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From 28 February to the end of March 2012, the Italian media reacted fiercely to the Giubilini and Minerva paper published in the Journal of Medical Ethics a few days earlier. The first article viewed the proposal as analogous to 'barbaric invasions', but in a first stage of the debate it could be seen as a case of the usual controversy between Catholics and secularists. Then emotive reactions prevailed and a flood of papers expressed strong opposition to 'infanticide'. The authors were even deemed insane; the fact that both are Italian certainly increased interest in the subject as well as surprise at their proposal, which some reckoned to be an insult to their 'national identity'. Even freedom of academic research and discussion was put in question, and defenders of free debate were accused of being supporters of the theory of infanticide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When writing about policy, do you think in green or white? If not, I recommend that you do. I suggest that writers and journal editors should explicitly label every policy ethics paper either 'green' or 'white'. A green paper is an unconstrained exploration of a policy question. The controversial 'After-birth abortion' paper is an example. Had it been labelled as 'green', readers could have understood what Giubilini and Minerva explained later: that it was a discussion of philosophical ideas, and not a policy proposal advocating infanticide. A serious policy proposal should be labelled by writer(s) and editor(s) as 'white'. Its purpose should be to influence policy. In order to influence policy, I suggest three essential, and two desirable, characteristics of any white paper. Most importantly, a white paper should be set in the context in which the policy is to be made and applied. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the growth and restructuring of the National Health Service (NHS). Impact of medical insurance and hospital independent revenues; Role of the NHS as the catalysts; Collaboration of top companies for better hospitals.

This is a response to Barutta and Vollmann's article ‘Physician-assisted death with limited access to palliative care.’ I show how they misconstrue a key empirical statement made by the European Association for Palliative Care regarding legalisation of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Additionally, I include some further remarks on the relationship between euthanasia and palliative care. I read with interest the article, which delineate well several positions and gives a nice overview of arguments presented on either side. I also found the line of argument unprejudiced and clear, and am sure people working within palliative care would benefit from reading it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this commentary we consider the validity of tobacco industry-funded research on the effects of standardised packaging in Australia. As the first country to introduce standardised packs, Australia is closely watched, and Philip Morris International has recently funded two studies into the impact of the measure on smoking prevalence. Both of these papers are flawed in conception as well as design but have nonetheless been widely publicised as cautionary tales against standardised pack legislation. Specifically, we focus on the low statistical significance of the analytical methods used and the assumption that standardised packaging should have an immediate large impact on smoking prevalence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Authors ore required to describe in their manuscripts ethical approval from an appropriate committee and how consent was obtained from participants when research involves human participants. Objective: To assess the reporting of these protections for several study designs in general medical journals. Design: A consecutive series of research papers published in the Annals of Internal Medicine, BMJ, JAMA, Lancet and The New England Journal of Medicine between February and May 2003 were reviewed for the reporting of ethical approval and patient consent. Ethical approval, name of approving committee, type of consent, data source and whether the study used data collected as part of a study reported elsewhere were recorded. Differences in failure to report approval and consent by study design, journal and vulnerable study population were evaluated using multivariable logistic regression. Results: Ethical approval and consent were not mentioned in 31% and 47% of manuscripts, respectively. 88 (27%) papers failed to report both approval and consent. Failure to mention ethical approval or consent was significantly more likely in oil study designs (except case-control and qualitative studies) than in randomised controlled trials (RCTs). Failure to mention approval was most common in the BMJ and was significantly more likely than in The New England Journal of Medicine. Failure to mention consent was most common in the BMJ and was significantly more likely than in all other journals. No significant differences in approval or consent were found when comparing studies of vulnerable and non-vulnerable Conclusion: The reporting of ethical approval and consent in RCTs has improved, but journals ore less good at reporting this information for other study designs. Journals should publish this information for all research on human participants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A letter to the editor is presented in response an article about the refusal of Nick Fremantle and colleagues to share raw data about weekend mortality effect in the September 12, 2015 issue.

Clinical practice and research are governed by distinct rules and regulations and have different approaches to, for example, consent and providing results. However, genomics is an example of where research and clinical practice have become codependent. The 100 000 genomes project (100kGP) is a hybrid venture where a person can obtain a clinical investigation only if he or she agrees to also participate in ongoing research-including research by industry and commercial companies. In this paper, which draws on 20 interviews with professional stakeholders involved in 100kGP, we investigate the ethical issues raised by this project's hybrid nature. While some interviewees thought the hybrid nature of 100kGP was its vanguard, interviewees identified several tensions around hybrid practice: how to decide who should be able to participate; how to determine whether offering results might unduly influence participation into wide-ranging but often as yet unknown research and how to ensure that patients/families do not develop false expectations about receiving results. These areas require further debate as 100kGP moves into routine healthcare in the form of the national genomic medicine service. To address the tensions identified, we explore the appropriateness of Faden et al.'s framework of ethical obligations for when research and clinical care are completely integrated. We also argue that enabling ongoing transparent and trustworthy communication between patients/families and professionals around the kinds of research that should be permitted in 100kGP will help to understand and ensure that expectations remain realistic. Our paper aims to encourage a focused discussion about these issues and to inform a new 'social contract' for research and clinical care in the health service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper starts by establishing a prima facie case that disadvantaged groups or individuals are more likely to get a chronic disease and are in a disadvantaged position to adhere to chronic treatment despite access through Universal Health Coverage. However, the main aim of this paper is to explore the normative implications of this claim by examining two different but intertwined argumentative lines that might contribute to a better understanding of the ethical challenges faced by chronic disease health policy. The paper develops the argument that certain disadvantages which may predispose to illness might overlap with disadvantages that may hinder self-management, potentially becoming disadvantageous in handling chronic disease. If so, chronic diseases may be seen as disadvantages in themselves, describing a reproduction of disadvantage among the chronically ill and a vicious circle of disadvantage that could both predict and shed light on the catastrophic health outcomes among disadvantaged groups-or individuals-dealing with chronic disease. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patient and public involvement (PPI) is important both in research and in quality improvement activities related to healthcare services . While PPI activities do not require formal ethical approval, they can raise a number of ethical concerns, through the introduction of complex technical medical concepts, challenging language or sensitive subject areas. There is very little published literature to guide ethical practice in this area. We have been conducting PPI with children and young people throughout a research study in paediatric palliative care. PPI started during the application process and continued to guide and shape the research as it progressed. Ethical issues can arise at any time in PPI work. Although many can be predicted and planned for, the nature of PPI means that researchers can be presented with ideas and concepts they had not previously considered, requiring reflexivity and a reactive approach. This paper describes how we considered and addressed the potential ethical issues of PPI within our research. The approach that emerged provides a framework that can be adapted to a range of contexts and will be of immediate relevance to researchers and clinicians who are conducting PPI to inform their work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies and contests the thesis it takes to be the central premise of Giubilini and Minerva, 'Why should the baby live?', namely that rights, subjecthood and personhood have as a necessary condition that the undergoing of a harm be experienced. That thesis entails the repugnant or absurd conclusion that we do not have the right not to be killed in our sleep. The conclusion can be avoided by adding some premise or qualification about actual capacities for experience of harm, but nothing in the Giubilini and Minerva article shows that such capacities do not exist, as actual and not merely potential, in the newly born human infant (and indeed in the unborn human child/foetus). The present paper reviews an earlier philosophical attempt to deploy an awareness criterion of personhood, and proposes objections to some other aspects of the article under consideration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sport, as a microcosm of society, is not immune to the abuse of its stakeholders. Attention to abuse in sport has recently become a priority for sport organisations following several high-profile cases of athlete abuse from different sports around the world. Resulting from this increased awareness, many sport organisations have commenced work in the field of athlete safeguarding including the development of policy, educational programmes, reporting pathways, investigation mechanisms and research initiatives. One mechanism adopted by many sport organisations to support their safeguarding efforts is the engagement of survivors of abuse in sport: typically, as guest speakers at conferences or educational events. Unfortunately, many sport organisations do not have the knowledge or trauma-informed expertise to engage survivors safely and effectively; and in doing so, may unintentionally retraumatise the survivor if erroneous methods of engagement are employed. For some survivors, this experience may compound the original harms, and thus it also represents an area of vulnerability for the organising entity. The purpose of this paper is to explore the rationale for partnering with survivors of abuse in sport in safeguarding initiatives and to propose a living conceptual framework to support effective and safe survivor engagement in safeguarding initiatives. We will explore the underpinning scientific background, as well as the 'why', and 'how' of survivor engagement to inform sport organisations, research scientists, policy-makers, conference organisers, safeguarding officers, sport medicine clinicians and survivors themselves. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I outline and explore some problems in the way that the Nuffield Council of Bioethics' report Public Health: Ethical Issues (2007) presents its 'Intervention Ladder'. They see the metaphor of a ladder both as capturing key normative priorities and as making a real and important contribution to ethical policymaking in public health. In this paper I argue that the intervention ladder is not a useful model for thinking about policy decisions, that it is likely to produce poor decisions and that it is incompatible with the report's stated approach to relevant public health policy values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conflict of interest arises by having two conflicting goals in one's research. The primary goal of research relevant to public health is to produce impartial evidence on health hazards for humans. Several entities -including industry - may have public health as a goal among others, but this is not their primary goal. Primary goals are in those cases profit or career, that conflict with the goal of health. It is a role of the State to foster research whose primary goal is impartial evidence on factors affecting population health. Disclosure of conflicts of interest is not enough: the view that disclosure solves all problems amounts to say that a declaration of having produced unbiased evidence is a self-fulfilling guarantee that the evidence will not be affected by conflicts of interest. This concept is seriously misleading. A conflict of interest arises from the circumstances in which research occurs and does not exist only in the opinion of some people or groups (or the authors of a paper). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

References to the 'natural' are common in public health messaging about breastfeeding. For example, the WHO writes that 'Breast milk is the natural first food for babies' and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has a breastfeeding promotion campaign called 'It's only natural', which champions breastfeeding as the natural way to feed a baby. This paper critically examines the use of 'natural' language in breastfeeding promotion by public health and medical bodies. A pragmatic concern with selling breastfeeding as 'natural' is that this may reinforce the already widespread perspective that natural options are presumptively healthier, safer and better, a view that works at cross-purposes to public health and medicine in other contexts. An additional concern is that given the history of breastfeeding in the USA, 'natural' evokes specific and controversial conceptions of gender and motherhood. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humanitarian organisations often work alongside those responsible for serious wrongdoing. In these circumstances, accusations of moral complicity are sometimes levelled at decision makers. These accusations can carry a strong if unfocused moral charge and are frequently the source of significant moral unease. In this paper, we explore the meaning and usefulness of complicity and its relation to moral accountability. We also examine the impact of concerns about complicity on the motivation of humanitarian staff and the risk that complicity may lead to a retreat into moral narcissism. Moral narcissism is the possibility that where humanitarian actors inadvertently become implicated in wrongdoing, they may focus more on their image as self-consciously good actors than on the interests of potential beneficiaries. Moral narcissism can be triggered where accusations of complicity are made and can slew decision making. We look at three interventions by Médecins Sans Frontières that gave rise to questions of complicity. We question its decision-guiding usefulness. Drawing on recent thought, we suggest that complicity can helpfully draw attention to the presence of moral conflict and to the way International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) can be drawn into unintentional wrongdoing. We acknowledge the moral challenge that complicity presents to humanitarian staff but argue that complicity does not help INGOs make tough decisions in morally compromising situations as to whether they should continue with an intervention or pull out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the demand for healthcare rises, so does the need for priority setting in healthcare. In this paper, I consider a prominent priority-setting principle: proportional shortfall. My purpose is to argue that proportional shortfall, as a principle, should not be adopted. My key criticism is that proportional shortfall fails to consider past health.Proportional shortfall is justified as it supposedly balances concern for prospective health while still accounting for lifetime health, even though past health is deemed irrelevant. Accounting for this lifetime perspective means that the principle may indirectly consider past health by accounting for how far an individual is from achieving a complete, healthy life. I argue that proportional shortfall does not account for this lifetime perspective as it fails to incorporate the fair innings argument as originally claimed, undermining its purported justification.I go on to demonstrate that the case for ignoring past health is weak, and argue that past health is at least sometimes relevant for priority-setting decisions. Specifically, when an individual's past health has a direct impact on current or future health, and when one individual has enjoyed significantly more healthy life years than another.Finally, I demonstrate that by ignoring past illnesses, even those entirely unrelated to their current illness, proportional shortfall can lead to instances of double jeopardy, a highly problematic implication. These arguments give us reason to reject proportional shortfall. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional male circumcision is a deeply entrenched cultural practice in South Africa. In recent times, there have been increasing numbers of botched circumcisions by untrained and unscrupulous practitioners, leading to genital mutilation and often, the need for penile amputation. Hailed as a world's first, a team of surgeons conducted the first successful penile transplant in Cape Town, South Africa in 2015. Despite the euphoria of this surgical victory, concerns about the use of this costly intervention in a context of severe resource constraints have been raised. In this paper, we explore some of the ethical implications of penile transplants as a clinical and public health response to the adverse consequences of traditional male circumcision. Given the current fiscal deficits in healthcare and public health sectors, how can one justify costly, high-technology interventions for conditions affecting a small section of the population? Since botched traditional male circumcisions are preventable, is a focus on penile transplantation as a form of treatment reasonable? Finally, do such interventions create undue expectations and false hope among a highly vulnerable and stigmatised group of young men? In this paper, we argue that given limited healthcare resources in South Africa and competing healthcare needs, prevention is a more appropriate response to botched traditional circumcisions than penile transplants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers and bioethicists are typically sceptical about invocations of dignity in ethical debates. Many believe that dignity is essentially devoid of meaning: either a mere rhetorical gesture used in the absence of good argument or a faddish term for existing values like autonomy and respect. On the other hand, the patient experience of dignity is a substantial area of research in healthcare fields like nursing and palliative care. In this paper, it is argued that philosophers have much to learn from the concrete patient experiences described in healthcare literature. Dignity is conferred on people when they are treated as having equal status, something the sick and frail are often denied in healthcare settings. The importance of equal status as a unique value has been forcefully argued and widely recognised in political philosophy in the last 15 years. This paper brings medical ethics up to date with philosophical discussion about the value of equal status by developing an equal status conception of dignity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I reply to Tony Hope's response to my non-identity paper, aiming to clarify the nature of my objections, and also to address, briefly, Hope's suggestion that the implications of my view are that any book written for a lay audience ought to seek to present a 'balanced overview'. Essentially, I suggest that there may be a pro tanto consideration in favour of such an approach, but this would only be one consideration, to be weighed against competing considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I focus on a kind of medical intervention that is at the same time fascinating and disturbing: identity-changing interventions. My guiding question is how such interventions can be ethically justified within the bounds of contemporary bioethical mainstream that places great weight on the patient's informed consent. The answer that is standardly given today is that patients should be informed about the identity effects, thus suggesting that changes in identity can be treated like 'normal' side effects. In the paper, I argue that this approach is seriously lacking because it misses important complexities going along with decisions involving identity changes and consequently runs into mistakes. As a remedy I propose a new approach, the 'perspective-sensitive account', which avoids these mistakes and thus provides the conceptual resources to systematically reflect on and give a valid consent to identity-changing interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We respond in this paper to various counter arguments advanced against our stance on conscientious objection accommodation. Contra Maclure and Dumont, we show that it is impossible to develop reliable tests for conscientious objectors' claims with regard to the reasonableness of the ideological basis of their convictions, and, indeed, with regard to whether they actually hold they views they claim to hold. We demonstrate furthermore that, within the Canadian legal context, the refusal to accommodate conscientious objectors would not constitute undue hardship for such objectors. We reject concerns that refusing to accommodate conscientious objectors would limit the equality of opportunity for budding professionals holding particular ideological positions. We also clarify various misrepresentations of our views by respondents Symons, Glick and Jotkowitz, and Lyus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An analogy is sometimes drawn between the proper treatment of conscientious objectors in healthcare and in military contexts. In this paper, I consider an aspect of this analogy that has not, to my knowledge, been considered in debates about conscientious objection in healthcare. In the USA and elsewhere, tribunals have been tasked with the responsibility of recommending particular forms of alternative service for conscientious objectors. Military conscripts who have a conscientious objection to active military service, and whose objections are deemed acceptable, are required either to serve the military in a non-combat role, or assigned some form of community service that does not contribute to the effectiveness of the military. I argue that consideration of the role that military tribunals have played in determining the appropriate form of alternative service for conscripts who are conscientious objectors can help us to understand how conscientious objectors in healthcare ought to be treated. Additionally, I show that it helps us to address the vexed issue of whether or not conscientious objectors who refuse to provide a service requested by a patient should be required to refer that patient to another healthcare professional. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ethics of health incentive research-a form of public health research-are not well developed, and concerns of justice have been least examined. In this paper, we explore what potential long term harms in relation to justice may occur as a result of such research and whether they should be considered as part of its ethical evaluation. 'Long term harms' are defined as harms that contribute to existing systematic patterns of disadvantage for groups. Their effects are experienced on a long term basis, persisting even once an incentive research project ends. We will first establish that three categories of such harms potentially arise as a result of health incentive interventions. We then argue that the risk of these harms also constitutes a morally relevant consideration for health incentive research and suggest who may be responsible for assessing and mitigating these risks. We propose that responsibility should be assigned on the basis of who initiates health incentive research projects. Finally, we briefly describe possible strategies to prevent or mitigate the risk of long term harms to members of disadvantaged groups, which can be employed during the design, conduct and dissemination of research projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Financial incentives may provide a way of reducing the burden of chronic diseases by motivating people to adopt healthy behaviours. While it is still uncertain how effective such incentives could be for promoting health, some argue that, even if effective, there are ethical objections that preclude their use. One such argument is made by Michael Sandel, who suggests that monetary transactions can have a corrupting effect on the norms and values that ordinarily regulate exchange and behaviour in previously non-monetised contexts. In this paper, I outline Sandel's corruption argument and consider its validity in the context of health incentives. I distinguish between two forms of corruption that are implied by Sandel's argument: efficiency corruption and value corruption While Sandel's thought-provoking discussion provides a valuable contribution to debates about health policies generally and health incentives specifically, I suggest the force of his criticism of health incentives is limited: further empirical evidence and theoretical reasoning are required to support the suggestion that health incentives are an inappropriate tool for promoting health. While I do not find Sandel's corruption argument compelling, this only constitutes a partial defence of health incentives, since other criticisms relating to their use may prove more successful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his classic paper, 'Why abortion is immoral', Don Marquis argues that what makes killing an adult seriously immoral is that it deprives the victim of the valuable future he/she would have otherwise had. Moreover, Marquis contends, because abortion deprives a fetus of the very same thing, aborting a fetus is just as seriously wrong as killing an adult. Marquis' argument has received a great deal of critical attention in the two decades since its publication. Nonetheless, there is a potential challenge to it that seems to have gone unnoticed. A significant percentage of fetuses are lost to spontaneous abortion. Once we bring this fact to our attention, it becomes less clear whether Marquis can use his account of the wrongness of killing to show that abortion is the moral equivalent of murder. In this paper, I explore the relevance of the rate of spontaneous abortion to Marquis' classic anti-abortion argument. I introduce a case I call Unexpected Death in which someone is about to commit murder, but, just as the would-be murderer is about to strike, his would-be victim dies unexpectedly. I then ask: what does Marquis' account of killing imply about the moral status of what the would-be murderer was about to do? I consider four responses Marquis could give to this question, and I examine what implications these responses have for Marquis' strategy of using his account of the wrongness of killing an adult to show that abortion is in the same moral category. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents arguments for two claims. First, post-persons, beings with a moral status superior to that of mere persons, are possible. Second, it would be bad to create such beings. Actions that risk bringing them into existence should be avoided. According to Allen Buchanan, it is possible to enhance moral status up to the level of personhood. But attempts to improve status beyond that fail for want of a target - there is no category of moral status superior to that of personhood. Buchanan presents personhood as a threshold. He allows that persons may succeed in enhancing their cognitive and physical powers but insists that they cannot enhance their moral status. I argue that it is an implication of accounts that make a cognitive capacity, or collection of such capacities, constitutive of moral status, that those who do not satisfy the criteria for a given status find these criteria impossible to adequately describe. This obstacle notwithstanding, I offer an inductive argument for the existence of moral statuses superior to personhood, moral statuses that are necessarily beyond human expressive powers. The second part of this paper presents an argument that it is wrong to risk producing beings with moral status higher than persons. We should look upon moral status enhancement as creating especially morally needy beings. We are subject to no obligation to create them in the first place. We avoid creating their needs by avoiding creating them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In two recent papers, Hugh McLachlan, Jacob Busch and Raffaele Rodogno have criticised my new perspective on euthanasia. Each paper analyses my argument and suggests two flaws. McLachlan identifies what he sees as important points regarding the justification of legal distinctions in the absence of corresponding moral differences and the professional role of the doctor. Busch and Rodogno target my criterion of brain life, arguing that it is a necessary but not sufficient condition and that it is not generalisable. In this paper I indicate flaws in all of these criticisms, and again suggest that my perspective does add something new to the debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Theoretical and empirical research in bioethics frequently focuses on ethical dilemmas or problems. This paper draws on anthropological and phenomenological sources to develop an alternative framework for bioethical enquiry that allows examination of a broader range of how the moral is experienced in the everyday lives of individuals and groups. Our account of moral experience is subjective and hermeneutic. We define moral experience as "Encompassing a person's sense that values that he or she deem important are being realised or thwarted in everyday life. This includes a person's interpretations of a lived encounter, or a set of lived encounters, that fall on spectrums of right-wrong, good-bad or just-unjust". In our conceptualisation, moral experience is not limited to situations that are heavily freighted with ethically-troubling ramifications or are sources of debate and disagreement. Important aspects of moral experience are played out in mundane and everyday settings. Moral experience provides a research framework, the scope of which extends beyond the evaluation of ethical dilemmas, processes of moral justification and decision-making, and moral distress. This broad research focus is consistent with views expressed by commentators within and beyond bioethics who have called for deeper and more sustained attention in bioethics scholarship to a wider set of concerns, experiences and issues that better captures what is ethically at stake for individuals and communities. In this paper we present our conceptualisation of moral experience, articulate its epistemological and ontological foundations and discuss opportunities for empirical bioethics research using this framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Genomics provides information on genetic susceptibility to diseases and new possibilities for interventions which can fundamentally alter the design of fair health policies. The aim of this paper is to explore implications of genomics from the perspective of equal opportunity ethics. The ideal of equal opportunity requires that individuals are held responsible for some, but not all, factors that affect their health. Informational problems, however, often make it difficult to implement the ideal of equal opportunity in the context of healthcare. In this paper, examples are considered of how new genetic information may affect the way individual responsibility for choice is assigned. It is also argued that genomics may result in relocation of the responsibility cut by providing both new information and new technology. Finally, how genomics may affect healthcare policies and the market for health insurance is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper defends the acts/omissions distinction which underpins the present law on euthanasia, from various criticisms (including from within the judiciary itself), and aims to show that it is supported by fundamental principles. After rejecting arguments that deny the coherence and/or legal relevance of the distinction, the discussion proceeds to focus on the causal relationship between the doctor and the patient's death in each case. Although previous analyses, challenging the causal efficacy of omissions generally, are shown to be deficient, it is argued that in certain cases of causing death by omission the causal authorship of the doctor lapses. The final part of the paper examines why this should be morally significant and proposes an answer in terms of the principle of equality. Assuming all other factors are equal, the infringement of this principle provides an additional reason against actively killing a patient, which is not present in cases of passively letting die. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The development of human genetics raises a wide range of important ethical questions for us all. The interpersonal dimension of genetic information in particular means that genetics also poses important challenges to the idea of patient-centredness and autonomy in medicine. How ought practical ethical decisions about the new genetics be made given that we appear, moreover, no longer to be able to appeal to unquestioned traditions and widely shared communitarian values? This paper argues that any coherent ethical approach to these questions must be able both to uphold the moral status of the individual and at the same time recognise the communitarian, interpersonal dimensions both of the world in which we live and of personal autonomy itself The paper then goes on to propose an approach to the resolution of the ethical questions raised by the use of the new genetics in reproductive choice through the development of a coherent and principled process of public reason and justification oriented towards the support and development of personal autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore the ethics of subject selection in the context of biomedical research. I reject a key principle of what I shall refer to as the standard view According to this principle, investigators should select participants so as to minimise aggregate risk to participants and maximise aggregate benefits to participants and society. On this view, investigators should exclude prospective participants who are more susceptible to risk than other prospective participants. I argue instead that investigators should select subjects in accordance with an alternative principle: formal equality of opportunity. According to this principle, investigators must treat all prospective participants the same unless differential treatment is warranted by the scientific goals of the study or the need to promote participants' medically related interests. All prospective participants (1) who meet the scientifically defined eligibility criteria and (2) for whom participation is consistent with their medically related interests should have an equal, formal opportunity to participate in the study. Prospective participants should not be excluded simply because they are more susceptible to risk than others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the current state of right to refuse medical treatment in Turkey. Even though there are only a few studies carried out with Turkish physicians on their attitude towards the right to refuse treatment, I argue that recent studies on physicians' views on informed consent and honest disclosure show that Turkish physicians do not tend to recognise their patients' right to decline treatment. This is because the refusal of treatment crucially requires that patients be properly informed and asked for their consent before the treatment. Turkish physicians and healthcare providers' tendency to ignore the right to decline medical treatment cannot be separated from their paternalistic approach to patients and their rights. I argue that part of the problem is the legal framework, which, in essence, is still paternalistic. More specifically, the frequent appearance of the phrase 'medical necessity' in the relevant legislation is conveniently used to justify medical intervention against a patient's will. I conclude the paper by proposing reforms in the legal documents defining and regulating patient rights, including the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, and I will argue that these reforms will help enhance patient rights in Turkey. Turkey has been discussing a new Constitution for the past several years, so my proposal should best be understood as contributing to public discussion of the new Constitution by initiating debate about medical paternalism and patient autonomy in Turkish medicine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Clinicians and health researchers frequently encounter opportunities to rescue people. Rescue cases can generate a moral duty to aid those in peril. As such, bioethicists have leveraged a duty to rescue for a variety of purposes. Yet, despite its broad application, the duty to rescue is underanalysed. In this paper, we assess the state of theorising about the duty to rescue. There are large gaps in bioethicists' understanding of the force, scope and justification of the two most cited duties to rescue--the individual duty of easy rescue and the institutional rule of rescue. We argue that the duty of easy rescue faces unresolved challenges regarding its force and scope, and the rule of rescue is indefensible. If the duty to rescue is to help solve ethical problems, these theoretical gaps must be addressed. We identify two further conceptions of the duty to rescue that have received less attention--an institutional duty of easy rescue and the professional duty to rescue. Both provide guidance in addressing force and scope concerns and, thereby, traction in answering the outstanding problems with the duty to rescue. We conclude by proposing research priorities for developing accounts of duties to rescue in bioethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A notorious debate in the ethics of healthcare rationing concerns whether to address rationing decisions with substantial principles or with a procedural approach. One major argument in favour of procedural approaches is that substantial principles are indeterminate so that we can reasonably disagree about how to apply them. To deal with indeterminacy, we need a just decision process. In this paper I argue that it is a mistake to abandon substantial principles just because they are indeterminate. It is true that reasonable substantial principles designed to deal with healthcare rationing can be expected to be indeterminate. Yet, the indeterminacy is only partial. In some situations we can fully determine what to do in light of the principles, in some situations we cannot. The conclusion to draw from this fact is not that we need to develop procedural approaches to healthcare rationing, but rather that we need a more complex theory in which both substantial principles and procedural approaches are needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is about the moral status of those human beings who have profound intellectual disabilities (PIDs). We hold the common sense view that they have equal status to 'normal' human beings, and a higher status than any non-human animal. On the standard account of moral status, this view cannot be sustained. In this paper, we ask whether, in order to be justified in continuing to hold our view, we are obliged to offer an alternative account that does sustain it? Our answer is that we are not. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent article for this journal, Morten Magelssen argues that the right to conscientious objection in healthcare is grounded in the moral integrity of healthcare professionals, a good for both professionals and society. In this paper, I argue that there is no right to conscientious objection in healthcare, at least as Magelssen conceives of it. Magelssen's conception of the right to conscientious objection is too expansive in nature. Although I will assume that there is a right to conscientious objection, it does not extend to objections that are purely religious in nature. i Thus, this right is considerably more restricted than Magelssen thinks. In making my case, I draw on John Rawls's later work in arguing for the claim that conscientious objection based on purely religious considerations fails to benefit society in the appropriate way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a controversial paper, David Seedhouse argues that medical ethics is not and cannot be a distinct discipline with it own field of study. He derives this claim from a characterization of ethics, which he states but does not defend. He claims further that the project of medical ethics as it exists and of moral philosophy do not overlap. I show that Seedhouse's views on ethics have wide implications which he does not declare, and in the light of this argue that Seedhouse owes us a defence of his characterization of ethics. Further, I show that his characterization of ethics, which he uses to attack medical ethics, is a committed position within moral philosophy. As a consequence of this, it does not allow the relation between moral philosophy and medical ethics to be discussed without prejudice to its outcome. Finally, I explore the relation between Seedhouse's position and naturalism, and its implications for medical epistemology. I argue that this shows us that Seedhouse's position, if it can be defended, is likely to lead to a fruitful and important line of inquiry which reconnects philosophy and medical ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often argued that the continuity of the processes of embryo development precludes the establishment of morally significant boundaries, once development is under way. These arguments typically claim that marking out any moral boundaries requires identifying particular significant events, and that in such circumstances this is either impossible or arbitrary. In this paper it is argued that arguments of this kind are not cogent. The paper concludes by indicating where the real problems lie. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This is the third of a series of four articles addressing ethical approaches and issues in undertaking clinical research with children and young people (CYP). This paper addresses the major ethical aspects of studies with CYP, where they vary from studies in adults. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Concerns that people would be disinclined to voluntarily undergo moral enhancement have led to suggestions that an incentivised programme should be introduced to encourage participation. This paper argues that, while such measures do not necessarily result in coercion or undue inducement (issues with which one may typically associate the use of incentives in general), the use of incentives for this purpose may present a taboo trade-off. This is due to empirical research suggesting that those characteristics likely to be affected by moral enhancement are often perceived as fundamental to the self; therefore, any attempt to put a price on such traits would likely be deemed morally unacceptable by those who hold this view. A better approach to address the possible lack of participation may be to instead invest in alternative marketing strategies and remove incentives altogether. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Julian Savulescu defends the principle of procreative beneficence, according to which parents have a prima facie moral obligation to choose the child with the best expected life. In this paper, I argue that Savulescu fails to show that procreative beneficence is genuinely obligatory, because of his equivocation between moral reason and moral obligation. Savulescu assumes that morality requires us to do what we have most (moral) reason to do, but many deny this, for instance because they believe we have reasons (but no obligation) to perform supererogatory actions. Even if parents have moral reasons to choose the child with the best expected life, they may not be under any obligation to do so. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In contemporary Japan, at least in the field of regenerative medicine, human induced pluripotent stem cells (hiPSCs) are given no moral status and are treated in a purely instrumental way. However, some authors have mentioned the potentiality of hiPSCs in that 'tetraploid complementation' would make it possible to create humans directly from human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) and hiPSCs. A blastocyst consists of inner cell mass (ICM) cells and a trophoblast. The tetraploid complementation technique demonstrates that hESCs and hiPSCs both have the same capacity as ICM cells. If ICM cells, hESCs and hiPSCs were all provided with a trophoblast or a substitute with the same function, which would work as a placenta, they would have the same potential to develop into embryos, fetuses and adult human beings. Thus hiPSCs could be regarded as potential humans. However, no authority or guideline in Japan has specifically considered the status and use of hiPSCs. In this paper, I will address the extent to which the existing recommendations apply to hiPSCs and develop a novel Japanese bioethical perspective on the status of hiPSCs and its implications for hiPSC research, based on the reasoning in the report, 'The fundamental way of thinking in treating the human embryo' presented by the Bioethics Committee of the Council for Science and Technology Policy in 2004, and broader consideration of Japanese culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The enhancement of human traits has received academic attention for decades, but only recently has moral enhancement using biomedical means -- moral bioenhancement (MB) -- entered the discussion. After explaining why we ought to take the possibility of MB seriously, the paper considers the shape and content of moral improvement, addressing at some length a challenge presented by reasonable moral pluralism. The discussion then proceeds to this question: Assuming MB were safe, effective, and universally available, would it be morally desirable? In particular, would it pose an unacceptable threat to human freedom? After defending a negative answer to the latter question -- which requires an investigation into the nature and value of human freedom -- and arguing that there is nothing inherently wrong with MB, the paper closes with reflections on what we should value in moral behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Animal use in medical research is widely accepted on the basis that it may help to save human lives and improve their quality of life. Recently, however, objections have been made specifically to the use of animals in scientific investigation of human obesity. This paper discusses two arguments for the view that this form of animal use, unlike some other forms of animal-based medical research, cannot be defended. The first argument leans heavily on the notion that people themselves are responsible for developing obesity and so-called 'lifestyle' diseases; the second involves the claim that animal studies of obesity's causes and therapies distract attention from preventive efforts. Drawing on both empirical data and moral reasoning, we argue that the relevant attributions of responsibility and claims about distraction are not plausible, and that, therefore, there is no reason to single out the use of animals in obesity research as especially problematic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]