism. Accordingly, the model focuses on making decisions in full awareness of one’s freedom and responsibility. The steps of the model are intended to encourage reflection of one’s projects and one’s situation and the possibility of refusing the expectations of others. A case study involving affirmative action in South Africa is used to demonstrate the workings of the model and a number of strengths and weaknesses are identified. Despite several weaknesses that can be raised regarding existential ethics, the model’s success lies in the way that it reframes ethical dilemmas in terms of individual freedom and responsibility, and in its acceptance and analysis of subjective experiences and personal situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the "Dual-Process theory", morality is characterized by the interaction between an automatic-emotional process, mediated by the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) and linked to personal-deontological decisions, and a rational-conscious one, mediated by the Dorso-Lateral Prefrontal Cortex (DLPFC) and linked to impersonal-utilitarian decisions. These areas are altered by chronic use of cocaine, with a possible impact on moral decision-making. To evaluate the difference between a group of Cocaine Use Disorder (CUD) patients and a control group in moral decision-making. Subjects with CUD were compared to an equal-sized healthy group regarding their moral decision-making. Trolley and Footbridge Moral Dilemmas were administered to each group. The quality of the answer (yes or no) and the time needed to answer were recorded. The recruited group includes 72 subjects, 36 with CUD and 36 healthy subjects (average age of 39.51 ± 9.89). In the Trolley dilemma, almost all the subjects (97.3%) answered "yes", while in the Footbridge dilemma CUD subjects answered "yes" more often (52.7%) than the healthy group (19.4%). For strong emotional dilemmas (Footbridge), cocaine users answered "yes" with a higher frequency compared to healthy subjects, highlighting a wider utilitarian tendency in decision-making and a poor emotional participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has found that those who are more psychopathic are more supportive of the actions that harm others to maximize the outcomes. This might be because the more psychopathic: 1) care more about the consequences; 2) care less about the "no harm" norms; 3) prefer action more often than inaction irrespective of consequences and norms. These possibilities are claimed to be dissociated by the so-called CNI model. We aimed to address the limitations of the CNI model by using an alternative algorithm that algebraically generates the probabilities of consequence sensitivity, norm sensitivity, and overall action bias; the CAN algorithm for short. We applied the CAN algorithm and reanalyzed the raw data from four previous studies. The results demonstrated some new findings. People who are more psychopathic have more overall action bias, have stronger inaction and action preferences opposite to the requirements of norms and consequences, and have weaker inclinations to follow moral principles. Perceived societal standards, rather than personal standards, can alleviate the positive effects of psychopathy on overall action bias and action preference opposite to norms and consequences. The present study clarified and deepened our insights into the relationship between psychopathy and moral decisions. Theoretical and methodological implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A moral crisis poses significant challenges to the success and sustainable development of a corporation. In this context, managers' moral decision-making becomes paramount. Managers' moral choices and actions directly impact the corporation's ability to effectively address these crises, ultimately shaping its outcomes and prospects. This study employs the extended theory of planned behavior (TPB) as a theoretical framework to explore the determinants that influence the moral decision-making process of managers. Specifically, the study introduces two new variables, namely, moral climate and moral self-efficacy, to enrich the existing theory. By employing structural equation modeling (SEM), the study examines the interrelationships among moral attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, moral intentions, moral decision-making, and the two new variables. The research findings provide compelling evidence that both moral climate and moral self-efficacy have a substantial impact on the moral decision-making process of managers. Notably, moral self-efficacy emerges as a mediating variable in the relationship between moral climate and moral intention. The findings of this study hold significant value for the development of moral decision-making models and the theory of planned behavior, with practical implications that can assist organizations in achieving sustainable growth and success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 'Other' can be near to us, or far from us. We are in-relation with both. Given that, we explore whether, from a moral philosophical perspective, the 'near-other' is in tension with the 'far-other'. We argue that we find our relationship with the near-other through a transcendent metaphysical empathy derived from the noumenon, which is manifest in the phenomenon as compassion and justice. We then argue that perceived differences in the phenomenon mean that we do not reliably transfer this empathy for the near-other, to the far-other. Further, empathic and constructive dialogue is made more difficult because of our proclivity to actively engage in 'othering' those not-like-us. Properly, moral decision-making is positioned in a space cognizant of the other. Near-otherness makes consensus in the decision-making process easier, while far-otherness makes consensus more difficult. In our post-modern, multicultural and multifaith era, we need to be alert to the other's perspective, to find a way to have a meaningful dialogue and thus achieve consensus in our moral decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The classification of clinical problems, such as AIDS, requires choices. Choices are made on epistemic (i.e., knowledge-based) and non-epistemic (i.e., action-based) grounds. That is, the ways in which we classify clinical problems, such as AIDS, involve a balancing of different understandings of clinical reality and of clinical values among participants of the clinical community. On this view, the interplay between epistemic and non-epistemic interests occurs within the embrace of particular clinical contexts. The ways in which we classify AIDS is the topic of this paper. We consider the extent to which we construct clinical reality; we examine a suggested classification of AIDS; and we conclude suggesting that the choice regarding how to classify AIDS is the result of negotiation among participants in the clinical community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Military ethics training has tended to focus on imparting ethical attitudes and on improving deliberative moral decision-making through classroom instruction. However, military personnel can be exposed to extreme conditions on operations, which can lead to heat-of-the-moment thinking. Under stress, individuals are more likely to engage in automatic processing than deliberative processing, and visceral states such as anger and disgust can increase a person's risk of behaving unethically. We propose that military ethics training could be improved by reinforcing classroom ethics training with interventions to counteract these risk factors. As training interventions, we recommend incorporating affect-labeling, goal-setting, and perspective-taking into realistic, pre-deployment training to make moral decision-making more robust against stress and other emotional experiences typical in combat. We outline steps researchers and trainers can take to test whether these interventions have the desired impact on ethical behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Older adults comprise the fastest-growing population in the United States. By exercising their right to vote, guiding the value systems of future generations, and holding political office, they shape the moral context of society. It is therefore imperative that we understand older adults' capacity for moral decision-making. Although the vast majority of research on moral decision-making has either focused specifically on younger adults or has not considered age, recent work points to age-related differences in sacrificial moral decision-making, with cognitively healthy older adults making more deontological decisions relative to younger adults. Although only a small number of studies have to date examined age-related differences, there is a wealth of relevant literature on cognitive aging, as well as on sacrificial moral decision-making in younger adults, that point to possible mechanistic explanations for the observed age-related differences. The goal of this review is to situate these age-related differences in sacrificial moral decision-making in the context of these existing literatures in order to guide future, theory-informed, research in this area. We specifically highlight age-related decline in cognitive abilities purported to support utilitarian moral decision-making in younger adults, along with age-related changes to socioemotional information processing as potential mechanistic explanations for these age-related differences. The last section of this review discusses how age-related neural changes may contribute to both cognitive decline and motivational shifts, highlighting the importance for future research to understand brain-behavior relationships on the topic of sacrificial moral decision-making and aging. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Two ecological and social versions of the Trolley-like Problem (a direct-impact [DI] and a no-direct-impact [NDI] scenario) were created to investigate moral decision-making and determine whether age, gender, and empathy significantly predicted people's choices. Two hundred and fifty-five participants were recruited in this study. We found that men and women made more Utilitarian Choices (UC) in the NDI scenario. In this scenario, the attribution of penalties was low (6%). In the DI scenario, we found that the UC rate was significantly reduced compared to the NDI scenario, and, surprisingly, women made more UC than men. We found that UC decreased as a function of men's affective empathy in the NDI scenario. In the DI one, lower affective empathy levels predicted UC differently for men and women. Lastly, the attribution of penalties tripled. In conclusion, this study highlighted the role played by scenarios, gender, and empathy in predicting UC in Trolley-like Problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the majority of moral decision-making research, we are asked to consider the action of someone we know little about—an anonymous actor. This is inconsistent with our everyday judgments of the actions of others. Here we test the novel prediction of whether actions are considered as comparably virtuous or malignant when performed by a good person, an immoral person, or the standard anonymous actor. Across four sets of experiments (nine studies in total), we show that the moral status of the actor contaminates peoples’ evaluations of the virtue of their actions. Even without ulterior motives, people do not judge good acts consistently across actors. We also discover a dose–response relationship where the more immoral the actor has been in the past—the less credit they are given for a good action in the present. This process does not occur for good people performing bad acts, however. Bad acts are bad regardless of who commits them. These results give new insights into the way people evaluate the behaviors of others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: The present systematic review investigates the psychological tools available for capturing high-stakes decisions involving life-death content and their psychometric properties. Valid measurement of these individual differences will provide crucial information in the personnel selection and training in fields where high-stakes moral issues exist (e.g., military, medicine). To our knowledge, this is the first systematic examination of such instruments. Methods: Systematic searches of 6 electronic databases were conducted according to the PRISMA guidelines. An appraisal tool evaluated the quality of identified measures. Twenty studies met pre-determined inclusion criteria. Moral decision-making was assessed with either a self-report scale (n = 3) or moral dilemmas (n = 17). Results: The findings identified two measures, the Defining Issues Test and the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale as psychometrically sound measures of moral decision-making. However, they are unlikely to be considered “gold standard” measures due to their theoretically specific, but limited, scope. Overall, the findings suggest that research in the area has been scattered. There is a lack of consensus on the definition of moral decision-making, and a lack of cross-validation on how differentmeasures ofmoral decision-making relate to each other. This presents a gap between theory and empiricalmeasurement in moral decision-making. Further work is needed for a unified conceptualization ofmoral decision-making to pave the way to both theory development and the development of well-validated measurement tools, and this review provides a critical foundation for both. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a deficiency of in-depth investigations of young people's moral decision-making during the coronavirus pandemic. The current article studies such decision-making with respect to socializing with peers, drawing on 44 interviews with Hungarian university students. The interviewed students overwhelmingly changed their socializing behavior because of the pandemic, however their concrete actions showed great differences. For some it was enough if they greeted their friends differently, and did not drink from their glasses, whilst for others greater changes were made in their former socializing habits. Based on their accounts, the following factors influenced their socializing: taking responsibility by not infecting others (concentrating on family members), conformity (alignment with friends' behavior), closeness of relationships, epidemiological restrictions and rules, and fatigue and growing familiar with the pandemic connected to the passage of time. Whilst research on decision-making during the pandemic has primarily been quantitative, we argue that this study illustrates how qualitative research can provide valuable input. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous studies have investigated moral decision‐making by using moral dilemmas that involve a single decision. This article extends this paradigm, introducing two‐stage scenarios to examine how moral decision‐making is influenced by previous decisions in the same narrative—especially whether people tend to stay consistent or to reconsider within a morally challenging situation. It further compares decision‐making between two‐stage and one‐stage scenarios. In Study 1 (N = 239), participants read scenarios requiring two successive decisions of harming one person to spare multiple people (utilitarian action), or vice versa (deontological action), within the same narrative. Second decisions were mostly found to be consistent with first decisions. Remarkably, inconsistent responding (switching) was robustly observed in about 29% of cases. Study 2 (N = 63), using one‐stage scenarios, showed that having made a previous decision in the same narrative generally decreased utilitarian responding. Potential explanations for these phenomena are discussed. The present article concludes that prior choices within the same setting significantly influence decision‐making. It also reveals the potential of gaining new insights using multiple‐stage scenarios in moral decision‐making research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do we form opinions about typical and morally acceptable behavior in other social groups despite variability in behavior? Similar learning problems arise during language acquisition, where learners need to infer grammatical rules (e.g., the walk/walk-ed past-tense) despite frequent exceptions (e.g., the go/went alternation). Such rules need to occur with many different words to be learned (i.e., they need a high type frequency). In contrast, frequent individual words do not lead to learning. Here, we ask whether similar principles govern social learning. Participants read a travel journal where a traveler observed behaviors in different imaginary cities. The behaviors were performed once by many distinct actors (high type frequency) or frequently by a single actor (low type frequency), and could be good, neutral or bad. We then asked participants how morally acceptable the behavior was (in general or for the visited city), and how widespread it was in that city. We show that an ideal observer model estimating the prevalence of behaviors is only sensitive to the behaviors' type frequency, but not to how often they are performed. Empirically, participants rated high type frequency behaviors as more morally acceptable more prevalent than low type frequency behaviors. They also rated good behaviors as more acceptable and prevalent than neutral or bad behaviors. These results suggest that generic learning mechanisms and epistemic biases constrain social learning, and that type frequency can drive inferences about groups. To combat stereotypes, high type frequency behaviors might thus be more effective than frequently appearing individual role models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Joshua Greene and his colleagues have proposed a dual-process theory of moral decision-making to account for the effects of emotional responses on our judgments about moral dilemmas that ask us to contemplate causing direct personal harm. Early formulations of the theory contrast emotional and cognitive decision-making, saying that each is the product of a separable neural system. Later formulations emphasize that emotions are also involved in cognitive processing. I argue that, given the acknowledgement that emotions inform cognitive decision-making, a single-process theory can explain all of the data that have been cited as evidence for Greene's theory. The emotional response to the thought of causing harm may differ in degree, but not in kind, from other emotions influencing moral decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Within moral psychology, theories focusing on the conceptualization and empirical measurement of people's morality in terms of general moral values -such as Moral Foundation Theory- (implicitly) assume general moral values to be relevant concepts for the explanation and prediction of behavior in everyday life. However, a solid theoretical and empirical foundation for this idea remains work in progress. In this study we explore this relationship between general moral values and daily life behavior through a conceptual analysis and an empirical study. Our conceptual analysis of the moral value-moral behavior relationship suggests that the effect of a generally endorsed moral value on moral behavior is highly context dependent. It requires the manifestation of several phases of moral decision-making, each influenced by many contextual factors. We expect that this renders the empirical relationship between generic moral values and people's concrete moral behavior indeterminate. Subsequently, we empirically investigate this relationship in three different studies. We relate two different measures of general moral values -the Moral Foundation Questionnaire and the Morality As Cooperation Questionnaire- to a broad set of self-reported morally relevant daily life behaviors (including adherence to COVID-19 measures and participation in voluntary work). Our empirical results are in line with the expectations derived from our conceptual analysis: the considered general moral values are poor predictors of the selected daily life behaviors. Furthermore, moral values that were tailored to the specific context of the behavior showed to be somewhat stronger predictors. Together with the insights derived from our conceptual analysis, this indicates the relevance of the contextual nature of moral decision-making as a possible explanation for the poor predictive value of general moral values. Our findings suggest that the investigation of morality's influence on behavior by expressing and measuring it in terms of general moral values may need revision. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social impairment in Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) has been linked to Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits. However, little research has investigated the relationship between ToM and moral decision-making in children with ASD. This study compared moral decision-making and ToM between aggregate-matched ASD and neurotypical boys (n = 38 per group; aged 6–12). In a third-party resource allocation task manipulating recipient merit, wealth, and health, neurotypical children allocated significantly more resources to the morally deserving recipient, suggesting equitable allocation. A comparatively larger portion of the ASD group allocated equally. ToM emerged as a predictor of moral decision-making. We suggest that ToM (cognitive empathy) deficits may underly atypical moral decision-making in ASD by limiting the integration of empathic arousal (affective empathy) with moral information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Past research showed that the ability to focus on one's internal states (e.g., interoceptive ability) positively correlates with the self-regulation of behavior in situations that are accompanied by somatic and/or physiological changes, such as emotions, physical workload, and decision-making. The analysis of moral oriented decision-making can be the first step for better understanding the legal reasoning carried on by the main players in the field, as lawyers are. For this reason, this study investigated the influence of the decision context and interoceptive manipulation on the moral decision-making process in the legal field gathering the responses of two groups of lawyers. A total of 20 lawyers were randomly divided into an experimental group (EXP), which was explicitly required to focus the attention on its interoceptive correlates, and a control group (CON), which only received the general instruction to perform the task. Both groups underwent a modified version of the Ultimatum Game (UG), where are presented three different moral conditions (professional, company, and social) and three different offers (fair, unfair, and equal). Results highlighted a significant increase of Acceptance Rate (AR) in those offers that should be considered more equal than fair or unfair ones, associated with a general increase of Reaction Times (RTs) in the equal offers. Furthermore, the interoceptive manipulation oriented the Lawyers toward a more self-centered decision. This study shows how individual, situational, contextual, and interoceptive factors may influence the moral decision-making of lawyers. Future research in the so-called Neurolaw field is needed to replicate and expand current findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Moral dilemma tasks have been a much appreciated experimental paradigm in empirical studies on moral cognition for decades and have, more recently, also become a preferred paradigm in the field of cognitive neuroscience of moral decision-making. Yet, studies using moral dilemmas suffer from two main shortcomings: they lack methodological homogeneity which impedes reliable comparisons of results across studies, thus making a metaanalysis manifestly impossible; and second, they overlook control of relevant design parameters. In this paper, we review from a principled standpoint the studies that use moral dilemmas to approach the psychology of moral judgment and its neural underpinnings. We present a systematic review of 19 experimental design parameters that can be identified in moral dilemmas. Accordingly, our analysis establishes a methodological basis for the required homogeneity between studies and suggests the consideration of experimental aspects that have not yet received much attention despite their relevance. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

This study investigated the influence of different emotions and social consensus on moral decision-making using a mixed 2 (emotion: positive, negative) × 2 (social consensus: high, low) experimental design. The results showed that the main effect of social consensus was significant: the moral decision-making level of participants under the condition of low social consensus was lower than that of participants under the condition of high social consensus, while no main effect of emotion emerged. Second, the results showed that emotion and social consensus have interactive effects on moral decision-making. When social consensus was high, there was no significant difference in moral decision-making between individuals with positive emotions and individuals with negative emotions. When social consensus was low, individuals with negative emotions were more likely to make immoral decisions than individuals with positive emotions. These results reveal that emotion and social consensus work together in affecting moral decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Coinciding with the recent psychological attention paid to the broad topic of wisdom, interest in the intellectual virtue of phronesis or practical wisdom has been burgeoning within pockets of psychology, philosophy, professional ethics, and education. However, these discourses are undercut by frequently unrecognized tensions, lacunae, ambivalences, misapplications, and paradoxes. While a recent attempt at conceptualizing the phronesis construct for the purpose of psychological measurement offers promise, little is known about how phronesis develops psychologically, what motivates it, or how it can be cultivated. Many psychologists aspire to make sense of wise thinking without the contextual, affective, and holistic/integrative resources of phronesis. This article explores some such attempts, in particular, a new "common model" of wisdom. We argue for the incremental value of the phronesis construct beyond available wisdom accounts because phronesis explains how mature decision-making is motivated and shaped by substantive moral aspirations and cognitively guided moral emotions. We go on to argue that, in the context of bridging the gap between moral knowledge and action, phronesis carries more motivational potency than wisdom in the "common model." The phronesis construct, thus, embodies some unique features that psychologists studying wise decision-making ignore at their peril. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the perspective of the Aristotelian notion of 'Form', the author explores the history of the concepts of mind and soul focusing on their ontologized version, as entertained by conventional science. He concludes that current neuroscience lacks the conceptual wherewithal required to deal with the meaning of mind and soul and with agential consequences such as free will and moral decision making. [GEB] [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On March 9, 2020, Italy has gone into “lockdown” because of COVID-19 pandemic, with a national quarantine. All non-essential working activities and schools of all levels have been temporarily closed: consequently, the entire population have been forced to dramatically change their daily habits. The pandemic raised important psychological, moral, social, and economic issues. Our research focused on the moral decision-making of people during an emergency. This paper reports two studies. The aim of Study 1 was to evaluate moral decision-making, level of perceived stress, ability of mentalizing and empathy in university students and Italian workers. 224 front-line workers (FLW), 413 second-line workers (SLW), and 663 university students (US), during Italian Phase 1 of lockdown, completed an online questionnaire. The results of Study 1 showed that participants in the FLW group are more likely to choose utilitarian solutions and judge as morally acceptable actions finalized to saving lives of more people if this requires sacrificing a low number of individuals. At the same time, decision-making was experienced as less unpleasant and less arousing with respect to the other two groups, demonstrating a greater ability to keep emotional control under pressure. In Study 2, we compared the same variables used in Study 1, selecting two professional categories from the FLW group engaged in emergency during COVID-19, namely healthcare providers (n = 82) and public safety personnel (n = 117). Our results showed that healthcare providers were more stressed and emotionally involved than public safety personnel, with higher empathic concern and arousal in moral decision-making. We suggest it is essential providing immediate psychological support and monitoring physical and emotional well-being for workers in the front-line during emergencies like the COVID-19 pandemic, in order to prevent experiences of moral distress or mental health problems.

The neuroscience interest for moral decision-making has recently increased. To investigate the processes underlying moral behavior, this research aimed to investigate neurophysiological and behavioral correlates of decision-making in moral contexts. Specifically, functional Near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) allowed to record oxygenated (O2Hb) and deoxygenated (HHb) cerebral hemoglobin concentrations during different moral conditions (professional fit, company fit, social fit) and offers types (fair, unfair, neutral). Moreover, individuals' responses to offers types and reaction time (RTs) were considered. Specifically, from hemodynamic results emerged a difference in O2Hb and HHb activity according to moral conditions and offers types in different brain regions. In particular, O2Hb increase and a HHb decrease were observed in ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (VMPFC, DLPFC) for fair offers in professional fit condition and in superior temporal sulcus (STS) for unfair offers in social fit condition. Moreover, an increase of left O2Hb activity in professional fit condition and in right VMPFC for unfair offers in company fit condition was observed. In addition, from behavioral results, an RTs increase in company and social fit condition for fair and unfair offers emerged. This study, therefore, shows the behavioral and neurophysiological correlates of moral decision-making that guide moral behavior in different context, such as company one. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When people must either save a greater number of people from a smaller harm or a smaller number from a greater harm, do their choices reflect a reasonable moral outlook? We pursue this question with the help of an experiment. In our experiment, two-fifths of subjects employ a similarity heuristic. When alternatives appear dissimilar in terms of the number saved but similar in terms of the magnitude of harm prevented, this heuristic mandates saving the greater number. In our experiment, this leads to choices that are inconsistent with all standard theories of justice. We argue that this demonstrates the untrustworthiness of distributive judgements in cases that elicit similarity-based choice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]