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Post-Mao reforms ranging from de-collectivization to the abolition of agricultural taxes have eroded the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) control over the rural periphery. However, with an agenda to strengthen the CCP’s all-around control over the economy and society, the Xi Jinping era saw a reversal of the long-term trend. We argue that Xi’s high-profile anti-poverty campaign from 2015 to 2020 consisted of massive Party building attempts and served as an important strategy for the Party to repenetrate the rural periphery. Based on in-depth fieldwork, archival research, and secondary information sources, we show that by injecting human and financial resources into poverty regions, the CCP reinvigorated its previously underfunded and demoralized grassroots organs, expanded rural Party member recruitment, and enhanced the Party’s intervention in village affairs. Therefore, despite its seemingly economic nature, Xi’s anti-poverty campaign may lead to the long-lasting effect of Party power consolidation in the countryside. This finding suggests that authoritarian regimes can use campaigns with appealing policy goals to advance broader political agendas and enhance authoritarian resilience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's environmental crackdowns under Xi Jinping have led to a sweeping shutdown of private enterprises. To circumvent this, enterprises have developed different survival strategies including direct lobbying to government officials and indirect lobbying through business associations. Based on comparative case studies of environmental lobbying in Chinese cities, our research finds that larger enterprises, enjoying more economic leverage, tend to lobby directly using their own political connections to sway environmental enforcement. By contrast, smaller enterprises are excluded from these clientelist networks and have to lobby through business associations, the effectiveness of which hinges on the support of large enterprises. Therefore, we argue that although the Chinese government's increasingly stringent environmental policies have shrunk the lobbying (and living) space for private enterprises, the existence of environmental clientelism protects economically powerful and politically connected private enterprises but sacrifices the others in the implementation of environmental policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In autocracies facing widespread corruption, the allocation of the scant attention available for fighting corruption strongly affects corruption control. Although research has found that authoritarian regimes tend to fight corruption selectively, it is unknown whether and how autocracies allocate attention across different policy areas to combat corruption. We propose that single‐party authoritarian regimes can steer anticorruption attention to the policy domains prioritized by the central authority through the mechanism of cross‐organizational policy coordination. Using original datasets compiled from Chinese governmental and procuratorial policy papers from 1998 to 2016, we demonstrate that Chinese prosecutors direct anticorruption attention to the policy domains accentuated in the central government's major reforms. Our field interviews support this finding and reveal possible disruption of anticorruption efforts in policy domains falling off the central government's top list. Thus, we extend the research on political influence over anticorruption agencies and show that single‐party regimes can instrumentalize anticorruption to serve the government's policy agenda, driving the allocation of limited anticorruption attention across policy areas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Handbook on Local Governance in China: Structures, Variations, and Innovations is a comprehensive and timely contribution to the study of local governance in China. Edited by Ceren Ergenc and David S.G. Goodman, the book offers fresh insights and a holistic view of China's local institutional structures, cross-regional variations, and innovative practices. With an interdisciplinary approach and contributions from diverse fields, the handbook covers a wide range of topics including administrative structures, digital governance, environmental regulation, social inclusion, and grassroots corruption control. The chapters provide both literature reviews and empirical research, making it a valuable resource for scholars and policy analysts interested in Chinese governance. [Extracted from the article]

With China's continuous rise and growing external commercial, strategic, and political endeavours, questions have arisen about the motivation, timing, and locale of China's outreaching strategies. This research analyzes China's overseas port investments through a comparative study of Greece and Pakistan, two important partners of China's Belt and Road Initiative. Adopting the neoclassical realist framework and drawing on expert interviews, official statistics, and policy documents, this paper reveals how China's economic security objectives in combination with changing geopolitical structures led to its external port investments. This research contributes to the studies on rising powers and geopolitics by showing how China as a rising power capitalizes on geopolitical opportunities created by the changing interests of dominant powers to expand its presence in strategically important regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is widely assumed that authoritarian states tend to use repression to suffocate social conflicts that threaten regime stability. Focusing on the Chinese state's responses to resource conflict, a particular type of social conflict triggered by mineral resource extraction, this research argues that authoritarian regimes may prefer to use redistributive policies to defuse social unrest under certain circumstances. Through mixed methods combining qualitative research and statistical analysis, I find that local governments in resource-rich regions do not spend heavily on coercive state apparatus. Instead, they generously hand out social security benefits to appease aggrieved citizens. Furthermore, the Chinese state actively involves mining companies in the redistribution process and requires them to share the financial costs of relief policies. Therefore, when conflicts arise between specific social groups with conflicting interests, redistribution may be a more effective strategy to preserve regime stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the late 1970s, China's fiscal system has facilitated the initiation and implementation of economic reforms and greatly contributed to China's remarkable economic achievements. However, weaknesses of the fiscal system have been exposed that have aroused concerns about the weakening of state capacity. While many have discussed the loss of central fiscal control over localities under decentralization and its negative consequences, not enough attention has been paid to another major problem: the diffusion of fiscal power to nonfiscal government departments. In this article, I argue that the existence of the extra-budgetary system has granted ad hoc taxation power to nonfiscal departments and led to the mismanagement of fiscal revenue. Compared with the vertical diffusion of fiscal power, i.e., the devolution of fiscal authority from central to lower-level governments, the horizontal diffusion of fiscal power is more difficult to control and more detrimental to the institutionalization of China's fiscal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]