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The paper seeks answers to the puzzle, "How is that, in the face of an overwhelming scientific consensus that global warming is real, the advanced industrialized countries cannot agree on measures to deal with the problem?" The paper is guided by two intuitions: (1) national-level decision-making processes may foreclose mutually acceptable bargains between countries and (2) the ways international norms get framed may make getting on the agenda more likely but success at the decision stage less likely and The study concludes that the international arena’s early commitments froze in preferences that were too distant from those of important players in U.S domestic politics, both Congressional and larger societal (i.e. corporate interests). At the same time, as depicted by a simple spatial model, the preferences of European polities restricted the range of acceptable compromises that could be made, thus leaving the U.S. and its European allies at odds. Through the example of global warming, the paper also seeks to ascertain the gravity and significance of the foreign policy differences between the U.S. and its allies. Here, the argument emphasized the proxy nature of global warming as part of a larger European concern about U.S. unilateralism and diffidence. Implicitly, the paper favored the notion that the character of American hegemony matters for cooperation, and that the conflict with Europe over global warming and other issues may significantly undermine the capacity for Europe to cooperate with the U.S. on issues of interest to the Americans. Check author’s web site for an updated version of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the source and significance of the transatlantic divide between the U.S. and Europe. The paper examines several explanations such as Robert Kagan’s argument that American preferences for unilateralism and European preferences for multilateralism stem from underlying power positions. Drawing on John Ikenberry’s work, the essay notes that multilateralism is often a successful tool of great powers. The paper then considers Charles Kupchan’s argument that great powers inevitably decline. With Europe on the rise and eager to play a more dominant role, Kupchan suggests more conflict can be expected. As evinced by a widening cultural gap on issues such as the death penalty, Kupchan envisions strains in the transatlantic alliance that only conscientious policymakers can mute. While sympathetic to Kupchan’s argument, the essay takes issue with his assessment of European cohesiveness and the extent of the values gap. Through the analysis of climate change politics, the paper concludes that domestic political processes and institutional configurations undermine transatlantic cooperation and accentuate values differences, particularly on issues such as the use of force. Like Kupchan, the essay suggests that policymakers can mitigate these problems, but success will require appeals to respective domestic polities that compromises are necessary to further the common good. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]