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The article discusses issues related to subjective powerlessness in the U.S. The paper focuses on changes since 1952 in citizen efficacy or feelings of control over government for various sub-groups in the U.S. population such as blacks, blue collar workers, Southerners, Jews, young and old people. As with most issues in the study of social change, there is widespread disagreement on trends in citizen efficacy for industrial societies such as the U.S. Most theory predicts trends in objective powerlessness, rather than subjective powerlessness, although it is possible that trends in objective powerlessness do not match trends in subjective powerlessness. Within the U.S. at each point of observation, powerlessness does not vary much by stratum, except when education and race are used as indicators. And within the white population, some of the differences are heavily explained by educational differentials. It therefore seems fair to conclude that white subordinate interest groups are not oriented toward government as a result of what would seem to be objective powerlessness but more on the basis of their educational achievement.

Since its first systematic treatment by Max Weber in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in the early twenties, the concept of charisma has been of only limited use to the social sciences. This is so because of fundamental disagreement concerning its meaning and application. In response to this, the present paper offers (1) a brief examination of Weber's contribution, (2) a critical analysis of this position based in part on the recent literature, and (3) a final formulation of the concept. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is required for understanding models of development is a combination of linguistic analysis and sociological analysis. It might well be that what is needed is nothing short of a combination of the logical skills of Wittgenstein and the sociological capacities of Weber. It would be presumptuous of me to claim to have effected such a synthesis. On the other hand, it would be ludicrous of all of us not to at least make an attempt to scale the heights. The word model is as slippery a concept as is currently in use by the social sciences. Even if we can settle on a formal definition of the word, namely, that a model is an isomorphic representation of objects that leads to an unmistakable identification of the expression of the object with the physical object, we are left with a host of substantive issues. There are at least three different fundamental meanings which attach to the term model—meanings which almost put the word in a different universe of discourse each time. First, model is used as a surrogate for levels, or an epistemological statement of how the world is carved up. Second, model is used as a surrogate for strategies. This entails the pragmatics of social change, or how one goes about carving a world up. Third, model is often used as a surrogate for theory, or how the explanation of changes in the world can best be made. What I should like to do here is provide at the outset a framework showing what is entailed in each of these types of models of development and then showing the implications of model-construction for social change. In this paper, I do not take my chore to be other than an accounting of the meaning of development at the macroscopic scale (rather than its microscopic details). Nor do I interpret my chore as a presentation of my own model, since this has been attempted elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The title of this study is that given to the review of a book in a recent issue of Commentary. It also refers to an important contemporary social movement, namely, mental illness. This is a movement that accords to irrationalism a constantly increasing respectability. An enormous increase in the kinds of conduct classified as irrational has resulted in the past few decades from the work of some of the most highly educated and intellectual students of human behavior. One corollary is a decrease in the kinds of behavior classified as rational. This has been accompanied by a violent attack upon the concepts of reason and individual responsibility, and by attempts to substitute the concepts of irresponsibility and exculpation. These attempts have been successful to a great degree. This paper will concern itself with two problems that mark this social movement. The first problem is that of definition and counting. The second is that of resolving the paradox of irrationalism. It would be tedious to summarize the studies of the past twentyfive years that show that the interest in mental illness is a social movement rather than a scientific development. One of the first, by Kingsley Davis, showed that it possesses a characteristic essential to any social movement. Its proponents conceive it to be a panacea. As a social movement it is in many respects the functional equivalent of religion in the system of traditional middle-class values. The movement is today continuing to propagate middle-class values and ethics under the guise of science. It presents the prototype of the middle-class or upper-class person as being in all important respects equivalent to that of the mentally healthy person. Thus it is not to be wondered at that when psychiatrists and other clinicians (who are professional and upper class ) interview and otherwise "examine" lower-class children, especially delinquent boys, they find that the boys are "emotionally disturbed" or "mentally ill" in some form and to some degree. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A genuinely sociological theory of social change is lacking, but the literature of the social sciences abounds with the elements of such a theory. The present paper deals with one of these elements, namely the change from tribalism to urbanism as a major instance of social change. For this purpose the concepts of culture and civilization are examined, and a plea is made to restore the concept of civilization to its rightful place in the vocabulary of sociologists and anthropologists. In doing this, the intention is not to reduce social change to the process of urbanization, but rather to isolate the sociological element which makes for social change within the supersession of a familial by a territorial society, wherever it occurs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]