Author: "Holland, Alisha C." / Language: english / Publication Year Range: Last 50 years / Region: santiago (chile) - Searchworks@Jio Institute Digital Library Search Results

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Start Over Author "Holland, Alisha C." Publication Year Range Last 50 years Language english Region santiago (chile)

Author: Holland, Alisha C.
Subjects: *LAW enforcement, *DISTRIBUTIVE justice, *ELECTIONS, *DEMOGRAPHIC characteristics, *GOVERNMENT policy, *SOCIAL history, *POLITICAL participation, COLOMBIAN politics & government, PERUVIAN politics & government, COLOMBIAN social conditions
Abstract: Why do some politicians tolerate the violation of the law? In contexts where the poor are the primary violators of property laws, I argue that the answer lies in the electoral costs of enforcement: Enforcement can decrease support from poor voters even while it generates support among nonpoor voters. Using an original data set on unlicensed street vending and enforcement operations at the subcity district level in three Latin American capital cities, I show that the combination of voter demographics and electoral rules explains enforcement. Supported by qualitative interviews, these findings suggest how the intentional nonenforcement of law, or forbearance, can be an electoral strategy. Dominant theories based on state capacity poorly explain the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Published: 2015
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Author: Holland, Alisha C.
Subjects: *RULE of law, *PUBLIC welfare, *SOCIAL services, *SOCIAL policy, *SOCIAL structure, COLOMBIAN politics & government
Abstract: Why do politicians tolerate the violation of the law? The conventional wisdom is that the weak rule of law reflects a weak state. This paper argues, in contrast, that enforcement depends on the electoral consequences. I develop the concept of forbearance, meaning intentional non-enforcement of law, and distinguish subtypes of forbearance based on their distributive incidence. When forbearance has economically progressive effects, I propose that politicians who represent poor constituents are more likely to forbear to provide informal social welfare and signal their commitments to the poor. However, substitute government social expenditures allow politicians to enforce, regardless of their electoral constituency, by boosting local welfare and attenuating class cues. I test the argument through an analysis of enforcement against unlicensed street vendors and squatters in two cities with varying electoral and social policy structures, Bogotá, Colombia and Santiago, Chile. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Published: 2010

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